Clara Ruplinger v. louisville/jefferson County Metro Government ( 2020 )

RENDERED:
2020-SC-0140-CL
IN RE:
CLARA RUPLINGER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
V. LOUISVILLE DIVISION
CASE NO. 3:19-CV-583
LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY
METRO GOVERNMENT; LOUISVILLE
METRO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
GREG FISCHER, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY; DOUG HAMILTON, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AND MARK BOLTON
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE VANMETER
CERTIFYING THE LAW
By order entered May 28, 2020, this Court granted the United States
District Court, Western District of Kentucky’s request for certification of law on
the following issues:
Whether the General Assembly waived sovereign immunity from
suit in the Kentucky Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“KRFRA”);
and
Whether, if the underlying statute provides a waiver of sovereign
immunity, the use of KRS1 446.070 to seek redress for violations of
that underlying statute nevertheless entitles government
defendants to immunity from suit.
1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
We hold that the General Assembly did not waive sovereign immunity from suit
under the KRFRA as to monetary damages, and thus, Plaintiff, Clara
Ruplinger, is limited to a potential declaratory judgment enjoining
Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government (“Metro”) if she can prove a
violation of KRFRA.
In the case pending in federal court, Metro has moved for dismissal of all
claims against it, including a state law damages claim under KRFRA based on
sovereign immunity. Ruplinger was arrested while protesting and was
subsequently booked and photographed by Metro Police. Ruplinger, a Muslim
woman, was wearing a hijab during her arrest. Upon arrival at the Main Jail
Complex of Metro Corrections, a group of female officers initiated the facility’s
intake process. Ruplinger removed her headscarf which she states followed her
sincerely held religious belief that the removal of a headscarf is proper around
members of her own gender. However, when Ruplinger was asked to remove
the headscarf for a booking photograph—taken by a male officer—she
protested, stating that her religion prevented her from removing the headscarf
in the presence of non-family, male individuals. Metro officers allegedly
ordered Ruplinger to remove her headscarf and eventually she complied. The
picture was then published on an online database. Metro alleges that all its
actions were proper and were required by police policy.
Ruplinger filed her complaint in Jefferson Circuit Court alleging various
federal claims and a state claim under KRFRA. Metro removed the case to the
Western District of Kentucky and filed for dismissal. Metro acknowledges that
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relief may be available to Ruplinger in the form of a declaratory judgment, but
argues that sovereign immunity is not waived by KRS 446.350. While this
Court has never ruled on whether KRS 446.350’s language implies a waiver of
sovereign immunity for monetary damages, this Court has extensive precedent
discussing what language and intent is necessary for a complete waiver of
sovereign immunity to be implied in a Kentucky statute.
“[P]ure sovereign immunity, for the state itself, has long been the rule in
Kentucky.” Comair, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Airport Corp., 295
S.W.3d 91, 94 (Ky. 2009). This absolute immunity extends to county
governments, including consolidated city-county government schemes like
Metro. Bryant v. Louisville Metro Housing Auth., 568 S.W.3d 839, 845 (Ky.
2019). Sovereign immunity can only be waived by the General Assembly. Dep’t
ofCorrs. v. Furr, 23 S.W.3d 615, 616 (Ky. 2000) (citation omitted). “(AJbsent an
explicit statutory waiver, Metro [] is entitled to sovereign immunity.” Jewish
Hosp. Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t, 270
S.W.3d 904, 907 (Ky. App. 2008). Thus, we must determine whether KRFRA
contains an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity.
KRFRA states:
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s freedom of
religion. The right to act or refuse to act in a manner motivated by
a sincerely held religious belief may not be substantially burdened
unless the government proves by clear and convincing evidence
that it has a compelling governmental interest in infringing the
specific act or refusal to act and has used the least restrictive
means to further that interest. A “burden” shall include indirect
burdens such as withholding benefits, assessing penalties, or an
exclusion from programs or access to facilities.
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KRS 446.350. The above language includes no express waiver of sovereign
immunity. An example of an express waiver can be found in the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act (“KCRA”). KRS 344.450. KCRA explicitly provides a remedy for
violations of the statute and states that “]a]ny person injured by any act in
violation of the provisions of this chapter shall have a civil cause of action in
Circuit Court to enjoin further violations, and to recover the actual damages
sustained[.]” Id. No such language exists in KRFRA. While KRFRA codifies the
standard a court must use to analyze a claim regarding a sincerely held
religious belief, it does not express or imply what relief is available. Further,
filing a claim in conjunction with KRS 446.070 does not waive sovereign
immunity.2 See Clevinger v. Bd. ofEduc., 789 S.W.2d 5, 9 (Ky. 1990) (KRS
446.070 does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity); see also Dep’t of
Nat. Res. v. Adkins, 2012-CA-1310-MR, 2013 WL 5524138, at *1 n.2 (Ky. App.
Oct. 4, 2013) (“KRS 446.070 does not constitute a broad waiver of sovereign
immunity[]”). KRFRA’s absence of an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity and
KRS 446.070’s lack of authority to waive sovereign immunity is apparent from
the language of both statutes. Thus, we certify that sovereign immunity as to
monetary damages is waived neither as to the KRFRA, nor in conjunction with
KRS 446.070.
All sitting. All concur.
2 As no express waiver exists in KRFRA, the Western District’s second certified
question is moot.
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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Paul Stewart Abney
Kelly Marie Parry
Jeremiah Wesley Reece
Soha Tajoddin Saiyed
ABNEY LAW OFFICE, PLLC
Vanessa Lynn Armstrong, Clerk
United States District Court
Louisville, Kentucky
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES:
Susan Klein Rivera
Louisville, Kentucky
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