Jarvis Helton v. Rockhampton Energy, LLC ( 2022 )


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  •                                                    RENDERED: JUNE 16,2022
    TO BE PUBLISHED
    Supreme Court of Kentucky
    2021-SC-0248-WC
    JARVIS HELTON                                                       APPELLANT
    ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
    V.                        NO. 2020-CA-1589
    WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
    NOS. 2019-WC-01426, 2019-WC-01427 & 2020-WC-00095
    ROCKHAMPTON ENERGY, LLC;                                            APPELLEES
    HONORABLE CHRIS DAVIS,
    ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
    WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
    OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE HUGHES
    AFFIRMING
    Jarvis Helton appeals from a Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the
    Workers Compensation Board’s (Board’s) reversal of an Administrative Law
    Judge’s (ALJ) application of the 2x multiplier in Kentucky Revised Statute
    (KRS) 342.730(1)(c)2. That provision doubles a claimant’s benefits if the
    claimant returns to work after injury at the same or higher wages but then
    experiences a cessation of that employment. After suffering a work-related
    injury that manifested on November 16, 2018, Helton continued working his
    normal job until he was laid off for economic reasons on September 2, 2019.
    The ALJ determined that since Helton earned no wage after the lay-off, he
    qualified for the 2x multiplier. The Board reversed the ALJ’s application of the
    2x multiplier, determining that there was no “return” to work pursuant to KRS
    342.730(1)(c)2 because there was never a cessation on Helton’s part followed by
    a resumption. The Court of Appeals agreed, and this appeal followed. For the
    reasons stated below, we affirm the Court of Appeals.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Jarvis Helton began working in the mining industry in 1989 and started
    his employment with Rockhampton Energy in 2013 as an underground
    electrician and repairman. On September 2, 2019, he was laid off for economic
    reasons and started receiving unemployment benefits. Helton filed a workers’
    compensation claim on November 19, 2019, alleging cumulative trauma
    injuries to his neck and low back he suffered while working for Rockhampton
    Energy.1 As of the date of the ALJ’s award, July 7, 2020, Helton was still
    receiving unemployment benefits.
    A Benefit Review Conference was held on April 15, 2020, and the
    contested issues included benefits per KRS 342.730. A final hearing was
    conducted on May 13, 2020. The ALJ relied on the medical evidence to
    determine that Helton’s back and neck injuries were the result of work-related
    1 Helton also filed a claim for occupational hearing loss caused by loud noise
    exposure while working for Rockhampton Energy. He later added a claim alleging he
    contracted coal workers’ pneumoconiosis from his employment with Rockhampton
    Energy. All claims were consolidated. Because the issues on appeal only concern
    Helton’s neck and back injuries, we will not discuss the details related to his other
    claims.
    2
    cumulative trauma and assessed a 10% impairment rating. The ALJ further
    found the date of manifestation of these injuries was November 16, 2018.2
    The ALJ determined that Helton retained the physical capacity to return
    to the type of work performed on the date of his injury. The ALJ noted that
    Helton “was laid-off for economic reasons, not job performance, and that he did
    not voluntarily quit.” While Helton’s pain may have increased, there was no
    evidence that he would not have kept working if he could. The ALJ determined
    the 2x multiplier applied pursuant to KRS 342.730(1)(c)2. That subsection
    provides that:
    If an employee returns to work at a weekly wage equal to or greater
    than the average weekly wage at the time of injury, the weekly
    benefit for permanent partial disability shall be determined under
    paragraph (b) of this subsection for each week during which that
    employment is sustained. During any period of cessation of that
    employment, temporary or permanent, for any reason, with or
    without cause, payment of weekly benefits for permanent partial
    disability during the period of cessation shall be two (2) times the
    amount otherwise payable under paragraph (b) of this subsection.
    This provision shall not be construed so as to extend the duration
    of payments.
