Patrick Allen Watkins v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2011 )


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    RENDERED: APRIL 21, 2011
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    o$uprrtur Court oftlfir
    2008-SC-000798-MR
    EAT
    PATRICK ALLEN WATKINS                                              APPELLANT
    ON APPEAL FROM CLARK CIRCUIT COURT
    V.                 HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
    NO. 07-CR-00051-001
    COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                            APPELLEE
    AND
    2008-SC-000823-MR
    JOY RENEE WATKINS                                                  APPELLANT
    ON APPEAL FROM CLARK CIRCUIT COURT
    V.                HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
    NO. 07-CR-00051-002
    COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                             APPELLEE
    MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
    AFFIRMING, IN PART, AND REVERSING AND REMANDING, IN PART
    Appellants, Patrick and Joy Watkins, were found guilty by a Clark Circuit
    Court jury of wanton murder. For these crimes, Appellants were sentenced to
    life imprisonment. They now appeal their convictions as a matter of right. Ky.
    Const. § 110(2)(b).
    I. BACKGROUND
    In the spring of 2007, Patrick and Joy Watkins resided in Winchester,
    Kentucky. The couple was married and had two young children together. The
    Watkinses had also obtained legal custody of young Michaela Watkins,
    Patrick's daughter from a previous marriage. Michaela was twelve years old
    and had been in foster care after being removed from her biological mother's
    custody due to severe abuse and neglect. Michaela later died a tragic death.
    The relevant facts are as follows.
    At 3:56 p.m. on Sunday, March 11, 2007, Patrick called his sister,
    Stephanie Radar, and asked her to come to his apartment. When Stephanie
    and her husband arrived, Patrick indicated that something was wrong with
    Michaela. After Stephanie asked Patrick where Michaela was, he initially
    responded, "[s]he's in there on the bed asleep." Patrick soon admitted that
    Michaela was not asleep but dead, explaining that she had fallen down the
    stairs some forty-five minutes earlier. Stephanie did not believe him because
    "[i]t looked like she had been beaten to death." Patrick stated that he "needed
    his family" and that "he was going to jail."
    In response to Radar's 911 call, paramedic Gary Conn soon arrived on
    the scene and found Michaela lying on her bed with a blanket draped over her
    body. As Conn was examining Michaela, Patrick appeared at the door and
    Conn asked him what had happened. Patrick again responded that Michaela
    had fallen down the stairs an hour earlier. Conn, however, did not believe that
    her injuries were caused by such a fall, nor did he believe that Michaela had
    only been dead for an hour. He noted that she was cold to the touch, rigor
    mortis had set in, and lividity was present. When Sergeant Frick asked what
    happened, Patrick similarly responded that Michaela had fallen down the stairs
    and that, afterward, she went to her bedroom. Sergeant Frick discovered
    Michaela with "a bruised face like I have never seen before."
    Detective Hall began his investigation at the scene and Patrick gave the
    same explanation. He viewed Michaela's body and observed pattern bruising
    on her face, a bite mark behind her ear, a bite mark on her left ankle, and
    significant burns on her legs. He noticed that the burn marks went straight
    down the back of her legs, indicating that she had likely been held down in hot
    water, that her heels had unbroken blisters, indicating that she likely did not
    walk afterwards, and that there were no splash marks on her body, indicating
    that the burns were not accidental. Patrick and Joy stated that Michaela had
    burnt herself the previous night while taking a bath.
    Based upon all the evidence, deputy coroner Dr. Hamon believed that
    Michaela died between four and six hours earlier (between 11:15 a.m. and 1:15
    p.m.), that she did not die in bed but was placed there, and that her injuries
    were not self-inflicted.
    The testimony of medical examiner Cristin Rolf figured prominently into
    trial. Dr. Rolf identified dozens of bruises and abrasions to Michaela's head; as
    well as a broken vertebrate and bleeding around her spinal cord. Michaela
    3
    suffered at least second-degree burns on the backs of her legs, buttocks,
    vagina, and feet, and the skin was removed in spots. There was a well-defined
    line where the tissue was burned, while the balls of her feet and toes were not
    burned. Dr. Rolf believed that someone either held Michaela in hot water or
    that she was too weak to move.
    Notably, Dr. Rolf discovered that Michaela had a large bruise on the left
    side of her chest. Under the bruise, her ribs were fractured (five in particular
    were crushed and compressed into other bones), and the left lung was partially
    collapsed - known as a "flailed" chest injury, causing significant pain and
    difficulty breathing. Though Dr. Rolf was unable to determine the exact cause
    of the chest injury, she believed that it was likely brought about by a forceful,
    high velocity blow or blunt impact.
    Dr. Rolf concluded that all of Michaela's injuries occurred within thirty-
    six hours and that they were neither self-inflicted nor caused from a fall down
    the stairs. She believed that the flailed chest was the cause of Michaela's
    death, though noting that the blunt impacts to her head, trunk, and
    extremities could have also contributed. Dr. Rolf also noted that Michaela had
    burns covering her lower extremities and testified that "with the removal of the
    skin, a person can become infected and die easily—very quickly—if it's not
    treated."
    Joy gave several taped police statements.' Though initially reluctant to
    offer much detail, Joy admitted that, on Saturday morning, she placed her
    entire body weight on the child, restraining her, and hitting her in - the face. 2 At
    that point, Michaela urinated on herself, which temporarily stopped the abuse.
    Both Joy and Patrick then ordered Michaela to bathe. Joy maintained that she
    did not know who ran the hot water causing Michaela's burns, but that she ran
    upstairs to the bathroom after hearing Michaela scream and saw Patrick
    standing in the hallway. Michaela proceeded to fall three times and strike her
    head (twice in the bathroom and once down the stairs). Michaela's legs were
    later bandaged and ointment was applied to her burns. Joy noticed that the
    skin was peeling on Michaela's heels and she asked Patrick whether they
    should take Michaela to the hospital, but he responded that she would be
    okay. Patrick carried Michaela downstairs where she ate dinner and watched
    television.
    According to Joy, Michaela awoke the next morning and ate breakfast
    but was acting strangely. She stated that Michaela vomited and began to fall
    down and lurch over at times. The family soon left the apartment and drove to
    Red River Gorge for a family picnic.
    Joy maintained that Michaela was alive during the drive to the Gorge.
    Contradicting prior statements, Joy stated that, once there, Michaela was not
    feeling well and that she stayed in the car while the other children ate and
    1   Patrick and Joy gave taped statements to police, all of which were played for the
    jury. Neither testified at trial.
    2   Joy admitted to occasionally biting and backhanding Michaela "really hard."
    played. Several times throughout the day, Joy stated that Michaela was in
    need of medical attention. She claimed that Patrick refused to take Michaela to
    a hospital because he suspected that Michaela was trying to manipulate them
    and because he was fearful that Joy's prior acts of physical abuse would be
    discovered.
