St. Augustine School v. Janet Cropper , 533 S.W.3d 186 ( 2017 )

RENDERED: NOVEMBER2, 2017
TO BE PUBLISHED
juprtmt filnttrf nf I&tnfueku
2016-SC-000243-DG
SAINT AUGUSTINE SCHOOL; APPELLANTS
DIOCESE OF COVINGTON
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
·v. CASE NO. 2014-CA-001518
BRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT NO. 13-CI-00024
JANET CROPPER APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE MINTON
AFFIRMING AND REMANDING
Janet Cropper was dismissed from her job as the lay administrat~r of
Saint Augustine s'chool, an elementary school affiliated with the Roman
)
Catholic Diocese of Covington. She then brought this action against the
·diocese, the school, and the pastor of the Saint Augustin~ Churchl, claiming
damages for, among other theories of recovery, breach of her employment
contract. On discretionary review, we hold that the trial court and the Court of
Appeais panel did not err when they rilled-for different reJsons-that Cropper is
not barred from asserting her breach-of-contract claim. In affirming the result
i The appellants are collectively referred to as Saint Augustine in this opinion.
reached by the Court.of Appeals panel, we reject the argument from the diocese
that the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine bars this breach of contract claim.
Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial co_urt for proceedings (consistent)
with this opinion.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.
The Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington employed Janet Cropper to be
the lay administrator of Saint Augustine School for the 2011-12 academic year.
Near the end of the 2011-12 school term, the diocese renewed Cropper's
·· employment contract for the following academic year. But on the eve of the
opening of the school term, Father Gregory Bach, Saint Augustine's Pastor,
informed Cropper that her job as lay administrator was eliminated ~d her
employment with the diocese was terminated, stemming from the school's
declining enrollment and dwindling operating funds.
Cropper then sued Saint Augustine for, among other theories of recovery,
breach of her employment contract. Both Cropper and Saint Augustine filed
motions for summary judgment. The trial court ruled in favor of Cropper that
\.
her claims were not barred by the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine but .
ultimately ruled .in favor or' Saint Augustine that, as a matter of law, Cropper
could not show a breach of her employment contract. Cropper appealed the
trial court's decision, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
determination that Cropper could not prove a breach of contract and remanded
the case to the tri~ court for further proceedings. The appeals ..panel rejected
the application of the ministerial:...exception doctrine without m.entioning the
application of the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine.
2
.\
II. ANALYSIS.
A. Standard of Review.
We review a trial court's granting of a party's summruy judgment motion
de novo.2 "On appeal, '[t]he standard of review ... of a summruy judgment is
whether the circuit judge correctly found that there were no issues as to any
material fact and that the moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter
oflaw."'3
. B. Substantive Analysis.
Saint Augustine argues that the ecclesiastical-abstention· doctrine bars
Cropper from ass~rting a claim for damages for breach of her employment
contract. As a matter of clarification, both the ecclesiastical-abstention and
ministerial-exception doctrines operate as affirmative defenses, not as
jurisdictional bars, that the party asserting the defenses bears the burden of
proving.4
We note that Saint Augustine not only did not argue that the ministerial-
exception doctrine applies in its defense, but specifically asserted that it is not
arguing for the application of this doctrine to the facts of this case:
"... Appellants are not pursuing their ministerial exception defense .. .Instead,
Appellants are talting their stand solely on [the] broader abstention
2 Caniffv. CSX Transp., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 368, 372 (Ky. 2014).
3Id. (quoting Pearson ex rel. Trent v. Nat'l Feeding Sys., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Ky.
2002)).
4 Kirby v. Lexington Theologk:al Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 607-08 (Ky. 2014)
("ministerial! exception is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved");
Saint Joseph Catholic Orphan Society v. Edwards, 449 S.W.3d 727, 737 (Ky. 2014)
("ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine is an affirmative defense").
3
doctrine .... "5 So we will not analyze the ministerial exception and its possible
application to this case and confine our analysis to the ecclesiastical-
abstention doctrine.
1. Ecclesiastical-Abstention Doctrine.
The ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine prohibits secular courts from
adjudicating pred449 S.W.3d 727 (Ky. 2014); 133
Am. Jur. Trials 379, § 7 (2014).
1 426 S.W.3d 597, 619 (Ky. 2014) (internal citations omitted).
4
/
requiied of them" fall within the scop~ of the ecclesiastical-
abstention doctrine.a
'
Under the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine, the question at the heart of
whether Cropper's contract claim should be allowed is "whether [Cropper's]
breach of contract claim can be decided without wading into doctrinal waters."9
Simply stated, deciding Cropper's breach of contract claim does not
'
require application of church law or doctrine. In fact, Saint 1Augustine's
justification for the Cropper's dismissal stems from declining student ·
enrollment and shrinking revenues. No matter the extent of Cropper's
involvement in the religious life of Saint Augustine; adjudicating her damages
claim for breach of her employment contract does not require the secular
court's "wading into doctrinal waters"; it is simply the termination of the lay
)
administrator at a parochial school. Even if Cropper had been a prominent
actor in the religious life of the community, unless Saint Augustine- fired her for
. .
reasons associated with the application of church doctrine or governance, the
·ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine would not apply.
This case mirrors the factual circumstances of Kirby almost perfectly. In
Kirby, this court held the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine not to apply to a
breach-of-contract claim raised by a tenured ·professor, Kirby, who taught
Christian social ethics at the Lexington .Theological Seminary. 10 The Seminary
terminated Kirby's position because of a "tsunami of economic disasters"
s 449 S.W.3d at 739.
9. Id. at 620.
10 Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 601 (Ky. 2014).
·s
causing the Seminary's budget to shrink dramatfoally.11 In this case, Cropper
was the lay adr:p.inistrator-the principal-of Saint Augustine School, which
terminated her position because enrollment was dropping and money was
tight. We follow this Court's rejection of the Lexington Theology Seminary's
ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine defense in Kirby by rejecting Saint
Augustine's ecclesiastical-a1Jstention doctrine defense today.
Therefore, we hold that the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine affirmative I
!
defense does not apply in this case because Cropper's "breach-of-contract
claim requires no inspection or evaluation of church doctrine. Neutral
principles of law can be applied. According, the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine does not apply .... "12
III. CONCLUSION. -
We affirm, the result reached by the Court of Appeals panel and hold that
the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply to the facts of this case.
Accordihgly, we remand this case to the trial court for further proceeding~.
All sitting. All concur.
. ;
11 Id. at 603.
12 Id. at 619.
.6
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS:
Richard G. Meyer ·
Nicholas Charles Birkenhauer
Dressman Benzinger Lavelle PSC
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gail Marie Langendorf
Busald, Funk & Zevely, PSC
7