Sheila Branham of the Estate of Roe Branham v. Gregory B. Nazar M.D. ( 2009 )

AS MODIFIED : AUGUST 27, 2009
RENDERED : APRIL 23, 2009
TO BE PUBLISHED
~SUyrrmr C~Ourf of ~rufurhv
2004-SC-001015- DG `` ``
7"
AND
2005-SC-000834-DG
n--% IL
GREGORY B . NAZAR, M .D ., ET AL . APPELLANTS/ CROSS-APPELLEES
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V. CASE NO . 2003-CA-001110-MR
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO . 00-CI-006591
SHEILA BRANHAM, EXECUTRIX OF
THE ESTATE OF ROE BRANHAM APPELLEE/ CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION OF THE COURT BY SPECIAL JUSTICE JEFFREY C . MANDO
REVERSING
This is an appeal from a defense verdict in a medical malpractice action.
Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Sheila Branham as Executrix of the Estate of Roe
Branham [hereinafter "Branham"] alleges that Appellant/ Cross-Appellee, Dr.
Gregory B . Nazar [hereinafter "Dr. Nazar"] committed medical malpractice by
failing to remove an object from Roe Branham's scalp following surgery. The
alleged professional negligence occurred at Norton Audubon Hospital
[hereinafter "Norton"] on February 27, 2000 during an operation in which a
malignant tumor was removed from Branham's brain . The surgery was largely
a success, with nearly 95-100 percent of the tumor having been extracted .
Following surgery, however, Branham complained of pain in his head, which
was initially dismissed as an attendant aspect of his surgery. When the pain
continued for several weeks Branham sought further medical attention . Tests
revealed that a Durahook, a small, metallic object used to hold soft tissues
apart during an operation, was left in Branham's scalp. On August 10, 2000,
the Durahook was surgically removed from Branham's scalp without further
complications . Branham incurred $11,900 .00 in medical expenses as a result
of the surgery.
After his second surgery, Branham filed suit in Jefferson Circuit Court,
naming Dr. Nazar, Dr. Nazar's medical practice, and Norton as Defendants .
Branham alleged that the Defendants had committed medical malpractice by
failing to remove the Durahook from his scalp after surgery. He further alleged
that both Dr . Nazar and Norton were vicariously liable for the nursing staff's
failure to remove the Durahook from his scalp . Following discovery, Branham
settled his claims against Norton and the trial court entered an agreed order
dismissing them, while preserving Branham's claims against Dr . Nazar.
Shortly after this settlement, Branham moved for summary judgment
against Dr. Nazar, arguing that he was negligent as a matter of law for having
left the hook in his scalp during surgery. In the alternative, Branham argued
that Dr. Nazar was vicariously liable for the failure of the nursing staff to
remove the hook. In opposing Branham's motion, Dr. Nazar presented
affidavits from two experts : Harold Smith, M.D ., a neurosurgeon, and Susan
Howe, R.N ., a surgical nurse. Both witnesses stated that Dr. Nazar had
satisfied the applicable standard of care, even though the Durahook remained
in Branham's scalp following surgery. As a result, the trial court denied
Branham's dispositive motion .
At trial, Dr. Nazar testified that he placed the hooks in Branham's scalp
and was supposed to remove them. Dr. Nazar also stated, however, that he did
not count the hooks himself because it was general practice for the nursing
staff to do so. Dr. Nazar further testified that he had no reason to assume that
any of the Durahooks had been left in Branham's scalp. Durahooks are placed
in the patient's scalp and fastened with a rubber band under the operating
table . If the fastening comes loose, Durahooks can slide under the tissue and
become concealed during surgery. Because a towel is placed over the operating
area, Dr. Nazar was unable to see if a Durahook became unfastened.
Furthermore, Dr. Nazar believed that the Durahooks were included in the
nurses' "sharps" count, and at the end of Branham's surgery, he relied upon
the nurses' assurance that all of the sharps had been removed .
