James Lang v. Honorable Eric Haner ( 2022 )


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  •              IMPORTANT NOTICE
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
    THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.”
    PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
    PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
    THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
    CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
    CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
    UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
    RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
    CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
    OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
    BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
    BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
    DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
    ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
    DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
    ACTION.
    RENDERED: AUGUST 18, 2022
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    Supreme Court of Kentucky
    2021-SC-0225-MR
    JAMES LANG                                                             APPELLANT
    ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
    V.                           NO. 2020-CA-1477
    JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
    NO. 12-CR-003625
    HONORABLE ERIC HANER, JUDGE,                                             APPELLEE
    JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
    AND
    COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                               REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
    MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
    AFFIRMING
    This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals’ decision denying a writ of
    prohibition to the Jefferson Circuit Court. James Lang, the Appellant, sought
    the writ to require the Jefferson Circuit Court to dismiss his indictment for
    receiving stolen property over $500 but under $10,000 and giving a peace
    officer a false name or address. Lang’s basis for the writ is the indictment was
    issued in 2012 and since that time he has not been brought to trial, i.e., his
    right to a speedy trial under the 6th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
    Section 11 of Kentucky’s Constitution has been violated. The Court of Appeals
    denied the writ first, because the record did not demonstrate Lang had ever
    asserted his right to speedy trial to the trial court nor did the record disclose
    any reasons which might justify the delay; and second, because violations of a
    speedy trial right are remediable by direct appeal. We affirm.
    I.     Facts and Procedural Posture
    Lang was arrested on September 15, 2012. He was incarcerated in the
    Louisville Metro Department of Corrections. On November 28, 2012, the
    Commonwealth in Jefferson Circuit Court obtained an indictment against Lang
    for receiving stolen property over $500 and under $10,000, and for giving a
    peace officer a false name or address. This indictment was unrelated to his
    September arrest. Lang asserts a detainer has been in place against him since
    November 28, 2012, on this indictment. The Commonwealth, however, has
    noted Lang is currently serving a twenty-year sentence for escape and being a
    persistent felony offender in the first degree. See Lang v. Commonwealth, No.
    2020-SC-0045-MR, 
    2022 WL 574453
     (Ky. Feb. 24, 2022). On January 5, 2021,
    Lang filed for a writ of prohibition in the Court of Appeals based on the
    violation of his right to speedy trial.
    The Court of Appeals noted the approximately eight-year delay in
    bringing Lang to trial is presumptively prejudicial, but concluded
    based on the limited record in this matter, there is no information
    before this Court with respect to the reasons for the delay or
    whether the petitioner has asserted his right to a speedy trial in
    the Jefferson Circuit Court. Accordingly, this Court holds that
    petitioner has failed to demonstrate a violation of his right to a
    speedy trial which necessitates the issuance of a writ of
    prohibition.
    Further, appellant would have a remedy by appeal if he is
    convicted in this matter.
    We now address the merits of the appeal.
    2
    II.    Standard of Review
    There are two classes of writs of prohibition. The first class involves those
    matters when a circuit court is alleged to be acting outside or beyond its
    jurisdiction. The second class involves issues when a circuit court is alleged to
    be acting erroneously within its jurisdiction. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trude, 
    151 S.W.3d 803
    , 808 (Ky. 2001). In the seminal decision of Hoskins v. Maricle, we
    held
    A writ of prohibition may be granted upon a showing that (1) the
    lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its
    jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an
    intermediate court; or (2) that the lower court is acting or is about
    to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there
    exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great
    injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not
    granted.
    
    150 S.W.3d 1
    , 10 (Ky. 2004), as modified on denial of reh'g (Dec. 16, 2004).
    “One seeking a writ when the lower court is acting ‘outside of its jurisdiction’
    need not establish the lack of an adequate alternative remedy or the suffering
    of great injustice and irreparable injury.” Goldstein v. Feeley, 
    299 S.W.3d 549
    ,
    552 (Ky. 2009). On the other hand, we have stringently emphasized that, as to
    the second class of writs, lack of an adequate remedy by appeal is “the one
    requirement that is set in stone and unavoidable.” Gilbert v. McDonald-
    Burkman, 
    320 S.W.3d 79
    , 85 (Ky. 2010).
    A denial of writ is reviewed by this Court for an abuse of discretion. “That
    is, we will not reverse the lower court’s ruling absent a finding that the
    determination was arbitrary, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”
    3
    Appalachian Racing, LLC v. Commonwealth, 
    504 S.W.3d 1
    , 3 (Ky. 2016)
    (internal citation and quotation omitted).
    III.   Analysis
    The Court of Appeals’ secondary holding that Lang did not lack an
    adequate remedy by appeal demonstrates the lower court analyzed Lang’s
    petition for a writ under the second class of writs. We agree with the lower
    court that the paucity of evidence and available remedy on appeal precludes
    issuing the writ.
    The lower court cited Goncalves v. Commonwealth, 
    404 S.W.3d 180
     (Ky.
    2013), Tackett v. Commonwealth, 
    445 S.W.3d 20
     (Ky. 2014), and Henderson v.
    Commonwealth, 
    563 S.W.3d 651
     (Ky. 2018), to demonstrate that speedy trial
    violations are considered on direct appeal. There is no need for extrapolation.
    Appellate courts may remedy violations of the right to speedy trial on direct
    appeal and that remedy precludes a writ of prohibition of the second class.
    Gilbert, 320 S.W.3d at 85.
    We also cannot say the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in
    determining the record was not developed enough to sustain issuance of the
    writ. “[A]ny inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis
    of the right in the particular context of the case[.]” Barker v. Wingo, 
    407 U.S. 514
    , 522 (1972). Having reviewed the record, Lang has not attached anything
    which might tend to prove that he has ever asserted his desire for a speedy trial
    to the trial court, orally or written; nor is there any record that the trial court
    has ever considered such a motion and rejected it. See Smith v. Com., 636
    
    4 S.W.3d 421
    , 445 (Ky. 2021) (noting assertion of speedy trial right both orally
    and in writing is a factor to consider in analysis). He has not attached a motion
    to dismiss for violations of said right either. There is no attachment from the
    trial court record of any kind. “[I]t is an appellant's burden to present a
    complete record and to establish that an error is preserved for our review.”
    Early v. Commonwealth, 
    470 S.W.3d 729
    , 734 (Ky. 2015). The Court of Appeals
    did not abuse its discretion in declining to issue the writ based on an
    insufficient record.
    Finally, we briefly note Lang’s statutory right to a speedy trial under
    KRS1 500.110. Lang never cited to this statute in his petition before the Court
    of Appeals, and he cites it only once before this Court merely to highlight the
    egregiousness of the delay of his trial. But even if we could say the Court of
    Appeals should have analyzed the petition under the auspices of KRS 500.110,
    we still would affirm for the lack of a record because there is no proof of a
    detainer, no proof a request for speedy trial was made to the trial court nor
    notice of said request being sent to the Commonwealth. See Spivey v. Jackson,
    
    602 S.W.2d 158
     (Ky. 1980); Donahoo v. Dortch, 
    128 S.W.3d 491
     (Ky. 2004).
    The Court of Appeals is affirmed.
    All sitting. All concur.
    1   Kentucky Revised Statutes.
    5
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
    James Lang, pro se
    APPELLEE:
    Hon. Eric Haner, Judge
    Jefferson Circuit Court
    COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST:
    Daniel Cameron
    Attorney General of Kentucky
    Jeanne Anderson
    Special Assistant Attorney General
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2021 SC 0225

Filed Date: 8/16/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/18/2022