Keith Spears v. Hon Pamela R. Goodwine Judge, Fayette Circuit Court ( 2016 )

RENDERED: JUNE 16, 2016
TO BE PUBLISHED
opi5uprrmr Court of ecifirtifuritu
2015-SC-000365-MR
KEITH SPEARS APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V. NO. 2015-CA-000314-MR
FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT NO. 14-CI-04359
HON. PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE, APPELLEE
FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
AND
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE APPELLEE/REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN
GOVERNMENT POLICEMEN'S
AND FIREFIGHTER'S
RETIREMENT FUND,
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE VENTERS
REVERSING AND VACATING
Appellant, Keith Spears, appeals from an order of the Court of Appeals
granting a writ of prohibition sought by Appellee, Board of Trustees of the
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government Policemen's and Firefighter's
Retirement Fund (Board), to prohibit the Fayette Circuit Court from
considering Spears' Petition for Judicial Review of the Board's denial of his
claim for disability benefits. For the reasons explained below, we reverse the
Court of Appeals and vacate the writ.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Spears was a Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government police officer
and a member of the Policemen's and Firefighter's Retirement Fund, which was
established pursuant to KRS 67A.360 - 67A.690 to provide retirement
annuities and disability benefits for police officers and firefighters of an urban-
county government. Spears sustained a work-related injury and filed an
application for disability benefits pursuant to KRS 67A.460.
Ultimately, the Board denied Spears' application. After exhausting his
administrative remedies, Spears filed in the Fayette Circuit Court a timely
appeal of the Board's decision pursuant to KRS 67A.670(1), 1 asserting that
due process violations had occurred during the administrative process
resulting in the denial of his application. The specifics of his allegations are
not relevant to our review.
The Board moved to dismiss Spears' appeal on the basis that his petition
for judicial review failed to comply with the requirement of KRS 67A.670(2) that
a petition for review "shall be verified by the petitioner," and for that reason,
the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the matter. It is uncontested that
Spears had not signed or verified the petition for judicial review filed by his
attorney with the circuit court clerk.
1 KRS 67A.670(1) provides that: "The order or determination of the board [of
Trustees of an urban county government Policemen's and Firefighter's Retirement
Fund] upon the rehearing shall be conclusive and binding, but any interested party
may, within twenty (20) days after the rendition of the order of the board, by petition
appeal to the Circuit Court of the county in which the urban-county government is
located for a review of the order of the board."
2
At the hearing held on the Board's motion to dismiss, Spears
acknowledged the deficiency but he argued that he was unable to sign the
initial petition because it was filed while he was away working as a cross-
country truck driver. He further noted that when he returned, he signed a
verification of the petition and filed it with an affidavit explaining his inability
to sign and verify the initial petition. He argued that these steps should be
regarded as a remedy for the initial deficiency. After considering the
arguments of the parties, the circuit court determined that by supplementing
the original petition with a subsequent verification, Spears had cured the
deficiency of his original pleading and had, therefore, "substantially complied"
with the verification requirement of the statute. On that basis, the circuit
court denied the Board's motion to dismiss Spears' appeal.
In response to the circuit court's ruling, the Board petitioned the Court of
Appeals for a writ of prohibition to bar the circuit court's judicial review of the
Board's decision in Spears' case. The Court of Appeals concluded that the
deficiency in Spears' initial pleading deprived the circuit court of subject matter
jurisdiction. On that basis the Court of Appeals granted the writ requested by
the Board. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
"A writ of prohibition is an 'extraordinary remedy and we have always
been cautious and conservative both in entertaining petitions for and in
granting such relief."' Grange Mutual Insurance Company v. Trude, 151 S.W.3d
803, 808 (Ky. 2004) (quoting Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Ky. 1961)).
3
Nevertheless, a writ of prohibition may be appropriately granted in three
situations.
It is within a court's discretion to grant a writ when it falls within
one of two classes of cases:
The first is where "the lower court is proceeding or is
about to proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is
no remedy through an application to an intermediate
court. . . ."
The second class of writ may issue where "the lower
court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although
within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate
remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and
irreparable injury will result if the petition is not
granted."
However, [as a subset of the second class of writ] even
where the petitioner does not stand to suffer
irreparable injury, "in certain special cases," a writ
may issue where "the administration of justice
generally will suffer the great and irreparable injury."