    The ALJ stated that “following November 16, 2018, his date of manifestation,
    [Helton] worked for another 9.5 months, at his normal rate of pay.” The ALJ
    increased the award of permanent partial disability benefits beginning on
    September 3, 2019, when Helton was laid off by Rockhampton Energy and
    2 In filing his workers’ compensation claim, Helton listed his date of injury as
    September 2, 2019, his last day of work. Dr. C. A. Moore informed Helton that his
    conditions were work-related on November 16, 2018, and Helton did not notify his
    employer until the claim was filed on November 19, 2019. The ALJ determined that
    the delay was excusable because Helton did not know his injuries were compensable.
    3
    thus ceased earning an equal or greater wage than his average weekly wage.
    The ALJ ordered that from November 16, 2018, to September 2, 2019, Helton
    recover from Rockhampton Energy $59.49 per week and $118.98 from
    September 3, 2019, until his weekly wage is equal to or greater than his
    average weekly wage of $1,400, for a total of 425 weeks.
    Rockhampton Energy appealed to the Board and argued, among other
    things, that the 2x multiplier was inapplicable. The Board agreed.
    It is undisputed Helton continued to perform his regular job after
    his low back and neck symptoms arose and worsened to the point
    he sought medical care. Helton only ceased working when he was
    laid off due to the mine closing on September 2, 2019. Helton has
    not returned to any work since the date of the layoff. . . . [T]he ALJ
    found the two-multiplier applicable beginning September 3, 2019,
    when Helton stopped earning any wages due to the layoff. As in
    [Bryant v. Jessamine Car Care, No. 2018-SC-000265-WC, 
    2019 WL 1173003
     (Ky. February 14, 2019)], there was no “return” to work
    pursuant to KRS 342.730(1)(c)(2) because there was no cessation
    followed by a resumption. Helton simply continued in his regular
    employment until he was laid off. Therefore, we reverse the ALJ’s
    determination that the two-multiplier is applicable beginning
    September 3, 2019.
    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Board, finding no error in its
    analysis. The appellate court concurred with the Board’s reliance on an
    unpublished opinion by this Court, Bryant, 
    2019 WL 1173003
    , at *1. In
    Bryant, the employee was injured on June 13, 2013, and continued working
    until he was terminated in September 2013. This Court held that the 2x
    multiplier “only applies if the claimant returns to work after the injury. After
    Bryant was terminated, he did not return to work.” Id. at *7. Because Bryant
    continued to work until his September discharge, his “continuation of work is
    not a return to work under KRS 342.730(1)(c)2. To qualify as such a ‘return,’
    4
    there must be a cessation followed by a resumption.” Id. Applying the
    rationale from Bryant, in addition to the plain language of the statute, the
    Court of Appeals concluded that because Helton continued working from the
    manifestation date of his injury until his layoff, the 2x multiplier was
    inapplicable. Helton appealed.
    ANALYSIS
    Helton argues that the Board and Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
    ALJ’s decision to apply the 2x multiplier. He asserts that these determinations
    were based on a misunderstanding of the evidence of record. According to
    Helton, all of the medical evidence, as well as his own testimony, proves that he
    is entitled to the 2x multiplier.
    In a workers’ compensation case, the claimant has the burden of proving
    every element of her claim. Gibbs v. Premier Scale Co./Ind. Scale Co., 
    50 S.W.3d 754
    , 763 (Ky. 2001). We are not bound by the ALJ’s decisions on
    questions of law or an ALJ’s interpretation and application of the law to the
    facts. Ford Motor Co. v. Jobe, 
    544 S.W.3d 628
    , 631 (Ky. 2018). Helton’s claim
    of error involves the ALJ’s application of the 2x multiplier statutory provision to
    the facts of his claim and therefore our standard of review is de novo. 
    Id.
    An obvious purpose of KRS 342.730(1)(c)(2) is to encourage continued
    employment. Livingood v. Transfreight, LLC, 
    467 S.W.3d 249
    , 257 (Ky. 2015).
