Herbert Eades v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2010 )


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  •                                                       RENDERED : APRIL 22, 2010
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    2008-SC-000920-MR
    HERBERT EADES
    DATE S-r3-to -               D,C
    APPELLA
    - i;~
    ON APPEAL FROM OHIO CIRCUIT COURT
    V                   HONORABLE RONNIE C . DORTCH, JUDGE
    NO . 07-CR-00060
    COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE
    MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
    AFFIRMING
    Appellant Herbert Eades appeals his conviction for three counts of first-
    degree sodomy, and one count of first-degree sexual abuse . Appellant received
    a life sentence on each of the sodomy convictions and a sentence of five years'
    imprisonment for the sex abuse conviction . The court ordered that the
    sentences run concurrently for a total of life imprisonment. Appellant appeals
    to this Court as a matter of right' and raises two assignments of error: (1) that
    the trial court erred in allowing testimony suggesting prior sexual abuse of
    children ; and (2) that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an in camera
    review of the victim's mental health records .
    Ky. Constitution F 110 .
    The charges against Appellant were made by J .M ., a boy who was eight
    years old at the time of the incidents and ten years old at the time of trial .
    Appellant was a friend of J .M .'s family. In the summer of 2006, Appellant
    asked J .M .'s mother if J .M . could help him with some yard work at his house
    in Beaver Dam, Kentucky . J .M . stayed overnight at Appellant's house on two
    occasions with Appellant and Appellant's girlfriend Dana Gould.
    J .M . testified that, on the second visit, he and Appellant drove to get ice
    cream in Appellant's truck, but Appellant first took him to a wooded area .
    Once there, Appellant told J .M . to put on a pair of shorts that he had in the
    truck, and they moved to the camper in the back of the truck. According to
    J.M ., Appellant then removed the shorts and placed his mouth on J .M .'s penis .
    He then turned J .M . over and placed his tongue in J .M .'s rectum . Then, he
    turned J.M . back over to once again place his mouth on J.M.'s penis .
    J .M . also testified that, one night when he and Appellant were alone in
    Appellant's living room, Appellant licked J .M .'s leg. These two incidents formed
    the basis for Appellant's conviction for three counts of first-degree sodomy and
    one count of sexual abuse . Appellant now appeals from those convictions.
    ALLEGED PRIOR BAD ACTS EVIDENCE
    Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence of his prior
    convictions and prior bad acts . More specifically, Appellant wanted to exclude
    evidence of his conviction for numerous sexual offenses involving a young boy,
    including first-degree sodomy, in 1989 . The court ruled the evidence of
    Appellant's prior sexual abuse convictions inadmissible because the probative
    value of such evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of undue
    prejudice.
    At trial, when cross-examining Appellant's girlfriend Dana Gould, the
    Commonwealth asked about statements she had made to the investigating
    detective . The prosecutor asked, "Isn't it true that you told Detective Jones
    that you made a point not to let [Appellant] alone with children?" Gould
    answered yes . The Commonwealth then asked, "Is it also true that [Appellant]
    made a point not to be alone with children?" Gould again answered yes.
    Appellant testified in his own defense, denying any abuse. On cross-
    examination, the prosecutor asked, "And actually you made a point yourself to
    stay away from eight-year-old boys, didn't you?" Appellant answered yes . The
    trial court permitted these questions over Appellant's objection, but did not
    permit any specific mention of Appellant's prior bad acts.
    On appeal, Appellant contends it was error to allow these questions,
    because they were highly suggestive of a predisposition to sexual abuse and
    were merely an attempt to circumvent the prohibitions of KRE 404(b), which
    states that "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
    prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
    therewith ." We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
    discretion, Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S .W.3d 117, 119 (Ky. 2007) (citing
    Woodard v. Commonwealth, 147 S .W.3d 63 (Ky. 2004)), i.e. "whether the trial
    judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound
    legal principles." Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co . v. Thompson, 11 S .W .3d 575, 581
    (Ky. 2000) (citing Commonwealth v. English, 
    993 S.W.2d 941
    , 945 (Ky. 1999)) .
