Edna Miles v. Bluegrass Rehabilitation Center ( 2015 )

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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 24, 2015
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2014-SC-000442-WC
EDNA MILES APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V. CASE NO. 2013-CA-000973-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION NO. 12-94841
BLUEGRASS REHABILITATION CENTER;
HONORABLE WILLIAM J. RUDLOFF,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Edna Miles, appeals a Court of Appeals decision which
reversed a workers' compensation award entered in her favor. Miles argues
that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Workers' Compensation
Board's ("Board") opinion because substantial evidence supports the
Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") finding that she was entitled to permanent
total disability ("PTD") benefits. For the below stated reasons, we affirm the
Court of Appeals.
Miles filed a Form 101 alleging she injured her back, hips, and lower
abdomen while lifting a patient in the course of her employment as a certified
nursing assistant at Bluegrass Rehabilitation Center. As she lifted the patient,
Miles alleges she experienced a pop in her back and that her right leg went
numb, causing her to fall to the floor. Miles sought treatment for her injury
and attempted to return to light duty work at Bluegrass. However, Dr. Thomas
Menke took Miles off work and she has been unemployed since.
Miles submitted reports from Dr. James Owen and Dr. Jared Madden in
support of her claim. Relevant to the issue appealed in this matter, the ALJ
summarized Dr. Madden's findings as follows:
[Miles] also filed the medical report of Dr. Jared Madden. Dr.
Madden examined Ms. Miles on November 9, 2012. Dr. Madden
took a comprehensive medical history from Ms. Miles and reviewed
her medical records. He conducted a thorough physical
examination of the plaintiff. His diagnosis was that Ms. Miles'
condition involved low back pain, lumbar degenerative disc
disease, lumbar radiculopathy and chronic pain syndrome due to
trauma. Dr. Madden stated that he did not believe that the
plaintiff was at maximum medical improvement because she had
not had the required medical treatment due to the fact that the
insurance carrier had denied the necessary medical treatment. He
stated, however, that he believed that Ms. Miles was at maximum,
medical improvement as of August 6, 2012, approximately six
months after her work injuries. Based upon a maximum medical
improvement date of August 6, 2012, Dr. Madden stated that in
his opinion Ms. Miles will sustain a 12% whole person impairment
under the AMA Guides, Fifth Edition. Dr. Madden stated that Ms.
Miles does not retain the physical capacity to return to the type of
work which she performed at the time of her work injuries and he
recommended that she be restricted to permanent light duty work.
Bluegrass filed the report of Dr. Thomas Menke to counter Miles's evidence.
The ALT found that Miles sustained a work-related injury. The ALJ
made the following findings regarding Miles's eligibility for PTD benefits:
I saw and heard [Miles] testify at the hearing and she was a
credible and convincing witness. Based upon the totality of the
evidence, including [Miles's] sworn testimony and the very
persuasive medical reports from Dr. Owen and Dr. Madden, I make
the factual determination that Ms. Miles will sustain a 12%
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permanent whole person impairment under the AMA Guides, Fifth
Edition, as per the very persuasive medical report from Dr.
Madden.
In rendering a decision, KRS 342.285 grants the [ALJ] as
fact-finder the sole discretion to determine the quality, character,
and substance of evidence. AK Steel Corp. v. Adkins, 253 S.W.3d
59 (Ky. 2008). In this case I find most persuasive the opinion of
Dr. Madden and find that the plaintiff will sustain a 12% whole
person permanent impairment.
"Permanent total disability' means the condition of an
employee who, due to an injury, has a permanent disability rating
and has a complete and permanent inability to perform any type of
work as a result of an injury . . . ." Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 342.0011. To determine if an injured employee is
permanently totally disabled, an AI,J must consider what impact
the employee's post-injury physical, emotional, and intellectual
state has on the employee's ability "to find work consistently under
normal employment conditions . . . . [and] to work dependably[.]"
Ira A. Watson Dept. Store v. Hamilton, 34 S.W.3d 48, 51 (Ky. 2000).
