Zachariah Minix v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2023 )

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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
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RENDERED: AUGUST 24, 2023
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky
2022-SC-0330-MR
ZACHARIAH MINIX APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM ADAIR CIRCUIT COURT
V. HONORABLE JUDY VANCE MURPHY, JUDGE
NO. 20-CR-00165
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Zachariah Minix (Minix) pled guilty to one count each of kidnapping,
second-degree unlawful transaction with a minor, second-degree rape,
possession or viewing of materials portraying a sexual performance by a minor,
and possession of marijuana. Before sentencing, Minix moved to withdraw his
guilty plea, and the circuit court denied the motion. He now appeals the circuit
court’s ruling as a matter of right.1 After review, we find no error occurred in
the trial court’s ruling and affirm.
1 Ky. Const. § 110.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 18, 2020, Minix and another man, Ethan Harville (Harville)
took the thirteen-year-old victim in this case, Jane,2 from Colorado and
intended to take her to Tennessee, Minix’s state of residence. Both Minix and
Harville were twenty-one years old at the time of the offenses herein. Because
this case was disposed of pursuant to a guilty plea, the facts surrounding the
kidnapping were not fully developed in the record before us. But we discern
that Minix met the victim through the internet, and that she initially told him
she was older than she was. However, at some point while en route from
Colorado to Tennessee, Minix was informed over the phone by both Jane’s
father and Colorado law enforcement that she was in fact thirteen. Minix did
not return Jane upon learning this, and instead continued toward Tennessee.
At some point during that trip, Minix threw Jane’s phone out of the car.
Three days after Jane was taken investigators were able to locate her
using cell phone data, presumably from Minix’s phone. They narrowed the
location down to a room at a Sleep Inn Hotel in Adair County, Kentucky. Minix
and Harville refused to open the door when officers attempted to gain entry to
the room, and the officers ultimately had to use a key card obtained through
the hotel’s staff to enter. Jane was found in the room, and she later informed
the officers that Minix had raped her the day prior while she was trying to take
a shower.
2 As the victim is a minor, this opinion will use a pseudonym to protect her
privacy.
2
On November 5, 2020, Minix was indicted by a grand jury for one count
each of kidnapping, first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor, first-degree
rape, possession or viewing of matter portraying a sexual performance by a
minor, and possession of marijuana.
Both federal law enforcement and several state law enforcement agencies
were involved in this case. As such, the evidence submitted in discovery was
extensive and several pre-trial hearing dates and trial dates were set and then
subsequently extended. It appears that defense counsel and the
Commonwealth were actively negotiating a plea deal from at least March 2021
to December 2021. During a hearing on January 25, 2022, defense counsel
informed the court that the defense had received an offer for a plea deal from
the Commonwealth that Minix was interested in, but Minix still had questions
that counsel was trying to get answers for regarding wait times for the sex
offender treatment program due to COVID-19. The defense requested a few
more days for Minix to decide. Three days later, on January 28, defense
counsel reported that Minix and his family had differing views on the
Commonwealth’s offer and Minix still had not decided. The Commonwealth
and defense counsel agreed that March 29, 2022, would be the cut off date for
Minix to either accept or reject the Commonwealth’s plea offer.
On March 29, Minix and his counsel agreed to and signed the
Commonwealth’s plea agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, the
Commonwealth amended Minix’s charge of first-degree unlawful transaction
with a minor to second-degree unlawful transaction with a minor. This
3
downgraded that charge from a Class B felony, punishable by imprisonment for
10-20 years, to a Class D felony, punishable by imprisonment for 1-5 years.
The Commonwealth further agreed to amend the charge of first-degree rape to
second-degree rape. This downgraded the charge from a Class B felony,
punishable by imprisonment for 10-20 years, to a Class C felony punishable by
imprisonment for 5-10 years. Amending both charges in this manner also
meant that Minix would not be considered a “violent offender” pursuant to
KRS3 439.3401(1)(i) and KRS 439.3401(1)(f), respectively. He therefore would
not have to serve 85% of his sentence before attaining eligibility for parole.4
Under the plea agreement, the Commonwealth recommended the
following sentences: fifteen years for kidnapping, five years for second-degree
unlawful transaction with a minor, ten years for second-degree rape, five years
for possession or viewing a matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor,
and thirty days for possession of marijuana. All charges except the kidnapping
charge would run concurrently for a total of ten years, and that ten-year
sentence would run consecutively with the fifteen-year sentence for kidnapping
for a total of twenty-five years. Of note, the plea agreement also required Minix
to “[acknowledge] that he will be deemed to be a ‘sexual offender,’” and that “he
will be subject to lifetime registration on the sex offender registry.”
