Tracy Scott Toler v. Oldham County Fiscal Court ( 2022 )

Supreme Court of Kentucky
2021-SC-0356-WC
TRACY SCOTT TOLER APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V. NO. 2021-CA-0325
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
NO. 2018-WC-82397
OLDHAM COUNTY FISCAL COURT, APPELLEES
HONORABLE JONATHAN R. WEATHERBY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE, AND
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR REHEARING AND GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION
The Petition for Rehearing filed by Appellee Oldham County Fiscal Court,
of the Opinion of the Court, rendered June 16, 2022, is DENIED. The Petition
for Modification or Extension filed by Appellee Oldham County Fiscal Court, of
the Opinion of the Court, rendered June 16, 2022, is GRANTED to correct
typographical errors in the Opinion.
All sitting. All concur.
ENTERED: December 15, 2022.
_____________________________________
CHIEF JUSTICE
MODIFIED: DECEMBER 15, 2022
RENDERED: JUNE 16, 2022
TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky
2021-SC-0356-WC
TRACY SCOTT TOLER APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V. NO. 2021-CA-0325
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
NO. 2018-WC-82397
OLDHAM COUNTY FISCAL COURT, APPELLEES
HONORABLE JONATHAN R. WEATHERBY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE, AND
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE LAMBERT
REVERSING AND REMANDING
Officer Tracy Toler (Officer Toler) challenges the Court of Appeals’ opinion
which affirmed the Workers’ Compensation Board (the Board) and the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Officer Toler’s appeal requires this Court to
address, as a matter of first impression, whether a physician that is not
licensed in Kentucky meets the definition of “physician” under KRS1
342.0011(32). After review, we reverse and remand this case for further
proceedings.
1 Kentucky Revised Statute.
1
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are not in dispute. On January 16, 2018, Officer
Toler sustained a work-related injury to his left knee. He was placed on light
duty on January 17. On April 30, 2018, Dr. Nicolas Kenney (Dr. Kenney)
surgically repaired Officer Toler’s knee by performing a left knee arthroscopy
with a partial medial, lateral meniscectomy. Dr. Kenney released Officer Toler
to return to full duty on August 8, 2018.
On December 5, 2018, Dr. Craig Roberts (Dr. Roberts) conducted an
independent medical examination (IME) on Officer Toler. Dr. Roberts
diagnosed left knee medial lateral meniscus tears that required surgery.
Officer Toler reported that he continued to have occasional sharp knee pain in
the anterior portion of his knee, and that the pain was generally a three out of
ten on a scale of one to ten. Dr. Roberts opined that Officer Toler had reached
maximum medical improvement, and assessed a 4% impairment rating for
Officer Toler’s surgery and a 2% impairment rating for pain, equaling a 6%
whole person impairment rating. Dr. Roberts reasoned that the additional 2%
rating for pain was appropriate based on Table 18-1 of the 5th Edition of the
AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, which states: “If pain-
related impairment appears to increase the burden of the individual’s condition
slightly, the examiner may increase the percentage found ... by up to 3%.”
Officer Toler submitted Dr. Roberts’ IME as an attachment to his Application
for Resolution of a Claim, which he filed on January 7, 2020.
To contest Dr. Robert’s 6% impairment rating, Officer Toler’s employer,
2
Oldham County Fiscal Court (Oldham) filed a report by Dr. Christopher
Brigham (Dr. Brigham). Dr. Brigham did not physically examine Officer Toler,
but instead reviewed his medical records. Dr. Brigham agreed with Dr.
Roberts’ assignment of a 4% impairment rating for Officer Toler’s surgery, but
believed an additional 2% impairment rating for pain was inappropriate. Dr.
Brigham provided a thorough, multiple-page explanation for his conclusion,
which included the following:
In defining the rating provided in the Fifth Edition for diagnoses,
including procedures such as a partial medial and lateral
meniscectomy, it is assumed that there are residual symptoms and
mild interference with activities of daily living. [Officer Toler’s] mild
complaints of pain and mild interference with activities of daily
living is not unexpected eight months following his surgery. [. . .]