Nurse Susan Howe, an expert witness called by Dr. Nazar, testified that
it was the nursing staff's duty, and not the surgeon's, to ensure that all
"sharps" were accounted for after surgery. In her opinion ; the nurses should
have counted the hooks as sharps despite the fact that they were not explicitly
mentioned in Norton's hospital protocol. Howe also testified that she knew of
no customs or practices which required surgeons to count sharps during or
after surgery. Thus, Howe concluded that Dr. Nazar reasonably relied on the
nurses and scrub technician to count the Durahooks during Branham's
surgery .
Dr. Nazar's second expert, Dr. Harold Smith, testified that the nurses
should have counted the Durahooks as sharps because it was typically the
duty of the nursing staff to account for sharps after surgery. Dr . Smith,
therefore, opined that Dr. Nazar was not responsible for counting the sharps
and was justified in relying on the nursing staff to conduct the count.
Nurse Anna Ball and surgical technician Meshon Daniels, who assisted
Dr. Nazar during the surgery, testified that they did not count the hooks
because hospital policy did not require it. Norton's protocol listed several items
which were specified as "sharps," including: "needles, blades, bovie tips, safety
pins, injectables," but not Durahooks . Ms. Ball further testified, however, that
if she had counted items and discovered that one was missing, she would have
promptly notified Dr. Nazar so that he and the nursing staff could search for
the missing item until it was located .
Following the presentation of this evidence, the trial court denied the
parties' respective motions for directed verdict. The trial court also refused to
instruct the jury on Branham's vicarious liability theory against Dr . Nazar. The
jury then deliberated and returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Nazar, finding that
he had not breached the standard of care .
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reluctantly reversed the trial court's
denial of Branham's motion for summary judgment . See Branham v. Nazar,
No . 2003-CA-001 110-MR, at *2 (October 22, 2004) . An en. bane Court of
Appeals concluded that under Laws v. Harter , 43 S .W. 2d 449 (Ky. 1975), Dr.
Nazar was negligent as a matter of law for having left the Durahook in
Branham's scalp . As such, summary judgment should have been granted as to
Dr. Nazar's liability and the jury should only have addressed the question of
damages. Id. at 16-17 . From this opinion, Dr. Nazar filed a motion for
discretionary review, asking this Court to reinstate the jury verdict in his favor .
Branham filed a cross-motion for discretionary review on the vicarious liability
issue . We granted both motions.
A. Dr. Nazar's Individual Liability
In defense of the Court of Appeals' decision, Branham argues that under
Laws v. Harter, 534 S .W .2d 449 (Ky. 1975), Dr. Nazar was negligent as a
matter of law for permitting the Durahook to remain in his scalp after surgery .
In Laws, a surgical sponge was left in the plaintiff following thoracic surgery
performed by the defendant surgeon. Id. at 450 . Before the incision in the
plaintiff's body was closed, a nurse's count revealed that one of the sponges
was missing. Id. After searching the operating room for an extended period of
time, the sponge still could not be located. Id. The surgeon decided that under
the circumstances it would be best to close the patient despite the fact that the
sponge was missing. Id. Following the surgery, X-rays revealed that the
missing sponge remained in the plaintiff's body . Id.
Upon discovering the sponge, the plaintiff sued the surgeon, alleging that
he was negligent as a matter of law. Id. The surgeon argued that he had
satisfied the standard of care -f a reasonably prudent doctor by deciding to
close the patient, despite the missing sponge . Id. The former Court of Appeals,
however, was not convinced, and held that the reasonableness of the doctor's
decision was not relevant. Id. at 450-51 . Instead, the Court held that the
surgeon was negligent per se because "[h]owever exemplary the care given to
appellant after discovering that a sponge was missing, the fact remains that
when the incision through the diaphragm was closed a sponge was left in the
abdomen ." Id. at 450 . Accordingly, the Court remanded to the trial court for a
new trial addressing only the issue of plaintiff's damages . Id. at 451-52 .
