Antwoin Williams v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2020 )

IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED: MAY 28, 2020
2019-SC-000288-MR
ANTWOIN WILLIAMS
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
V. HONORABLE ANGELA MCCORMICK BISIG, JUDGE
NOS. 16-CR-001681, 16-CR-003365 AND 18-CR-002503
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
In circuit court case numbers 16-CR-001681 and 18-CR-002503, a
Jefferson County jury found Antwoin Williams guilty of murder, first-degree
wanton endangerment, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and
being a second-degree persistent felony offender. In case number 16-CR-
003365, Williams pleaded guilty to attempted criminal possession of a forged
instrument and tampering with physical evidence. Williams was sentenced to a
total of thirty years of imprisonment. This appeal followed as a matter of right.
See Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b). Having reviewed the record and the arguments of
the parties, we hereby affirm the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 10, 2016, Williams spent most of the day riding around in a car
with Sequoia Camp, Jacoya Mangrum, and Mangrum’s one-year old son. Camp
drove, picking up Williams around 11:00 AM, then picking up Mangrum and
the child. The group rode around in Camp’s vehicle for much of the day,
stopping at a friend’s house at least once. Troy Cheatham also joined the
group, though he drove separately. The group continued to drive around until
the early morning hours.
At one point, Camp drove the group to a man’s house so Mangrum could
collect some money from the man. However, the man was not home, so the
group drove to a nearby gas station, arriving sometime around 2:44 AM on
June 11, 2016. Soon after, Camp, Mangrum, and Mangrum’s son left in
Camp’s car, but Williams and Cheatham stayed behind. Camp drove Mangrum
and her son back to the man’s house, and the man gave Mangrum the money
she had been trying to collect from him earlier. Camp, Mangrum, and the child
then returned to the gas station around 3:44 AM. Williams got into Camp’s car,
sitting in the back passenger-side seat, while Mangrum sat in the front
passenger seat. Her son was in the back seat with Williams. The group left the
gas station around 3:50 AM. Cheatham followed behind in his own vehicle.
After the group left the gas station, Williams and Mangrum began
arguing over gas money. At some point during the argument, Mangrum
punched Williams, and the fight escalated into a physical fight. Camp could not
get the two to stop fighting, and she continued to drive for several blocks before
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pulling over. She flagged Cheatham down, who pulled over and got out of his
car. He and Camp physically separated Williams and Mangrum, but the two
continued to cuss at each other. Soon, Williams and Mangrum, now outside of
the vehicle, began physically fighting again. Camp and Cheatham separated
Williams and Mangrum again, and Camp told Mangrum to get back into the
car so Camp could drive her home. Mangrum sat down in the front passenger
seat of Camp’s car. The passenger-side door was still open, however. Mangrum
then picked up Williams’s phone and threw it on the ground. Williams then
came around the vehicle and shot Mangrum in the head before running away.
Camp removed Mangrum’s child from the backseat and called 911. Mangrum
died at the scene.
Williams was arrested the following day after a routine traffic stop. The
matter proceeded to a four-day juiy trial beginning February 19, 2019. The
jury ultimately found Williams guilty of one count of murder, one count of first-
degree wanton endangerment, one count of possession of a handgun by a
convicted felon, and one count of being a second-degree persistent felony
offender. The jury recommended a total sentence of thirty years of
imprisonment. Williams also pleaded guilty to one count of attempted criminal
possession of a forged instrument and one count of tampering with physical
evidence, for charges arising from the June 12, 2016 traffic stop. He received a
one-year sentence on each of these convictions. All sentences were ordered to
run concurrently, for a total sentence of thirty years of imprisonment. This
appeal followed as a matter of right.
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II. ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give a jury
instruction on first-degree manslaughter under extreme emotional disturbance.
Defense counsel requested this instruction at trial, arguing that the fight
between Williams and Mangrum lasted approximately four miles and the
roughly fifteen-minute altercation sufficiently enraged Williams. The trial court
ultimately denied the request to give an extreme emotional disturbance
instruction. The court explained that the fighting and punching did not rise to
the level necessary to warrant such an instruction, and a fight over money and
a cell phone was not the type of extreme emotional distress contemplated by
the law. Rather, the trial court explained, this was better characterized as
“garden-variety anger.” The case was therefore submitted to the jury without an
extreme emotional disturbance instruction.
Later, Williams filed a Motion for A New Trial, again arguing that the trial
court should have provided an instruction for first-degree manslaughter under
extreme emotional disturbance. The trial court denied the motion, again
explaining that there was no evidence to support such an instruction. The trial
court explained, “At best, the parties had a dispute over possession of a cell
phone and a few dollars. The altercation had ended by the time of the
shooting.” The trial court again referred to the altercation as “garden-variety
anger over a cell phone” that “in no way rose to the level that would support
the Court giving an instruction of Extreme Emotional Disturbance.”