    On the drive back to Winchester, Michaela was unresponsive and Joy
    was upset. When they arrived home sometime before 3:00 p.m., Patrick carried
    Michaela to her bedroom before returning to Joy and stating that something
    was wrong.
    Patrick offered less information to police and his account diverged from
    Joy's in several ways. According to Patrick, it was Michaela that had - filled the
    tub with scalding hot water and burned herself. Patrick maintained that
    Michaela was later able to walk down the stairs and eat dinner with the family.
    On the way home from the Gorge, he noticed that Michaela's hands were cold.
    When the family returned home, Patrick claimed that Michaela walked into the
    apartment. It was then that Michaela allegedly fell down an entire flight of
    stairs and hit her head before going to bed. When Patrick went to check on her
    thirty to forty-five minutes later, he found Michaela lying in her bed
    unresponsive and not breathing. Patrick admitted that a "mistake" was made
    in failing to take Michaela to the hospital. When confronted with Joy's
    statement that she found him upstairs after hearing Michaela scream, Patrick
    announced he had nothing else to say.
    6
    At trial, Appellants argued that their culpability, if any, did not rise to the
    level of wanton murder. Patrick maintained that Michaela had burned herself,
    that he had never witnessed Joy physically abuse Michaela, but that he
    neglected to take her to a hospital or otherwise obtain medical assistance.
    While Joy admitted that she, too, should have sought medical assistance for
    Michaela, she claimed that she did not intentionally or knowingly cause
    Michaela's fatal chest injury, and that she did not know who had run the hot
    bath water.
    At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Appellants guilty of wanton
    murder, fixing their punishment at life imprisonment. On appeal, Appellants
    raise several allegations of error in their underlying trial. Due to the improper
    hearsay used against him, we reverse Patrick Watkins' conviction, but affirm
    Joy Watkins'.
    II. ANALYSIS
    A. Right of Confrontation: Statements
    Appellants argue that their Sixth Amendment confrontation rights were
    offended when the trial court permitted the Commonwealth to introduce their
    police interviews without redaction, limiting admonition, or opportunity for
    cross-examination. Puzzlingly, the Commonwealth contends that the
    "statements exculpated both of the Watkines, rather than incriminating either
    of them."
    7
    Prior to trial, Appellants filed a motion arguing that, absent an
    opportunity for her cross-examination, the Confrontation Clause prohibited
    their unredacted, out-of-court statements to be admitted at trial. The motion
    was continued several times and, ultimately, never heard or ruled upon until
    the Commonwealth attempted to play the police interviews for the jury. In
    response to a defense objection, the Commonwealth insisted that during the
    interviews, Appellants simply did not incriminate one another and thus
    redaction was not required. The trial court briefly reviewed, in camera, the
    partial transcripts tendered before overruling the objection. Having reviewed
    the statements, we find error with respect to both Patrick and Joy; but,
    pertaining to Joy, we hold the error was harmless.
    At the outset, we note that though Patrick's brief cites Crawford v.
    Washington, 
    541 U.S. 36
    (2004) in support of his contentions here, the nature
    of his argument indicates that his allegation of error rests not on Crawford,
    but, rather, on Bruton v. United States, 
    391 U.S. 123
    (1968) - i.e., that Joy's
    unredacted statements incriminated him. 3
    Crawford held that "the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
    forbids admission of all testimonial hearsay statements against a defendant at
    a criminal trial, unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant has had a
    3   In his original motion in limine before the trial court, Patrick cited Bruton and the
    Commonwealth, noting this "curiosity" responded in its brief to both Crawford and
    Bruton.
    8
    prior opportunity for cross-examination." 4 Bray v. Commonwealth, 
    177 S.W.3d 741
    , 743 (Ky. 2005) (emphasis added) (citing 
    Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68
    ); see
    also Rankins v. Commonwealth, 
    237 S.W.3d 128
    , 130 (Ky. 2007) ("Returning to
    the Framers' intent, Crawford held that the Sixth Amendment prohibits the
    admission of the testimonial statement of a declarant who does not appear at
    trial, unless the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a
    prior opportunity for cross-examination."). "In the context of a joint trial,
    therefore, the pretrial confession of one [defendant] cannot be admitted against
    the other unless the confessing defendant takes the stand."'         Rodgers v.
    Commonwealth, 
    285 S.W.3d 740
    , 745-46 (Ky. 2009) (quoting Richardson v.
    Marsh, 
    481 U.S. 200
    , 206 (1987)).
    Before Crawford may apply at all, the hearsay at issue must be
    considered "testimonial" in nature. As we explained in Rankins, the holding in
    Crawford concerns "'testimonial' statements, because it is statements of a
    testimonial character, as opposed to other hearsay, which cause the declarant
    to be a witness against the accused for purposes of the Confrontation 
    Clause." 237 S.W.3d at 130
    (citation omitted). At a minimum, testimonial hearsay
    encompasses "prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or
    at a former trial" or statements made during "police interrogations."         
    Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68
    . In general, hearsay may be "testimonial when the
    4   The Court in Crawford explicitly noted that the Confrontation Clause "does not bar
    the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of
    the matter asserted" - i.e., non-hearsay 
    uses. 541 U.S. at 59
    n.9 (citing Tennessee
    v. Street, 
    471 U.S. 409
    , 414 (1985)).
    circumstances objectively indicate that there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and
    that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past
    events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." Davis v. Washington,
    
    547 U.S. 813
    , 822 (2006). 5
    However, "Crawford and its progeny do not address the use of a prior
    testimonial statement against the declarant himself," which is the question
    addressed in Bruton and its progeny. 6 Rodgers, 
    285 S.W.3d 746
    . Therefore
    complementing the protections in Crawford is the holding in Bruton, wherein
    the Supreme Court of the United States "held that a defendant is deprived of
    his rights under the Confrontation Clause when his nontestifying codefendant's
    5   The Court in Crawford added:
    Various formulations of this core class of testimonial statements exist:
    ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent - that is, material
    such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the
    defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements
    that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially;
    extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial
    materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
    confessions; statements that were made under circumstances which
    would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
    would be available for use at a later trial.
    Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 
    129 S. Ct. 2527
    , 2531 (2009) (quoting 
    Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52
    ).
    Generally speaking, a statement is
    "against" a defendant for purposes of the Confrontation Clause only if [the]
    testimony is part of the body of evidence that the jury may consider in
    assessing his guilt. Therefore, a witness whose testimony is introduced
    in a joint trial with the limiting instruction that it be used only to assess
    the guilt of one of the defendants will not be considered to be a witness
    "against" the other defendants [unless it is incriminating pursuant to
    Bruton].
    Cruz v. New York, 
    481 U.S. 186
    , 190 (1987) (emphasis added).
    10
    confession [implicating] him as a participant in the crime is introduced at their
    joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider that confession only against
    the codefendant." Richardson v. Marsh, 
    481 U.S. 200
    , 202 (1987)
    (summarizing the Bruton rule); see 
    Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137
    ("[I]n the context of
    a joint trial we cannot accept limiting instructions as an adequate substitute
    for petitioner's constitutional right of cross-examination. The effect is the same
    as if there had been no instruction at all.").