Dr . Nazar argues that despite Laws, retained foreign object cases are
generally resolved under a res ipsa loquitur standard under Kentucky law.
Under this standard, juries may - but are not required to - infer negligence
from the fact that a surgical item was left in a patient's body . While the
retained foreign object is evidence of negligence, the jury is free to determine
the ultimate issue of the surgeon's liability from the evidence presented at trial.
In support of his argument, Dr. Nazar relies upon Chalothorn v. Meade, 15
S .W .3d 391 (Ky. App . 1999), where the Court of Appeals reversed a trial court
order holding a doctor negligent as a matter of law. In Chalothorn, the plaintiff
required a cesarean section to deliver her baby. Id. at 392 . After the baby was
delivered, the nurse informed the doctor that one surgical sponge was missing.
Id. When a search revealed that a sponge was located on the baby's body in
the nursery, a nurse told the doctor that the count was correct and the doctor
closed the incision in the plaintiff's body. Id. Later, it, was discovered that
what was believed to be a sponge on the baby's body was not a sponge at all
and that in fact one sponge was still missing. Id. The missing sponge was
eventually discovered in the plaintiff's abdomen and was removed without
complications . Id.
After the sponge was discovered, the plaintiff sued the doctor, arguing
that he was negligent as a matter of law for having left the sponge in her body .
Id. at 393. Relying on Laws, the trial court granted summary judgment to the
plaintiff and the doctor appealed . Id. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling
that because the doctor had presented evidence of his compliance with the
standard of care summary judgment was inappropriate. Id. The appellate
court distinguished Laws because in that case the doctor was aware that a
sponge was missing when he decided to close the patient . Id. The doctor in
Chalothorn, on the other hand, relied on a nurse's sponge count which
informed him that all the sponges had been located . Id. As such, the appellate
court remanded with instructions for the jury to determine the doctor's
liability . Id.
In the present case, the Court of Appeals held that Laws mandates the
application of a negligence per se standard in all retained object cases, and
overruled Chalothorn . Branham v. Nazar, No . 2003-CA-001110-MR, at * 19
(October 22, 2004) . In doing so, the court was influenced more by the binding
authority of Laws than by the reasonableness and wisdom of its holding. See
id. Indeed, the court acknowledged that it was troubled by many aspects of the
negligence per se rule, but noted that it lacked the authority to formally adopt
the res ipsa loquitur approach in Kentucky. Id. Because we are similarly
troubled by the impact that the negligence per se approach would have on
Kentucky medical malpractice jurisprudence, we adopt the res ipsa loquitur
approach and hold that juries should generally be permitted to determine a
healthcare professional's liability in a retained foreign object case . Our
decision to adopt this approach was influenced by a number of reasons .
First, the negligence per se standard is inconsistent with Kentucky's
pure comparative fault system. Nine years after Laws applied the negligence
per se rule, the Supreme Court in Hilen v. Hays joined the majority of
American jurisdictions in adopting comparative fault. See 673 S .W .2d 713,
720 (Ky. 1984) . Under comparative fault, a jury is permitted to allocate fault
each party to the action, considering both the nature and conduct of each
party at fault and the extent of the causal relationship between the conduct
and the damages claimed. Id. a t 719 . The negligence per se rule announced
Laws takes the issue of individual accountability away from the jury and
inexplicably ascribes fault to the surgeon, regardless of whether the evidence
suggests otherwise. As the Court of Appeals noted, "Laws assumes that
negligence had to have occurred so, therefore the surgeon must have been
negligent." Branham v. Nazar, No. 2003-CA-001110-MR .
This conflict is significant because comparative fault analysis will
inevitably arise in the vast majority of retained foreign object cases . Usually,
retained foreign object cases originate from medical operations in which
multiple medical care professionals perform a variety of tasks. As illustrated
by the present case, any number of people including the surgeon,
anesthesiologist, nursing staff, and other hospital staff may be at fault for
having left an offending item in a plaintiff's body. The varied business
relationships which exist at modern hospitals further complicate the issue .
