Gilbert Hall v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2020 )


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    NOT TO BE PUBLISHEDOPINION
    THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
    PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
    PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
    THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
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    UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
    RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
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    DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
    ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
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    ACTION.
    GILBERT HALL                                                          APPELLANT
    ON APPEAL FROM BRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
    V.                HONORABLE STOCKTON B. WOOD, JUDGE
    NO. 17-CR-00031
    COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE
    MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
    AFFIRMING
    A circuit court jury convicted Gilbert Hall of second-offense trafficking of
    a controlled substance in the first degree and recommended a sentence of
    twenty years’ imprisonment. He now appeals the resulting judgment as a
    matter of right.1 He argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to
    suppress evidence obtained under a warrant to search his residence and that
    palpable error resulted from extraneous information contained in trial exhibits
    available for the jury’s review during deliberation.
    We affirm the judgment. We hold that the trial court properly denied
    Hall’s motion to suppress because the issuance of the search warrant for the
    residence was supported by probable cause and because any error resulting
    from the jury’s access to exhibits containing extraneous information was
    1 Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).
    1
    waived by trial counsel’s failure to object, and otherwise fails to rise to the level
    of palpable error.
    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Trooper Currans believed individuals with outstanding arrest warrants
    were staying in Gilbert Hall’s residence. He therefore called Hall and obtained
    his permission to enter the residence to search for these individuals. Once
    inside, Currans observed two padlocked doors downstairs and three women
    upstairs, all with outstanding arrest warrants.
    Currans first approached Chelsey Curtis, who was sitting in a room with
    a hole in the wall that visibly held a green Crown Royal bag. The bag contained
    needles and a spoon with residue. When asked if the bag was hers, she stated
    she would claim it but that it contained “a little bit of everyone’s things.” She
    also informed Currans that a needle was in the drawer of the dresser.
    In another room, Currans located two other women, Chylynn Elliot and
    Hope Elliot. On a table inside the room they occupied, Currans observed a
    plate holding a syringe, a razor blade, and a plastic bag. As he was leaving, he
    saw in an unoccupied room a spilled trashcan containing needle caps.
    Based on these observations, Currans sought and obtained from the trial
    commissioner a search warrant for the premises. The search revealed
    additional drug paraphernalia and a locked safe. He then obtained a second
    search warrant for the safe and found inside methamphetamine, marijuana, a
    digital scale, cash, a rolled-up dollar, straws, a cell phone, needles, and a
    needle cap.
    2
    Hall was later indicted on one count of trafficking a controlled substance
    of more than two grains of methamphetamine in the first degree, second
    offense. He moved to suppress the evidence against him based on a lack of
    probable cause for the first search warrant, but the trial court denied his
    motion.
    II. ANALYSIS
    A. The Trial Court Properly Denied the Defendant’s Motion to
    Suppress.
    In reviewing a trial court’s suppression-motion ruling, an appellate court
    first determines if substantial evidence supports the factual findings.2 The
    proper factual findings are then reviewed to determine if the trial court
    accurately decided that the issuing judicial officer had a substantial basis for
    concluding probable cause existed.3 So we review the trial court’s conclusion
    that a substantial basis existed for the trial commissioner’s determination of
    probable cause.4 The trial commissioner’s decision is given deference, and a
    reviewing court only considers the information within the four comers of the
    affidavit.5
    2 Commonwealth v. Pride, 
    302 S.W.3d 43
    , 49 (Ky. 2010); Beemer v.
    Commonwealth, 
    665 S.W.2d 912
    , 915 (Ky. 1984) (applying the “substantial basis” test
    to the decision of the warrant-issuing judge to determine if there was probable cause).
    3 Pride, at 49. (“The proper test for appellate review of a suppression hearing
    ruling regarding a search pursuant to a warrant is to determine first if the facts found
    by the trial judge are supported by substantial evidence, and then to determine
    whether the trial judge correctly determined that the issuing judge did or did not have
    a ‘substantial basis for . . . concluding]’ that probable cause existed.”) (citing Illinois v.
    Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 238 (1983)).