3 Kentucky Revised Statute.
4 KRS 439.3401(3)(a) (“A violent offender who has been convicted of a . . . Class
B felony shall not be released on probation or parole until he has served at least
eighty-five percent (85%) of the sentence imposed.”).
4
On the same date, March 29, the defense filed a motion to enter a guilty
plea, and the circuit court held a standard Boykin5 plea colloquy on the
motion. During the colloquy, Minix agreed that he had sufficient time to review
the plea agreement with his attorney, and that he was satisfied with the
services rendered by his attorney. He stated that he did not have any
questions for the court or his attorney regarding the plea agreement. In
addition, he understood the constitutional rights he was waiving by entering
the guilty plea, including: his right not to testify against himself, his right to a
speedy and public trial by jury, his right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, and his right to appeal. Defense counsel stated that he had gone
over the plea agreement with Minix and that the plea was consistent with his
advice. The court and Minix then had the following exchange:
Court: Are you pleading guilty because you are guilty?
Minix: Yes, your honor.
Court: Is your plea of guilty being made freely, knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily?
Minix: Yes, your honor.
Minix entered a guilty plea to every count of the indictment against him, which
were stated individually by the court. The court accepted Minix’s guilty plea,
finding it was made freely, knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Sentencing
5 See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969)
(holding that due process requires that a trial court must make an affirmative showing
on the record that a guilty plea is voluntary and intelligent before it may be accepted).
5
was initially scheduled for May 10, 2022, but was later continued to June 28,
2022.
Before discussing the events of the sentencing hearing, we note for
context that in accordance with Minix’s sex crime convictions, he was classified
as a “sexual offender.” Because of this, Minix was required by statute to
complete the sex offender treatment program before he could attain eligibility
for parole.6 In order to progress through the sex offender treatment program,
individuals are required, inter alia, to admit guilt for the sexual offenses they
committed. We further highlight that prior to the sentencing hearing, Minix
was represented by attorney Luke Lawless (Lawless). But, on the morning of
the sentencing hearing, attorney Scott Lanzon (Lanzon) also appeared to
represent Minix as co-counsel alongside Lawless.
During the hearing, Lawless and Lanzon claimed that they had filed a
written motion to withdraw Minix’s guilty plea. The circuit court stated that
the motion had not been filed and requested that the defense state its grounds
on the record. Lawless argued:
After looking at the PSI7 and talking to Mr. Minix and to Mr.
Lanzon, my client wants to try the case. He’s not going to be able
to make these admissions of guilt. And also, a part of this sex
offender treatment that he would have to complete with this
currently, he’s not going to make these admissions so he’s not
going to complete it and he’s not going to, he’ll never complete the
program or the requirements they’re going to ask him to do to be
6 KRS 197.045(4) (“A sexual offender who does not complete the sex offender
treatment program for any reason shall serve his or her entire sentence without
benefit of sentencing credit, parole, or other form of early release.”).
7 Pre-sentence investigation report.
6
parole eligible. It’s never going to happen. So I think at this point
in time the only option that we have is to try the case.
The Commonwealth had not received the motion and objected to it. The
Commonwealth believed the motion to be “buyer’s remorse” and argued that it
had discussed all the terms of the agreement with Lawless at length. The
Commonwealth also asserted that Lawless discussed parole eligibility and
other details with Minix and his family so that everyone went into the plea
agreement with “eyes wide open.” It argued that Minix knew what he was
doing when he entered the plea and that they should proceed with sentencing.
As the defense’s written motion is not included in the certified record on
appeal, and an order by the circuit court ruling on the motion is likewise
absent, we must rely on the oral arguments made by the defense and the oral
ruling of the circuit court. That exchange occurred as follows:
Court: I’m reading through the [sex offender evaluation report] that
was completed. Just going back to your argument Mr. Lawless, it
says that the defendant stated he understands that his behavior
was wrong and that he will enter into the sex offender treatment
program to help him understand what motivated him to commit
the sex offenses, he is amenable to treatment. So, explain to me
again what your argument is.
Defense (Lawless): Well, he is amenable to treatment, of course he
would be willing to do whatever he needs to do to move forward.
