Rickey Jackson v. Phoenix Transportation ( 2022 )


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  •              IMPORTANT NOTICE
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
    THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.”
    PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
    PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
    THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
    CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
    CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
    UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
    RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
    CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
    OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
    BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
    BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
    DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
    ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
    DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
    ACTION.
    RENDERED: JANUARY 20, 2022
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    Supreme Court of Kentucky
    2021-SC-0154-WC
    RICKEY JACKSON                                                       APPELLANT
    ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
    V.                           NO. 2020-CA-1514
    WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
    NO. 19-WC-95750
    PHOENIX TRANSPORTATION, INC.,                                        APPELLEES
    WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD;
    AND HONORABLE W. GREG HARVEY,
    ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
    MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
    AFFIRMING
    This case is before the Court on administrative appeal as a matter of
    right1 by Rickey Jackson (Jackson), the Appellant. Jackson’s appeal before this
    Court concerns only the constitutionality of KRS2 342.730(4) and whether the
    provision improperly discriminates based upon age thus violating the 14th
    Amendment of the United States Constitution and Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the
    Kentucky Constitution. The Workers’ Compensation Board lacked the authority
    to render a decision regarding the constitutionality of the statute, but affirmed
    the ALJ’s Opinion, Award and Order. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
    the constitutionality of the statute. Jackson appealed.
    1   Ky. Const. § 115.
    2   Kentucky Revised Statutes.
    For the following reasons, we affirm.
    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    On January 23, 2019, Jackson suffered a work-related injury within the
    course and scope of his employment with Phoenix Transportation, Inc.
    (Phoenix), the Appellee. Jackson was 70 years old at the time of the accident.
    On August 24, 2020, the ALJ rendered an Opinion, Award and Order. The ALJ
    found Jackson to be permanently totally occupationally disabled as a result of
    the injury. The ALJ awarded income benefits pursuant to KRS 342.730(4),
    which requires, in part, that income benefits terminate four years from the date
    of injury. Jackson’s income benefits will terminate on January 23, 2023.
    Jackson appealed the 4-year cap to the Workers’ Compensation Board
    (Board). As an administrative tribunal, the Board noted it had no jurisdiction to
    determine the constitutionality of a statute. However, the Board affirmed the
    ALJ’s application of KRS 342.730(4) based on Holcim v. Swinford, 
    581 S.W.3d 37
     (Ky. 2019). Jackson then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
    the Board and the ALJ. Jackson appealed to this court.
    II. ANALYSIS
    KRS 342.730(4) states:
    All income benefits payable pursuant to this chapter shall
    terminate as of the date upon which the employee reaches the age
    of seventy (70), or four (4) years after the employee's injury or last
    exposure, whichever last occurs. In like manner all income benefits
    payable pursuant to this chapter to spouses and dependents shall
    terminate as of the date upon which the employee would have
    reached age seventy (70) or four (4) years after the employee's date
    of injury or date of last exposure, whichever last occurs.
    2
    Jackson argues the statute treats employees who are 66 or older at the time of
    their work-related injury differently than other employees. He opines this
    disparate treatment violates the Equal Protection Clause of 14th Amendment of
    the United States Constitution and Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Kentucky
    Constitution.
    In our recently published Opinion—Cates v. Kroger, 
    627 S.W.3d 864
     (Ky.
    2021)—this Court addressed whether the 2018 Amendment to KRS 342.730(4)
    violates the Equal Protection Clause. The Appellants in that case argued, as
    Jackson does herein that the statute treats older injured works less favorably
    than their younger counterparts.
    In Cates, we held “the current version of KRS 342.730(4) is not violative
    of the Equal Protection Clause because the age classification is rationally
    related to a legitimate state purpose.” 626 S.W.3d at 871. There is nothing in
    this case that distinguishes Jackson’s appeal from the issue presented and
    settled in Cates. As such, we hold Cates to be dispositive in this matter.
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the ALJ’s Opinion, Award and Order
    dated August 24, 2020.
    All sitting. All concur.
    3
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
    Danny E. Darnall
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, Phoenix Transportation. Inc:
    Jonanna F. Ellison
    Aziza H. Ashy-Jones
    Fowler Bell PLLC
    Administrative Law Judge:
    Hon. Greg Harvey
    Workers’ Compensation Board
    Michael Wayne Alvey,
    Chairman
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2021 SC 0154

Filed Date: 1/13/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/20/2022