Pain itself is a subjective experience and influenced by
psychosocial issues. It is probable that his mild complaints of
pain, secondary to surgery, would decrease further with time.
According to the records, [Officer Toler] does have normal or
expected pain associated with his surgical procedure. The Guides’
impairment ratings currently include allowances for the pain that
individuals typically experience when they suffer from various
injuries or diseases. [. . .]
Section 18.3b When This Chapter Should Not Be Used to Rate
Pain-Related Impairment lists the following situations:
1. When Conditions Are Adequately Rated in Other
Chapters of the Guides
2. When Rating Individuals With Low Credibility
3. When There Are Ambiguous or Controversial Pain
Syndromes
When Conditions Are Adequately Rated in Other Chapters of the
Guides explains:
Examiners should not use this chapter to rate pain-
related impairment for any condition that can be
adequately rated on the basis of the body and organ
3
impairment rating systems given in other chapters of
the Guides. (5th ed, 571)
In this case, the subjective reports by [Officer Toler] are commonly
associated with someone who has undergone meniscal surgery.
Therefore, the Guides are clear that providing additional
impairment is not appropriate.
If, hypothetically, the patient had marked pain, objective
documentation of interference with activities [of] daily living,
and/or significant gait disorder, then it may be reasonable to
assign additional impairment, up to 3% whole person, for pain.
However, none of these factors are documented in this case. It is
clear that the impairment in this case is based solely on the
diagnosis-based estimate, i.e. 4% whole person.
Dr. Roberts subsequently filed a supplemental report to his IME wherein
he stood by his additional 2% rating for pain notwithstanding Dr. Brigham’s
report. Dr. Roberts’ supplement again emphasized the language of Figure 18-
1, which allows for an increase of a whole person impairment rating by up to
3% “[if] the pain-related impairment appears to increase the burden of the
individual’s condition slightly.”2 Dr. Roberts also noted the following language
from Section 18.3 of the Guides, which he faulted Dr. Brigham for overlooking:
“Thus, if an examining physician determines that an individual has a pain-
related impairment, he or she will have the additional task of deciding whether
or not that impairment has already been adequately incorporated into the
rating the person has received on the basis of other chapters of the guides.”3
Dr. Roberts highlighted that, as he physically examined Officer Toler, he was in
the best position to render an opinion regarding an additional rating for pain.
2 Emphasis added by Dr. Roberts.
3 Emphasis added by Dr. Roberts.
4
Officer Toler filed an objection to the admission of Dr. Brigham’s report
as direct evidence. Officer Toler noted that Dr. Brigham “never met,
interviewed or examined” him. But his primary argument was that Dr.
Brigham is not a “physician” as defined by KRS Chapter 342, the Workers’
Compensation Statutes, because he is not licensed in the Commonwealth of
Kentucky.4 Consequently, Officer Toler argued, Dr. Brigham’s report was
inadmissible. Officer Toler reasoned:
Pursuant to 803 KAR5 25:010, §14: “The Rules of Evidence
prescribed by the Kentucky Supreme Court shall apply in all
proceedings before the ALJ except as varied by specific statute and
this administrative regulation.” The only variances which allow
reports to be filed as direct testimony are medical reports by
“physicians.” (803 KAR 25:010, §11 [and] KRS 342.033) and
Vocational Reports (803 KAR 25:010, §9).
803 KAR 25:010, §10 allows for the filing of medical reports of
“physicians.” Pursuant to KRS 342.0011 § (32), “Physician” means
“physicians and surgeons, psychologists, optometrists, dentists,
podiatrists, and osteopathic and chiropractic practitioners acting
within the scope of their license issued by the Commonwealth.”
Pursuant to 803 KAR 25:010 § 10(1) a party shall not introduce
direct testimony from more than two (2) physicians. [. . .]
As Dr. Brigham is not a “Physician” as defined by the
Regulations/Statutes, his report cannot be filed into evidence by
Notice.
The ALJ did not rule on the admissibility of Dr. Brigham’s report until
after the final hearing.6 In the ALJ’s Opinion and Order, he ruled that Dr.