    Yet, given certain conditions, a joint trial may be had: "[W . . . . the [non-
    testifying co-defendant's] confession is redacted so as to remove all reference to
    the co-defendant(s), including obvious inferential references, then the
    confession may be admitted against the confessor," 
    Rodgers, 285 S.W.3d at 746
    (citing 
    Richardson, 481 U.S. at 206
    ; Gray v. Maryland, 
    523 U.S. 185
    (1998)), "if a limiting instruction is given to admonish the jury not to consider
    the [confession] as evidence against any defendant other than the [confessor]." 7
    Commonwealth v. Stone, 
    291 S.W.3d 696
    , 700 (Ky. 2009) (citing 
    Richardson, 481 U.S. at 207-08
    ); but see Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 
    251 S.W.3d 309
    ,
    314 (Ky. 2008) ("In accordance with Gray v. Maryland, 
    523 U.S. 185
    , 195 . . .
    (1998) and Stanford v. Parker, 
    266 F.3d 442
    , 457 (6th Cir. 2001), this Court
    has extended slightly the protections of Bruton, holding that redacted
    confessions which merely delete the name of the other defendant or insert the
    phrase 'other party' or 'deleted' also constitute a Bruton violation because the
    7   We restate that the court need only "giVe the limiting admonition 'upon request."'
    Barth v. Commonwealth, 
    80 S.W.3d 390
    , 397 (Ky. 2001); see also Caudill v.
    Commonwealth, 
    120 S.W.3d 635
    , 658 (2003).
    11
    statements still facially incriminate the co-defendant.") (citing 
    Barth, 80 S.W.3d at 395
    (Ky. 2001)); 
    Stone, 291 S.W.3d at 701
    ("When the purpose of the
    statement is to incriminate the non-declarant, a Bruton redaction makes no
    sense. In that situation, Crawford must be considered."). 8
    1. Patrick's Bruton Challenge to Joy's Statements
    Turning to Patrick's arguments here, he identifies seventeen different
    statements that Joy made in police interviews that, he contends, incriminated
    him.
    We have reviewed the statements and conclude that the following were
    properly admitted without redaction. When asked whether Joy saw Patrick hit
    Michaela, Joy replied, "[ilf he did, then I don't know why, and I didn't see it and
    that's the honest to God's truth. I'm just saying I did not see it . . . Is it
    possible that he did? I'm not saying it's not possible." At another point in the
    interview, Joy was again asked to explain what happened during Michaela's
    bath: "Now as far as Michaela goes, am I saying my husband didn't hold her in
    the bath? I'm not saying he did. I'm not saying he didn't. . . . It is possible
    8   In Rodgers, we also noted:
    Where a jury hears a non-testifying co-defendant's statement to be
    considered only against that particular defendant/declarant, both the
    redaction and the limiting instruction . . . insure compliance with
    Crawford, i.e., facially incriminating matters are removed and even if
    inferentially incriminating statements remain the admonition is
    presumed to be followed so that the testimonial hearsay is not being
    used against the defendant(s) who did not make the statement.
    [Therefore, tjhe combination of redaction and limiting instruction
    satisfies 
    Crawford. 285 S.W.3d at 747
    ; but see 
    Stone, 291 S.W.3d at 697-701
    (Crawford implicated
    when redacted confession of co-defendant explicitly used against defendant).
    12
    that he did, I'm not saying it's not possible." Joy also made several statements
    regarding the family's trip to Red River Gorge and other events occurring on the
    day Michaela died, including, "Was she unresponsive in the car on the way
    back from the Gorge? Yes, she was." And, "[i]t felt to me like she had a
    heartbeat, but I wasn't sure." In response the question asking whether Joy
    knew Michaela was dead, Joy stated "I didn't know for sure, like I told you
    earlier, I was not positive, I was driving . . . I suspected something was not
    right . . . something was very serious [sic] wrong." Finally, when the group
    arrived home from the Gorge, Joy stated that she, "came in and got the little
    ones some juice and they went upstairs to play."
    In none of these statements can it be said that Joy expressly or implicitly
    incriminated Patrick in Michaela's death.
    However, we conclude that the following statements were improperly
    admitted and should have been redacted in order to protect Patrick's right of
    confrontation under Bruton. In her statements, Joy indicated that Patrick was
    upstairs with Michaela alone when she was burned in the bath tub:
    Yeah, [Patrick] was upstairs at some point in time. I do know that.
    I don't know what for.
    When I went upstairs, I tried to help get her out of the bathtub and
    she flopped backwards before anybody could grab her. I asked
    [Patrick] what happened and he said, "I guess the water's too hot."
    Does he feel responsible? Yeah, I think he does feel responsible.
    I'm not going to lie to you.
    Though not specifically identified, Joy's related statement to the effect that she
    found Patrick in the upstairs hallway after hearing Michaela scream should
    13
    have also been redacted. In addition, Joy assigned knowledge to Patrick that
    Michaela was grievously injured and in need of medical attention and explained
    that Patrick, in response, did nothing:
    I told my husband that I thought she needed to go to the hospital.
    I did.
    That's when I told him that we needed to get something to put on
    her feet. So he gave me the money and I went down and got that
    and I came back and then I told him later on that we probably
    need to take her to the hospital. He said "No. She'll be fine."
    She said, "Can I lay down?" and I said, "Yeah, you can lay down."
    So she laid down for a minute and when she laid down and
    stretched out, I noticed the skin on her heels peeling. And that's
    when I told her dad, I said, "Maybe we should take her to the
    hospital." And the reason he didn't want to take her to the
    hospital wasn't to protect himself. I think it was to protect me
    because of the bruises on her face.
    Later on that night, I told my husband, I said, "Are you sure?" She
    hadn't complained of hurting and I said, "Are you sure we
    shouldn't take her to the hospital?" And he said, "I think she's
    fine. She's just trying to use it as a way to manipulate us." I said,
    "Okay."
    When I went in that morning is when I stressed how important it
    was that I thought we needed to take her to the doctor because
    that's when I realized how bad her skin was peeling. I don't even
    recall what my husband said at the time. I just know that we just
    didn't go to the doctor.
    All we kept saying back and forth to each other [sic}, "Is she okay?
    What should we do? Where should we go? What should—" that's
    all we kept saying.
    I think we just went home and said, "let's see if she's all right," and
    once we got home and about an hour in, we realized that . . . after
    he got her in and we got her to the bedroom and she was in there I
    don't know how long and she hadn't moved and that's when we
    really realized, no, she's gone.
    At that point, yeah, I knew something was definitely, he told me
    14
    that he went in to check on her and he said she wasn't—something
    wasn't right. He just said, "She's not right. I don't think she's
    breathing."
