Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Thomas Moore ( 2023 )

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 16, 2023
TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky
2021-SC-0411-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V. NO. 2019-CA-1549
TODD CIRCUIT COURT NO. 18-CR-00011
THOMAS MOORE APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE LAMBERT
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
In accordance with his plea agreement, Appellee Thomas Moore was
convicted of two class D felonies and of being a persistent felony offender in the
second degree and sentenced to twenty years in prison. When Moore’s motion
to vacate, challenging the plea agreement and his conviction and sentence, was
unsuccessful, Moore sought relief through the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals concluded that Moore’s sentence must be vacated because the circuit
court committed palpable error. While the Court of Appeals’ treatment of
Moore’s appeal as a direct appeal may be erroneous, the sentencing issue in
this case supports the Court of Appeals’ decision that relief is warranted.
However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals’ reversal of Moore’s probation
revocation and we reverse that decision. Therefore, we affirm in part and
reverse in part the Court of Appeals’ decision, and we remand this case to the
Todd Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Following his indictment on various charges, Moore entered a guilty plea
to two class D felonies: (1) operating a motor vehicle under the influence of
alcohol/drugs (DUI), fourth offense or greater within ten years, aggravating
circumstances present;1 and (2) operating a motor vehicle while license is
suspended for driving under the influence and at the time of the offense,
operating the motor vehicle in violation of KRS 189A.010(1).2,3 Moore also pled
guilty to the amended charge of being a persistent felony offender in the second
degree (PFO II).4 Moore did not waive his right to appeal.
Moore memorialized his plea agreement with the Commonwealth on July
18, 2018. A separate order which details the Commonwealth’s sentencing
recommendation to the circuit court was contemporaneously entered into the
record. For each class D felony, the Commonwealth recommended that Moore
receive a prison sentence of three years enhanced to ten years due to being a
PFO II and that these two ten-year sentences run consecutively. For the PFO II
1 Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 189A.010(1) and (5)(d).
2 KRS 189A.090(1) and (2)(b).
3 Moore also pled guilty to the following charges for which he received a fine:
careless driving, KRS189.290; no/expired registration plate, KRS 186.170; and failure
of owner to maintain required insurance, first offense, KRS 304.39-080.
The possession of marijuana, KRS 218A.1422, and drug paraphernalia, KRS
218A.500, charges were dismissed.
4 KRS 532.080(2).
2
charge, the Commonwealth noted “[twenty] years concurrent.” On the same
day, the circuit court accepted Moore’s guilty plea and convicted Moore of the
two class D felonies and of being a PFO II. As recommended by the
Commonwealth, the circuit court fixed Moore’s punishment at twenty years in
prison and probated the sentence for five years. Days later, on July 27, 2018,
the Commonwealth’s Attorney filed a motion to revoke Moore’s probation.5
Moore’s probation was revoked on August 15, 2018, and the circuit court
entered its Final Judgment on Plea of Guilty and Sentence of Imprisonment
(Final Judgment), imposing a twenty-year sentence. According to the Final
Judgment, for each class D felony, the circuit court imposed a three-year
prison sentence enhanced to ten years by the PFO II charge, and for the PFO II
charge itself, the circuit court imposed twenty years. The Final Judgment
states that all sentences run concurrently for a total of twenty years in prison.6
After the circuit court denied Moore’s shock probation motion, Moore
filed a pro se motion styled “Motion to Vacate Imposed Sentence and Request
for New Trial Pursuant to RCr 10.26 and CR 61.02 Substantial Error Rules.”7
5 The grounds for the motion were that Moore failed to report to his Probation
Officer as directed. Moore failed to appear for the August 1, 2018 revocation hearing.
When Moore was arrested he tested positive for use of methamphetamine and
benzodiazepines.
6The amended Final Judgment entered September 20, 2018 did not change the
sentence imposition.
7 Because Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26 and Kentucky Rule
of Civil Procedure (CR) 61.02 are identical and interpreted the same, Nami Resources
Company, L.L.C. v. Asher Land and Mineral, Ltd., 554 S.W.3d 323, 338 (Ky. 2018), the
remainder of this Opinion cites the criminal rule, RCr 10.26, only when referencing
Moore’s arguments.