Brigham’s report was admissible:
4 Dr. Brigham is licensed to practice medicine in Hawaii, Maine, and California.
5 Kentucky Administrative Regulation.
6 Neither party objected to the ALJ’s deferral of the ruling under 803 KAR
25:010, §10(6)(e), which directs that “[t]he administrative law judge shall rule on the
5
19. [Officer Toler] has challenged the admissibility of the report of
Dr. Brigham due to his being a physician licensed outside of the
Commonwealth based upon the definition of “Physician” as it
appears in KRS 342.0011 which provides:
“Physician” means physicians and surgeons,
psychologists, optometrists, dentists, podiatrists, and
osteopathic and chiropractic practitioners acting
within the scope of their license issued by the
Commonwealth.
20. The ALJ notes that these definitions are listed with the caveat,
“unless the context requires otherwise” and finds that the intent of
this particular provision is not to limit the ability of otherwise
qualified physicians to render opinions that may be used in
Workers’ Compensation jurisprudence. Additionally, Dr. Brigham
possesses a Kentucky Physician Index Number on file with the
Department of Workers’ Claims which provides significant context
to the interpretation of this definition.
21. The ALJ therefore finds that the context of the definition of the
“Physician” dictates a more expansive definition of the term than
that suggested by [Officer Toler] and that to conclude otherwise
would frustrate the aims of the Department that has provided Dr.
Brigham with a Physician Index Number. The ALJ thus finds that
the report of Dr. Brigham is admissible herein.
The ALJ further found that “the pain described by [Officer Toler] and
documented by the evidence of record herein does not rise to the level of that
referenced by the AMA Guides in order to support an impairment rating in
excess of what is associated with [Officer Toler’s] Meniscectomy.” The ALJ
accordingly found Dr. Brigham’s opinion to be more credible than Dr. Roberts’
and did not award Officer Toler an additional 2% impairment rating for pain.
Officer Toler filed a Petition for Reconsideration (PFR) from the ALJ’s
Opinion and Order. In it, he again argued that Dr. Brigham did not meet the
objection [to a medical report] within ten (10) days of the response or the date the
response is due.”
6
definition of “physician” under the Workers’ Compensation Statutes, and his
opinions could not “be admitted into evidence in this matter, nor relied upon by
this ALJ.” Additionally, Officer Toler’s PFR correctly pointed out that the ALJ’s
Opinion and Order inaccurately stated that Dr. Brigham physically examined
Officer Toler. Officer Toler contended that
this error [was] important, given that the subjective complaints of
pain noted by Dr. Roberts, and as described in his report, are
based upon actual examination and observation of Officer Toler.
The fact that Dr. Brigham did not [examine]Officer Toler impairs
his ability to accurately assess the level of pain which Officer Toler
experienced, and its affects upon him.
The ALJ denied Officer Toler’s PFR without analysis, stating only that it was
“an impermissible re-argument of the merits of the claim.”
On appeal to the Board, Officer Toler reasserted that Dr. Brigham did not
qualify as a “physician” under KRS 342.0011(32). In addition, he argued that
Dr. Brigham could not make a pain rating assessment for Officer Toler because
he conducted a records review and not a physical examination. The Board
unanimously disagreed on both fronts, and affirmed the ALJ. Concerning
whether Dr. Brigham met the definition of “physician,” the Board ruled:
While we acknowledge KRS 342.0011(32) defines “physicians” as
one of the specified practitioners acting within the scope of his or
her license issued by the Commonwealth, the opening caveat—i.e.
“unless the context otherwise requires”—does, as interpreted by
the ALJ, seemingly afford the ALJ the discretion to look beyond the
confines of the definition. Thus, we hold the ALJ’s interpretation of
the caveat is harmonious with the wide discretion afforded to
Administrative Law Judges in the workers’ compensation arena by
both statutory and case law.
The ALJ set forth a thorough and cogent explanation why he
believes the statute permits him to rely upon Dr. Brigham’s
opinions despite the fact that he is not licensed to practice
medicine in Kentucky. Persuasive to the ALJ is the fact that Dr.
