Dejuan Earl Hammond v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2016 )

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RENDERED: JUNE 16, 2016
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DEJUAN EARL HAMMOND APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
V. HONORABLE ANGELA MCCORMICK BISIG, JUDGE
NO. 13-CR-003412
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART
On the evening of March 23, 2009, Steven Pettway shot and killed Troya
Sheckles in Shelby Park in Louisville, Kentucky. Pettway was tried and
convicted by a Jefferson Circuit Court jury of murder and intimidating a
participant in the legal process. In accordance with the jury's
recommendation, the trial court sentenced him to a total of 55 years'
imprisonment. On appeal, we determined that "Pettway could not have been
guilty of intimidating a witness under any view of the facts and evidence in this
case." Pettway v. Commonwealth, 470 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Ky. 2015); see also
KRS 524.040. We held that this unpreserved error was palpable and required
reversal of Pettway's intimidation conviction. Id. The murder conviction was
affirmed.
Pettway's co-defendant was Dejuan Hammond (hereinafter "Appellant").
The two were tried separately. Similar to the case involving Pettway, the
Commonwealth's theory against Appellant was that Pettway killed Sheckles at
Appellant's direction to prevent her from testifying in the upcoming murder
trial of Appellant's younger brother, Lloyd Hammond. It is undisputed that
Sheckles was an essential eye witness in Lloyd's murder trial.
After multiple mistrials, Appellant was successfully tried and convicted
by a Jefferson Circuit Court jury of complicity to murder and complicity to
intimidating a participant in the legal process. After convicting Appellant of
being a second-degree persistent felony offender, the jury sentenced him to 25
years' imprisonment for murder, and five years enhanced to 10 for intimidating
a participant in the legal process. The sentences were ordered to run
consecutively for a total sentence of 35 years' imprisonment. Appellant now
appeals his judgment and sentence as a matter of right pursuant to § 110(2)(b)
of the Kentucky Constitution. Three issues are addressed as follows. For the
reasons stated herein, we reverse Appellant's conviction for intimidating a
participant in a legal process, but affirm the murder conviction.
Intimidating a Participant in a Legal Process
Appellant's primary argument is that he could not be convicted of both
intentional murder and intimidating a participant in a legal process. The
statute at issue is KRS 524.040. It provides in relevant part:
(1) A person is guilty of intimidating a participant in the legal
process when, by use of physical force or a threat directed to a
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person he believes to be a participant in the legal process, he or
she:
(a) Influences, or attempts to influence, the testimony ... of that
person; [or]
(c) Induces or attempts to induce, that person to absent himself or
herself from an official proceeding to which he has been legally
summoned.
Applying this statute in Pettway, we held that "[k]illing a witness
forecloses the possibility of influencing that witness's testimony or inducing the
witness to absent herself from trial." Pettway, 470 S.W.3d at 710. As
previously stated, we reversed Pettway's intimidation conviction. The
Commonwealth requests that we reconsider our previous holding in Pettway
when applying that holding to the present case. We decline the invitation.
However, we will address the Commonwealth's argument that the
present case is factually distinguishable from Pettway. The Commonwealth
essentially argues that it presented evidence of Appellant's criminal conduct
that occurred prior to Sheckles' murder and was entirely distinct from the act
or complicity to murder. We will address this issue in the context of whether
Appellant was entitled to a directed verdict.
To clarify, Appellant argued before the trial court that the
Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence on the intimidation charge
and that he was entitled to a directed verdict. The court denied Appellant's
motion. Similar to the issue addressed in Pettway, Appellant's argument here
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requires that we review the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the
Commonwealth.
We will reverse the trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict "if
under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to
find guilt[.]" Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) (citing
Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1983) (emphasis added)). Our
review is confined to the proof at trial and the statutory elements of the alleged
offense. Lawton v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 565, 575 (Ky. 2011). The
Commonwealth presents several items of evidence in support of its argument
that Appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict and, therefore, that he was
properly convicted of murder and intimidating a participant in a legal process.