    First, we note that not wanting to be alone with children is not illegal or
    immoral, and thus is not "bad acts" evidence by itself. There is no doubt that
    the jury could only speculate as to why Appellant was not left alone with
    children . However, the questions by the prosecutor were aimed more at
    pointing out the inconsistency of Appellant not wanting to be alone with
    children, and yet choosing to be alone with J.M. The questions were asked in
    isolation, without reference to any specific bad acts by Appellant .
    And viewed in context with the prosecutor's other questions, these
    isolated questions were not particularly persuasive with respect to Appellant's
    guilt or innocence . After reviewing the complete cross-examination of Gould
    and Appellant, we "can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not
    substantially swayed" by the questions at issue . Winstead v. Commonwealth,
    283 S.W .3d 678, 689 (Ky. 2009) (citing   Kotteakos v. United States,   328 U.S .
    750 (1946)) . Therefore, the error, if any, was harmless .
    DENIAL OF MOTION FOR IN CAMERA REVIEW OF VICTIM'S MENTAL
    HEALTH RECORDS
    Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion requesting the production of, and
    an in camera review of, J .M .'s mental health records. The motion contended
    that J.M . was being seen by both a psychiatrist and a psychologist, and was on
    medication . The motion also contended that J .M .'s mother had taken him to
    see his psychiatrist, because she had doubts as to whether J .M . was telling the
    truth about the alleged sexual abuse.
    Appellant's motion requested the court conduct an in camera inspection
    of the mental health records for exculpatory or impeachment material . The
    trial court heard the motion on August 19, 2008, after the jury was selected .
    The trial court denied the motion, agreeing with the Commonwealth that the
    request was a "fishing expedition," and stating that there must be a reasonable
    expectation that the files would produce exculpatory evidence .
    On appeal, Appellant contends that he met the preliminary showing of
    evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable belief that the records contain
    exculpatory evidence to request the court review those records .
    Only upon a preliminary showing of "evidence
    sufficient to establish a reasonable belief that the
    records contain exculpatory evidence" are a witness's
    psychotherapy records subject to production . And
    even at that point, the production is limited to an in
    camera inspection by the trial court to determine
    whether the records, in fact, contain exculpatory
    evidence, including that relevant to the witness's
    credibility.
    Richardson v. Commonwealth, 161 S .W.3d 327, 329 (Ky. 2005) (quoting
    Commonwealth v. Barroso, 
    122 S.W.3d 554
    , 564 (Ky 2003)) (internal citation
    and footnote omitted) .
    Factors a court should consider in allowing such
    evidence are the nature of the psychological problem,
    the temporal recency or remoteness of the condition,
    and whether the witness suffered from the condition at
    the time of the events to which she is to testify. For
    example, a. mental illness that causes hallucinations
    or delusions is generally more probative of credibility
    than a condition causing only depression, irritability,
    impulsivity, or anxiety.
    Barroso, 122 S .W.3d at 562-63 (quoting People v. Anderson, 
    22 P.3d 347
    , 391
    (Cal . 2001) (Kennard, J ., concurring)) .
    Here, Appellant failed to make the preliminary showing necessary to
    trigger an in camera review of J.M.'s mental health records. Appellant's motion
    simply asserted that J.M .'s mother took him to a psychiatrist because she was
    unsure he was telling the truth. We recognize that it may be difficult for
    someone in Appellant's position to formulate a reasonable belief without first
    seeing the contents of the mental health records. However, without a
    preliminary showing of some articulable evidence, the inquiry is simply a
    "fishing expedition." Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying
    Appellant's motion for an in camera inspection of J .M .'s mental health records .
    For the forgoing reasons, the judgment and sentence of the Ohio Circuit
    Court is hereby affirmed .
    All sitting . All concur.
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
    Shelly R . Fears
    Assistant Public Advocate
    Department of Public Advocacy
    100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
    Frankfort, KY 40601-1133
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
    Jack Conway
    Attorney General
    Michael John Marsch
    Assistant Attorney General
    Office of Criminal Appeals
    Attorney General's Office
    1024 Capital Center Drive
    Frankfort, KY 40601
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2008 SC 000920

Filed Date: 4/21/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/31/2016