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We review the trial court’s ruling on the extreme emotional disturbance
jury instruction for abuse of discretion. Tunstull v. Commonwealth, 337 S.W.3d
576, 583 (Ky. 2011) (citation omitted). In doing so, we are mindful that “it is the
duty of the trial judge to prepare and give instructions on the whole law of the
case . . . [including] instructions applicable to every state of the case deducible
or supported to any extent by the testimony.” Holland v. Commonwealth, 114
S.W.3d 792, 802 (Ky. 2003) (quoting Taylor v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 355,
360 (Ky. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the trial court
should instruct on a lesser-included offense1 “only if, considering the totality of
the evidence, the jury might have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt
of the greater offense, and yet believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he is
guilty of the lesser offense.” Houston v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 925, 929
(Ky. 1998) (citation omitted). In considering this issue, we review the evidence
in the light most favorable to the party that requested the instruction. Thomas
v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 343, 347 (Ky. 2005) (citation omitted).
Under Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 507.020(1)(a), a person is guilty
of murder when
[w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the
death of such person or of a third person; except that in any
prosecution a person shall not be guilty under this subsection if he
acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for
which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the
reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of
1 Manslaughter in the first degree is a lesser-included offense of murder.
Holland, 114 S.W.3d at 805.
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a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as
the defendant believed them to be.
Accordingly, a person who intentionally causes the death of another is not
guilty of murder if he was acting under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance, as defined in the statute. Instead, he is guilty of manslaughter in
the first degree under KRS 507.030(l)(b). That statute provides that a person is
guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when
[w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the
death of such person or of a third person under circumstances
which do not constitute murder because he acts under the
influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined in
subsection (l)(a) of KRS 507.020.
Accordingly, acting under extreme emotional disturbance “does not exonerate
or relieve one of criminal responsibility.” McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715
S.W.2d 464, 468 (Ky 1986). Rather, it “reduces the degree of homicide from
murder to manslaughter. In that respect, it serves the same function as ‘acting
in sudden heat of passion’ in pre-penal code times.” Id.
Two primary distinctions exist between extreme emotional disturbance
and sudden heat of passion, however. First is the requirement that the jury
view the situation subjectively from the defendant’s point of view. Holland, 114
S.W.3d at 807 (quoting Spears v. Commonwealth, 30 S.W.3d 152, 154-55 (Ky.
2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As noted above, the statute requires
that the reasonableness of the explanation or excuse for the emotional
disturbance “be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s
situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.” KRS
507.020(l)(a).
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Second, extreme emotional disturbance “is not restricted to
circumstances which would constitute provocation ‘in the ordinary meaning of
the term.” Holland, 114 S.W.3d at 806 (quoting Spears, 30 S.W.3d at 154-55)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, “it is possible for any event, or even
words, to arouse extreme mental or emotional disturbance.” Id. (quoting
Spears, 30 S.W.3d at 154-55) (internal quotation marks omitted). As long as
the extreme emotional disturbance is sudden and uninterrupted, “[n]o definite
time frame between the triggering event and the killing is required.” Id. at 807
(quoting Spears, 30 S.W.3d at 155). However, it is important to remember that
there must be evidence of more than just mere hurt or anger. Talbott v.
Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 76, 85 (Ky. 1998) (citation omitted).
In the present case, Williams argues that the trial court erred by failing
to consider the distinctions between extreme emotional disturbance and heat of
passion. More specifically, he contends that the trial court erred by failing to
consider that any event could be the triggering event regardless of timing. He
also argues that the trial court erred by considering the reasonableness of his
extreme emotional disturbance from an objective viewpoint.
In considering these arguments, we are mindful that a request for an
extreme emotional disturbance instruction “must be supported by some
definite, non-speculative evidence.” Padgett v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 336,
341 (Ky. 2010) (citations omitted). We have previously explained,
Specifically, the evidence must show that some triggering event
caused the defendant to suffer “a temporary state of mind so
enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one’s judgment,
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and to cause one to act uncontrollably from [an] impelling force of
the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or
malicious purposes.”
Id. (quoting Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76, 81 (Ky. 2006)). For
example, the defendant may testify at trial as to his state of mind at the time of
the killing. However, it is not necessary that a defendant testify at trial in order
to introduce evidence sufficient to necessitate the giving of an EED instruction.