In making that determination,
the ALJ must necessarily consider the worker's
medical condition . . . . [however,] the ALJ is not
required to rely upon the vocational opinions of either
the medical experts or the vocational experts. A
worker's testimony is competent evidence of his
physical condition and of his ability to perform various
activities both before and after being injured.'
Id. at 52. (Internal citations omitted.) See also, Hush v. Abrams,
584 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1979).
In the present case, I considered the severity of [Miles's] work
injury, her age, her work history, her education, the testimony of
[Miles] and Dr. Madden's specific opinions regarding her
occupational disability. Based on all of those factors, I make the
factual determination that [Miles] cannot find work consistently
under regular work circumstances and work dependably. I,
therefore, make the factual determination that she is permanently
and totally disabled.
Bluegrass filed a petition for reconsideration which was denied. The Board
affirmed the ALJ's opinion and order, finding that substantial evidence
supported the PTD award.
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The Court of Appeals, citing to Arnold v. Toyota Motor Mfg., 375 S.W.3d
56, 61-62 (Ky. 2012), reversed and remanded the ALJ's opinion and award.
Judge VanMeter wrote:
Here, the record shows no evidence that the ALJ balanced Miles's
age, work history, and education against her physical restrictions,
the availability of more sedentary jobs, and her ability to perform
those jobs. Instead, the ALJ's opinion is simply conclusive, stating
that he considered the evidence without any explanation of how he
did so. As a result, the record does not contain the evidentiary
basis for the ALJ's findings so as to allow for a meaningful review
of this case. We believe the Board erred in affirming the ALJ's
decision, since the ALJ did not make sufficient findings to support
his award of PTD benefits.
Miles subsequently filed this appeal.
The function of the Court of Appeals is to "correct the Board only where
the Court perceives the Board has overlooked or misconstrued controlling
statutes or precedent, or committed an error in assessing the evidence so
flagrant as to cause gross injustice." W. Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d
685, 687-88 (Ky. 1992). The ALJ, as fact-finder, has sole discretion in
determining the quality, character, and substance of the evidence. AK Steel
Corp. v. Adkins, 253 S.W.3d 59, 64 (Ky. 2008). The ALJ is given broad
discretion to weigh the quality and substance of the evidence. Square D Co. v.
Tipton, 862 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Ky. 1993). However, in making his findings, the
ALJ must keep in mind the following standard provided in Arnold, 375 S.W.3d
at 61-62:
KRS 342.275(2) and KRS 342.285 contemplate an opinion that
summarizes the conflicting evidence concerning disputed facts;
weighs that evidence to make findings of fact; and determines the
legal significance of those findings. Only when an opinion
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summarizes the conflicting evidence accurately and states the
evidentiary basis for the ALJ's finding does it enable the Board and
reviewing courts to determine in the summary manner
contemplated by KRS 342.285(2) whether the finding is supported
by substantial evidence and reasonable.
The Court of Appeals held that the ALj did not provide a proper
summary of his reasoning in finding that Miles is entitled to PTD benefits. The
Court of Appeals held that the ALJ's opinion was conclusory and did not
provide a sufficient explanation as to how he reached his ultimate conclusion.
We agree.
The ALJ stated that based on the "severity of [Miles's] work injury, her
age, her work history, her education, the testimony of [Miles] and Dr. Madden's
specific opinions regarding her occupational disability" he found she was
entitled to PTD benefits. But, he does not provide any indication as to what it
was about that evidence or testimony that led him to find she was entitled to
PTD benefits. Notably, the ALJ's summary of Dr. Madden's opinion stated that
the doctor believed Miles did not retain the physical capacity to return to the
type of work which she performed at the time of her work injuries and
recommended she should be on permanent light duty work. The ALJ's
summary of Dr. Madden's opinion did not indicate that Miles was unable "to
find work consistently under normal employment conditions . . . . [and] to work
dependably[.]" Hamilton, 34 S.W.3d at 51. Additionally, Miles did not testify
that she could not work in the future, only that her injury prevented her from
working at her former job with Bluegrass. Bluegrass is entitled to greater
detail regarding the ALJ's reasoning. Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals
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that the opinion and award should be vacated and the matter remanded for the
ALJ to make additional findings. We note that on remand the ALJ is free to
again conclude that Miles is entitled to PTD benefits as long as the record
supports such a conclusion and the ALJ articulates the basis for his findings
and conclusion.
