Aryone Lymon v. Georgia Pacific ( 2021 )

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RENDERED: JUNE 17, 2021
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky
2020-SC-0411-WC
ARYONE LYMON APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V. NO. 2019-CA-1842
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD NO. WC-17-54578
GEORGIA PACIFIC; HONORABLE MONICA APPELLEES
RICE-SMITH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE; AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
BOARD
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Aryone Lymon appeals from the Court of Appeals’ decision upholding an
Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) dismissal of her workers’ compensation
claim. Lymon argues that the evidence was so overwhelming as to compel a
finding in her favor and that the ALJ failed to properly articulate the basis for
her decision. We disagree. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Aryone Lymon worked at a Georgia Pacific factory as a Dixie Cup
Machine Operator for approximately six months. She worked a normal twelve-
hour shift from 7:00 p.m. on December 1, 2017 until 7:00 a.m. on December 2,
2017. Lymon testified that during that shift one of her duties was to change
out twenty to thirty-pound rolls of paper on the bottom of the machines. The
machines converted rolls of paper into small paper cups. She had to roll the
paper from its rack to the machine and use a crank to lift the paper into
position on the machine. She testified that the cranks were often broken,
necessitating that she lift the roll with her right foot and hands a few inches to
its position on the machine. Lymon also stated that she typically had to try
two or three different rolls to find one that fit properly.
After her shift Lymon went home the morning of December 2, 2017 and
showered, ate and went to bed. When she awoke that afternoon she
immediately noticed a sharp pain in her right foot. While driving herself to
work that evening she experienced pain as though her foot was asleep. She
stated the pain was excruciating so she went to her sister’s house and her
sister took her to the emergency room.
Lymon’s emergency room records dated December 2 indicate that on that
date she complained of right leg numbness, pain in her right buttock radiating
down her right leg, and difficulty with mobility in her toes and leg. She stated
the symptoms began the day prior and had persisted for twenty-four hours or
more. She also denied any acute injury or trauma. In addition, she reported
injuring her fingers four days prior. Lymon was diagnosed with a pinched
nerve and released.
Lymon did not go to work that day and was off work the rest of the
weekend. The following Monday she began experiencing right leg weakness,
urinary incontinence and increasing low back pain. She went back to the
emergency room on December 5, 2017. An MRI revealed a herniated disc at
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L4-L5 ruptured with a sequestered fragment which compressed a nerve root
and caused cauda equina syndrome and right foot drop. The syndrome is a
rare disorder affecting a bundle of roots at the lower end of the spinal cord
called cauda equina.1 Nerve roots in the lumbar spine are compressed, which
is often caused by a severe ruptured disc.2 Cauda equina syndrome is difficult
to diagnose and may cause severe low back pain; pain, numbness or weakness
in the legs; and loss of sensation in the legs or feet.3
Lymon underwent emergency back surgery by Dr. Harry Lockstadt on
December 6, 2017 to remove the sequestered fragment at L4-L5. The surgery
resolved her urinary incontinence and improved her low back pain, but she still
experienced some weakness in her right foot. Lymon did not return to work for
Georgia Pacific after December 2, 2017. Although Lymon could not identify a
work event or work-related onset of symptoms, she believed that her work
activity in general on December 1-2 caused the disc herniation.
On January 17, 2018 Lymon filed a workers’ compensation claim
alleging she was injured within the scope and course of her employment. In
support of her claim Lymon filed medical questionnaires completed by Dr.
Lockstadt. Dr. Lockstadt stated that it is possible that cauda equina syndrome
can be caused by heavy lifting over a period of months, but unlikely.
Additionally, he acknowledged that cauda equina syndrome can manifest
1WebMD, Cauda Equina Syndrome Overview, https://www.webmd.com/back-
pain/guide/cauda-equina-syndrome-overview (last visited Apr. 27, 2021).
2 Id.
3 Id.
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without specific incident and that it can have many causes, including heavy
lifting. In a letter dated March 8, 2018, Dr. Lockstadt assessed a 13%
impairment rating but noted that the impairment could decrease to 10%
depending on Lymon’s recovery.