Because of these various types of relationships, no two surgical procedures are
exactly alike, and the duties and responsibilities of the medical care
professionals will likely depend on the specific facts of each case . A per se rule
cannot account for these differences and would unfairly ascribe fault to
surgeons, regardless of their responsibility for the plaintiff's injury.
The res ipsa loquitur approach avoids this unfairness by permitting juries
to infer negligence from the fact of the retained foreign object, while granting
them the latitude to analyze other facts and evidence relevant to liability . As
such, juries are free to analyze the reliability and veracity of the defendant's
expert witnesses and weigh it against the likelihood that the surgeon was
negligent in failing to remove an object from the plaintiff's body during surgery.
The res ipsa loquitur standard simply provides a more equitable method for
resolving retained foreign object cases .
In addition, the res ipsa loquitur approach is more consistent with most
of our caselaw. Of all the retained foreign object cases in Kentucky, only Laws
applied the negligence per se rule. Before Laws, Kentucky courts repeatedly
held that a jury should decide whether a surgeon is liable for permitting a
surgical item to remain in a patient after surgery. See Samuels v. Willis , 118
S.W. 339, 342 (Ky. 1909) ; Barnett's Adm'r v . Brand , 177 S .W. 461, 464
(Ky. 1915) ; Carter v. Harlan Hospital, 128 S .W.2d 174, 176 (1939) .
Unfortunately, the Court in Laws made no effort to distinguish these decisions
or to question the significance of this line of contrary precedent. Further, the
court cited no legal authority, from Kentucky or any other jurisdiction, to
support its per se rule. The lack of analysis and supporting authority in Laws
does little to instill confidence in the wisdom of its approach .
The lukewarm reception of Laws by subsequent Kentucky courts further
undermines our faith in the negligence per se rule . Just two years after Laws,
this Court noted that a res ipsa loquitur standard should apply in a case where
a surgical blade was left in a patient's body during an operation to remove a
kidney stone . See City of Somerset v . Hart, 549 S .W .2d 814, 817 (Ky. 1977) .
This theme continued in Chalothorn, where the Court of Appeals refused to
apply the negligence per se rule and distinguished Laws on its facts. See 15
S .W .3d at 393 . Even in the process of applying the negligence per se rule in
the present case, the Court of Appeals expressed disapproval of Laws and
argued for its hasty demise . Branham v. Nazar, No. 2003-CA-001110-MR. As
such, to promote a negligence per se rule now would require us to adopt a rule
that has never been well-received by Kentucky courts . Instead, we reaffirm the
caselaw which leaves the issue of a surgeon's liability to the jury and adopt the
res ipsa loquitur approach for Kentucky retained foreign object cases.
Our adoption of the res ipsa loquitur standard renders the continued
viability of Laws questionable . Though stare decisis inspires in this Court both
humility and respect for established precedent, it "does not commit us to the
sanctification of ancient fallacy." Hilen, 673 S .W.2d at 717 . As Justice Leibson
10
noted, "[t)he common law is not a stagnant pool, but a moving stream ." Id.
(citing City of Louisville v. Chapman, Ky., 413 S .W.2d 74, 77 (1967)) . When
rules, as the one announced in Laws, prove unworkable or inconsistent with
other law, it is the duty of this Court to clarify the common law and direct its
development. Because the negligence per se rule announced in Laws is
inconsistent with the res ipsa loquitur approach we adopt today, it is now
overruled.