To make a determination that a claimant is permanently and totally
disabled the ALJ must:
necessarily . . . [consider] . . . factors such as the worker's post-
injury physical, emotional, intellectual, and vocational status and
how those factors interact. It also includes a consideration of the
likelihood that the particular worker would be able to find work
consistently under normal employment conditions. A worker's
ability to do so is affected by factors such as whether the
individual will be able to work dependably and whether the
worker's physical restrictions will interfere with vocational
capabilities.
Hamilton, 34 S.W.3d at 51. Thus, the ALJ must consider a number of factors,
not just a claimant's physical restrictions. Furthermore, we have not
previously held and we do not now hold that a claim of permanent total
disability must be supported by a physician's opinion that the claimant is
unable "to find work consistently under normal employment conditions . . . .
[and] to work dependably." That is a finding the ALJ must make based on the
factors set forth above.
Finally, we note that the Court of Appeals stated that the ALJ failed to
balance "Miles's age, work history, and education against her physical
restrictions, the availability of more sedentary jobs, and her ability to perform
those jobs." (Emphasis added.) The ALJ must determine if a claimant can find
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work "under normal employment conditions," McNutt Constr./ First Gen. Servs.
v. Scott, 40 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Ky. 2001), however, the parties are not required
to provide evidence regarding the availability of jobs nor is the ALJ required to
make a specific finding regarding the availability of jobs. The AW is only
required to find whether employment conditions are normal, a finding that
could include, but does not necessitate, a finding regarding the availability of
various job classifications.
Thus, for the above stated reasons, we affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
All sitting. Minton, C.J.; Abramson, Keller, and Noble, JJ., concur.
Barber, J., dissents by separate opinion in which Cunningham and Venters,
JJ., join.
BARBER, J., DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent. The Board concluded
that the ALJ had applied the proper legal standard for determining whether
Miles was permanently total disabled in accordance with Ira A. Watson
Department Store v. Hamilton, 34 S.W.3d 48 (Ky. 2000). As the Board explained:
There is no question Miles sustained a work-related injury. This
was assessed by Drs. Owen, Madden and Menke. Likewise, all of
these physicians assessed impairment ratings and recommended
restrictions resulting from her work injury. Miles testified she
cannot return to work. She also testified she has constant low
back pain (sometimes increased with activity), takes medication,
and her right leg occasionally goes numb, causing her to fall.
I agree with the Board that the award of PTD benefits is not so
unreasonable under the evidence that the ALJ's decision must be reversed. The
ALJ explained that he relied upon Miles' testimony, as well as the "very
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persuasive" reports of Dr. Owen and Dr. Madden. Both physicians assigned
significant restrictions. Dr. Madden opined that Miles' lumbar radicular pain
negatively impacts "nearly all aspects of daily living as well as limiting her
ability to competitively engage in employment." Miles testified that she has not
worked anywhere since she last worked for Bluegrass. In her deposition, Miles
explained that she unsuccessfully tried to find private care work "where they
send you to private care homes. They said they needed more information about
my restrictions. And that was it."
"[Al worker is not required to be homebound in order to be found to be
totally occupationally disabled." Transp. Cabinet v. Poe, 69 S.W.3d 60, 63-64
(Ky. 2001).
Although the Act underwent extensive revision in 1996, the ALJ
remains in the role of the fact-finder, and it is among the functions
of the ALJ to translate the lay and medical evidence into a finding
of occupational disability. ...the ALJ is not required to rely on the
vocational opinions of either the medical experts or the vocational
experts. A worker's testimony is competent evidence of his physical
condition and of his ability to perform various activities both before
and after being injured.
Corn., Transp. Cabinet v. Guffey, 42 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Ky. 2001) (citations
omitted).
Cunningham and Venters, JJ., join.
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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT,
EDNA MILES:
McKinnley Morgan
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
BLUEGRASS REHABILITATION CENTER:
Kimberly Newman
Lucas Ryan Braun
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