Lymon testified by deposition on March 1, 2018. She recounted a 2015
motor vehicle accident after which she was diagnosed with a pinched nerve in
her low back. She stated that her low back symptoms resolved after
completing two months of physical therapy. She also provided details about
her typical work activities, including a statement that the paper rolls she had
to maneuver weighed between twenty and thirty pounds. Notably, at the
hearing before the ALJ Lymon amended her estimate and indicated that the
rolls weighed fifty pounds each. If the machine she was operating was out of
paper, she had to put a new roll of paper on the machine. The machines have
cranks for use when switching the rolls of paper but Lymon testified that if a
crank was broken she had to lift the paper roll two or three inches off the
ground with her foot and hand to place it on the machine.
Sharon Markle, Lymon’s supervisor at Georgia Pacific, was deposed on
May 25, 2018 and at that time had served as a plant supervisor for over eleven
years. She testified that she interacted with Lymon about once an hour.
Markle also testified that Lymon worked her entire shift without incident on
December 1-2, 2017. She also testified that the next afternoon Lymon called
into work to report she had smashed two fingers at work. Markle denied
Lymon reported a low back or right foot injury at that time. Markle learned of
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Lymon’s low back condition when she received an email from the human
resources department stating she was undergoing emergency surgery for
ruptured discs. To her knowledge, no work event or accident occurred on
December 1-2, 2017.
Markle also provided information about Lymon’s duties as a Dixie Cup
Machine Operator and the process of switching paper rolls at the Georgia
Pacific facility. Operators are required to load the bottom paper rolls, which
weigh about sixty pounds. Operators are supposed to roll the paper rolls off
the rack and to the machine, use a crank to lower the machine, and slide on
the rolls. Next, they are to use the crank to move the roll up and thread the
paper into the machine. She also described Lymon’s method of lifting rolls
using a foot and hands as dangerous and an unauthorized shortcut. She
testified that workers had been injured using this method in the past and that
it was against company policy. Markle also was unaware of any broken cranks
and did not believe any cranks had been broken while she had worked there
over the past eleven years. Additionally, she testified that it was not Lymon’s
job to lift the bottom paper rolls and if they needed to be lifted Lymon was
supposed to have another employee do so. No heavy lifting was required of
Lymon at her job with Georgia Pacific.
Dr. Timothy Kriss evaluated Lymon on behalf of Georgia Pacific on April
4, 2018. He reviewed all medical records and radiology reports and examined
and interviewed Lymon. Dr. Kriss opined that Lymon’s injuries were natural
and spontaneously occurring due to the natural aging process and Lymon’s
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degenerative disc disease. He further reported that there was “no evidence
whatsoever to indicate any work-related causation for [the] right L4/L5 disc
herniation.” Lymon did not describe a work injury. Dr. Kriss acknowledged
that the spontaneous nature of the herniation and Lymon’s symptoms were
odd but, nonetheless, he did not attribute Lymon’s condition to her
employment at Georgia Pacific. He further opined that the cauda equina
syndrome had resolved, except the right foot drop.
Dr. Kriss assigned a 12% whole person impairment rating but was clear
in his opinion that Lymon’s impairment was not work-related. Dr. Kriss
performed a second evaluation on December 12, 2018. He diagnosed Lymon
with cauda equina syndrome and noted that although the syndrome resolved
completely with surgical decompression, Lymon still has residual lumbar
radiculopathy manifesting as chronic foot weakness with numbness and
tingling. He opined that Lymon reached maximum medical improvement on
December 6, 2018.
Lymon submitted the medical questionnaire of Dr. Brandon Cook dated
November 15, 2018. Dr. Cook opined that a person can develop cauda equina
syndrome by lifting heavy objects without a discernable instance of feeling
pain. He believed that it is highly likely Lymon’s cauda equina syndrome was
caused as a direct and proximate result of her work activities lifting heavy rolls
of paper. Notably, Dr. Cook’s questionnaire does not state which medical
records were reviewed and largely consists of “yes” or “no” answers to questions
with little explanation. Dr. Cook’s only statement is that Lymon “without a
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doubt had cauda equina syndrome which was secondary to a large herniated
disc which in her case was sudden which is usually correlated with heavy
lifting.” As Dr. Kriss highlighted, even if it is presumed that some type of lifting
at work on December 1-2, 2017 caused Lymon’s disc herniation, she
nonetheless did not have a “sudden” development of cauda equina syndrome.