Because we have rejected the per se rule in retained foreign object cases,
the trial court was correct in refusing to hold Dr. Nazar negligent as a matter of
law for failing to remove the Durahook from Branham's scalp. Branham,
however, still argues that trial court should have granted his motion for
summary judgment or his motion for directed verdict. Summary judgment is
only appropriate where the moving party establishes that there is no genuine
issue of material fact warranting resolution by a jury . See Ky. R . Civ. P. 56 .03;
see also Steelvest, Inc . v . Scansteel Service Center, Inc ., 807 S .W .2d 476, 482
(Ky. 1991) . Similarly, motions for directed verdict are appropriate if the moving
party can establish that based on the evidence presented at trial, reasonable
minds could not differ on the proper resolution of the case . See Ky . R. Civ. P.
51 .01 ; Spivey v. Sheeler, 514 S.W.2d 667, 673 (Ky. 1974) . Both standards
require, however, the reviewing court to construe the facts in favor of the non-
moving party.
Dr. Nazar presented adequate evidence both before and during trial
which created fact issues sufficient to defeat Branham's motions . Before trial,
Dr. Nazar submitted expert affidavits stating that he complied with the
standard of care, despite the failure to remove the Durahook after surgery. At
trial, Dr. Nazar presented one expert who testified that it was common practice
for doctors to rely on nurses to account for all sharps used during surgery and
another expert who testified that it was the nursing staff's obligation to count
the Durahooks even though these items were not listed specifically in the
Norton protocol. Even though the presence of the Durahook in Branham's
scalp constituted prima facie evidence of negligence, the expert testimony
created a question of fact regarding Dr . Nazar's liability for Branham's injuries .
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Branham's motions for
summary judgment and directed verdict .
B. Dr. Nazar's Vicarious Liability
Having determined that the jury was correctly allowed to resolve the
issue of Dr. Nazar's individual liability, we must now determine whether the
jury should have been permitted to address his vicarious liability . The trial
court twice rejected Branham's contentions that Dr . Nazar is vicariously liable
for the conduct of Norton's nursing staff during his operation . First, the court
denied his motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of respondeat
superior, and second the court refused to instruct the jury on that theory at the
close of evidence . Branham v. Nazar, No . 2003-CA-001110-MR . Because it
ruled that Dr. Nazar was liable as a matter of law, the Court of Appeals did not
address this issue in its majority opinion. On appeal, however, Branham
renews his claim that Dr . Nazar should be held vicariously liable for the failure
12
of the nursing staff to fulfill their duties to remove the Durahook from his
scalp.
To hold Dr. Nazar vicariously liable for the nursing staff's negligence,
Branham must establish that the nurses were Dr. Nazar's agents . "Where the
facts are in dispute and the evidence is contradictory or conflicting, the
question of agency, like other questions of fact, is to be determined by a jury .
However, where the facts [regarding the parties' relationship] are undisputed,
the question becomes one of law for the court." Wolford v . Scott Nickels Bus
Co . , 257 S .W.2d 594, 595 (Ky. 1953) . Here, Branham argued to the trial court
that Dr. Nazar's admissions that he supervised the nurses and was in charge of
the placement and removal of the Durahooks demonstrated that he was in
control of the nurses and they were his agents . Disagreeing that those
admissions proved an agency relationship, Dr. Nazar contended that the
hospital's manual, which directs nurses to follow certain steps when assisting
surgeons, and his reliance on the nurses to count the sharps showed that they
were not his agents . Thus, the parties did not dispute the facts surrounding
Dr. Nazar's and the nurses' relationship-that Dr . Nazar relied on the nurses to
count the sharps-they simply disagreed with whether or not these facts
established an agency relationship . Therefore, because the facts surrounding
the parties' relationship were undisputed in this case, the question of whether
an agency relationship existed between Dr. Nazar and the nurses was a
question of law for the trial court . See CSX Transportation, Inc . v. First
National Bank of Gram , 14 S .W .3d 563, 566 (Ky. App. 1999) ("[a]s the facts
13
surrounding the relationship between CSXT and CTI are undisputed, the trial
court properly made the determination of the issue of agency rather than to
submit the question to the jury") .