    4
    Id. 5
    Id. (“[A]ll reviewing courts 
    must give great deference to the warrant-issuing
    judge's decision ....”) (citing 
    Gates, 462 U.S. at 238
    ).
    3
    The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Section 10 of the
    Kentucky Constitution protect a citizen from unreasonable searches and
    seizures. A search warrant is required to “allow a neutral judicial officer to
    assess whether the police have probable cause to make an arrest or conduct a
    search.”6 Any valid search warrant must be adequately supported by probable
    cause.7 In determining if probable cause exists, the issuing judicial officer
    evaluates the totality of the circumstances, as described in the supporting
    affidavit.8 The issuing judicial officer must consider the circumstances stated
    in the affidavit and determine if they establish a fair probability that
    contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched.9
    In the present case, substantial evidence supported the trial court’s
    finding that the warrant was supported by probable cause. The totality of the
    circumstances described in the affidavit indicated that evidence of drug
    trafficking would likely be found at Hall’s residence. The affidavit stated that
    Currans, after entering the home with Hall’s permission, observed various drug
    paraphernalia, such as needle caps, razor blades, and residue on spoons.
    Further, the affidavit described that he found three women with outstanding
    arrest warrants who were staying there. Additionally, most of the
    paraphernalia Currans observed remained unclaimed at the time he applied for
    a warrant. The green Crown Royal bag was partially claimed by Curtis, who
    6
    Id. 7
     Id.
    8 
    Beemer, 665 S.W.2d at 914
    .
    9
    Id. at 915. 4
    stated it was hers but that it contained everyone’s things. However, no one
    claimed the discarded needle caps or the plate, syringe, or razor blade. The
    unclaimed items, the padlocked doors, and the fact that Currans saw drug
    paraphernalia in three different rooms located near or in the possession of two
    women staying at Hall’s residence established that additional evidence of drug
    trafficking would likely be found inside the residence.
    Therefore, substantial evidence supported the trial court’s determination
    that probable cause existed because the affidavit provided the issuing trial
    commissioner a substantial basis to conclude evidence of drug trafficking
    would likely be found at Hall’s residence. As such, we affirm the trial court’s
    denial of the suppression motion.
    B. Hall is not entitled to a new penalty-phase trial.
    Hall contends that he is entitled to a new penalty phase because he was
    prejudiced by extraneous information contained in the Commonwealth’s
    exhibits introduced during the penalty phase of the trial. During the penalty
    phase, the jury heard testimony from Hall’s parole officer listing his extensive
    history of criminal convictions. The Commonwealth then introduced copies of
    these prior convictions as trial exhibits. And the trial court sent these exhibits
    into the jury room, making them available for review by the jury during
    deliberation. The Commonwealth does not dispute that some of these exhibits
    contained extraneous information: a listing of an amended charge and the
    names of two of Hall’s prior victims.
    5
    1. Hall waived for this appeal the issue of extraneous information
    appearing in the Commonwealth’s penalty phase exhibits.
    As an initial matter, we note that any error resulting from the
    information within the exhibits was invited and, therefore, could be properly
    considered waived on appeal.10 Lack of objection can result in either the issue
    being unpreserved or waived.11 An issue is waived when there is a knowing
    relinquishment of a right.12 This requires some affirmative act by the waiving
    party.13 For example, in Quisenberry v. Commonwealth, the defense approved
    jury instructions after being able to review them and raise any objections.14 As
    a result, any error arising from the instructions was invited because any issue
    with the instructions should have been raised after reviewing them.15 So the
    right to challenge the instructions on appeal was relinquished.16 Similarly in
    Graves v. Commonwealth, an error in jury instructions was waived because
    defense counsel was informed of the defect at trial by opposing counsel but
    raised no objection and subsequently approved them.17 The trial counsel’s
    awareness and acceptance of the proposed, defective jury instructions invited
    10 Salisbury v. Commmonwealth, 
    556 S.W.2d 922
    , 927 (Ky. App. 1977).
    11 Quisenberry v. Commonwealth, 
    336 S.W.3d 19
    , 37-38 (Ky. 2011).
    12
    Id. at 38. 13
    Id.
    14
     Id. at 37
    , 38.