3
Pertinently, Moore argued that it was palpable error and an abuse of discretion
for the circuit court in its Final Judgment to list the PFO II conviction as an
independent criminal offense, to sentence him to twenty years for that offense,
and then to order that twenty-year sentence on the PFO II charge to be served
concurrently to the two ten-year concurrent sentences. Moore requested the
circuit court to vacate its judgment and sentence and to set his case for a new
trial. The circuit court appointed counsel for Moore.
Over the course of several hearings, the circuit court discussed the
merits of Moore’s motion with appointed counsel and the Commonwealth’s
Attorney. Early on, appointed counsel expressed his belief that there was merit
in Moore’s illegal sentence argument. At the March 6, 2019 hearing, appointed
counsel presented Moore’s argument raised in his filed motion. At the final
hearing on June 26, 2019, in addition to arguing that the twenty-year sentence
imposed based upon the PFO II charge was illegal, because the two ten-year
enhanced class D sentences could not run consecutively and that the Final
Judgment did not state that the ten-year sentences run consecutively,8
8 At the final hearing on June 26, 2019, the primary discussion in regard to
Moore’s illegal sentence argument was whether Moore’s PFO II status could enhance
both class D felonies and if so, whether the enhanced ten-year sentences could run
consecutively. Without providing a citation to the circuit court, appointed counsel
described a case provided by the Commonwealth supportive of the conclusion that a
defendant with a PFO II status, being found guilty of two class D felonies, may have
the enhanced ten-year sentences run consecutively. Appointed counsel, however, also
advocated that because the Final Judgment did not state that the ten-year sentences
were to run consecutively, the ten-year sentences run concurrently. Responding to
the circuit court’s question, appointed counsel further stated that if both class D
felonies could be enhanced by the PFO II status, twenty years is the maximum
sentence Moore could receive, which would also be the maximum sentence if he pled
guilty to the PFO I charge.
4
appointed counsel presented a probation sentencing argument on Moore’s
behalf. The circuit court denied Moore’s motions and entered a final and
appealable order.
Moore acted pro se before the Court of Appeals.9 Rather than presenting
his preserved illegal plea agreement and illegal sentence arguments, Moore
presented both preserved and unpreserved arguments related to his probation
sentencing and its revocation.
The Commonwealth did not address Moore’s briefed arguments. Instead,
the Commonwealth argued that Moore’s motion to vacate pursuant to RCr
10.26 was procedurally improper because RCr 10.26’s standard of review may
be utilized only on direct appeal and does not provide an avenue for a
defendant to collaterally attack his convictions. The Commonwealth argued
that because Moore failed to raise each of his issues in a prior proceeding, by
way of an RCr 11.42 motion or a CR 60.02 motion, the failures amounted to a
fatal procedural bar for consideration of his arguments and that the Todd
Circuit Court should be affirmed.
The Court of Appeals first concluded that Moore was entitled to relief
from the circuit court’s imposition of a twenty-year sentence because that
sentence was solely and improperly based on Moore’s PFO II charge. The Court
9 Although a defendant who enters an unconditional guilty plea typically waives
his right to appeal, it was determined in the course of Moore’s appeal to the Court of
Appeals that he did not waive that right. However, even if Moore had waived his right
to appeal, this Court has recognized some exceptions to the general rule, one of which
is the appealability of so-called sentencing issues, which applies to this case. Windsor
v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 306 (Ky. 2008).
5
of Appeals explained, citing Commonwealth v. Jones,10 that Moore is entitled to
relief under the RCr 10.26 palpable error standard. The Court of Appeals
concluded the imposition of the twenty-year sentence was a plain error under
existing law, particularly KRS 532.080; was more likely than ordinary error to
have affected the judgment because without the invalid separate sentence for
the PFO charge, Moore would have been sentenced to ten years in prison; and
the error seriously affected the fairness of the proceedings and is
“jurisprudentially intolerable.”