In some cases, the defendant’s statements to police have been introduced to
demonstrate the defendant’s state of mind. See, e.g., Lasure v. Commonwealth,
390 S.W.3d 139, 143 (Ky. 2012); Hudson v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 106,
108 (Ky. 1998). In other cases in which the defendant declined to testify, we
have held that a psychologist may provide testimony about the defendant’s
state of mind, provided that the expert’s opinion was not based primarily on
the defendant’s out-of-court statements. Talbott, 968 S.W.2d at 85. Regardless
of how the evidence is introduced, there must be some factual basis to support
the request for an extreme emotional disturbance instruction. Accordingly,
absent definitive and unspeculative proof of an extreme level of emotional
disturbance, a defendant is not entitled to such an instruction.
Furthermore, there must be evidence of more than just mere hurt or
anger. Id. at 85 (citation omitted). For example, in Bray v. Commonwealth, 68
S.W.3d 375 (Ky. 2002), the defendant introduced a letter that his wife had
written him, in which it was suggested that the wife was going to file an
amended divorce petition. The witness who discussed the letter stated that
“anyone would’ve been [upset] in this situation.” Id. at 383. However, there was
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no evidence that the defendant had experienced a severe emotional response.
Id. Thus, the trial court had not erred in denying Bray’s request for an extreme
emotional disturbance instruction.
In this case, no definitive or non-speculative proof was offered that
Williams “suffered a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed
as to overcome one’s judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from an
impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or
malicious purposes.” McClellan, 715 S.W.2d at 468-69. Williams did not testify.
The two adult eyewitnesses to the shooting, Camp and Cheatham, did testify,
but they provided little insight into Williams’s state of mind. For example, when
asked what Williams did when Mangrum threw his cell phone, Camp
responded simply that “he came around and shot her and took off running.”
The Commonwealth asked, “He walked right up and shot her?” and Camp
responded “yes.” Other than this limited testimony, Camp does not discuss,
nor was she asked about, Williams’s emotional reaction to the destruction of
his cell phone or his state of mind at the time of the shooting.
Cheatham, on the other hand, contended that he could not remember
the shooting. However, portions of his interview with police were read during
trial in an attempt to refresh Cheatham’s memory.2 In the interview, Cheatham
explained that Williams had walked up to the car and put his hand in the
2 These statements were utilized in an attempt to refresh Cheatham’s
recollection; they were not admitted as substantive evidence. Nevertheless, the jury
heard these statements, so we cannot disregard them. Cheatham stated at trial that
he did not remember making any of these statements to police.
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window, but neither Williams nor Mangrum said anything, and then Williams
shot Mangrum. Accordingly, the portions of his interview read during trial do
not provide sufficient insight into Williams’s state of mind to demonstrate that
Williams suffered from an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the
shooting.
We acknowledge that the fight between Williams and Mangrum appears
to have been a violent physical altercation. For example, Camp testified that
the two had their fists balled up when hitting each other. The evidence also
demonstrated that Williams underwent a “head-to-toe” forensic examination on
June 13, 2016, and that he had multiple abrasions on his upper body and
head and a human bite mark on his chest. However, while we recognize that
most people will become hurt or upset after a physical fight and the destruction
of their cell phone, the record contains no definitive and non-speculative
evidence that Williams suffered from a severe emotional reaction. As our case
law makes clear, an extreme emotional disturbance instruction cannot be
premised on mere speculation as to the defendant’s state of mind, and there
must be evidence that the defendant suffered from more than mere hurt or
anger.
In sum, no definitive, non-speculative evidence was presented at trial to
suggest that Williams was acting under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance, or that any circumstances existed at the time of the shooting to
provoke such a severe emotional disturbance. A trial court “has no duty to
instruct on a theory not supported by the evidence.” Tunstull, 337 S.W.3d at
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583 (citing Payne v. Commonwealth, 656 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Ky. 1983)).
Accordingly, based on the evidence presented at trial, we cannot hold that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying Williams’s request to use an
extreme emotional disturbance jury instruction.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we hereby affirm the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Yvette Rene DeLaGuardia
Assistant Appellate Public Defender
Louisville Metro Public Defender’s Office
Joshua Michael Reho
Leo Gerard Smith
Louisville Metro Public Defender’s Office
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel Jay Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky
Micah Brandon Roberts
Assistant Attorney General
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2019-SC-0288
ANTWOIN WILLIAMS APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
V. HONORABLE ANGELA MCCORMICK BISIG, JUDGE
NOS. 16-CR-001681; 16-CR-003365; AND 18-CR-002503
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
The Petition for Rehearing, filed by the Appellant, of the Memorandum
Opinion of the Court, rendered May 28, 2020, is DENIED.
All sitting. All concur.
ENTERED: August 20, 2020.