    15 
    Id. at 38.
    16 
    Id. at 37 
    (“[HJowever, at the close of proof, when the trial court and parties
    were discussing the jury instructions, Quisenberry himself requested facilitation
    instructions and referred the court to evidence he claimed supported them. These
    alleged errors, therefore, were not merely unpreserved, they were invited.”).
    17 
    384 S.W.3d 144
    , 152 (Ky. 2012).
    6
    any instructional error such that any challenges to them were waived on
    appeal.18
    Further, even if counsel is unaware of an issue, if it could have been
    discovered through adequate investigation it is waived on appeal. For example,
    in McQueen v. Commonwealth, a jury selection issue was not raised during trial
    because counsel was not aware of it.19 But the issue was waived on appeal
    4
    because “[t]hrough the exercise of reasonable diligence, McQueen's counsel
    could have discovered the disqualification of Juror S.S. prior to examining the
    jurors .... As such, we hold that McQueen waived his jury selection
    argument.”20 Trial counsel could have discovered the issue and objected at
    trial, but having failed to do so, could not later raise the issue on appeal.21
    Likewise, in Cummings v. Commonwealth, a jury-empanelment issue was
    waived because there was “no indication in the record that the defense should
    not have been similarly aware of the erroneous presence of Juror #25.”22 The
    issue was not merely unpreserved but waived because counsel had the
    opportunity to know of the error and to object during trial.23
    In this case, Hall has waived his right to challenge the Commonwealth’s
    penalty-phase exhibits because any prejudicial information in the exhibits
    18 Id. at 152.
    19 
    339 S.W.3d 441
    , 446-47 (Ky. 2011).
    20
    Id. at 447. 21
    Id.
    22 
    560 S.W.3d 844
    , 846 (Ky. 2018).
    23
    Id. at 845. 7
    could have been discovered through a reasonable investigation and defense
    counsel allowed them to be submitted to the jury without reviewing them. Any
    error that resulted from the extraneous information in the exhibits was invited
    because all counsel had ample opportunity to review them and make proper
    objections. The issue at hand is like that in McQueen where counsel would
    have been aware of the jury-empanelment issue if a reasonable investigation
    had been made.24 Here, defense counsel, the Commonwealth, and the trial
    court engaged in two bench conferences to discuss the exhibits and their
    contents. Defense counsel made no objection or request to review the
    documents at the bench conferences or any other time during trial. Defense
    counsel could have become aware of any extraneous information in the exhibits
    if she had exercised reasonable diligence in reviewing them.
    Further, counsel’s actions affirmatively relinquished the right to
    challenge the exhibits on appeal. Quisenberry and Graves found jury-
    instruction issues to be waived on appeal when the attorneys approved them
    without objection.25 In the current matter, Hall’s counsel did not specifically
    approve the exhibits, but during the first bench conference in which the
    exhibits were discussed, the Commonwealth seemed uncertain about the
    information within them, and Hall’s counsel specifically told the trial court she
    had not seen them. The Commonwealth’s uncertainty as to the information in
    the exhibits and the defense counsel’s acknowledgment that she had not
    24 McQueen, at 447.
    25 
    Quisenberry, 336 S.W.3d at 38
    ; 
    Graves, 384 S.W.3d at 152
    .
    8
    reviewed them should have resulted in either a request from defense counsel to
    examine them, or an objection. During the second bench conference, it
    became clear that the jury would have access to the exhibits during
    deliberations. Even though the Commonwealth stated it had double-checked
    them for extraneous information, Hall’s counsel still made no request to review
    them herself and made no objection. Therefore, defense counsel invited any
    error resulting from the jury’s access to the exhibits. Defense counsel was
    aware that she had not reviewed them, that the jury would have access to
    them, and that earlier uncertainty existed as to the information they contained
    Thus, any challenge to the extraneous information in the exhibits was waived
    on appeal.
    2. The extraneous information in the Commonwealth’s penalty phase
    exhibits did not result in palpable error.
