David Lake v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2010 )


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  •              I P TANT NOTICE
    NOT TO BE PU YLIS E OPINION
    THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
    PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
    PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
    THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
    CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
    CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
    UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
    RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
    CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
    OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
    BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
    BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
    DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
    ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
    DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
    ACTION.
    RENDERED: APRIL 22, 2010
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    Supranr Laud of ri,firti
    2008-SC-000129-DG
    AND
    2008-SC-000876-DG
    1
    DATE          5,3,0 E.,„4G,..... ;Dtc-
    COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                          APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
    ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
    V.                     CASE NO. 2007-CA-000172-MR
    KNOX CIRCUIT COURT NO. 93-CR-00177
    DAVID LAKE                                       APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
    MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
    REVERSING AND REMANDING
    After a jury trial in the Knox Circuit Court, David Lake was convicted of
    the 1993 murder of Christopher Golden and sentenced to a term of 20 years
    imprisonment. After the judgment, Lake filed a pro se motion for a new trial,
    with each of the five grounds alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. By
    order dated August 3, 1994, the trial court denied Lake's motion. A direct
    appeal to this Court followed. On appeal, Lake raised several issues, again
    alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. According to Lake, his trial counsel
    failed to adequately prepare for trial, subpoena necessary witnesses, conduct
    effective cross-examination, request a change of venue, move for dismissal of
    the indictment, and secure his release prior to trial. This Court ultimately
    affirmed Lake's conviction in an unpublished opinion dated August 24, 1995. 1
    On August 25, 1995, Lake filed a 29-page pro se document with the Knox
    Circuit Court styled as a "Memorandum of Law." This document was filed in
    support of Lake's "Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Motion to Vacate,
    Set Aside or Correct his sentence." In addition to arguing that he had a
    statutory right to appointment of counsel, Lake also set out six alleged
    instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. These allegations differed from
    those considered by the trial court in his motion for a new trial and those
    considered on direct appeal. Specifically, Lake alleged that trial counsel failed
    to: (1) properly seek a continuance; (2) object to the introduction of
    photographs of the deceased; (3) object to testimony concerning uncharged
    criminal conduct; (4) hire an expert witness to dispute the cause of death; and
    (5) call material witnesses to testify. The sixth allegation of ineffective
    assistance of counsel was that trial counsel improperly accepted money from
    the deceased's father to poorly represent him. In addition, Lake alleged that a
    witness for the Commonwealth committed perjury while testifying. On
    November 15, 1995, Lake filed with the Knox Circuit Court a pro se RCr 11.42
    motion. Lake reiterated his claims set forth in his August 25, 1995
    "Memorandum of Law." Lake again requested the appointment of counsel to
    assist him.
    1   Lake v. Commonwealth, No. 1994-SC-000544-MR (Ky., August 24, 1995).
    2
    An amended RCr 11.42 motion was eventually filed on June 30, 1998
    with the assistance of counsel. In this motion, two additional issues were
    raised: (1) trial counsel's waiver of the transfer hearing and stipulation to the
    juvenile court's findings were invalid; and (2) trial counsel failed to procure an
    expert witness, despite taking approximately $1,000.00 from Lake's father for
    that express purpose. By order dated August 18, 1998, the trial court denied
    Lake's motion without a hearing. Lake appealed the trial court's ruling, and
    the Court of Appeals upheld the ruling in an unpublished opinion. 2 This
    Court granted discretionary review and, by order dated September 18, 2002,
    vacated the decision and remanded the case for an evidentiary , hearing in light
    of the recently rendered opinions in Norton v. Commonwealth, 
    63 S.W.3d 175
    (Ky. 2001) and Fraser v. Commonwealth, 
    59 S.W.3d 448
    (Ky. 2001). 3
    An evidentiary hearing was finally held on March 11, 2004. The trial
    court denied Lake RCr 11.24 relief, stating that the motion was successive.
    The Court of Appeals disagreed and remanded the case for a decision on the
    merits. The trial court, in a 28-page order discussing all evidence introduced
    at trial and at the hearing, ultimately denied Lake's motion. The Court of
    Appeals, relying heavily on Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 
    153 S.W.3d 854
    (Ky.App. 2004), reversed the trial court. Based upon Humphrey, the Court of
    Appeals found no evidence in the record that Lake voluntarily, knowingly, and
    intelligently waived his right to a transfer hearing. Accordingly, the Court of
    2   Lake v. Commonwealth, No. 1998-CA-002187-MR (Ky.App., June 22, 2001).
    3   Lake v. Commonwealth, No. 2001-SC-000562-DG (Ky., September 18, 2002).
    3
    Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Knox District
    Court, juvenile session. Subsequently, this Court granted discretionary review.
    For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the Court of
    Appeals and remand this matter to that court for consideration of the
    remaining issues raised by Lake.
    We believe that the Court of Appeals' reliance on Humphrey is misplaced.
    This Court previously remanded this case for an evidentiary hearing, which
    was conducted in 2004 in accordance with Norton and Fraser. During this
    hearing, Lake had the opportunity to raise and argue the allegation that he was
    unduly prejudiced by trial counsel's stipulation of facts and the ultimate waiver
    of the preliminary hearing in the juvenile proceedings. After an extensive
    review of the record, this very issue was mentioned only twice by Lake during
    direct testimony. In neither instance was the issue further developed by any
    line of questioning.
    It has long been held by courts in this state that "[t]he burden of proof
    [is] upon the appellant to show that he was not adequately represented by
    appointed counsel." Jordan v. Commonwealth, 
    445 S.W.2d 878
    , 879 (Ky.
    1969). In order to establish counsel's assistance was so prejudicially ineffective
    as to require reversal, it is incumbent upon Lake to satisfy a two-part test.
    First, Lake "must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective
    standard of reasonableness." Second, Lake "must show that there is a
    reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
    4
    of the proceeding would have been different."' Hill v. Lockhart, 
    474 U.S. 52
    , 57
    (1985) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687-88, 694 (1984)).
    Even assuming arguendo that Lake had neither been advised of his rights, nor
    had made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver thereof, no evidence was
    introduced that the ultimate result would have been different—that Lake would
    not have been transferred to circuit court. Simply stated, Lake failed to satisfy
    his burden. To remand this case for yet another hearing on this issue would,
    in effect, "afford [Lake] a second bite at the apple."   Gross v. Commonwealth,
    
    648 S.W.2d 853
    , 857 (Ky. 1983) (citing Alvey v. Commonwealth, 
    648 S.W.2d 858
    (Ky. 1983)). Lake's failure to produce sufficient evidence during the 2004
    evidentiary hearing to meet the high threshold of ineffective assistance of
    counsel claims precludes him from yet another opportunity to do so.
    The other issues raised by Lake before the Court of Appeals were not
    reached because of the opinion therein remanding the case for a new
    evidentiary hearing. Thus, we reverse the Court of Appeals in all portions of its
    opinion and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the
    unresolved issues.
    All sitting. All concur.
    5
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE:
    Jack Conway
    Attorney General
    Gregory C. Fuchs
    Assistant Attorney General
    Office of Attorney General
    Office of Criminal Appeals
    1024 Capital Center Drive
    Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT:
    Mary Gail Robinson
    Department of Public Advocacy
    100 Fair Oaks, Suite 302
    Frankfort, KY 40601
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2008 SC 000876

Filed Date: 4/21/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/31/2016