First, the Commonwealth presented evidence at Appellant's trial that
Sheckles was evading service at the time of Lloyd Hammond's scheduled trial
date. The Commonwealth also contends that evidence indicated that Sheckles
was not herself in the time leading up to that trial and did not want to attend
family gatherings. However, the Commonwealth's citation to the record fails to
confirm this latter claim.
Second, Lloyd's case was dismissed without prejudice after Sheckles
could not be located. Because she was an indispensable eye witness, a
warrant was issued for her arrest. After she was located, Lloyd was again
indicted.
Third, Appellant visited his brother on three separate occasions in early
2009 and received jail phone calls from Lloyd in early March 2009. Prior to his
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2009 visits, Appellant had not visited his brother in jail since 2007. The
Commonwealth claims that the 2009 jail visit occurred one week before Lloyd's
trial was scheduled to begin.
Fourth, there was testimony that Appellant voiced his intent to identify
the witness, and help his younger brother, Lloyd, get out of jail. This evidence
came from Prince Bolin, the brother of Appellant's former girlfriend, Princess
Bolin. After Prince denied having any memory of speaking to the police about
this matter, the Commonwealth introduced a recording of his statements to the
police wherein he stated that Appellant told him that he had seen the victim,
Sheckles, in the park and that Appellant voiced his intention to "take her." The
Commonwealth also introduced Princess Bolin's prior statement to the police
wherein she stated that she overheard Appellant speaking to Lloyd over the
phone concerning Sheckles testifying at trial. Appellant told Lloyd not to worry
and that everything would be taken care of. According to Princess, she also
heard Appellant inform Lloyd that it had been "taken care of." This occurred
two or three days after Sheckles' murder.
It would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to convict Appellant based on
these four instances of evidence presented by the Commonwealth. More
precisely, Sheckles' aversion to appearing as a key eye witness in a murder
case is not entirely unique, and certainly not evidence from which jurors could
reasonably convict Appellant of intimidating a participant in a legal process.
And while the testimony that Appellant voiced his intent to "take care of it" and
help his younger brother get out of jail may be sufficient evidence of his
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intention to intimidate Sheckles, it fails to indicate that Appellant ever acted or
attempted to act on his intent to intimidate a witness other than the murder
itself. See KRS 524.040. Under our holding in Pettway, Appellant's complicity
to Sheckles' murder cannot satisfy that requirement.
In addition to this evidence, the Commonwealth also cites an instance
where Sheckles was ordered to appear at a pre-trial hearing in the murder case
against Appellant's brother, Lloyd. Some additional background information is
necessary.
As previously noted, Lloyd's murder indictment was dismissed without
prejudice after the key witness, Sheckles, could not be located. Because she
was an indispensable witness in Lloyd's case, a warrant was issued for her
arrest. After she was located, Lloyd was again indicted. Sheckles was ordered
to appear in court where she was sworn to appear at Lloyd's subsequent trial.
Appellant was present in the court room gallery during that hearing.
Tom Coffey was a former Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney who was
involved in the prosecution of Appellant's brother, Lloyd. Coffey testified at
Appellant's trial. Prior to testifying, Coffey was informed of the trial court's
ruling that Coffey could testify as to his observations of Sheckles' demeanor,
but could not testify as to how Sheckles felt. Thereafter, Coffey testified that,
during the hearing in which Appellant was present in the courtroom gallery,
Sheckles was trembling and "had all the signs of someone who looked very,
very, afraid." Defense counsel objected and the court admonished the jury that
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a witness cannot state what someone else is feeling and to "disregard anything
that's not in the category of something that could be observed."
We have previously recognized that "[g]enerally, a witness may not testify
to the mental impressions of another." See Young v. Commonwealth, 50
S.W.3d 148, 170 (Ky. 2001) (citations omitted); see also KRE 701 and KRE 602.
However, "[a]n exception occurs if the opinion is based on the witness's own
factual observations or perceptions." Attorney Coffey's testimony was based on
his own observation or perception of Sheckles' actions and reactions. Young, 50
S.W.3d at 170. Therefore, this evidence was admissible. Moreover, Appellant
received the benefit of an admonition that the jury not consider any portion of
Coffey's testimony that was based on anything other than Coffey's own
observations. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 430, 441 (Ky. 2003) ("[a]
jury is presumed to follow an admonition to disregard evidence and the
admonition thus cures any error."). Two other witnesses also testified in a
manner similar to Coffey.
