Uninsured Employers Fund v. Darlene Crowder ( 2016 )


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  •          IMPORTANT NOTICE
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
    THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
    PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
    PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
    THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
    CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
    CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
    UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
    RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
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    RENDERED: MAY 5, 2016
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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    UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND                                              APPELLANT
    ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
    V.                      CASE NO. 2014-CA-1556-WC
    WORKERS' COMPENSATION NO. 10-00493
    DARLENE CROWDER;
    PULASKI FRANCHISES, INC.;
    QFA ROYALTIES, LLC.;
    EUGENE DAVIS; JAMES DICK;
    HONORABLE J. GREGORY ALLEN,
    ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
    WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD                                            APPELLEES
    MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
    AFFIRMING
    Appellant, Uninsured Employers' Fund ("UEF"), appeals a Court of
    Appeals decision which affirmed that Appellee, QFA Royalties, LLC, ("QFA") did
    not have up-the-ladder liability for workers' compensation benefits paid to
    Darlene Crowder, and that Appellees, Eugene Davis and James Dick, are also
    not jointly and severally liable to pay for the benefits in question. For the
    below stated reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals.
    On February 27, 2009, Davis and Dick purchased an existing Quiznos
    sandwich shop in Somerset, Kentucky, from a third party. Davis purchased
    45% of the business and was to participate in the day-to-day management of
    the Quiznos. Dick purchased the remaining 55% but was not active in
    management. Davis and Dick signed the transfer agreements and franchise
    agreement with QFA in their individual capacity. The franchise agreement
    required Davis and Dick to pay QFA a one time transfer fee of $12,500 and a
    monthly 7% royalty fee based on sales. Several days after signing the
    contracts, on March 2, 2009, Davis and Dick created Pulaski Franchises, Inc.
    ("Pulaski") for the purpose of owning and operating the Quiznos. Davis owned
    45% of Pulaski and Dick 55%. However, the record indicates that neither the
    franchise agreement nor the assets of the restaurant were transferred into
    Pulaski's name. Nevertheless, all of the restaurant's cash flow was placed into
    accounts held by Pulaski. The employees' wages, taxes, and royalty payments
    to QFA were also paid from the Pulaski account.
    Davis hired Tyler Hibbard to manage the Quiznos. Hibbard, in turn,
    hired Crowder to serve as his assistant. Crowder's first day of work was April
    3, 2010. On April 15, 2010, she severely injured her left eye while working at
    the Quiznos. At the time Crowder suffered her work-related injury, the
    workers' compensation insurance for Quiznos, that was held in Pulaski's name,
    had lapsed. Crowder filed a Form 101 Application for Resolution of Injury
    Claim. QFA, Pulaski, Davis, and Dick were all joined as parties. The UEF was
    also joined as a party due to the lack of a workers' compensation insurance
    policy.
    2
    QFA's designated corporate representative, Lori Christensen, testified by
    deposition. She stated that QFA is in the business of licensing franchises and
    makes profit from the initial franchise fee and monthly
    o      royalties from its
    franchisees. Christensen testified that QFA has never owned or operated any
    Quiznos sandwich shops. However, another corporate entity which is part of
    the "Quiznos family" did briefly operate corporate owned restaurants.
    Christensen did testify that while QFA is not in the business of running the
    day-to-day operations of Quiznos restaurants, it did have an interest in making
    sure the individual franchises lived up to a certain standard to provide a
    consistent experience for its customers.
    UEF filed a copy of the franchise agreement entered into between QFA,
    Davis, and Dick. The franchise agreement set out with great specificity the
    parties' rights and obligations with respect to operating the franchise. The
    franchise agreement stated that QFA must approve the location for the
    Quiznos, the lease, the type of equipment used, and the signage. The
    agreement also stated that the franchisees must comply with the operations
    manual which provided even greater detail into how the Quiznos must be
    managed. The operations manual gave rules on how many employees must be
    on duty at all times, what the daily hours of the restaurant must be, and how
    to make and wrap sandwiches, among other rules.
    Davis testified that he was initially responsible for the day-to-day
    operation of the Quiznos, but hired Hibbard to take over all management
    duties. Davis stated that his primary employment was as a snack food
    3
    salesman. Dick testified that he was just a passive investor in the business
    and had no knowledge of the daily operations. However, there was no contract
    or agreement limiting Dick's involvement in the enterprise. His primary
    employment was as a funeral director. Both Davis and Dick testified that they
    set up Pulaski to own the Quiznos, but neither came up with a reason as to
    why the franchise was not transferred to the corporation However, Davis
    stated that all of the Quiznos's receipts were placed into and payments were
    made out of an account in Pulaski's name. Neither Davis nor Dick knew that
    the workers' compensation coverage for Pulaski had lapsed.