The Court of Appeals also considered Moore’s probation revocation
arguments, finding merit particularly in an unpreserved argument. Finding
that the circuit court did not make specific written findings as to the essential
elements of KRS 439.3106 in its revocation order, and that it was unclear from
the record whether the circuit court properly considered KRS 439.3106’s
criteria when revoking Moore’s probation, the Court of Appeals reversed the
circuit court’s probation revocation order and remanded the case for further
revocation proceedings.
Lastly, in a conclusory manner, the Court of Appeals addressed the
Commonwealth’s procedural argument. The Court of Appeals stated that
contrary to the Commonwealth’s assertions, Moore’s appeal serves as a direct
appeal and does not necessarily preclude a later, appropriate RCr 11.42
collateral attack.
10 283 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Ky. 2009).
6
The Commonwealth moved this Court for discretionary review, which we
granted. The Commonwealth complains that the Court of Appeals improperly
determined that Moore could collaterally attack his final judgment by filing a
motion under RCr 10.26 and that under this standard, the Court of Appeals
determined that the circuit court committed palpable error when it sentenced
Moore to twenty years in prison. Consistent with its motion for discretionary
review, the Commonwealth’s arguments to this Court do not seek to reverse on
the merits the Court of Appeals’ decision that the circuit court erred by
sentencing Moore to twenty years in prison on the PFO II conviction. In
addition to maintaining the RCr 10.26 procedural argument as a reason to
reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the circuit court, the Commonwealth
advances other arguments, including (1) because Moore waived his sentencing
claim by failing to brief it, the Court of Appeals improperly looked to RCr 10.26
as a basis to reverse the circuit court’s denial of Moore’s motion to vacate and
(2) the Court of Appeals improperly considered Moore’s KRS 439.3106 non-
compliance argument because Moore did not raise it before the circuit court.
ANALYSIS
I. Even if the Court of Appeals erred by treating Moore’s appeal from
the denial of his motion to vacate as a direct appeal, the Court of
Appeals’ conclusion that the circuit court committed reversible
error is not erroneous.
The Kentucky Constitution provides a convicted defendant a right to at
least one appeal or review of the trial court proceedings leading to his
conviction to determine whether the proceedings were carried out according to
7
law.11 This “direct appeal,”12 is generally based upon the trial court record
alone.13 The review is designed for preserved issues, claimed errors brought to
the trial court’s attention upon which the trial court had the opportunity to
rule.14 However, as prescribed by RCr 10.26,15 an appellate court may review
and grant relief from certain unpreserved issues. For these unpreserved
issues, they “can only be reviewed as palpable error on appeal, which requires
a finding of manifest injustice to prevail.”16 Nevertheless, even if a defendant is
unsuccessful on the direct appeal of his conviction and sentence, other civil
and criminal rules allow a criminal defendant to seek post-conviction relief
from judgment.17 In particular, a criminal defendant may seek post-conviction
relief through RCr 11.4218 and CR 60.02.19
11 Ky. Const. § 115.
12 See Howard v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.2d 809, 810 (Ky. 1963).
13 Id.14 See Fischer v. Fischer, 348 S.W.3d 582 (Ky. 2011).
15 RCr 10.26 states in full:
A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be
considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an appellate court on
appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and
appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice
has resulted from the error.
16 Fischer, 348 S.W.3d at 589.
17 See Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983).
18 Pertinently, RCr 11.42(1) states:
A prisoner in custody under sentence or a defendant on probation, parole
or conditional discharge who claims a right to be released on the ground that
the sentence is subject to collateral attack may at any time proceed directly by
motion in the court that imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct it.