    All the way back to Winchester, we both just [sic] there and we
    kept .. . "Is she alive?" I mean we were literally in shock.
    Furthermore, when asked why she did not seek medical treatment for
    Michaela, Joy responded:
    I guess because Patrick was so panicky and scared. He was
    worried about our kids and worried about them being taken away.
    That's where I made my mistake and I told you that earlier.
    And subsequently, when asked why someone did not call for an ambulance
    after Patrick stated that he did not think Michaela was breathing, Joy stated, "I
    don't know. I just did what—I was just doing what I was told to do."
    That these statements were especially incriminating cannot be
    questioned when one of the three theories of wanton murder expressed in the
    jury instructions was that Patrick "fail[ed] to provide medical treatment or aid
    for [Michaela's] resulting injuries." These statements directly inculpated
    Patrick, thus we cannot conclude that they were cumulative evidence or
    harmless error. Rather, this is a blatant situation "where the powerfully
    incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused
    side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a
    joint trial." 
    Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-136
    . Because the Commonwealth
    disregarded a basic tenet of constitutional law—the Bruton rule—by forging
    ahead and introducing Joy's unredacted and inculpatory statements, we have
    no choice but to reverse.
    15
    Since we are reversing Patrick's conviction, we address, at the conclusion
    of this opinion, his remaining allegations of error only to the extent that they
    are likely to recur on retrial.
    2. Joy's Bruton and Crawford Challenge to Patrick's
    and Other Witness' Statements
    Joy, too, argues that her Sixth Amendment confrontation rights were
    offended when the Commonwealth was permitted to introduce Patrick's police
    interview without redaction, limiting admonition, or opportunity for cross-
    examination. Having reviewed Patrick's statements that were played for the
    jury, we agree, but find that the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
    See Chapman v. California, 
    386 U.S. 18
    , 24 (1967); Heard v. Commonwealth,
    
    217 S.W.3d 240
    , 244 (Ky. 2007) ("It must not be overlooked that 'before a
    federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the [reviewing] court must be
    able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.")
    (quotation omitted).
    Save one reference, Joy's wholesale objection to Patrick's interview as
    offending Bruton lacks merit. Patrick stated: "Obviously there was a mistake
    made because we didn't take [Michaela] to the doctor, for one. That was a
    mistake, for one. That was made." (Emphasis added). Joy, however, fails to
    show how this reference prejudiced her when she admitted that she knew
    something was wrong and that she should have taken Michaela to a hospital
    for medical treatment.
    16
    Joy contends that Patrick's statements nevertheless constituted
    testimonial hearsay in violation of Crawford. While Patrick's statements were
    most assuredly testimonial in character, Joy offers no credible argument for
    how his statements prejudiced her but merely asserts that Patrick's denials
    and explanations were so implausible in the face of contrary forensic evidence
    that she, too, was somehow tainted.
    Next, Joy takes issue with statements that Patrick made to Conn, Hall,
    Frick, and Stephanie Radar. At the scene, Patrick proffered the same
    explanation to Conn, Sergeant Frick, and Detective Hall regarding Michaela's
    cause of death: that she had fallen down the stairs some thirty to forty-five
    minutes prior to their arrival. In the 911 call placed by Radar, Patrick can be
    heard in the background stating that Michaela had burnt herself, fallen out of
    the bathtub and again down the stairs, along with a similar chronology of the
    days' events he would later give during his police interview. Joy argues that
    these statements, which were met with skepticism, somehow prejudiced her.
    While none of these statements facially incriminated her, Joy again asserts that
    their admission violated Crawford.
    We find no manifest injustice. 9 Even assuming that there was no
    ongoing emergency and Patrick's statements were testimonial hearsay, Joy
    9   Introduction of the statements was not objected to at trial and thus the errors are
    not preserved. Joy, however, requests palpable error review. This Court has held
    that "an unpreserved error may be noticed on appeal only if the error is 'palpable'
    and 'affects the substantial rights of a party,' and even then relief is appropriate
    only 'upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error."'
    Commonwealth v. Jones, 
    283 S.W.3d 665
    , 668 (Ky. 2009) (quoting RCr 10.16). "An
    unpreserved error that is both palpable and prejudicial still does not justify relief
    17
    provides no compelling reason as to why such error should not be recognized
    as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, which it is.
    B. Right of Confrontation: Lab Reports
    Joy next contends that it was a violation of Crawford, and more
    specifically, its most recent incarnation, Melendez-Diaz, for the Commonwealth
    to admit various lab reports when their authors did not testify at trial so as to
    permit cross-examination. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 
    129 S. Ct. 2527
    (2009). We agree, but also find such error to be harmless.
    At trial, Dr. Rolf, the assistant medical examiner, testified that she
    utilized two other experts, a dentist and a neuropathologist, in formulating her
    autopsy report. Near the conclusion of Dr. Rolfs direct examination, the
    Commonwealth moved to introduce her autopsy report as well as the dentist's
    report and neuropathologist's report. Joy objected and argued that the
    Confrontation Clause forbids these additional reports from being received into
    evidence because the individuals who prepared them were not available for
    cross-examination. In response, the Commonwealth argued that Dr. Rolf was
    present when the dentist and neuropathologist performed their examinations
    and that her autopsy report thus incorporated those reports. The trial court
    overruled the objection, finding that Dr. Rolf had appropriately relied upon the
    reports.
    unless the reviewing court further determines that it has resulted in a manifest
    injustice, unless, in other words, the error so seriously affected the fairness,
    integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding as to be 'shocking or
    jurisprudentially intolerable."' 
    Id. (quoting Martin
    v. Commonwealth, 
    207 S.W.3d 1
    ,
    4 (Ky. 2006)).
    18
    As detailed above, the Sixth Amendment provides a criminal defendant
    with the "right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him," and when
    the prosecution seeks to introduce testimonial hearsay, the right to cross-
    examination. The Supreme Court of the United States recently considered the
    applicability of the Confrontation Clause to "affidavits reporting the results of
    forensic analysis." Melendez-Diaz, 129 at 2530. In that case, Melendez-Diaz
    was charged with distributing cocaine, and, at his trial, the prosecution
    introduced three "certificates of analysis," prepared by state-employed analysts,
    concluding that the substance he possessed was cocaine.         
    Id. at 2530-31.
    The
    Court held that the admission of these certificates violated the Confrontation
    Clause, as Melendez-Diaz was unable to confront the analysts who prepared
    these certificates, i.e., the witnesses against him.   
    Id. at 2532.
    The High Court
    further explained that "the 'certificates' are functionally identical to live, in-
    court testimony, doing 'precisely what a witness does on direct examination:m
    declaring that the substance found in Melendez-Diaz's possession was cocaine.
    
    Id. at 2532
    (quoting Davis v. Washington, 
    547 U.S. 813
    , 830, (2006)). Finally,
    the Court held that the prosecution failed to satisfy Crawford's dictates, since
    it could not "sho[w] that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and
    that [Melendez-Diaz] had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them."          