Instead, she had no symptoms whatsoever throughout the December 1-2 work
day or while at home that evening.
Lymon filed the October 23, 2018 medical records review report by Dr.
Joseph Zehner who reviewed records from 2017 and 2018. He opined Lymon
had pre-existing, dormant annular tears at L4-L5 and L5-S1 which were
brought into a disabling reality by the work injury. He opined that all of
Lymon’s conditions, including the disc herniation and cauda equina syndrome,
were related to the work injury. In response to questions, Dr. Zehner stated
that cauda equina syndrome can be caused by heavy lifting over a period of
months without a specific incident that would cause pain. Dr. Zehner
assessed a 21% impairment rating.
The ALJ concluded that Lymon failed to satisfy her burden of proving
that her low back condition is work-related. Clearly her condition was serious,
but the ALJ was not convinced that Lymon’s work activities caused her
condition. Lymon’s testimony was unpersuasive and the ALJ found it
compelling that the treating surgeon, Dr. Lockstadt, did not believe Lymon’s
back condition was work-related. While there were competing medical
opinions, the ALJ primarily relied on Dr. Kriss’s opinion, which concluded that
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Lymon’s condition occurred naturally and spontaneously without any
associated or triggering trauma. Further, the ALJ acknowledged that while
repetitive heavy lifting can cause disc herniation she did not believe Lymon
performed those activities. The ALJ denied Lymon’s petition for rehearing.
The Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) concluded that substantial
evidence, namely Dr. Kriss’s opinion, supported the ALJ’s determination that
Lymon failed to satisfy her burden of proof. The Board did not interpret Dr.
Kriss’s opinion, as suggested by Lymon, as requiring her to self-diagnose her
condition in order to establish a work-related injury. Further, the numerous
attacks on Dr. Kriss’s opinion applied to the weight of the evidence and did not
constitute an adequate basis for reversal. The Board affirmed the ALJ’s
opinion and order.
The Court of Appeals determined that Lymon failed to prove that the
evidence was so overwhelming as to compel a different result and, further, that
the ALJ properly relied on Dr. Kriss’s opinion. The Court of Appeals rejected
Lymon’s assertion that Dr. Kriss relied on history that was substantially
inaccurate or largely incomplete based on Cepero v. Fabricated Metals Corp.,
132 S.W.3d 839 (Ky. 2004). The ALJ’s findings mirrored Dr. Kriss’s opinions
and the lack of documented complaints linking Lymon’s symptoms to a work-
related injury or trauma was persuasive. Lymon now appeals the Court of
Appeals’ decision.
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ANALYSIS
On appeal, Lymon argues that (1) the evidence was so overwhelming as
to compel a finding in her favor; (2) Dr. Kriss’s opinion cannot constitute
substantial evidence because he based his opinion on Lymon’s failure to self-
diagnose her injury; and (3) the ALJ did not properly articulate the basis for
her decision to allow the parties to be reasonably apprised of the basis of that
decision.
I. The evidence was not so overwhelming as to compel a finding in
Lymon’s favor.
“If the party with the burden of proof fails to convince the ALJ, that party
must establish on appeal that the evidence was so overwhelming as to compel
a favorable finding.” Eddie’s Serv. Ctr. v. Thomas, 503 S.W.3d 881, 886 (Ky.
2016). As the claimant, Lymon had the burden of proving her workers’
compensation claim, including causation. “If the fact finder finds against the
person with the burden of proof [her] burden on appeal is infinitely greater.”
Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986). “[A]n ALJ's decision
should not be overturned on appeal unless it ‘is so unreasonable under the
evidence that it must be viewed as erroneous as a matter of law.’” Eddie’s Serv.