19 CR 60.02 states in full:
8
The interplay of RCr 11.42 and CR 60.02 with the direct appeal process
is well-settled.20 “The structure provided in Kentucky for attacking the final
judgment of a trial court in a criminal case is not haphazard and overlapping,
but is organized and complete. That structure is set out in the rules related to
direct appeals, in RCr 11.42, and thereafter in CR 60.02.”21 “RCr 11.42
provides a procedure for a motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence for ‘a
prisoner in custody under sentence or a defendant on probation, parole or
conditional discharge.’ It provides a vehicle to attack an erroneous judgment
for reasons which are not accessible by direct appeal.”22 CR 60.02 “is for relief
that is not available by direct appeal and not available under RCr 11.42. The
movant must demonstrate why he is entitled to this special, extraordinary
relief.”23
On motion a court may, upon such terms as are just, relieve a party or
his legal representative from its final judgment, order, or proceeding upon the
following grounds: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (b)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59.02; (c) perjury or
falsified evidence; (d) fraud affecting the proceedings, other than perjury or
falsified evidence; (e) the judgment is void, or has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (f) any other reason of an extraordinary nature
justifying relief. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and on
grounds (a), (b), and (c) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this rule does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
20See e.g., Howard, 364 S.W.2d at 810 (discussing direct appeal and CR
60.02); Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856 (discussing direct appeal, CR 60.02 and RCr. 11.42).
21 Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 853.
9
The Commonwealth relies primarily upon Gross, Parrish v.
Commonwealth,24 McQueen v. Commonwealth,25 and more recently decided
Commonwealth v. Dulin,26 to support its argument that Moore’s use of RCr
10.26 to collaterally attack his final conviction is procedurally barred. In Dulin,
we concluded that KRS 533.040(2) operated to extend Dulin’s term of probation
by tolling its expiration for at least six months beyond the original expiration
date and consequently the circuit court was not divested of jurisdiction to
revoke his probation.27 That conclusion disposed of the case, but we briefly
discussed the procedural arguments advanced by the Commonwealth for
reversing the Court of Appeals.
Pertinently, Dulin did not appeal the revocation order.28 Instead, two
years after the revocation order was entered, relying upon CR 60.02 and RCr
10.26, Dulin moved to vacate his sentence of imprisonment arguing that the
circuit court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation.29 While recognizing
that under certain circumstances CR 60.02 may afford relief to an incarcerated
former probationer, we stated that RCr 10.26 “is not intended as an
independent source under which an aggrieved party may bring a motion for
relief challenging an alleged error in a proceeding in which there has been a
24 272 S.W.3d 161, 176 (Ky. 2008).
25 948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1997).
26 427 S.W.3d 170, 178 (Ky. 2014).
27 Id. at 172.
28 Id. at 173.
29 Id.
10
final judgment entered.”30 The Commonwealth complains that the Court of
Appeals’ disregarded Dulin’s guidance and determined that Moore could
collaterally attack his final judgment under RCr 10.26.
While it appears that the procedural question raised by the
Commonwealth is relatively straightforward, that the differences between a
challenge to a conviction and sentence by direct appeal to an appellate court
and a post-conviction challenge by motion to the trial court easily resolves that
Moore’s appeal from his motion to vacate is not what is traditionally thought of
as a direct appeal, and that Moore’s post-conviction motion which was not
brought pursuant to RCr 11.42 or CR 60.02 was not properly before the circuit
court, this case goes beyond the traditional analysis. Although not addressed
by the parties, this case involves a sentencing issue, an issue which alters the
procedural analysis.
Specifically, a “sentencing issue” is a claim that a sentencing decision is
contrary to statute, such as when an imposed sentence is longer than allowed
by statute for the crime, or a claim that the decision was made without fully
considering the statutorily-allowed sentencing options.31 As we noted in Phon
v. Commonwealth,32 “this Court’s language in McClanahan [v. Commonwealth33]
implies that the mode of attack or time when the attack is brought are
30 Id. at 178 (citing Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856).
31 Grigsby v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 52, 54 (Ky. 2010) (citations omitted).
32 545 S.W.3d 284, 307 (Ky. 2018).
33 308 S.W.3d 694 (Ky. 2010).