    Because neither party addressed the waiver issue on appeal, we will
    analyze, as requested by Hall, the errors that appear of record arising out of
    extraneous information found in the exhibits sent to the jury room. Because
    this issue was unpreserved, we review for palpable error.26 Palpable error
    occurs when the defendant suffers egregious prejudice that seriously affected
    the fairness of the proceeding and creates a substantial possibility that the
    26 Stansbury v. Commonwealth, 
    54 S.W.3d 293
    , 300 (Ky. 2015).
    9
    result would not have been the same despite the error.27 Overall, the error
    must have resulted in a manifest injustice.28
    a. The improperly admitted amended charge did not result in palpable
    error.
    Under KRS 532.055, admissible evidence during the penalty phase
    includes: (1) minimum parole eligibility, prior convictions of the defendant,
    both felony and misdemeanor; and (2) the nature of prior offenses for which he
    was convicted. But, “(t]he evidence of prior convictions is limited to conveying
    the jury the elements of the crimes previously committed .... Additionally,
    the trial court should avoid identifiers, such as naming of victims, which might
    trigger memories of jurors who may—especially in rural areas—have prior
    knowledge about the crimes.”29
    During the penalty phase of Hall’s trial, the jury was potentially exposed
    to extraneous information including a prior amended charge of second-degree
    burglary, names of two prior victims, one of whom was from the surrounding
    area, and a court document stating he was likely to recidivate. Overall, it was
    27
    Id. at 300
    (“A palpable error ‘affects the substantial rights of a party . . . and
    appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has
    resulted from the error.’ To ascertain the existence of manifest injustice, ‘a reviewing
    court must plumb the depths of the proceeding ... to determine whether the defect in
    the proceeding was shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable.’”) (citing Martin v.
    Commonwealth, 
    207 S.W.3d 1
    , 4 (Ky. 2006)).
    28 Prescott v. Commonwealth, 
    572 S.W.3d 913
    , 922 (Ky. App. 2019) (“When an
    appellate court engages in a palpable error review, its focus is on what happened and
    whether the defect is so manifest, fundamental and unambiguous that it threatens the
    integrity of the judicial process.”).
    29 Mullikan v. Commonwealth, 
    341 S.W.3d 99
    , 109 (Ky. 2011).
    10
    error for the jury to have access to the amended charge and names of victims,
    but this did not result in a manifest injustice.
    The jury’s exposure to Hall’s amended charge did not egregiously affect
    his sentence. In deciding if improperly admitting dismissed or amended
    charges constitutes palpable error, the reviewing court considers if the
    defendant was ultimately sentenced to the maximum penalty and how directly
    the jury was introduced to the extraneous prejudicial information.30 For
    example, in Blane v. Commonwealth, the jury’s exposure to improper direct
    testimony about incorrect and ultimately dismissed charges created a palpable
    error and warranted resentencing.31 The live, incorrect testimony about the
    defendant’s prior charges was unduly prejudicial and likely had a significant
    effect on the jury’s penalty deliberations.32
    In contrast, in Martin v. Commonwealth no palpable error occurred even
    though the jury had access to the defendant’s amended charges during their
    penalty deliberations because the trial testimony about the prior convictions
    was proper.33 The jury’s less direct exposure to the defendant’s amended and
    dismissed charges during deliberations, as compared to hearing live, incorrect
    testimony, decreased the risk that the extraneous information would
    egregiously affect the outcome.34 The Court found it was more likely the jury’s
    30 
    Martin, 409 S.W.3d at 348
    ^19.
    31 
    364 S.W.3d 140
    , 153 (Ky. 2012).
    32 Id. at 153.
    
    33 409 S.W.3d at 348-49
    .
    34
    Id. at 349. 11
    sentence was influenced by the defendant’s criminal history and the crime
    committed instead of the amended charges.35 Similarly, in Miller v.
    Commonwealth, the erroneous discussion of the defendant’s uncharged prior
    bad acts was error but did not result in a manifest injustice because the jury
    was properly aware of the defendant’s three prior convictions, multiple parole
    violations, and continued drug use on parole.36 The jury’s exposure to his
    uncharged conduct was erroneous, but the jury was not so unfairly influenced
    by it to constitute palpable error in light of his other criminal conduct.37
    During deliberation in Hall’s penalty phase, the jury had access to an
    exhibit listing his amended charge of second-degree burglary. The discrepancy
    between the indictment charging him with first-degree burglary and the
    judgment explaining his plea to second-degree appears on separate pages.