Ctr., 503 S.W.3d at 886, (quoting Ira A. Watson Dep’t Store v. Hamilton, 34
S.W.3d 48, 52 (Ky. 2000)). “It is of no avail in such a case to show that there
was some evidence of substance which may have justified a finding in [her]
favor.” Special Fund, 708 S.W.2d at 643.
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Lymon claims that evidence that lifting the rolls of paper at work caused
her herniated disc was compelling because it is undisputed that lifting
increases pressure within a disc. Further, she argues that it is inconceivable
that such a massive injury could occur without any cause whatsoever.
The ALJ noted the contrary medical evidence, acknowledging the
opinions of both Dr. Cook and Dr. Zehner who believed Lymon’s condition was
work-related. She was persuaded, however, by the fact that Lymon’s treating
surgeon, Dr. Lockstadt, did not relate Lymon’s back condition to her work
activities. Dr. Lockstadt also stated that it was possible, but unlikely, that
cauda equina syndrome is caused by heavy lifting over a period of months. He
did not opine that a causal relation to work was within reasonable medical
probability.
The ALJ is tasked with weighing the medical evidence in reaching a
decision. Here, Lymon presented evidence to suggest her injuries were work-
related. Georgia Pacific introduced competing evidence that suggested her
injuries were unrelated to her work. Because Dr. Kriss’s opinion (along with
Dr. Lockstadt’s evidence) supports the ALJ’s determination that Lymon failed
to prove that her injuries were work-related, it was not an unreasonable
conclusion. “[T]he ALJ’s findings of fact are entitled to considerable deference
and will not be set aside unless the evidence compels a contrary finding.”
Finley v. DBM Technologies, 217 S.W.3d 261, 264 (Ky. App. 2007). Although
the evidence could have supported a different finding, the ALJ, as fact-finder,
has the sole authority to determine the weight, credibility, substance and
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inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt,
695 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Ky. 1985). The contrary opinions were not overwhelming
and therefore the evidence did not compel a finding in Lymon’s favor.
II. Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings.
Lymon argues that Dr. Kriss’s opinion on causation cannot constitute
substantial evidence because Dr. Kriss based his opinion on the fact that
Lymon did not self-diagnose her condition as being work-related. After review
of Dr. Kriss’s reports, we disagree that he based his opinions on a lack of self-
diagnosis.
Dr. Kriss’s opinions constitute substantial evidence and support the
ALJ’s opinion and order. Notably, Dr. Kriss reviewed thirty-four medical
records from December 2, 2017 through February 26, 2018, none of which
documented any work-related onset of symptoms, work-related aggravation of
symptoms, acute work injury or cumulative trauma injury. He also reviewed
Lymon’s December 5, 2017 MRI which he interpreted to support his diagnosis
of a herniated disc caused by degenerative disc disease. Dr. Kriss also noted a
study that supported his opinions. He acknowledged that while genetics are
the predominant cause for disc degeneration, other factors, like occupational
exposure from lifting, bending and twisting, can contribute, but still did not
attribute Lymon’s conditions to her work.
Concluding that the disc herniation occurred naturally and
spontaneously, Dr. Kriss reached the following conclusions: (1) no evidence
whatsoever indicated any work-related causation for the right L4-L5 disc
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herniation; (2) Lymon did not have any onset of symptoms at work associated
with a physical event or activity; (3) Lymon had no aggravation of symptoms at
work or associated with a physical event or activity; (4) Lymon did not describe
a work injury–discrete or cumulative and (5) the most common cause of lumbar
disc herniation in humans is degenerative and atraumatic, causing roughly
80% of all symptomatic lumbar disc herniations; spontaneous degenerative
causation is statistically the most likely cause of Lymon’s disc herniation.
Lymon’s disagreement with Dr. Kriss’s opinions would go to the weight of those
opinions and does not constitute a basis for reversal. As noted, an ALJ’s role is
to determine the weight given to the evidence. Paramount Foods, 695 S.W.2d at
419.