    Id. at 2532.
    With the above framework in mind, we conclude here that the trial court
    erred when it admitted the dentist's and neuropathologist's reports. Neither
    19
    medical professional testified at trial, thereby depriving Joy of her
    constitutional right "to be confronted with the witnesses against [her]." Rather,
    like Melendez-Diaz, she was forced to accept, without question, the substance
    and accuracy of the dentist's and neuropathologist's reports. Furthermore,
    the Commonwealth failed to show that the dentist and neuropathologist were
    unavailable to testify and that Joy had a prior opportunity to cross-examine
    them.
    However, as previously stated, although we find error here, such error
    was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.        See Chapman v. California, 
    386 U.S. 18
    , 24 (1967); Heard v. Commonwealth, 
    217 S.W.3d 240
    , 244 (Ky. 2007)
    (detailing the harmless error standard for examining constitutional errors).
    The dentist's report, which performed a bite mark analysis, was introduced
    apparently as evidence that Joy bit Michaela. We conclude this report is
    harmless given Joy's admission that she did bite the victim. Next, the
    neuropathologist's report is also harmless, as it was extraneous to
    Commonwealth's theories—beating, scalding, or failing to medically treat—
    regarding the method of wanton murder. 10 Notably, Joy fails to present any
    argument addressing the alleged prejudicial effect, apparently content to call it
    10 Joy makes several passing, detached statements regarding the admission of the
    toxicology tests on the victim's blood and urine. Those tests revealed the presence
    of an antidepressant, a mood-controlling drug, and Tylenol. It is unclear whether
    she specifically objected and preserved this error. Nonetheless, for the same
    reasons as above, namely, that the evidence is not related to the Commonwealth's
    theories of wanton murder, any error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
    20
    to our attention. Therefore, after examining the evidence, we conclude that
    there is no reasonable possibility that this error contributed to her conviction.
    C. Jury Instructions
    1. Unanimous Verdict
    Joy next contends that, pursuant to Section 7 of the Kentucky
    Constitution, she was denied the right to a unanimous verdict because the jury
    instructions, as presented, permitted her murder conviction on theories
    unsupported by the evidence. The wanton murder" instruction under which
    she convicted read:
    You will find [Joy] guilty of Murder under this Instruction if, and
    only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
    that in this county on or about the 11th day of March, 2007, and
    before the finding of the Indictment herein, [Joy] caused the death
    of Michaela Watkins by wantonly engaging in a course of conduct
    by beating or scalding her, or failing to seek medical treatment or
    aid for the resulting injuries, which created a grave risk of death to
    Michaela Watkins and thereby caused the death of Michaela
    Watkins under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference
    to human life.
    (Emphasis added). The above instruction, known as a combination
    instruction, presented multiple theories of the crime in a single instruction. As
    such, Joy contends that the verdict did not specify under which of the three
    theories they were found guilty, and thus, argue that this instruction offended
    11   "A person is guilty of murder when . . . he wantonly engages in conduct which
    creates a grave risk of death to another person and thereby causes the death of
    another person." KRS 507.020(1)(b). See also KRS 507.020 Commentary (1974)
    ("Subsection (1)(b) following the lead of the Model Penal Code and other modern
    statutes, manifests a judgment that there is a type of homicide that should be
    treated as murder even though the actor had no conscious desire to cause the
    victim's death.").
    21
    their right to a unanimous verdict because there was insufficient evidence to
    support all three alternative methods of committing wanton murder.
    Before turning to the merits of the argument, we pause briefly to note
    that Joy failed to preserve this alleged error and essentially concedes such in
    her brief. The error assigned to an erroneous jury instruction is unpreserved
    "unless the party's position has been fairly and adequately presented to the
    trial judge by an offered instruction or by motion, or unless the party makes
    objection before the court instructs the jury, stating specifically the matter to
    which the party objects and the ground or grounds of the objection." RCr
    9.54(2). Joy concedes that "no specific objection was made to the non-
    unanimous verdict," and does not argue, or provide any citation to the record,
    that she offered an instruction or made a motion relating to this jury
    instruction. Thus, we review this assignment of error to jury instruction for
    palpable error. RCr 10.26.
    This Court has long held that "a verdict can not be successfully attacked
    upon the ground that the jurors could have believed either of two theories of
    the case where both interpretations are supported by the evidence and the
    proof of either beyond a reasonable doubt constitutes the same offense."      Wells
    v. Commonwealth, 
    561 S.W.2d 85
    , 88 (Ky. 1978). Thus, a single jury
    instruction may combine multiple theories "so long as there is sufficient
    evidence of each [theory]." Travis v. Commonwealth, 
    327 S.W.3d 456
    , 459-460
    (Ky. 2010).
    22
    We now examine the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each of the
    three theories contained in the wanton murder jury instruction sub judice.
    . "Beating"
    The evidence supported the theory that Joy may have committed wanton
    murder by causing Michaela's fatal chest injury or contributing to her death by
    beating her. Dr. Rolf testified that Michaela's chest injury was caused by a
    blunt, firm, and crushing force as Michaela's back remained supported against
    a hard surface. She also testified that the various blunt impact injuries to
    Michaela's head, trunk, and extremities could have contributed to her death.
    In Joy's final police interview, she admitted that, on the morning of the day
    Michaela died, she and Michaela "got into a tussle" on the floor during which
    Joy placed her entire body weight upon Michaela to in order to restrain her as
    Joy punched her head. Joy admitted that she inflicted the bruising and stated
    that it was not Patrick's fault.
    b. "Scalding"
    The evidence supported the theory that Joy may have committed wanton
    murder by burning Michaela. 12 As stated above, Dr. Rolf's testified that her
    examination revealed burns covering a "large amount of the [victim's] body
    surface area;" and furthermore; Dr. Rolf stated that "with the removal of the
    skin, a person someone can become infected and die easily—very quickly."
    12   As stated above, Dr. Rolf testified that "with the removal of the skin a person can
    become infected and die easily—very quickly—if it's not treated."
    23
    Joy admitted ordering Michaela to bathe and being present upstairs with
    her at times during her bath. Taken with the fact that substantial forensic
    evidence showed that Michaela's burns were not self-inflicted but were the
    product of being held in three to four inches of nearly boiling hot water, the
    evidence was sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that Joy was not
    being entirely truthful and may have burned Michaela.
    c. "Failing to Seek Medical Treatment or Aid"
    The evidence supported the theory that Joy may have committed wanton
    murder by failing to seek medical treatment or aid for injuries she inflicted. A
    review of Appellants' police statements reveals that Joy explicitly admitted that
    she had individually failed to take Michaela to a doctor or hospital, knowing
    that she was seriously ill or injured. Dr. Rolf concluded that all of Michaela's
    injuries could have been treated had she been given proper medical support.
    Therefore, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to support this theory of
    wanton murder.