7
Brigham possesses a Physician Index Number on file with the
Department of Workers’ Claims. The ALJ ultimately concluded
that a more expansive definition of “physician” is appropriate in
this context, as the objectives of the Department would be
frustrated if the opinions of a physician to whom the Department
issued a Physician Index Number were excluded from
consideration. Indeed, we find there to be an illogical notion for
the Department of Workers’ Claims to issue a Physician Index
Number to a physician upon whom an ALJ could not rely.
Next, the Board disagreed that Dr. Brigham had to physically examine Officer
Toler before he could assess whether Officer Toler was entitled to an additional
impairment rating for pain. It reasoned:
Dr. Brigham’s May 6, 2020, report, firmly demonstrates he
reviewed the records of both Drs. Roberts and Kenny in detail. In
his “Clinical Summary,” as set forth verbatim herein, Dr. Brigham
noted [Officer] Toler’s pain level when examined by both
physicians. On August 7, 2018, when Toler was examined by his
treating physician, Dr. Kenney, Toler’s pain level was a one out of
ten, and Dr. Kenney returned Toler to work without any
restrictions. When Toler was examined by Dr. Roberts on
December 5, 2018, his pain level was a three out of ten. In the
subsequent section of his report entitled “Critique and Discussion
of Rating Pain,” Dr. Brigham set forth his reasoning over the
course of five pages, for concluding Toler is not entitled to an
impairment rating for pain. Relying upon the medical records of
Drs. Roberts and Kenney, Dr. Brigham concluded Toler’s
“subjective report of pain is minimal.” Thereafter, citing to
Sections 1.5, 18.3, 18.3a, and 18.3b of the AMA Guides, Dr.
Brigham concluded that, with [Officer] Toler’s minimal reports of
pain, “the Guides are clear that providing additional impairment is
not appropriate.” Dr. Brigham is fully entitled to rely upon the
records of Drs. Roberts and Kenney in utilizing the AMA Guides to
reach his conclusion.
We acknowledge the critique of Dr. Roberts as set forth in his May
14, 2020, supplemental report, namely that Figure 18-1
(“Algorithm for Rating Pain-Related Impairment in Conditions
Associated with Conventionally Ratable Impairment”) on page 574
of the AMA Guides refers to “the examiner.” However, there is
nothing within the AMA Guides, which directly mandates only a
physician who conducts a physical examination of a claimant can
formulate a pain rating assessment. Further, while the fact that
Dr. Brigham did not examine [Officer] Toler is something the ALJ
8
had the discretion to find compelling, it does not render Dr.
Brigham’s opinions inadmissible. Rather, it merely goes to the
weight the ALJ ultimately chooses to give to his opinions. Here,
the ALJ chose to give weight to Dr. Brigham’s opinions over those
of Dr. Roberts, and this Board has neither the inclination nor the
authority to take that discretion away.
Officer Toler then appealed the Board’s ruling to the Court of Appeals,
which likewise upheld the ALJ’s Opinion and Order. The Court of Appeals
simply held that “the Board's analysis of the issues raised by [Officer] Toler on
appeal is correct.”7
Additional facts are discussed below as necessary.
II. ANALYSIS
The function of this Court in reviewing an ALJ’s decision is “to address
new or novel questions of statutory construction, or to reconsider precedent
when such appears necessary, or to review a question of constitutional
magnitude."8 And, while an ALJ’s decision is generally entitled to a great deal
of deference, this Court is “bound neither by an ALJ’s decisions on questions of
law or an ALJ’s interpretation and application of the law to the facts. In either
case, our standard of review is de novo.”9 Accordingly, as this case requires us
to interpret the definition of “physician” under KRS 342.0011, the ALJ’s
construction of the statute is entitled to no deference. In that vein, we reiterate
our well-established standard for interpreting statutes enacted by our
legislature:
7 Toler v. Oldham Cnty. Fiscal Court, 2021-CA-0325-WC, 2021 WL 3234306, at
*3 (Ky. App. July 30, 2021).