    ALJ Allison Jones entered an interlocutory opinion and order on
    December 6, 2012, on the bifurcated issues of whether QFA had up-the-ladder
    liability per KRS 342.610(2); whether Pulaski, Dick, or Davis was Crowder's
    employer; and whether QFA can be held liable if it did not have a written
    agreement with Crowder's employer. ALJ Jones found QFA was in the
    business, of granting and overseeing franchise agreements, and that making
    and selling sandwiches to customers is not a regular and recurrent part of its
    business. She found that while QFA provides very detailed instructions to its
    franchises, it is not involved in operating or managing the stores. ALJ Jones
    found QFA's role in this matter was indistinguishable from the scenario in
    Doctors' Associates, Inc. v. Uninsured Employers' Fund, 
    364 S.W.3d 88
    (Ky.
    2011). ALJ Jones reasoned that QFA did not have up-the ladder liability, and
    dismissed it from the case. ALJ Jones then further found that Pulaski was
    Crowder's employer based on bank records and the parties' testimony. She
    4
    dismissed Davis and Dick from the claim. Thus, Pulaski would be responsible
    to repay the UEF for any workers' compensation benefits paid to Crowder.
    The UEF filed a petition for reconsideration asking for additional findings
    of fact and conclusions of law on the question of whether Davis, Dick, and
    Pulaski were involved in a joint venture and were therefore jointly and severally
    liable. The elements essential to find that there was a joint enterprise/venture
    are: "1) an agreement, express or implied, among the members of the group; 2)
    a common purpose to be carried out by the group; 3) a community of pecuniary
    interest in that purpose among the members; and 4) an equal right to a voice in
    the direction of the enterprise, which gives an equal right of control." Huff v.
    Rosenberg, 
    496 S.W.2d 352
    (Ky. 1973).
    Applying the facts of this matter, ALJ Jones determined that Davis, Dick,
    and Pulaski were not involved in a joint enterprise/venture because the first,
    third, and fourth element of the Huff test were not satisfied. ALJ Jones found
    the first element was not satisfied because there was no agreement between
    Dick, Davis, and Pulaski to jointly operate and run the Quiznos. The third
    element was not satisfied because ALJ Jones found that there was no evidence
    the three parties shared profits from the Quiznos. Instead, ALJ Jones believed
    that all of the profits from the restaurant were treated as corporate profits and
    retained by Pulaski to put back into the business. Finally, ALJ Jones found
    that the fourth element was not satisfied because Dick testified that he was a
    passive investor and exercised no control over the business. The ALJ further
    5
    opined that the parties made a mutual mistake when Dick and Davis
    purchased the franchise in their personal capacity and not in Pulaski's name.
    ALJ Gregory Allen was assigned to the matter after ALJ Jones was
    appointed to the Court of Appeals. He adopted ALJ Jones's findings regarding
    the parties' liability to pay Crowder's workers' compensation benefits. ALA
    Allen then ordered Pulaski to reimburse UEF per KRS 342.760(4) for any
    benefits paid. He awarded Crowder temporary total disability benefits and
    permanent partial disability benefits enhanced by the three multiplier per KRS
    342.730(1)(c)1. The Workers' Compensation Board ("Board") and Court of
    Appeals affirmed, and this appeal followed.
    The Board's review in this matter was limited to determining whether the
    evidence is sufficient to support the ALJ's findings, or if the evidence compels a
    different result. W. Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 
    827 S.W.2d 685
    , 687 (Ky. 1992).
    Further, the function of the Court of Appeals is to "correct the Board only
    where the Court perceives the Board has overlooked or misconstrued
    controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error in assessing the
    evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice."   
    Id. at 687-88.
    Finally, review
    by this Court "is to address new or novel questions of statutory construction,
    or to reconsider precedent when such appears necessary, or to review a
    question of constitutional magnitude." 
    Id. The ALJ,
    as fact-finder, has the sole
    discretion to judge the credibility of testimony and weight of evidence.
    Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, 
    695 S.W.2d 418
    (Ky. 1985).
    6
    I. QFA DOES NOT HAVE UP-THE-LADDER LIABILITY TO
    REIMBURSE THE UEF FOR CROWDER'S WORKERS'
    COMPENSATION BENEFITS
    UEF first argues that QFA should have up-the-ladder liability to pay for
    Crowder's workers' compensation benefits. UEF contends that QFA was a
    contractor and Davis, Dick, and Pulaski collectively served as a subcontractor,
    as a matter of law. It argues that QFA was as much in the sandwich selling
    business as Davis, Dick, and Pulaski, based on Christensen's testimony which
    indicated that QFA had an interest in making individual franchises succeed,
    and that the franchise agreement provided very specific instructions on how
    franchises must run their business. Because the UEF was unsuccessful before
    the ALJ and had the burden of proof regarding whether QFA has up-the-ladder
    liability, the question on appeal is if, upon consideration of the whole record,
    the evidence compels a finding in its favor.   Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 
    673 S.W.2d 735
    (KY. App. 1984).