    Appellant contends the indictment was the first page of the documents sent
    back to the jury. It is uncertain whether the jury viewed the exhibits because
    the documents were handed to the bailiff only to give to the jury if they
    requested to see them. While it is unclear if the jury saw this extraneous
    information, this analysis will presume it did.38
    35
    id. 36 394
    S.W.3d 402, 405-408 (Ky. 2011).
    37
    Id. at 408. 38
    Martin, at 348 (Ky. 2013); Parker v. Commonwealth, 
    482 S.W.3d 394
    , 407 (Ky.
    2016) (“The trial record does not make clear that the certified documents were, in fact,
    admitted into evidence. And even if they were introduced, the record further does not
    establish that the jury had access to them. Nevertheless, as in Martin we may
    presume that the unredacted certified records were erroneously provided to the jury
    when it retired to deliberate.”) (citation omitted).
    12
    It was error to show the amended charge. But we are satisfied that such
    error did not likely influence the jury’s sentence. By way of live testimony given
    by Hall’s parole officer, the jury was made aware of Hall’s prior convictions and
    this was one prior conviction among eight. Additionally, unlike in Blane, where
    the jury heard trial testimony about incorrect amended and dismissed charges,
    Hall’s jury was never directly informed of the amended charge.39 Here, the
    circumstances are more like Martin, as the jury was only exposed to an
    amended charge during the deliberations, and it was for the same crime of
    which Hall was eventually convicted, just for a lesser degree. Additionally, the
    jurors heard testimony regarding his prior offenses and were aware of the
    second-degree burglary charge. So, while the jury may have considered his
    prior offenses in determining his sentence, it is unlikely it specifically
    considered that he was originally charged with first-degree burglary but
    pleaded to second-degree. While this information should not have been
    submitted to the jury, it does not seem likely it was heavily considered in
    deciding Hall’s sentence.
    b. Exposure to the names of Hall’s prior victims did not result in
    palpable error.
    Hall’s jury also had access to exhibits containing the names of two of his
    victims from earlier crimes, but we again conclude such error did not
    egregiously affect his sentence. In Stansbury v. Commonwealth, the jury’s
    39 
    Blane, 364 S.W.3d at 152-53
    . Also, the Court notes that in Taulbee v.
    Commonwealth, 438 S.W.2d. 777, 779 (1969), prejudice was presumed because of the
    jury’s exposure to direct inflammatory testimony by the prosecutor; however, the
    current facts involve no issue with trial testimony.
    13
    access to the defendant’s amended charges and the names of his prior victims
    who were from the same small county as where the jury was seated resulted in
    palpable error.40 In a rural area, when the jury is exposed to the name of a
    victim from the same venue as the trial, it is perhaps more likely a juror might
    know the victim or their family.41 Further, Stansbury’s jury was also exposed
    to his amended charge for one out of two of his prior convictions.42 An
    amended charge among a limited criminal history is more prejudicial than
    when it is listed within an extensive criminal history because it becomes more
    likely the jury will notice it and give it weight in their deliberations.43 The
    combination of the substantial prejudice from the jury’s exposure to the
    victim’s names and the amended charge resulted in a manifest injustice.44
    In the present case, the jury was exposed to the name of Jennifer Hall,
    who is from Fleming County, because that name appeared on the exhibit
    evidencing Hall’s prior domestic-violence charge in that county. Hall argues
    that because Fleming County is near Bracken County, where the present trial
    took place, and both are rural counties, palpable error occurred as in
    Stansbury. But during voir dire at Hall’s trial the prospective jurors were
    asked if any of them knew Jennifer Hall because she is Hall’s former spouse.
    Additionally, the chance of a jury member knowing Jennifer Hall is lessened by
    40 
    454 S.W.3d 293
    , 304-05 (Ky. 2015).
    41
    Id. at 304. 42
    Id. at 305.
    43 
    Id.
    44
     Id.