PremierTox 2.0 v. Miniard, 407 S.W.3d 542, 546 (Ky. 2013) (quoting 3M Co. v.
Engle, 328 S.W.3d 184, 187 (Ky. 2010))
Generally, the standard for appellate review of the propriety of a writ is
"limited to an abuse-of-discretion inquiry, except for issues of law which are
reviewed de novo." Rehm v. Clayton, 132 S.W.3d 864, 866 (Ky. 2004); Newell
Enterprises, Inc. v. Bowling, 158 S.W.3d 750, 754 (Ky. 2005). 2 As noted by
this Court in Grange Mutual, "De novo review will occur most often under the
2 Overruled on other grounds by Interactive Media Entertainment and Gaming
Association, Inc. v. Wingate, 320 S.W.3d 692 (Ky. 2010).
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first class of writ cases, i.e., where the lower court is alleged to be acting
outside its jurisdiction, because jurisdiction is generally only a question of
law." 151 S.W.3d at 810. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of the first class
based upon its conclusion that the circuit court was proceeding outside its
jurisdiction, 3 thus raising an issue of law for which our review is de novo. .
A. A writ of the first class is unavailable because the circuit court is not
proceeding outside its jurisdiction.
"In the context of extraordinary writs, jurisdiction' refers not to mere
legal errors but to subject-matter jurisdiction, which goes to the court's core
authority to even hear cases." St. Joseph Catholic Orphan Society v. Edwards,
449 S.W.3d 727, 734 n. 14 (Ky. 2014) (quoting Lee v. George, 369 S.W.3d 29,
33 (Ky. 2012)). We have noted on several occasions over the years, most often
citing our predecessor court's decision in Duncan v. O'Nan, 451 S.W.2d 626
(Ky. 1970), that subject matter jurisdiction does not mean jurisdiction over
"this case;" rather, it means jurisdiction over "this kind of case." O'Nan makes
clear that a court is deprived of subject matter jurisdiction only in cases "where
the court has not been given any power to do anything at all." Id. at 631. "The
court has subject matter jurisdiction when the 'kind of case' identified in the
pleadings is one which the court has been empowered, by statute or
3 Although the Court of Appeals does not expressly designate the writ one of the
first class based upon the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it noted that the Board
argued "trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to proceed on Spears' petition for
review" and concluded, "We agree." Thus the Court of Appeals concluded that the
circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the litigation, and since it made
none of the findings essential for a writ of the second class, we regard the writ granted
as one of the first class.
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constitutional provision, to adjudicate." Daugherty v. Telek, 366 S.W.3d 463,
467 (Ky. 2012) (citation omitted). "[A] court has subject matter jurisdiction of
the case so long as the pleadings reveal that it is the kind of case assigned to
that court by a statute or constitutional provision." Id.
KRS 67A.670(1) clearly vests subject matter jurisdiction for judicial
review of the Board's decision in this case with the Fayette Circuit Court.
Subject matter jurisdiction assigned to the circuit court by statute does not
evaporate when it is invoked by way of a petition which, despite deficiencies,
nevertheless is obviously a pleading purporting to appeal a decision of the
Board. The circuit court had jurisdiction over "that kind of case"
notwithstanding the flaws of the initial pleading.
The Board cites our decision in Taylor v. Kentucky Unemployment
Insurance Commission, 382 S.W.3d 826, 828 (Ky. 2012) to support its
argument that the circuit court was acting outside its jurisdiction. 4 The Court
of Appeals relied upon Taylor when it concluded that, because of the deficient
pleading, the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction of Spears' appeal.
However, it must be noted that Taylor was not a writ case. Taylor went to the
Court of Appeals as an ordinary appeal of a circuit court judgment. Taylor
4 Although Taylor arose in the context of an appeal to the circuit court from an
unemployment compensation decision pursuant to KRS 341.450(1), it addressed the
merits of a substantially similar issue: whether the failure to strictly comply with the
requirement for verification of the initial petition for judicial review is fatal to the
petition.
6
does not address the question of subject matter jurisdiction in the writ context,
and did not hold that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Taylor determined only that the deficiency of the initial pleading invoking
the circuit court's appellate authority left that court without jurisdiction of the
particular case, much as the insufficiency of service of process leaves a court
without personal jurisdiction over the unserved litigant. 5 The deficiency has no
effect on the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction. Taylor holds that the
circuit court properly dismissed the unemployment compensation appeal
because proceeding with the adjudication despite the deficiency of the initial
pleading would have been erroneous.