Lymon is correct in asserting that an employee is not required to self-
diagnose her condition as work-related. Hill v. Sextet Mining, 65 S.W.3d 503,
507 (Ky. 2001). But nothing in Dr. Kriss’s opinions suggests that because
Lymon did not self-diagnose her injuries as work-related, he could not find a
causal relationship between her injuries and employment. Dr. Kriss provided
lengthy explanations about causation, citing studies and information regarding
the onset of cauda equina syndrome. We reiterate that the ALJ’s reliance on
Dr. Kriss’s opinion was not “so unreasonable that it must be viewed as
erroneous as a matter of law.” Ira A. Watson Dep’t Store, 34 S.W.3d at 52.
III. The ALJ properly articulated the basis for her decision.
Next Lymon argues that the ALJ failed to consider a myriad of details in
the record, like how cauda equina syndrome could arise in a short period of
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time, the broken cranks at Georgia Pacific, and the pressure placed on the
spine when lifting or standing. This Court has held that Kentucky Revised
Statute (KRS) 342.285 requires an ALJ to render an opinion that “summarizes
the conflicting evidence concerning disputed facts; weighs that evidence to
make findings of fact; and determines the legal significance of those findings.”
Arnold v. Toyota Motor Mfg., 375 S.W.3d 56, 61-62 (Ky. 2012). Only then can a
reviewing authority determine whether the findings are supported by
substantial evidence and reasonable. Id. While Lymon is entitled to findings
that demonstrate the ALJ appropriately considered her theory of the case, we
find no error. Sidney Coal Co., Inc./Clean Energy Mining Co. v. Huffman, 233
S.W.3d 710, 714 (Ky. 2007).
The ALJ’s nineteen-page opinion and order summarizes the deposition
testimony, medical records from the emergency room, and the four doctors who
either treated Lymon or formed medical opinions regarding her conditions. The
ALJ noted that she was unpersuaded by Lymon’s testimony and found it
compelling that Dr. Lockstadt, Lymon’s treating surgeon, did not relate
Lymon’s back condition to her work activities. She also discussed that while
Drs. Zehner and Cook opined that Lymon’s condition was related to her work
activities, their opinions were based on Lymon’s account of her work duties,
which the ALJ believed was inaccurate, presumably based in part on Markle’s
testimony. The ALJ heard Lymon’s description of her work, symptoms and
conditions through her deposition testimony. The opinion and order provides a
comprehensive overview of the evidence, reflects that the ALJ weighed the
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varying evidence and includes sufficient information that indicates the basis for
the ALJ’s decision.
In her opinion the ALJ demonstrated that she thoroughly considered and
reviewed all medical evidence in the record, including any deposition
testimony. “An ALJ may reject any testimony and believe or disbelieve various
parts of the evidence, . . . . The mere existence of evidence that would have
supported a different decision is an inadequate ground for reversal on appeal.”
American Greetings Corp. v. Bunch, 331 S.W.3d 600, 602 (Ky. 2010). The ALJ
articulated her reliance on Dr. Kriss’s opinion in deciding to dismiss Lymon’s
claim. An ALJ is not required to recount the record with line-by-line specificity
or to acknowledge every statement in the record. An ALJ’s opinion and order
must inform the parties of the basis of the decision, and the ALJ in this case
did exactly that.
CONCLUSION
“Although a party may note evidence which would have supported a
conclusion contrary to the ALJ’s decision, such evidence is not an adequate
basis for reversal on appeal.” Ira A. Watson Dept. Store, 34 S.W.3d at 52 (citing
McCloud v. Beth-Elkhorn Corp., 514 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1974)). While the record
here obviously contains conflicting medical evidence, Lymon is not entitled to
reversal unless she demonstrates that the evidence was so overwhelming as to
compel a favorable finding. Kroger, 338 S.W.3d at 273. She failed to do so.
Therefore, the ALJ did not err in dismissing her claim for workers’
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compensation benefits. Accordingly, we affirm the Courts of Appeals’ decision
affirming the Board and upholding the ALJ’s opinion and order.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Alan Steven Rubin
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
GEORGIA PACIFIC:
Steven Lynn Kimbler
Pohl & Aubrey, PSC
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:
Monica J. Rice-Smith
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD:
Michael Wayne Alvey, Chairman
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