    14
    
    her residing in Fleming County rather than Bracken County. Bracken and
    Fleming Counites are both within the 19th Judicial Circuit but are separated
    from each other by Mason and Robertson counties. There is a remote chance
    that a member of the jury did not forthrightly respond during voir dire
    concerning their knowledge of Jennifer Hall, but the inquiry removes the
    likelihood of prejudice as identified in Stansbury. The trial taking place in a
    venue different from the venue where the prior charge was prosecuted
    combined with the screening during voir dire renders unlikely the prospect that
    the appearance of Jennifer Hall’s name as a victim in Hall’s criminal history
    was extremely prejudicial to Hall.
    In another exhibit, the jury had access to the name of Hall’s previous
    victim, “Officer Charlie Sims,” who is listed in Hall’s 2001 Adams County, Ohio
    indictment for intimidation of a witness. However, there is no evidence or
    indication that any member of the jury knew the officer, or that he was from
    Bracken County. Further, the incident apparently arose in Adams County,
    Ohio, which lessens the probability that a member of this Bracken County jury
    knew Officer Charlie Sims. We are satisfied that the appearance of Officer
    Charlie Sims’s name in an exhibit potentially viewed by the jury did not result
    in the extreme prejudice as in Stansbury.
    Although the names of the previous victims were admitted alongside an
    amended charge, unlike Stansbury, where the defendant only had two prior
    convictions and the amended charges related to one of the two, Hall has an
    extensive criminal history and his jury was properly made aware of his seven
    15
    prior convictions during the trial.45 Therefore, while it was error for the jury to
    have access to the amended charge and the names of his prior victims, the
    probability that the outcome was egregiously affected by these errors is low and
    does not constitute palpable error.
    c. The jury’s access to information that Defendant was likely to
    reoffend did not result in palpable error.
    Also available to the jury were documents stating Hall had violated his
    community control for prior crimes, had committed new offenses before
    completing parole, and that he was likely to recidivate. For example, page two
    of the Commonwealth’s Exhibit #13 lists a finding that Hall is likely to reoffend
    because he has committed offenses while on community control in Ohio and
    has a repetitive criminal history. The jury knew of his criminal history because
    of his parole officer’s testimony about Hall’s seven prior convictions and that he
    was a repeated felony offender. The jury could reasonably infer from the
    testimony that because he had repeatedly offended in the past, he was likely to
    do so again, and therefore the maximum penalty should be imposed. Further,
    the jury asked one question during their brief deliberations regarding how long
    Hall had served for his previous eleven-year sentence. This may suggest that
    the jury was contemplating his prior convictions and the effectiveness of his
    
    45 454 S.W.3d at 305
    (“Stansbury's only prior convictions consisted of two
    counts of third-degree burglary and third-degree criminal mischief and one count each
    of third-degree assault and third-degree arson. We cannot say that introduction of the
    dismissed wanton endangerment charge, which was filed in conjunction with the
    assault and arson charges, did not have an impact. Furthermore, we cannot say that
    the introduction of the identities of local victims with whom the jurors might have had
    a connection did not have an impact.”).
    16
    past punishments. While it cannot be said that the jury’s sentence of twenty
    years was not influenced by the extraneous information, it did not cause such
    egregious error to result in a manifest injustice.
    Hall’s jury was erroneously exposed to extraneous information during
    deliberation of the penalty phase of Hall’s trial in the form of an amended
    charge, names of the two prior victims, and a statement that Hall was likely to
    reoffend. We find that this exposure did not create a substantial likelihood of
    manifest injustice. The jury’s recommended sentence of twenty years was more
    likely the result of consideration of Hall’s extensive criminal history,
    ineffectiveness of previous punishments, and lack of acceptance of
    responsibility. Moreover, we are persuaded that Defense counsel waived the
    erroneous nature of the exhibits. We conclude that Hall is not entitled to a new
    penalty phase.
    III.      CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment.
    All sitting. All concur.
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
    Molly Mattingly
    Department of Public Advocacy
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
    Daniel Jay Cameron
    Attorney General of Kentucky
    James Patrick Judge
    Assistant Attorney General
    17