8 W. Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Ky. 1992).
9 Ford Motor Co. v. Jobe, 544 S.W.3d 628, 631 (Ky. 2018).
9
In construing statutes, our goal, of course, is to give effect to the
intent of the General Assembly. We derive that intent, if at all
possible, from the language the General Assembly chose, either as
defined by the General Assembly or as generally understood in the
context of the matter under consideration.10
Stated differently, we must “assume that the Legislature meant exactly what it
said, and said exactly what it meant,” and if the plain language of the statute is
clear, our inquiry ends.11
A. Dr. Brigham is not a “physician” as defined by KRS 342.0011(32).
The Kentucky Rules of Evidence must be followed in all proceedings
before an ALJ, except as varied by statute or 803 KAR 25:010.12 One such
variance is provided for in 803 KAR 25:010, §10(6)(a), which states: “Upon
notice, a party may file evidence from two (2) physicians in accordance with
KRS 342.033, either by deposition or medical report, which shall be admitted
into evidence without further order if an objection is not filed.” In turn, KRS
342.033 provides, in relevant part, that “[a] party may introduce direct
testimony from a physician through a written medical report. The report shall
become a part of the evidentiary record, subject to the right of an adverse party
to object to the admissibility of the report and to cross-examine the reporting
physician.”
As discussed above, Officer Toler objected to the admissibility of Dr.
Brigham’s report in this case based on his contention that Dr. Brigham was
10 Shawnee Telecom Res., Inc. v. Brown, 354 S.W.3d 542, 551 (Ky. 2011).
11 Univ. of Louisville v. Rothstein, 532 S.W.3d 644, 648 (Ky. 2017).
12 803 KAR 25:010, §14(1).
10
not a “physician” under KRS 342.0011.13 That statute declares: “As used in
this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires . . . ‘Physician’ means
physicians and surgeons, psychologists, optometrists, dentists, podiatrists, and
osteopathic and chiropractic practitioners acting within the scope of their
license issued by the Commonwealth[.]”14 The statute’s prefatory phrase
“unless context otherwise requires” means that provided definition of
“physician” must be applied, unless the context in which it is found compels a
different definition.
Here, the context is the introduction of direct testimony through a
physician’s report, i.e., providing medical opinions for use in workers’
compensation cases. The ALJ found that this context should permit the
expansion of the definition of “physician” to include individuals who do not
have a Kentucky medical license in order to widen the pool of physicians
qualified to provide medical opinions in workers’ compensation cases. The
legislature may decide in the future to widen the pool of potential medical
experts. However, the statutory language is limited so that only physicians
licensed in Kentucky may provide such evidence. We are therefore bound to
rule in accordance with the plain language of the statute.
By way of example, Bright v. American Greetings Corp., is the only case in
our jurisprudence wherein we held that the context in which the term
13 Oldham argues that Officer Toler’s objection was untimely filed. However,
Oldham did not raise this argument before the ALJ, the Board, or the Court of
Appeals. We accordingly decline to address it.
14 KRS 342.0011(32) (emphasis added).
11
“physician” was used necessitated an altered definition.15 In Bright, the
employee claimed that he suffered work-related hearing loss and submitted an
evaluation from an audiologist who was an appointed university evaluator.16
The employer argued that the audiologist’s testimony was inadmissible because
audiologists are not listed in KRS 342.0011(32).17 This Court disagreed, and
held that “testimony concerning the cause of a hearing impairment that is
made by an audiologist who is designated as a university evaluator is
admissible even though audiologists are not included in KRS 342.0011(32).”18
The Bright Court based its holding on KRS 342.315, which provides in relevant
part:
(1) For workers who have had injuries or occupational hearing loss,
the commissioner shall contract with the University of Kentucky
and the University of Louisville medical schools to evaluate
workers. For workers who have become affected by occupational
diseases, the commissioner shall contract with the University of
Kentucky and the University of Louisville medical schools, or other
physicians otherwise duly qualified as “B” readers who are licensed
in the Commonwealth and are board-certified pulmonary
specialists. Referral for evaluation may be made whenever a
medical question is at issue.
(2) The physicians and institutions performing evaluations
pursuant to this section shall render reports encompassing their
findings and opinions in the form prescribed by the commissioner.
Except as otherwise provided in KRS 342.316, the clinical findings
and opinions of the designated evaluator shall be afforded
presumptive weight by administrative law judges and the burden
to overcome such findings and opinions shall fall on the opponent
of that evidence. When administrative law judges reject the clinical
findings and opinions of the designated evaluator, they shall
15 62 S.W.3d 381 (Ky. 2001).
