L. H., a Child Under Eighteen v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2020 )

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky
2019-SC-0321-DG
L. H., A CHILD UNDER EIGHTEEN APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
v. NO. 2016-CA-1551
HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT NOS. 16-J-00049-004,
16-XX-00002, 16-XX-00003, 16-XX-00004 AND 16-XX-00005
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER
Appellant, L.H., was committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice
under the convictions currently on appeal on April 18, 2016, which
commitment terminated on April 18, 2017, under the terms of the commitment
order, and no later than October 18, 2017, by operation of KRS
635.060(4)(b)(2). On August 20, 2020, this Court ordered L.H. to show cause
why this appeal should not be dismissed as moot based on Kentucky law.
L.H. responded arguing his appeal should not be dismissed as moot
because it falls under the exceptions to the mootness doctrine. The
Commonwealth filed a response reiterating the holding in Morgan v. Getter, 441
S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Ky. 2014), that “[a] ‘moot case’ is one which seeks to get a
judgment . . . upon some matter which, when rendered, for any reason, cannot
have any practical legal effect upon a then existing controversy.” (Citation
omitted). We agree with the Commonwealth that L.H.’s case is moot, and this
appeal must therefore be dismissed.
“Appellate courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to decide cases that
have become moot. . . . Thus, mootness is a threshold matter for a reviewing
court to resolve.” Commonwealth, Kentucky Bd. of Nursing v. Sullivan
University System, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 341, 343 (Ky. 2014). When necessary, this
Court is required to sua sponte assess its own subject matter jurisdiction.
Kentucky High School Athletic Association v. Edwards, 256 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky.
2008).
In Q.C. v. Commonwealth, 164 S.W.3d 515, 517 (Ky. App. 2005), it was
concluded the appeal was moot as the child’s commitment to Department of
Juvenile Justice (DJJ) had expired two years prior and no relief could thus be
granted. In Dillingham v. Commonwealth, 249 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Ky. 1952), the
predecessor to this Court held
[s]ince appellant has already satisfied the sentence of the court, we
could make no order on this appeal which would affect her status.
We cannot remit the jail sentence already served, and even if we
should decide the sentence should not have have [sic] been
imposed, and [sic] opinion could not afford appellant any effectual
relief in this case.
Following a careful review of the briefs, the record, and the law, it
appears none of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine are applicable, and
any opinion we render in this matter would be advisory, at best. L.H.’s
commitment to DJJ terminated over three years ago and nothing this Court
holds can grant him any relief from the term he has completed. Id.
2
 Contrary to L.H.’s assertion, no collateral consequences attach sufficient
to trigger an exception to the mootness doctrine. Juveniles do not lose the
same civil rights as adults upon conviction and their records are not subject to
public inspection. Although prior adjudications are taken into account if a
juvenile returns to court as a public offender, L.H. has never challenged his
guilt but rather has focused on the disposition following those adjudications.
Any collateral consequences would flow from the prior adjudications, not the
sentences imposed.
Further, there is no reasonable expectation L.H. will be subject to the
same action again as he cannot be recommitted on the offenses to which he
admitted guilt so many years ago. Thus, this case does not meet the criteria
for “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Morgan, 441 S.W.3d at 100
(citing Philpot v. Patton, 837 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Ky. 1992)).
Finally, although the issues raised are interesting, the public interest
exception to the mootness doctrine likewise does not apply. In Morgan, we
reiterated the three elements required to invoke the public interest exception:
the issue must be of a public nature; there must be a need for authoritative
guidance; and the question must be likely to recur. Here, the questions
presented are clearly of a public nature. However, although L.H. argues
authoritative guidance is necessary as “a genuine dispute” exists regarding the
appropriate interpretation of the statutory language, the provisions in question
appear to be plain and unambiguous and any dispute should be minimal.
Finally, the facts presented herein are unique and L.H. offers nothing more
than speculation the specific questions raised will recur.
3
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, this appeal must be, and hereby is
DISMISSED as MOOT.
All sitting. All concur.
ENTERED: October 29, 2020.
_______________________________________
CHIEF JUSTICE
4