But as part of that treatment, the issue is going to be that, what
they’re going to ask him to do is to admit to things that he’s not
going to admit to doing because he maintains he didn’t do those
things. So that’s the one part of it, not that he’s not willing to do
the treatment aspect of it, but to admit to doing things that he’s
saying he didn’t do, they’re not going to progress him through the
treatment program. He’s never going to be able to complete it
because my understanding from, I’ve spent a lot of time on the
phone trying to get some answers from some higher ups from
probation and parole and from everybody that’s with the sex
offender treatment program, I’ve called several jail facilities trying
7
to get some more specific answers to these questions and that part
maybe came in too late but this was also as a response to him
asking me to do these things. He wanted more information and we
found this out and it’s like well, if he’s not going to admit to these
certain things that are contained in the PSI and certain allegations
that are in the indictment then he’s not going to be able to
complete the treatment program. He’s basically going to be stalled
out on whatever phase number that it is because he’s not going to
admit.
Court: And again, it states in this report Mr. Minix has admitted to
committing the sex crimes with which he is charged and to which
he pled guilty and I’m not sure exactly what it is that he doesn’t
want to admit guilt to. But of course this court goes over a very
detailed questioning with each defendant when they enter a guilty
plea and I asked him specifically ‘are you pleading guilty because
you are guilty?’ and his answer was yes. . . . He was unequivocal,
he didn’t tell me, you know, I’m taking this because it’s a good
deal. . . . I think it’s a stall tactic and I’m ready to proceed with
sentencing.
Defense (Lanzon): I think the other issue is that it’s not a one- or
two-year sentence, it’s a twenty-year sentence, it’s a major
sentence. He was incarcerated leading up to the plea, so the
amount of pressure that was by his own admission, and him and I
have gone through it as it relates to his colloquy with the court and
I think upon reflection, I know the state has indicated it’s buyer’s
remorse. Well, what was he admitting to under those
circumstances is what he’s having the questions about. And so I
understand this court may view that as a stall tactic but we are
looking at a twenty year sentence—
Court: Twenty-five.
Defense (Lanzon): Twenty-five. I mean that’s a major, major life
alteration.
Court: Sure. And there are major, major, major crimes that he
committed, and told me that he did commit, against a child.
Defense (Lanzon): And so, as the state is well aware, there are
many extenuating circumstances with this case, they’ve seen the
text messages they’ve seen how this transpired over the internet,
and so, what we’re looking for is a trial date as quick as this court
can accommodate it.
8
Court: He’s been in jail for 627 days. He’s had time to consider
whether or not he is guilty, so when I ask him if he’s pleading
guilty because he’s guilty, I take him at his word. 627 days he’s
had time to consider whether or not he committed these crimes
and wants to admit to that. Mr. Lawless is a fine attorney; I’d
recommend him to anyone. I’m not allowed to recommend
attorneys but if I were he’d be on the top of my list. He’s had
competent counsel. I see no reason to not go forward with
sentencing today.
Defense (Lanzon): You’re honor what we’re looking for—
Court: I heard what you’re looking for. It’s overruled.
The court then gave the defense time to go over the PSI with Minix. When the
hearing reconvened, the court asked Lawless if he would like to make a
statement on Minix’s behalf. He stated:
I would just like to reiterate what we had put on the record when
we came up the first time, judge. When I stood up here with Mr.
Minix at the end of March when we entered this plea, I agree with
[the Commonwealth’s] statement that we had worked pretty hard
on trying to get this deal put together, but there were certain
aspects of it that came together at the very last minute, one of
which, the main one, that came together at the last minute was
parole eligibility and how that would work. And I specifically
remember meeting with [Minix] in the holding cell that day trying
to go through some of these last minute details on what this plea
would mean because basically that was our deadline date, we had
to make a decision right then and I thought at the time that when I
was speaking of parole eligibility that his understanding of what
that meant was greater than what it seems to be and that that’s
not an automatic at all; just because you’re eligible does not mean
that you’re going to receive it and that was kind of what he was
relying on in accepting this deal along the way. I understand that
now. . . . So I just want to put that on the record that I don’t feel
like after speaking with [Minix] again and going through this
paperwork with him I don’t know that he realized exactly what that
eligibility status meant and so I would reiterate that we would like
to have a hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea. I
understand that the court has already ruled on that, but I just
want to put it on the record again that we’re going to maintain that
9
we would like to withdraw the plea and move the case on for trial.
That’s my statement your honor.