Whether the Fayette Circuit Court acted erroneously when it applied the
doctrine of substantial compliance and proceeded accordingly is a. significant
issue; but erroneously or not, the circuit court was clearly proceeding within its
subject matter jurisdiction, which is the relevant inquiry under our writ
analysis. The Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the circuit court
was acting outside its subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, it also erred
when it granted the Board's petition for a writ of the first class.
B. A writ of the second class is unavailable because there is no showing
that "great injustice and irreparable injury" would ensue.
Having determined that the Court of Appeals erred by. granting a writ of
the first class, we proceed to determine if the writ might otherwise be upheld as
5 Soileau v. Bowman, 382 S.W.3d 888, 892 (Ky. App. 2012)(The trial court erred
by proceeding without personal jurisdiction over the individual, "and thus the orders
affecting him are void.").
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one satisfying the conditions of a writ of the second class. As noted above, a
writ of prohibition of the second class is available when "the lower court is
acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction." Unlike
the requirements for writs of the first class, when the lower court is proceeding
within its jurisdiction but proceeding erroneously, the aggrieved litigant must
further demonstrate that it has "no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise
and great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not
granted." PremierTox 2.0, 407 S.W.3d at 546.
Taylor provides a plausible argument for concluding that the Fayette
Circuit Court in this instance was proceeding erroneously. Whether Taylor's
rationale for strict compliance with the requirements of KRS 341.450(1) should
apply equally to the similar requirements for appeal under KRS 67A.670 is an
issue we need not decide because the issue before, us in this case is simply
whether a writ terminating the circuit court action was available to the Board.
That question is easily resolved because there has been no claim that the
Board will suffer "great injustice and irreparable injury" if the writ is not
granted.
The Court of Appeals made no finding that the Board would suffer great
injustice or irreparable injury if required to litigate Spears' case in the circuit
court to a final judgment before undertaking a conventional appeal of the trial
court's failure to apply the Taylor standard of strict compliance to Spears'
pleading. The record before this Court is devoid of any indication that great
injustice or irreparable harm will ensue, and we are unable to perceive any
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such injury arising from this situation. We therefore conclude that the Board
was not entitled to the alternate form of writ relief characterized above as a writ
of the second class.
C. A special case writ is unavailable because the orderly administration
of justice is not imperiled by the circuit court's ruling.
As noted above, a variant of the second class of writ may be issued in
limited circumstances.
[W]e find that in certain special cases this Court will entertain a
petition for prohibition in the absence of a showing of specific great
and irreparable injury to the petitioner, provided a substantial
miscarriage of justice will result if the lower court is proceeding
erroneously, and correction of the error is necessary and
appropriate in the interest of orderly judicial administration. It may
be observed that in such a situation the court is recognizing that if
it fails to act the administration of justice generally will suffer the
great and irreparable injury.
Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Ky. 1961).
"As we have made clear, ``[i]nconvenience, expense, annoyance, and other
undesirable aspects of litigation' are insufficient to constitute irreparable
injury. Rather, the injury "should be of a ruinous or grievous nature."' Toyota
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Johnson, 323 S.W.3d 646, 654 (Ky.
2010) (citations omitted.) In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, we held that the
orderly administration of justice would not be irreparably harmed if a writ was
not issued to prohibit the re-opening, pursuant to CR 60.02, of a dormant case
more than six years after the entry of the final judgment. Id. We concluded
that the propriety of the proceeding could be adequately addressed by
conventional appellate review.
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Upon reviewing our precedent for prior applications of the special case
writ, we are satisfied that the orderly administration of justice will not suffer
and no substantial miscarriage of justice will occur if the Fayette Circuit Court
is left to proceed in this matter to final judgment and the validity of its
application of substantial compliance to the issue at hand is tested by the
process of ordinary appellate review.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Court of Appeals erred
as a matter of law in granting the writ of prohibition. We therefore reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals and vacate the writ of prohibition.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Donald Richard Todd
Todd & Todd, PLLC
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/PAMELA R. GOODWINE:
Pamela R. Goodwine
Fayette District Court
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST:
Roger Goodin Wright
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government Department of Law
10