11
immaterial when the issue is an illegal sentence. ‘[S]entences falling outside
the permissible sentencing range cannot stand uncorrected.’”34
“Our review of unpreserved ‘sentencing issues’ is based on protection of
the defendant from being subjected to an illegal sentence, ‘since all defendants
have the right to be sentenced after due consideration of all applicable law.’”35
The appellate court will automatically treat an unpreserved sentencing issue as
though it was preserved for appellate review.36 Furthermore, because the trial
court and appellate court have inherent authority to correct an unlawful
sentence at any time,37 a defendant may raise a sentencing issue through any
of the following relief mechanisms: direct appeal, with the standard of review
being abuse of discretion even when the sentencing issue is not preserved;38
RCr 11. 42; CR 60.02; or a writ of habeas corpus.39
Despite the Court of Appeals’ likely good intention of construing Moore’s
motion and appeal in a manner which would not keep him from seeking RCr
11.42 relief, because of the manner in which we think of a direct appeal – an
appeal directly from the final judgment and not an appeal from a post-
34545 S.W.3d at 307 (quoting McClanahan, 308 S.W.3d at 700) (emphasis
added in Phon).
Martin v. Commonwealth, 576 S.W.3d 120, 122 (Ky. 2019) (quoting Hughes v.
35
Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Ky. 1994)).
36 Webster v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.3d 321, 325 (Ky. 2014).
See, e.g., Phon v. Commonwealth, 545 S.W.3d 284, 308 (Ky. 2018), and Jones
37
v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Ky. 2011).
38 Jones, 382 S.W.3d at 27-28; McClanahan, 308 S.W.3d at 698.
39Myers v. Commonwealth, 42 S.W.3d 594, 596 (Ky. 2001), overruled on other
grounds by McClanahan v. Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 694 (Ky. 2010).
12
conviction motion attacking a final judgment through RCr 11.42 or CR 60.02,
we do not view Moore’s appeal as a direct appeal. Nevertheless, even if the
Court of Appeals’ treatment of Moore’s appeal was erroneous, the
Commonwealth’s procedural argument is not a basis to reverse the Court of
Appeals’ decision that Moore’s sentence must be vacated and to affirm the
circuit court. While Moore describes his case as an anomaly and likely it is so,
“[i]n Kentucky, a court speaks through the language of its orders and
judgments”40 and given the involvement of a sentencing issue, like the Court in
Howard v. Ingram,41 we decline to engage in “useless ‘circuity of motion,’”42,43
requiring Moore to file an additional post-conviction motion seeking relief when
this procedural issue was not raised before the circuit court and the
Commonwealth does not dispute the fact that the twenty-year sentence based
on the PFO II charge is erroneous. Whether the circuit court’s denial of
Moore’s motion to vacate his sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
40 Cumberland Valley Contractors, Inc. v. Bell Cnty. Coal Corp., 238 S.W.3d 644,
648 (Ky. 2007).
41 452 S.W.2d 410 (Ky. 1970).
42 Id. at 411.
43 In Ingram, although the defendant’s original judgment of conviction fixed his
sentence at one year in prison, upon his probation revocation, the trial court
sentenced him to two years. Id. After the defendant served more than thirteen
months, his petition for habeas corpus was sustained, and the defendant was released
from prison. Id. The state reformatory superintendent appealed, arguing that the
defendant should have brought an RCr 11.42 motion to vacate. Id. While the
appellate court agreed with the superintendent, it noted that it would be useless
‘circuity of motion’ to reverse the judgment, since it could only result in the necessity
of reincarcerating the defendant, thereby reestablishing his eligibility to proceed under
RCr 11.42. Id. at 411-12.
13
standard44 or as considered by the Court of Appeals here, the palpable error
standard, Moore is entitled to relief.
The Commonwealth also argues that the Court of Appeals erred by
considering Moore’s illegal sentence claim under RCr 10.26 because it was not
briefed by Moore. “Implicit in the concept of palpable error correction is that
the error is so obvious that the trial court was remiss in failing to act upon it
sua sponte.”45 Nevertheless, pertinent to the Commonwealth’s argument, this
Court has stated that “[a]bsent extreme circumstances amounting to a
substantial miscarriage of justice, an appellate court will not engage in
palpable error review pursuant to RCr 10.26 unless such a request is made and
briefed by the appellant.”46
An erroneous sentence is injurious to a defendant’s substantial rights.47
By applying the preceding standard, under which we conclude Moore’s case fits
easily within the exception, we simply may recognize that appellate briefing is
not required for a defendant to be granted relief from an illegal sentence.