    In an incomplete sub-argument, Joy claims that the trial court erred in
    failing to instruct the jury on whether she had a duty to seek medical
    treatment. She contends that legal duty is an element in failing to provide
    medical care, and attempts to draw a parallel to a deadly weapon jury
    instruction.' 3 According to Joy, it is error for a court not to instruct the jury
    that it must first find a gun operable before concluding that it was a deadly
    13   Thacker v. Commonwealth, 
    194 S.W.3d 287
    (Ky. 2006). This is the only case Joy
    cites in support of her argument.
    24
    weapon, just as it was error for the court here to fail to instruct on her duty to
    provide medical care. We disagree and find Joy's analogy inapt.
    This section of the jury instruction presented a theory of her wanton
    conduct—causing Michaela's death by failing to treat her resulting injuries
    (injuries Joy inflicted). As such, duty to treat is not an element of the offense;
    failure to treat was merely a theory of how Joy's conduct in causing Michaela's
    death rose to the level of wanton murder. Consequently, our inquiry, as
    detailed above, is whether there was sufficient evidence of this theory to
    support the jury's verdict, an inquiry we previously answered in the affirmative.
    D. Change of Venue
    Joy argues that the trial court erred by denying a change of venue due to
    pretrial publicity. It appears that Joy never filed a motion seeking change of
    venue, but rather "she agreed with Patrick Watkins' motion for a change of
    venue and adopted his assertions." Regardless of the dubious preservation, we
    find no error.
    On April 14, 2008, Patrick filed a motion for a change of venue on
    grounds that a fair trial could not be had in Clark County due to prejudicial
    media attention and, in the alternative, requested individual voir dire on the
    effect of publicity. In support of the motion, he highlighted numerous
    newspaper articles documenting Michaela's death and the subsequent
    investigation. For example, on March 13, 2007, the Lexington Herald-Leader
    published a front page article, entitled "Neighbors Describe Dead Girl's Chronic
    25
    Abuse." The article claimed that Michaela was an unhappy child and that
    several neighbors and relatives stated that Appellants routinely belittled and
    cursed the child, including a statement by Joy's grandmother that she had
    once witnessed Patrick smash Michaela's fingers on a table. On March 15,
    2007, the Winchester Sun carried a front page photograph of Michaela and a
    makeshift memorial, stating that Appellants had been charged with murder
    and that they had given inconsistent statements. In all, at least forty stories
    appeared in the local media. 14
    On April 25, 2008, Patrick filed a supplemental motion for a change of
    venue. Therein, he described a memorial service that was held on the
    courthouse lawn on April 17th for child abuse victims. Several Clark County
    residents attended and, during the service, decorative angels representing
    abused children were placed on the lawn and left there for a number of days.
    Two children were selected from the victims to represent the group, one of
    which was Michaela. People who knew the two children spoke at the service
    and balloons of Michaela's favorite color were flown at the scene to
    commemorate her. WKYT of Lexington reported on the service and, on the
    14   The motion also made much of the fact that the Grand Jury had attached a
    statement to its report acknowledging the crime's disturbing nature, which, in its
    entirety, read:
    The most profound cases involved crimes of violence and neglect,
    particularly when the victims are young and helpless. We are appalled
    that some members of our community were capable [sic] causing such
    great harm. Notwithstanding the horror of the case where a young girl
    lost her life we were impressed by the response of law enforcement.
    Winchester Police Detective James Hall has earned our collective respect
    and appreciation for the way he conducted the investigation into the
    death of Michaela Watkins.
    26
    following day, the Winchester Sun headlined the story, carrying Michaela's
    picture and describing her cause of death.
    On May 1, 2008, the trial court held one of two hearings on the motion.
    Though the trial court concluded that the facts of the case would likely lead
    any person to naturally conclude that it was a heinous offense, the court was
    troubled by recent events and stated:
    When I came here to court this morning, the first thing I did at
    7:30 and [sic] go out front and . . . there were all the angels of the
    child victims. . . . And I certainly don't criticize in any fashion any
    memorial service for the victims, particularly child victims of crime.
    I think it is entirely proper as all of us know April was child abuse
    prevention month throughout the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
    These types of memorial services are held probably in most every
    county. I think it was extremely unfortunate that this service took
    place on the front steps of the courthouse less than three weeks
    from the day this trial was to occur. . . . I think it would be
    virtually impossible to expect that you can get a jury of people that
    were not affected by that, particularly when they walk through the
    front door of the courthouse and look on both sides of the main
    entrance at the ribbons and the individual angels that are there
    and have been there two weeks today.
    As a result, the trial court granted a continuance and stated that it would
    consider a change of venue.
    The court subsequently denied the motion for change of venue and
    expressed its desire to try to seat an impartial jury. The court reserved ruling
    on the possibility for individual voir dire, as it intended to conduct extensive
    questioning regarding pretrial publicity.
    The trial began on September 2, 2008. The court opened by stating to
    the jury pool that many had probably heard about the case but those who had
    27
    formed feelings or opinions would likely be unable to hear the case. At the
    court's request, several jurors approached the bench who felt they could not
    fairly hear the evidence where they were questioned by the trial court and
    counse1. 15. As a result, out of the eighty-four potential jurors called, the trial
    court was forced to excuse fifteen (18%) for cause.
    "In Kentucky, the right to an impartial jury is protected by Section 11 of
    the Kentucky Constitution, as well as the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
    to the [United States] Constitution." Fugett v. Commonwealth, 
    250 S.W.3d 604
    ,
    612 (Ky. 2008); see also Irvin v. Dowd, 
    366 U.S. 717
    , 722 (1961) ("In essence,
    the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel
    of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing
    violates even the minimal standards of due process.") (citations omitted).
    Though "[i]t is not required . . . that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts
    and issues involved" to be impartial, 
    Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722
    , a juror must have a
    "mental attitude of appropriate indifference" - a state of mind for which there is
    no precise test or formula. 
    Id. at 724-25.
    A corollary to the right to an impartial jury is that a change of venue may
    be constitutionally required where the jurors' "minds [are] ineradicably
    poisoned" by prejudicial publicity. Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 
    870 S.W.2d 412
    ,
    416 (Ky. 1994); see Wilson v. Commonwealth, 
    836 S.W.2d 872
    , 888 (Ky. 1992)
    15   Appellants did not object to the trial court's questioning nor did they renew their
    request for individual voir dire. We, therefore, only address the issue of venue. See
    Bell v. Commonwealth, 
    473 S.W.2d 820
    , 821 (Ky. 1971) ("[I]f an objection is made,
    the party making the objection must insist that the trial court rule on the objection,
    or else it is waived.").
    28
    ("[A] change of venue should be granted if it appears that the defendant cannot
    have a fair trial in the county wherein the prosecution is pending.") (citing
    Brewster v. Commonwealth, 
    568 S.W.2d 232
    (Ky. 1978)); McCleskey v. Kemp,
    
    481 U.S. 279
    , 310 n.30 (1987) ("Widespread bias in the community can make a
    change of venue constitutionally required.") (citing 
    Irvin, 366 U.S. at 717
    ). 16 In
    order to justify a change of venue on these grounds, a defendant must show
    that "there is a reasonable likelihood that the accounts or descriptions of the
    investigation and judicial proceedings have prejudiced" him, though it is not
    enough "that jurors may have heard, talked, or read about a case."            