Tom Van De Rostyne was a former Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney
who had been intimately involved in Appellant's prosecution until he was
removed from the case. The Jefferson County Commonwealth Attorney's office
initiated an internal investigation into Van De Rostyne's handling of Appellant's
case that will be discussed later in our analysis. For purposes of the present
issue, it is only relevant that Van De Rostyne testified during Appellant's trial
that Sheckles looked "terrified" at the hearing where she was ordered to appear
prior to Lloyd Hammond's trial. To clarify, that was the same hearing where
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Appellant was present in the court room gallery. Detective Roy Stalvey, also
testified that he had been informed that "apparently [Sheckles] was nervous
from a prior proceeding that she was in where she saw [Appellant] in the
courtroom." This isolated comment occurred while Detective Stalvey was
generally describing why he believed Sheckles' murder to be a targeted killing.
Appellant failed to object to these statements by Van De Rostyne and Detective
Stalvey.
Like Coffey's testimony, Van De Rostyne's statements were based on his,
own observation or perception of Sheckles' actions and reactions. Similarly,
Detective Stalvey's statement concerned Sheckles' apparent nervousness. No
error occurred here, and certainly no palpable error. RCr 10.26; McCleery v.
Commonwealth, 410 S.W.3d 597, 606 (Ky. 2013) (we will not reverse unless "it
can be determined that manifest injustice, i.e., a repugnant and intolerable
outcome, resulted from that error.").
Even viewing Van De Rostyne and Coffey's disputed testimony as
properly admitted, however, there was still insufficient evidence in this case to
instruct the jury on the intimidation charge. The disputed testimony involves
Appellant's presence in the courtroom gallery where he presumably had a right
to be. The Commonwealth has not offered any evidence that the hearing at
which Sheckles and Appellant were present was closed to the public.
Therefore, when considering the evidence as a whole, it was clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find guilt here. Accordingly, we reverse Appellant's
conviction for intimidating a participant in a legal process.
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Discovery Violations
Next, Appellant argues that due to numerous discovery violations by the
Commonwealth, "the court must employ its inherent supervisory power and its
power under Section 2 of the Constitution to dismiss the indictment with
prejudice . . . ." Appellant contends that the appropriate remedy here is
dismissal of his indictment. We disagree.
Before the first trial date in this case, the charge was dismissed without
prejudice because the Commonwealth's witnesses were unavailable.
Appellant's second trial resulted in a mistrial when a complete copy of an
investigative letter was not disclosed by the Commonwealth until the middle of
trial. As such, Appellant moved to dismiss the case with prejudice. In support,
Appellant argued that the investigative letter included the statement of a
witness who provided an alibi for Appellant. The court denied the motion.
Defense counsel subsequently discovered that the Commonwealth possessed
additional discovery materials that had not been disclosed to the defense. In
response, Appellant filed additional motions to dismiss which were denied by
the court.
Having reviewed the record, we agree with the Commonwealth that the
trial court's orders denying Appellant's dismissal motions were well-reasoned
and appropriate. In denying Appellant's third and final motion to dismiss, the
court stated the following:
The Court has twice found that the Commonwealth failed in its
duty to conduct a thorough review of its files to insure that all
materials were properly disclosed. However, in these most recent
documents, the Court does not find that the information fell within
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the scope of RCr 7.24 or Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) . .
.. The Court therefore finds no discovery violation. It is of the
utmost importance that [Appellant] be able to receive a fair trial
and have his due process rights vigorously defended. The Court
notes that all of the information at issue is now disclosed prior to
the next-scheduled trial date for [Appellant]. The Court further
would grant a motion to continue if defense counsel believes it
needs additional time to prepare in light of the evidence disclosed
in this case.