16 Id. at 382-83.
17 Id. at 384.
18 Id.
12
specifically state in the order the reasons for rejecting that
evidence.
This Court interpreted KRS 342.315(2) to mean that “an ALJ is authorized to
weigh a university evaluator’s testimony and to disregard it if a reasonable
basis for doing so is stated.”19 In other words, the ALJ could consider the
audiologist’s evaluation as though it were a physician’s report submitted as
direct testimony because the specific language of KRS 342.315(2) compelled an
altered definition of “physician.”
In the case at bar, there is nothing in KRS 342.033, regarding the
admission of a physician’s report into evidence, that compels the definition of
physician to include physicians not licensed in Kentucky.
Similarly, we do not find it dispositive that Dr. Brigham was issued a
Physician Index Number by the Department of Workers’ Claims. The
administrative regulation governing the issuance of Physician Index Numbers
provides:
(4) The commissioner shall establish a medical qualifications
index.
(a) An index number shall be assigned to a physician
upon the filing of the physician's qualifications.
(b) Any physician who has been assigned an index
number may offer the assigned number in lieu of
stating qualifications.
(c) Qualifications shall be revised or updated by
submitting revisions to the commissioner.
(d) A party may inquire further into the qualifications
of a physician.
19 Id.
13
(e) If the physician's qualifications have not previously
been filed into the index maintained by the
commissioner, the filing party shall provide sufficient
information containing the physician's qualifications,
and request the physician be included in the index
and a number issued.20
As Officer Toler argues, this regulation allows for the issuance of a Physician
Index Number upon a request for the same and a filing of the physician’s
qualifications. It does not, on its face, provide for validation of those
qualifications, such as ensuring that the physician is licensed in Kentucky.
Instead, it allows a party to inquire further into the qualifications of a
physician, which is precisely what occurred in this case.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that Dr. Brigham does not meet the
statutory definition of “physician” under KRS 342.0011(32). His report was
therefore inadmissible, and the ALJ should not have considered it as evidence.
As a final point of clarification, our holding today does not apply to
treating physicians. KRS Chapter 342 is clear that, in general, an employee is
free to choose his or her own treating physician. Specifically, KRS 342.020(4)
states:
In the absence of designation of a managed health care system by
the employer, the employee may select medical providers to treat
his injury or occupational disease. Even if the employer has
designated a managed health care system, the injured employee
may elect to continue treating with a physician who provided
emergency medical care or treatment to the employee.21
20 803 KAR 25:010, §14(4)(a)-(e).
21 See also, e.g., Square D Co. v. Tipton, 862 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Ky. 1993) (“[KRS
342.020(4)] allows a worker to choose her own physician and to have whatever
medical treatment is reasonably necessary for the cure and/or relief of her injury.”).
14
Accordingly, for example, if an employee whose employer does not have a
managed health care system chooses a treating physician that is not licensed
in Kentucky, KRS 342.020(4), coupled with KRS 342.0011, would compel the
definition of “physician” to include a non-Kentucky licensed physician. Thus, a
treating physician not licensed in Kentucky may provide evidence on behalf of
the employee.
B. Officer Toler’s argument regarding Dr. Brigham’s failure to
physically examine him is moot.
Officer Toler also argues that Dr. Brigham was not qualified to opine on
whether he was entitled to an additional impairment rating for pain because he
conducted a records review and not a physical examination. But, with our
opinion today, we hold that Dr. Brigham does not meet the definition of
“physician” under KRS 342.0011(32), and his report is therefore inadmissible.
Officer Toler’s argument against the basis for Dr. Brigham’s opinions contained
therein is accordingly moot, and we will not address it.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the ALJ’s Opinion and Order is vacated. This
case is hereby remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Bruce Garrett Anderson
Louisville, KY
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, OLDHAM COUNTY FISCAL COURT:
Thomas L. Ferreri
Ferreri Partners, PLLC
15
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD:
Michael Wayne Alvey
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:
Hon. Jonathan R. Weatherby
16