    Brewster, 568 S.W.2d at 235
    ; see also 
    Wilson, 836 S.W.2d at 888
    ("In order for a change
    of venue to be granted there must be a showing that: 1) There has been
    prejudicial news coverage, 2) It occurred prior to trial, and 3) The effect of such
    news coverage is reasonably likely to prevent a fair trial."). 17
    However, we note that "a showing of actual prejudice is unnecessary if
    the procedure involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is
    deemed inherently lacking in due process" - i.e., where the prejudice is implied
    or presumed from the totality of the circumstances. 
    Brewster, 568 S.W.2d at 235
    (citing Estes v. Texas, 
    381 U.S. 532
    (1965)). Though we have not always
    16   We note that less drastic approaches may suffice to remedy the risk of prejudicial
    publicity. See Groppi v. Wisconsin, 
    400 U.S. 505
    , 510 (1971) ("One way to try to
    meet the problem is to grant a continuance of the trial in the hope that in the
    course of time the fires of prejudice will cool. . . . Another way is to provide a
    method of jury qualification that will promote, through the exercise of challenges to
    the venire - preemptory and for cause - the exclusion of prospective jurors infected
    with the prejudice of the community from which they come.").
    17   The often quoted three-part test from Wilson appears simply an elemental summary
    of our previous holding in Brewster.
    29
    carefully reiterated the distinction, "there is clearly established Supreme Court
    [of the United States] precedent distinguishing between cases involving
    presumed prejudice - when the setting of the trial [is] inherently prejudicial, -
    and actual prejudice - when review of both the jury voir dire testimony and the
    extent and nature of the media coverage indicates a fair trial [was] impossible."
    Joseph v. Coyle, 
    469 F.3d 441
    , 468 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
    omitted) (quoting Nevers v. Killinger, 
    169 F.3d 352
    , 364 (6th Cir. 1999))
    (abrogated on other grounds by Harris v. Stovall, 
    212 F.3d 940
    , 942-43 (6th Cir.
    2000)); see Murphy v. Florida, 
    421 U.S. 794
    , 788-89 (1975) (contrasting Irvin, a
    case of actual prejudice, to Rideau v. Louisiana, 
    373 U.S. 723
    (1963), Estes,
    and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 
    384 U.S. 333
    (1966), where prejudice was
    presumed); see also 
    Nevers, 169 F.3d at 362-64
    (same); see generally Skilling v.
    United States, 
    130 S. Ct. 2896
    (2010).
    A change of venue determination is especially appropriate for the trial
    court's discretion. See Stopher v. Commonwealth, 
    57 S.W.3d 787
    , 795 (Ky.
    2001) ("It is readily acknowledged . . . that wide discretion is, and should be,
    vested in the trial court when determining a change of venue question.") (citing
    
    Jacobs, 870 S.W.2d at 412
    ). We have explained that "[g]reat weight is given to
    the trial court's decision because the judge is present in the county and is
    presumed to know the situation." 
    Id. (citing Nickell
    v. Commonwealth, 
    371 S.W.2d 849
    (Ky. 1963)); accord Mu'Min v. Virginia, 
    500 U.S. 415
    , 427 (1991)
    ("Particularly with respect to pretrial publicity, we think this primary reliance
    30
    on the judgment of the trial court makes good sense. The judge of that court
    sits in the locale where the publicity is said to have had its effect and brings to
    his evaluation of any such claim his own perception of the depth and extent of
    news stories that might influence a juror.").
    Turning to the merits of Joy's allegations, after examining the totality of
    the circumstances, we do not believe that the trial setting was inherently
    prejudicial. See 
    Nevers, 169 F.3d at 362
    ("One type of prejudice is . . . [where]
    the 'circumstances under which the trials . . . were held' were such that
    inherent prejudice to the venire should be presumed.") (quoting 
    Murphy, 41 U.S. at 798-99
    ). While we agree that the facts of the case were, indeed,
    heinous and even disturbing, the ensuing publicity was neither so prolific or
    prejudicial in nature so as to give rise to a presumption of prejudice.    Cf.
    
    Rideau, 373 U.S. at 724
    (defendant's confession televised and seen by as many
    as 97,000 people in a community of 150,000, rendering "[ajny subsequent
    court proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle .
    .. a hollow formality"); 
    Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 353-58
    (sensational and
    inflammatory reporting prior to and during a trial where "the judge gave the
    throng of newsmen gathered in the corridors of the courthouse absolute free
    rein"); 
    Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799
    (describing the Estes trial as one "conducted in
    a circus atmosphere, due in large part to the intrusions of the press, which was
    allowed to sit within the bar of the court and to overrun it with television
    equipment"). While it is true that at least one media account, if not more,
    31
    identified prior acts of mistreatment or abuse, this fact, taken alone, does not
    give rise to an inference of prejudice per se. See 
    Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799
    (rejecting the idea that "juror exposure to information about a state defendant's
    prior convictions . . . alone presumptively deprives the defendant of due
    process"). And while the April 17th memorial service has given this Court
    pause, we conclude that the trial court, in its sound discretion, rightly
    dismissed it. There is no indication that the service itself was intended to be,
    or was, anything more than a legitimate commemoration of Michaela and other
    child abuse victims brought about not by an acute disgust toward Appellants,
    but by the month of April, representing child abuse prevention month.       Cf.
    
    Jacobs, 870 S.W.2d at 415
    ("The force of adverse publicity gave impetus to the
    excitement and fostered prejudice among the people of the community. In fact,
    one of the public fund raising events to aid in Jacobs' prosecution raised
    $2,922."). To be sure, there is also no indication that any remnants of the
    memorial persisted on the courthouse lawn beyond the month of May, let alone
    into the time of the September trial.
    Moreover, Joy has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that the
    pretrial publicity actually prejudiced the venire.   See 
    Nevers, 169 F.3d at 363
    ("The other type of prejudice . . stands for the proposition that absent the
    ``televised confession amounting to a trial' or 'carnival atmosphere' situations,
    pretrial publicity that would inherently prejudice the jury pool can be discerned
    only by reviewing both the extent and nature of the publicity and the responses
    32
    of the prospective jurors in voir dire."). Setting aside what we believe was,
    given the tragic nature of the case, an unsurprising amount of unremarkable
    publicity, we find it significant that only fifteen (18%) of the eighty-four
    potential jurors had to be excused for cause due to bias or preconceptions of
    Appellants' guilt. This is a figure that falls far short of that usually incident to
    a finding of prejudice. In reversing the defendant's conviction in Jacobs, this
    Court found "ominous" that 74% (112 of 153) of the jury pool had to be
    excused for cause due to "fixed opinions of 
    guilt." 870 S.W.2d at 415-16
    .