A principal may be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of his or
her agent, but generally is not held liable for the conduct of an independent
contractor . Williams v. Kentucky Dept. of Educ. , 113 S .W.3d 145, 151 (Ky.
2003) . An individual is the agent of another if the principal has the power or
responsibility to control the method, manner, and details of the agent's work.
See City of Winchester v. King, 266 S .W.2d 343, 345 (Ky. 1954) . If, however,
an individual is free to determine how work is done and the principal cares
only about the end result, then that individual is an independent contractor.
See Pancake v. Cull, 388 S .W.2d 391, 392 (Ky . 1960) .
Relying upon City of Somerset, supra, Branham argues that nurses are
the dual agents of the hospital and the surgeon during surgery. Like the facts
in the present case, the plaintiff in City of Somerset was a patient who had the
unfortunate experience of having a surgical item left in his body during an
operation . 549 S .W . 2d at 815 . Unlike the present case, however, the
defendant doctor settled before trial, leaving only the hospital and nursing staff
as defendants. Id. Because the operating surgeon was "authorized to
supervise and direct the staff in the operating room[,]" it was assumed that the
nurses were his agents . Id. at 816. Thus, the hospital defended against
liability by arguing that the nurses could not be the agents of the hospital
during the surgery because they were the doctor's agents at the time .
14
This Court rejected the hospital's argument and held that though the
nurses were the "borrowed servants" of the surgeon during the operation, they
remained the agents of the hospital . The Court noted that under traditional
agency law, the issue of control is determinative, and since the nurses were
paid, trained, and employed by the hospital their agency status was clear. City
of Somerset , 549 S .W .2d at 816. In borrowed servant cases, agency for one
party is only destroyed by agency for another if the fulfillment of one role
requires the abandonment of the other. Because the nurses' conduct during
the operation was in pursuit of the health of the patient, which was the end
goal of both the doctor and the hospital, there was no conflict which terminated
or suspended the nurses' agency relationship with the hospital. Therefore, the
Court concluded that the nurses remained the agents of the hospital even if
they were the surgeon's agents for the same act. Id. at 817 .
Branham suggests that City of Somerset requires the conclusion that a
surgeon and a hospital are dual principals of the nursing staff which assists
the surgeon during an operation. The decision cannot be read to compel such
an outcome . In City of Somerset, the court held that where there are facts
sufficient to support a dual agency relationship, a surgical nursing staff may be
the dual agents of both a surgeon and a hospital . See 549 S .W.2d at 816-17 .
City of Somerset did not displace the traditional inquiry required for all agency
determinations, but instead was founded upon it: agency relationships are
created when one party has the authority to control the details of another's
work. See Winchester, 266 S.W .2d at 345; Pancake, 388 S.W .2d at 392 .
15
Branham was, therefore, required to present evidence of the facts and
circumstances which supported his theory that an agency relationship existed
between Dr. Nazar and the nursing staff.
As stated above, the trial court should have granted Branham's motion
for summary judgment only if it appeared that there was no genuine issue of
material fact regarding Dr. Nazar's vicarious liability and that Branham was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Steelvest, Inc., 807 S .W.2d at 480.
Under this standard, Branham was required to show that the members of the
Norton nursing staff were Dr. Nazar's agents as a matter of law. This,
Branham simply could not do. He relies only on the testimony that as the
surgeon during the operation, Dr. Nazar "supervised" the conduct of the
nursing staff and the fact that Dr. Nazar "admitted" that he was in charge of
the placement and removal of the Durahooks.
Dr. Nazar, however, submitted affidavits which stated that he justifiably
relied upon the nursing staff to count the "sharps ." Dr. Nazar presented
evidence that he relied upon the nursing staff, rather than instructing them on
how, to count the sharps because it was common surgical practice to do so . In
addition, the hospital's manual lists over seventeen steps for nurses to follow
when assisting surgeons during surgery, but no evidence was presented which
suggested that Dr. Nazar attempted to augment or supplement the hospital
policy with his own direction . The evidence suggests that Dr. Nazar lacked the
authority to control the details of the nurses' work, their training, and terms of
employment, and that they were not his agents during Branham's surgery. As
16
a result, the trial court correctly concluded that Branham was not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on his vicarious liability theory.