    KRS 342.610(2) states, "A contractor who subcontracts all or any part of
    a contract and his or her carrier shall be liable for the payment of
    compensation to the employees of the subcontractor unless the subcontractor
    primarily liable for the payment of such compensation has secured the
    payment of compensation as provided for in his chapter." Any person who
    contracts with another, "To have work performed of a kind which is a regular or
    recurrent part of the work of the trade, business, occupation, or profession of
    such person shall for the purposes of [the statute] be deemed a contractor, and
    such other person a subcontractor." KRS 342.610(2)(b).
    7
    Work of a kind that is a 'regular or recurrent part of the work of
    the trade, business, occupation, or profession' of an owner does
    not mean work that is beneficial or incidental to the owner's
    business or that it is necessary to enable the owner to continue in
    business, improve or expand its business, or remain or become
    more competitive in the market. It is work that is customary,
    usual, or normal to the particular business (including work
    assumed by contract or required by law) or work that the business
    repeats with some degree of regularity, and it is of a kind that the
    business or similar business would normally perform or be
    expected to perform with employees.
    General Electric Co. v. Cain, 
    236 S.W.3d 579
    , 588 (Ky. 2007). Nothing within
    KRS 342.610(2) precludes a franchisor, such as QFA, from being considered
    the statutory employer of its uninsured franchisee's employee. Doctors'
    Associates, 
    Inc., 364 S.W.3d at 92
    . Whether an individual or business has up-
    the-ladder liability is decided on a case by case basis. 
    Id. at 89
    In this matter, the ALJ's determination that QFA does not have up-the-
    ladder liability is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ found that QFA
    is in the business of granting and overseeing franchisee agreements and that,
    unlike the Quiznos in Somerset, making and selling sandwiches to customers
    is not a regular and recurrent part of its business. This finding is supported by
    the fact that QFA did not actually operate any Quiznos restaurant. While the
    franchise agreement and operating manual do provide detailed instructions on
    how to manage the restaurants on a day-to-day basis, these guidelines were
    instituted to protect the brand which QFA sold. Keeping the brand strong is a
    critical part of QFA's purpose because it derives its revenue from franchise fees
    and royalties. Additionally, while the success of individual franchises does
    benefit QFA, its primary focus is making Quiznos franchises attractive to
    8
    investors. Thus, since QFA is not in the business of making and selling
    sandwiches to customers and the Quiznos in Somerset was engaged in that
    work, QFA cannot be considered the contractor, and does not have up-the-
    ladder liability in this matter.
    II. CROWER'S EMPLOYER IS PULASKI, THEREFORE DAVIS
    AND DICK ARE NOT JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE TO
    PAY FOR HER WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS
    UEF also argues that Davis and Dick are jointly and severally liable for
    Crowder's workers' compensation benefits because they were engaged in a joint
    venture with Pulaski to operate the Quiznos. UEF argues that Davis, Dick, and
    Pulaski had a common purpose to make money selling Quiznos sandwiches,
    and thus per the Huff test, they were engaged in a joint venture. However the
    UEF's focus on whether Davis, Dick, and Pulaski were involved in a joint
    venture is misplaced. Clearly, Davis and Dick were involved in a joint venture
    to make money from operating a Quiznos franchise and created Pulaski in an
    attempt to shield themselves from the liability of running such a business. See
    KRS 271B.6-220. The real question here is whether Pulaski is Crowder's
    employer despite the fact that Davis and Dick never transferred the assets and
    franchise agreement from the Quiznos to the corporation. If Pulaski is
    Crowder's employer, then Davis and Dick are shielded from being jointly and
    severally liable for the workers' compensation benefits.
    KRS 342.640(1) defines employees as, "Every person including a minor,
    whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, in the service of an employer under
    any contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, and all helpers and
    9
    assistants of employees, whether paid by the employer or employee, if
    employed with the knowledge, actual or constructive, of the employer."
    Crowder was clearly under a contract of hire because she was asked by
    Hibbard to work for Quiznos. There is no evidence that Davis or Dick had any
    say in hiring Crowder and both testified that Pulaski was incorporated to
    operate the Quiznos. Crowder and Hibbard were paid from Pulaski's bank •
    account and would have received worker's compensation benefits from an
    insurance policy held in Pulaski's name if it had not lapsed. Therefore, the
    ALJ's conclusion that Crowder was employed by Pulaski is supported by the
    record and shall not be disturbed on appeal. The fact that Davis and Dick
    never transferred the franchise agreement and restaurant assets into Pulaski's
    name does not change the fact that Pulaski was operating the restaurant on
    Davis and Dick's behalf. Pulaski is solely responsible to pay the UEF for
    Crowder's workers' compensation.
    For the above stated reasons, we affirm the decision of the Court of
    Appeals.
    All sitting. All concur.
    10
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT,
    UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND:
    James Robert Carpenter
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
    DARLENE CROWDER:
    McKinnley Morgan
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
    PULASKI FRANCHISES, INC.;
    EUGENE DAVIS; JAMES DICK:
    John G. Prather, Jr.
    Arden Winter Robertson Huff
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
    QFA ROYALTIES, LLC:
    Donald Cameron Walton, III
    John Patterson
    11