In sum, we cannot view the circumstances of this case as not warranting
relief.48 Accordingly, we remand this case to the circuit court for Moore’s
resentencing. The illegal twenty-year sentence for the PFO II charge is vacated.
44 McClanahan, 308 S.W.3d at 698.
45 Lamb v. Commonwealth, 510 S.W.3d 316, 325 (Ky. 2017).
46 Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 251 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Ky. 2008).
47 Peyton v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 504, 512 (Ky. 2008).
48 The Court of Appeals did not address Moore’s defective plea agreement claim.
Moore does not raise that issue before this Court.
14
However, it is unclear from the record on appeal what sentence was imposed
upon Moore for the two class D felonies.49 In consideration of precedent
respecting final judgments, see e.g., Machniak v. Commonwealth, 351 S.W.3d
648 (Ky. 2011), the circuit court is directed to resentence Moore on the two
class D felonies, pursuant to KRS 532.110 and KRS 532.080.
II. The Court of Appeals erred by reversing the circuit court’s probation
revocation order.
Finally, the Commonwealth claims that the Court of Appeals erred by
improperly using RCr 10.26 to review the probation-revocation order because
Moore did not raise this claim before the circuit court.
As noted previously, Moore’s appellate brief to the Court of Appeals
addressed preserved and unpreserved probation sentencing and probation
revocation arguments. The probation issue which the Court of Appeals relied
upon to reverse the circuit court’s revocation order – failure to comply with
KRS 439.3106 – was not an issue presented to the circuit court. Moore argued
before the Court of Appeals that the circuit court failed to make the mandatory
findings pursuant to KRS 439.3106(1) because the circuit court did not include
any findings on its calendar order other than the conclusive statements related
to the statutory criteria. Despite the issue being unpreserved and at most,
subject to palpable error review, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
circuit court abused its discretion by revoking Moore’s probation without
49 Moore certified for appeal the motion to vacate hearings only and the
Commonwealth did not supplement the record to clarify Moore’s proper sentence on
the two class D felonies.
15
making written findings in its orders about the statutory criteria under KRS
439.3106(1)(a), i.e., whether Moore posed a significant risk to prior victims or
the community at large and whether Moore could be appropriately managed in
the community.
There are two documents in the record related to Moore’s probation
revocation: the revocation hearing docket sheet/calendar order and the
subsequent order revoking Moore’s probation. The circuit court wrote its
findings of fact and conclusion of law, including its conclusion that Moore was
not capable of supervision and was a danger to the community, on the docket
sheet. The order revoking Moore’s probation references the revocation hearing
proof generally and identifies that Moore violated the terms of his probation by
failing to report to Probation and Parole as ordered and by using
methamphetamine and benzodiazepines.
Under RCr 10.26, if an unpreserved error is found to be palpable and if it
affects the substantial rights of the defendant, the appellate court may grant
appropriate relief if manifest injustice has resulted from the error. An error is
palpable when it is “easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily noticeable.”50
The error must be “so manifest, fundamental and unambiguous that it
threatens the integrity of the judicial process.”51 Upon review of the record, we
find no palpable error in regard to the circuit court’s compliance with KRS
50 Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006).
51 Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2006).
16
439.3106(1). We agree with the Commonwealth that the Court of Appeals
erred by reversing Moore’s probation revocation.52
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals’ decision is affirmed in
part and reversed in part. This case is remanded to the Todd Circuit Court for
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky
Bryan Morrow
Assistant Attorneys General
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jennifer Wade
Assistant Public Advocate
52 As noted above, Moore raised other probation related arguments, but those
issues were not addressed by the Court of Appeals: (1) the circuit court abused its
discretion by placing Moore on probation before he served the 240 days in jail
mandated by KRS 189A.010(5)(d), or (2) the circuit court committed palpable error by
failing to consider lesser sanctions than revocation under KRS 439.3107. Moore does
not raise those issues before this Court.
17