    Additionally,
    [t]he purpose of KRS 342.730(1)(c) 2 is to keep partially disabled
    workers in the habit of working and earning as much as they are
    able. It creates an incentive for them to return to work at which
    5
    they will earn the same or a greater average weekly wage by
    permitting them to receive a basic benefit in addition to their wage
    but assuring them of a double benefit if the attempt proves to be
    unsuccessful.
    Toy v. Coca Cola Enters., 
    274 S.W.3d 433
    , 435 (Ky. 2008).
    KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 begins with the following language: “[i]f an employee
    returns to work . . . .” Here, Helton did not “return” to work because he never
    left work. Further, at the time the ALJ entered the Opinion, Award and Order,
    Helton was still receiving unemployment benefits.
    We agree with the Board and the Court of Appeals that this case is
    similar to Bryant, 
    2019 WL 1173003
    , at *1. In that case, the claimant was
    injured while working as a technician at Jessamine Car Care on June 13,
    2013. 
    Id.
     Despite his injury, the claimant continued to work at his regular job
    until September 25, 2013, when he was terminated. 
    Id.
     Thereafter, the
    claimant did not return to work. Id. at *7. The ALJ determined that the
    claimant was entitled to the 2x multiplier after his employment was
    terminated. Id. at *2. The Board and the Court of Appeals affirmed, but this
    Court reversed:
    [T]he ALJ erred in determining the 2 multiplier applied under KRS
    342.730(1)(c)2. That multiplier only applies if the claimant returns
    to work after the injury. After Bryant was terminated, he did
    not return to work. ALJ Coleman cited to Bryant’s June 2013
    injury but that he continued to work until September. However,
    this continuation of work is not a return to work under KRS
    342.730(1)(c)2. To qualify as such a “return,” there must be a
    cessation followed by a resumption. Bryant simply continued on
    in his regular employment until he was discharged. Since that
    time, ALJ Coleman made no finding of a “return” to employment at
    a wage equal to or greater than his average weekly wage at the time
    of injury. The 2 multiplier has no bearing on Bryant's case.
    6
    Id. at *7.
    Helton indisputably continued to perform his regular job after his low
    back and neck symptoms arose and worsened to the point where he sought
    medical care in late 2018. Helton only ceased working when he was laid off
    due to the mine closing on September 2, 2019. Pursuant to KRS
    342.730(1)(c)2, no “return” to work occurred because there was no cessation
    followed by a resumption. Helton simply continued his regular employment
    until he was laid off along with other Rockhampton Energy employees.
    We recognize that Helton’s employment with Rockhampton Energy ended
    for reasons he could not control. However, the purposes of KRS 342.730(1)(c)2
    are to “encourag[e] continued employment,” Livingood, 467 S.W.3d at 257, and
    “create[] an incentive . . . to return to work,” Toy, 274 S.W.3d at 435. Helton
    continued performing his regular job after his low back and neck symptoms
    arose and the ALJ determined that Helton retains the physical capacity to
    return to the type of work performed on the date of his injury. Awarding the 2x
    multiplier in this instance does not accomplish these recognized objectives and,
    more importantly, does not comport with the plain language of the statute.
    The legislature has expressly authorized the 2x multiplier only where an
    employee “returns to work” and then experiences “a period of cessation of that
    employment.” KRS 342.730(1)(c)2.
    7
    CONCLUSION
    Because the ALJ misapplied the law to the facts, we affirm the Court of
    Appeals’ decision affirming the Board which reversed in part and remanded the
    ALJ’s opinion and order as to the application of the 2x multiplier.
    Minton, C.J.; Conley, Keller, Nickell, and VanMeter, JJ., sitting. All
    concur. Lambert, J., not sitting.
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
    McKinley Morgan
    W. Gerald Vanover
    Dan Scott
    Morgan, Collins, Yeast & Salyer
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
    Sara May
    Jones & Jones PLLC
    ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:
    Hon. Chris Davis
    WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD:
    Michael Wayne Alvey, Chairman
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2021 SC 0248

Filed Date: 6/10/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/16/2022