Due to the lack of evidence supporting Branham's vicarious liability
theory, the trial court likewise correctly refused to submit the issue to the jury.
"A party plaintiff is entitled to have their theory of the case submitted to the
jury if there is any evidence to sustain it." Clark v. Hauck Mfg . Co. , 910 S .W. 2d
247, 250 (Ky. 1995) . Trial courts, however, have the authority to deny
requested instructions and their decision to do so will only be reversed for an
abuse of discretion . See Office Inc . v . Wilkey, 173 S .W .3d 226, 229 (Ky. 2005) .
Though Dr . Nazar testified that he "supervised" the nursing staff and
placed the Durahooks, Branham presented no other evidence tending to
support his agency theory . Nurse Ball and Meshon Daniels, who both assisted
Dr . Nazar on the day of Branham's surgery, made no mention of Dr. Nazar's
orders during the operation, but instead both testified that they followed
hospital protocol in their decision not to count the Durahooks. In his brief,
Branham cites no other evidence that Dr. Nazar ordered or instructed the
nursing staff on how to assist him during the operation . In the absence of
more evidence establishing that Dr. Nazar had the right to control the details of
the nurses' work, we cannot say that the trial court erred in refusing to
instruct the jury on Branham's vicarious liability theory.
C. Branham's Settlement with Norton
Finally, Dr. Nazar argues that, even assuming that the nurses were his
agents, he cannot be held liable for their negligence because Branham has
17
already settled with and released Norton's from liability. Because we have
concluded that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on
Branham's vicarious liability theory, it is unnecessary for us to resolve this
issue.
D. CONCLUSION
For the reasons mentioned above, we REVERSE the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and reinstate the Judgment of the trial court in favor of Dr.
Nazar.
Abramson, Cunningham, Noble, Scott, and Venters, JJ. ; and Special
Justice Jeffrey C . Mando and Special Justice Walter A. Baker, sitting.
Abramson and Scott, JJ ., and Special Justice Walter A. Baker, concur.
Venters, J . concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion in which
Cunningham and Noble, JJ., joins . Minton, C .J. ; and Schroder, J ., not sitting.
VENTERS, JUSTICE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART: I concur with the sound reasoning and scholarly analysis expressed by
Special Justice Mando in our rejection of the negligence per se rule of Laws v.
Harter, 534 S.W.2d 449 (Ky. 1975), and adoption of the res ipso loquitor
approach to medical negligence issues arising from surgical objects left in a
patient. But, I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion with respect
to the issue of Dr . Nazar's vicarious liability for the negligent failure of the
nursing staff to accurately count the Durahooks removed from his patient's
scalp .
The Majority concedes that the dual agency doctrine of City of Somerset
v. Hart, 549 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 1977) is alive and well. But despite the
substantial similarity in the facts of Hart and the instant case, the Majority
concludes that Branham failed to produce sufficient evidence of an agency
relationship between Dr. Nazar and the surgical nursing staff to justify
submission of the issue to the jury. The existence of an agency relationship is
a legal conclusion to be reached only after analyzing the relevant facts. Wright
v . Sullivan Payne Co. , 839 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Ky. 1992) . Where the facts are in
dispute and the evidence is contradictory or conflicting, the question of agency
is one of fact to be determined by the jury. See CSX Transportation, Inc . v.