    Similarly, in Irvin, the trial court was forced to excuse for cause 62% (268 of
    430) of the 
    panel. 366 U.S. at 727
    . Though not dispositive, it is noteworthy
    that this Court has affirmed convictions with a significantly higher rate of
    excusal than that presented here. See, e.g., 
    Stopher, 57 S.W.3d at 796
    (40%
    excused for cause). Finally, we note that Joy does not make any contention
    that the trial court erred in failing to excuse for cause biased jurors, 18 or that
    any such jurors remained on the panel that decided their case.              Cf. 
    Jacobs, 870 S.W.2d at 415
    ("Of 38 jurors who were accepted by the court, 19 had an initial
    18   Joy does not argue that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to excuse for
    cause certain jurors. See generally Shane v. Commonwealth, 
    243 S.W.3d 336
    (Ky.
    2007). While it is true, as Joy suggests, that a prospective juror (#69) had formed
    an opinion in the case, a review of the strike sheets reveals that the juror was
    apparently excused prior to defense counsel's voir dire. We have also reviewed Joy's
    related allegation that, when asked by defense counsel, only one juror in the panel
    indicated they could presume Joy's innocence, and believe it similarly without
    merit. Defense counsel asked the panel to "please raise your hands if you think Joy
    Watkins is not guilty" and, after only one juror raised his or her hand, defense
    counsel moved to strike the entire panel on grounds that they could not presume
    innocence. After a bench conference, the motion was rightly overruled due to the
    fact that the question was inaccurately phrased. When defense counsel
    subsequently rephrased the question, there was no indication that the jurors could
    not presume Joy's innocent.
    33
    opinion that Jacobs was guilty. Of those 19 jurors, four sat on the panel that
    decided the case."); 
    Irvin, 366 U.S. at 727
    ("Here the 'pattern of deep and bitter
    prejudice' shown to be present throughout the community . . . was clearly
    reflected in the sum total of the voir dire examination of a majority of the jurors
    finally placed in the jury box. Eight out of the 12 thought petitioner was
    guilty.") (citation omitted).
    E. "Irrelevant" Evidence
    1. Credit Card Reference
    Joy next argues that the Commonwealth's reference at trial to obtaining
    a credit card in the name of Michaela was irrelevant and represented
    impermissible character evidence under KRE 404(b).
    While cross-examining Ashley Clem, the social worker that performed the
    out-of-county home evaluation on the Watkinses, the Commonwealth
    attempted to question her regarding a credit card bill issued to Appellants in
    the name of Michaela. Before the Commonwealth could proceed, defense
    counsel objected and argued that Clem lacked personal knowledge of the
    matter, that the bill could not be authenticated, and that it represented
    hearsay. The trial court sustained the objection and prohibited introduction of
    the credit card bill but permitted the Commonwealth to ask Clem whether she
    would have approved a child's placement had the prospective parents applied
    for a credit card in the child's name. The Commonwealth proceeded, where
    Clem responded that she would not have approved such a placement.
    34
    Joy made no other objection and requested no further relief; and
    consequently, failed to preserve error. As this Court has often repeated,. an
    appellant is "not . . . permitted to feed one can of worms to the trial judge and
    another to the appellate court." Neal v. Commonwealth, 
    95 S.W.3d 843
    , 848
    (Ky. 2003) (citing Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 
    544 S.W.2d 219
    (Ky. 1976)); see
    also Craig v. Dean, 
    741 S.W.2d 655
    , 657 (Ky. 1987) ("If a party chooses to state
    grounds in the absence of a request from the court, he is bound thereby."). On
    this issue, Joy does not request palpable error review, thus we do not address
    it further. Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 
    251 S.W.3d 309
    , 316 (Ky. 2008)
    ("Absent extreme circumstances amounting to a substantial miscarriage of
    justice, an appellate court will not engage in palpable error review pursuant to
    RCr 10.26 unless such a request is made and briefed by the appellant.")
    (citations omitted).
    2. Admission of Table Leg
    Finally, Joy alleges that it was palpable error to admit into evidence a
    wooden table leg found in Appellants' car because the forensic evidence was
    unable to establish whether it was actually used to inflict Michaela's chest
    injury. She points out that: no usable prints or fibers were found on the table
    leg indicating that it was used to strike Michaela; the bruise pattern on
    Michaela's chest appeared larger than the table leg's actual diameter; and, the
    medical examiner was unsure what instrument, if any, caused the injury. She
    argues that she was prejudiced by its admission because the Commonwealth
    35
    asserted that the table leg was the likely murder weapon.
    Having reviewed Joy's argument, we find no palpable error. According to
    Dr. Hamon, the table leg found in Appellants' car could have been used to
    inflict Michaela's chest injury, even though Dr. Rolf testified that a number of
    different objects could have caused it. This is sufficient.
    E. Patrick's Allegations of Error Likely to Recur on Retrial
    We briefly address several of Patrick's allegations to the extent that they
    are likely to recur on retrial. First, we must again remind the trial court that
    combination jury instructions are only appropriate when there is evidence to
    support each distinct theory of culpability.   See Benjamin v. Commonwealth,
    
    266 S.W.3d 775
    , 785 (Ky. 2008) (stating that "if the trial judge finds that the
    evidence is unlikely to support a combination instruction, the court should
    include separate verdict forms, and if the evidence suffices, the court may use
    a combination instruction which permits the jury to distinguish upon which
    theory it bases its findings."). Next, to the extent that the Commonwealth
    seeks to utilize the reports prepared by the dentist, neuropathologist, and/or
    the toxicologist, pursuant to Melendez-Diaz, Patrick's constitutional rights
    permit him to cross-examine the authors of the accusatory reports. That Dr.
    Rolf was present when these reports were prepared does not make this any less
    violative of the Sixth Amendment. Finally, the credit card evidence does not
    appear relevant to a murder prosecution, and likely runs afoul of the rules
    prohibiting character evidence. KRE 404.
    36
    III. CONCLUSION
    Therefore, for the above stated reasons, we hereby affirm Joy Watkins'
    conviction, but we reverse Patrick Watkins' conviction and remand to the trial
    court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    All sitting. Minton, C.J.; Abramson, Cunningham, Schroder, Scott, and
    Venters, JJ., concur. Noble, J., concurs in result only.
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, JOY RENEE WATKINS:
    Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt
    Appeals Branch Manager
    Department of Public Advocacy
    100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
    Frankfort, KY 40601-1109
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, PATRICK ALLEN WATKINS:
    Roy Alyette Durham, II
    Assistant Public Advocate
    Department of Public Advocacy
    100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
    Frankfort, KY 40601
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
    Jack Conway
    Attorney General of Kentucky
    Perry Thomas Ryan
    Assistant Attorney General
    Office of Attorney General
    Criminal Appellate Division
    1024 Capital Center Drive
    Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
    37