The trial court also ordered that defense counsel have access to the entire
police file in this case. That is an extraordinary remedy. We addressed a
similar issue in Pettway:
[Appellant] has already received appropriate judicial remedies in
the form of a mistrial and exclusion of evidence. To pile on would
be nothing but arbitrary. And such action would raise significant
separation-of-powers concerns. While we acknowledge the
observation of Chief Justice Palmore that "[s]ometimes, as Holmes
remarked, because the constable blundered the criminal must go
free, that being the most effective method of helping the constable
not to blunder the next time," Reid v. Cowan, 502 S.W.2d 41, 42
(Ky. 1973), this is not one of those times. There was no blunder
that could not be appropriately addressed, as the trial court did
here, under our rules of procedure.
Pettway, 470 S.W.3d at 712.
Like in Pettway, the discovery violations that occurred in the present case were
properly addressed by the trial court. Any prejudice that may have occurred
most certainly does not warrant the dismissal of the indictment.
Closing Argument
For his final argument, Appellant contends that the trial court
erroneously limited defense counsel's closing argument discussion of an
internal investigation into the handling of this case. Appellant asserts that this
information was critical to his defense that this case was the product of an
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"overzealous prosecution and tunnel-vision investigation where leads were not
followed and exculpatory evidence was disclosed years after the crime
occurred." Some additional background information is necessary.
The investigation at issue here was an internal investigation ordered by
the Jefferson County Commonwealth's Attorney that specifically targeted the
handling of discovery by former Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney Tom Van
De Rostyne. Mr. Van De Rostyne was actively involved in Appellant's case
before and after the indictment. He was subsequently removed from the case
in December 2012, which was two years before Appellant's trial. The
investigation into his handling of discovery was still pending during Appellant's
trial.
It is critical to note that the defense discussed the investigation during
opening statement and during its questioning of Attorney Coffey. The
Commonwealth did not object to these instances. However, near the end of
trial, the Commonwealth objected to any additional references to the
investigation on the basis that it was irrelevant. The Commonwealth also
requested that the court strike defense counsel's earlier remarks, and
requested that the jury be admonished not to consider those statements. The
trial court declined to strike the evidence or admonish the jury, but ordered
that there be no additional references to the internal investigation.
Subsequently, however, the trial court allowed defense counsel to briefly
question Attorney Van De Rostyne concerning his knowledge of the
investigation. The court also instructed the jury that they were not to consider
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Van De Rostyne's testimony on this issue as substantive evidence of the
defendant's case-in-chief.
Prior to closing arguments, the parties sought additional clarification
whether the defense could discuss the internal investigation. The court ruled
that the investigation could be discussed in closing as relevant to Van De
Rostyne's alleged bias, but not for any other purposes. Accordingly, Appellant
informed the jury during closing that Van De Rostyne was under investigation
and that they could use that information when assessing his credibility as a
witness.
Appellant specifically argues that he should have been able to further
develop his discussion of the internal investigation concerning Van De Rostyne
during closing argument in order to demonstrate how the investigation of the
murder case against Appellant had been mishandled, instead of being limited
to attacking Van De Rostyne's credibility.
In support of his argument, Appellant cites Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
683 (1986). In that case, the trial court excluded testimony concerning the
circumstances of the defendant's confession on the ground that the testimony
pertained solely to the issue of voluntariness. This Court affirmed the trial
court's decision. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and held that "evidence
about the manner in which a confession was obtained is often highly relevant
to its reliability and credibility" and that there was no "rational justification for
the wholesale exclusion of this body of potentially exculpatory evidence[.]" Id.
at 691. The issue in the present case is clearly distinguishable from Crane.
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Unlike the confession at issue in Crane, neither the testimony nor the
additional references concerning the investigation were introduced by the
prosecution as evidence against the accused. Also, the defendant in Crane
introduced the excluded evidence by avowal which included "testimony from
two police officers about the size and other physical characteristics of the
interrogation room, the length of the interview, and various other details about
the taking of the confession." Id. at 686. In contrast, Appellant has failed to
indicate what specific evidence he was precluded from introducing because of
the ineptness of the investigation that defense counsel had not already
addressed in the earlier stages of trial. There was no error here.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we hereby reverse the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court on the intimidating a participant in the legal process
conviction. We affirm the court's judgment on the murder conviction.
All sitting. All concur.
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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Karen Shuff Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Andy Beshear
Attorney General of Kentucky
Dorislee J. Gilbert
Special Assistant Attorney General
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