First National Bank of Grayson, 14 S .W.3d 563, 566 (Ky. App. 1999) . The right
to control is considered the most critical element in determining whether an
agency relationship exists . Id. a t 567 . Nazar admitted that he was responsible
for the removal of all of the Durahooks used . He testified that the surgical
nursing staff was under his supervision during the surgery. He depended
upon them to count the Durahooks as he removed them . The purpose for
counting the Durahooks was to enable Dr. Nazar to ascertain that he had
properly fulfilled his duty to remove all of them. It is inconceivable that, as the
supervisor of the nurses during the surgery, Dr. Nazar did not have the right to
control their counting of the "sharps" . The Court, in Hart, stated :
It is beyond cavil in this case that the accurate accounting for
scalpel blades is "of mutual interest to both" the surgeon and the
19
hospital, that such an accounting "effects their common purpose",
i.e., the cure of the patient, and that the surgeon issued no orders
to operating staff in regard to the accounting for scalpel blades
which conflicted with those of the Hospital . Consequently, the
operating room staff acted as servants of both the surgeon and the
hospital as a matter of law .
Id . at 817 .
In its conclusion that the evidence was insufficient, even to warrant a
jury instruction, the Majority observes that the nurses "made no mention of Dr.
Nazar's orders during the operation" and that Branham cited no evidence that
Dr. Nazar ordered or instructed the nursing staff on how to assist him during
the operation . Those facts simply indicate that he may have been deficient in
his supervision of the nurses, but they in no way negate his role as their
supervisor and their role as his agents during the surgery. I would submit that
Dr . Nazar's admissions resolve that issue in favor of Branham as a matter of
law, but at a minimum, the matter should have been submitted to the jury .
Cunningham and Noble, JJ ., join .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS/ CROSS-APPELLEES :
Gerald R . Toner
James Patrick Grohmann
Cathleen Charters Palmer
O'Bryan, Brown 8, Toner, PLLC .
1500 Stark Building
455 South Fourth Street
Louisville KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT:
Kevin Crosby Burke
Thomas Wesley Faulkner
125 South Seventh Street
Louisville KY 40202-2703
COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE,
KENTUCKY SOCIETY OF INTERVENTIONAL PAIN PHYSICIANS :
James Allen Sigler
300 Broadway
P O Box 995
Paducah KY 42002-0995
Jonathan D . Pitchford
James Richard Coltharp, Jr.
Whitlow, Roberts, Houston 8v Straub, PLLC .
300 Broadway
P O Box 995
Paducah KY 42002-0995
COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE,
THE KENTUCKY CHAPTER OF AMERICAN COLLEGE
OF SURGEONS :
Bradley R. Hume
Beth Hendrickson McMasters
Thompson Miller 8s Simpson, PLC .
600 West Main Street
Suite 500
Louisville KY 40202
21
'~$Uyrrmr (~Vurf of ~Rrufurhv
2004-SC-001015-DG
AND
2005-SC-000834-DG
GREGORY B . NAZAR, M .D ., AND
GREGORY B . NAZAR, M .D ., P.S .C. APPELLANTS/ CROSS-APPELLEES
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V. CASE NO . 2003-CA-001110-MR
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO . 00-CI-006591
SHEILA BRANHAM, EXECUTRIX OF
THE ESTATE OF ROE BRANHAM APPELLEE/ CROSS-APPELLANT
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND GRANTING MODIFICATION
The Petition for Rehearing, filed by the Appellee/ Cross-Appellant, of the
Opinion of the Court rendered April 23, 2009, is DENIED .
The Opinion of the Court rendered on April 23, 2009, is MODIFIED by
substitution of the attached Opinion in lieu of the original Opinion . Said
modifications do not affect the holding of the Opinion or the Concurring in Part
and Dissenting in Part Opinion as originally rendered .
Abramson, Cunningham, and Scott, JJ ., concur. Special Justice Jeffrey
C. Mando and Special ~T~astice Walter A. Baker, concur. Noble and Veneers,
JJ., dissent and would grant rehearing . Minton, C .J . ; and Schroder, J ., not
sitting.
Entered : August 27, 2009 .
DEPUTY CHIEF JUSTICE