The court then asked Minix if he would like to make a statement, but he
declined. The Commonwealth responded that given the facts of the case,
Minix’s lack of a valid legal defense, and the sentence that Minix would
otherwise be facing, it was a fair deal. It further pointed out that Minix had
already admitted guilt of the crimes to both the court and the evaluator that
compiled the sex offender evaluation report and that he told the evaluator that
he committed the crimes and that he is amenable to treatment. Moreover, it
argued that no one is guaranteed parole at any time and that parole would be
dependent on many other factors in addition to his completion of the sex
offender treatment program.
The circuit court, noting that it had reviewed the PSI and the sex
offender evaluation report, imposed the sentence recommended by the
Commonwealth and agreed to by Minix. Minix now appeals the circuit court’s
ruling to this Court.
Additional facts are discussed below as necessary.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Substantial evidence supported the circuit court’s finding that Minix’s
guilty plea was voluntary, and the court did not abuse its discretion by
denying his motion to withdraw it.
Minix first argues before this Court that his guilty plea was involuntary
because he did not know that he would be required to complete the sex
offender treatment program to be eligible for parole and he did not know he
would have to make admissions of guilt to complete the sex offender treatment
10
program.8 Relying on RCr9 8.10, Rodriguez v. Commonwealth,10 and Rigdon v.
Commonwealth,11 Minix further argues that the circuit court reversibly erred by
declining to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether his guilty plea
was voluntary before denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
The Commonwealth counters that under Edmonds v. Commonwealth,12
parole eligibility is not considered a “direct consequence” of a guilty plea and,
therefore, ignorance regarding parole eligibility cannot render a plea
involuntary. For this reason, and for additional reasons explained herein, we
agree with the Commonwealth and affirm the circuit court’s ruling.
As previously mentioned, Minix filed a pre-sentencing motion under RCr
8.10 to withdraw his guilty plea.
[T]o be entitled to relief on that ground the movant must allege
with particularity specific facts which, if true, would render the
plea involuntary under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, would render the plea so tainted by counsel's ineffective
assistance as to violate the Sixth Amendment, or would otherwise
clearly render the plea invalid. Motions which fail adequately to
specify grounds for relief may be summarily denied, as may be
motions asserting claims refuted or otherwise resolved by the
record.13
8 Minix’s appellate brief also raises new arguments concerning his status as a
brittle diabetic and poor living conditions in the Adair County Jail as contributing to
the involuntariness of his plea. These arguments were not raised before the circuit
court as grounds to withdraw his guilty plea. We will accordingly limit the arguments
we address to those raised before the circuit court.
9 Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure.
10 87 S.W.3d 8 (Ky. 2002).
11 144 S.W.3d 283 (Ky. App. 2004).
12 189 S.W.3d 558 (Ky. 2006).
13 Commonwealth v. Pridham, 394 S.W.3d 867, 874 (Ky. 2012) (internal
citations omitted).
11
Whether a plea was entered voluntarily is an inherently fact-intensive inquiry,
and it is well-established that the trial court “is in the best position to
determine the totality of the circumstances surrounding a guilty plea.”14
Accordingly, “[a] trial court’s determination on whether [a] plea was voluntarily
entered is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard,” i.e., whether the
ruling was supported by substantial evidence.15 “Substantial evidence means
evidence of substance and relevant consequence having the fitness to induce
conviction in the minds of reasonable men.”16 “If, however, the trial court
determines that the guilty plea was entered voluntarily, then it may grant or
deny the motion to withdraw the plea at its discretion. This decision is
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.”17 A trial court’s ruling is an
abuse of discretion if the decision “was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles.”18
Minix asserted to the circuit court that his plea was involuntary because
he did not know that he was required to complete the sex offender treatment
program to become eligible for parole and, in addition, that he did not know he
would be required to make admissions of guilt to complete the sex offender
14 Rigdon, 144 S.W.3d at 288 (citing Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482,
486 (Ky. 2001)).
15 Rigdon, 144 S.W.3d at 288.
16 See, e.g., Smyzer v. B.F. Goodrich Chem. Co., 474 S.W.2d 367 (Ky. 1971).
17 Rigdon, 144 S.W.3d at 288.
18 Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky.1999).
12
treatment program. A voluntary plea is one entered by a defendant that is
“fully aware of the direct consequences” of the guilty plea.19
[T]he “direct” consequences of a guilty plea, those consequences of
which the defendant must be aware for his plea to be deemed
voluntary as a matter of due process, [are] understood as the
waiver of the defendant's trial-related constitutional rights and the
potential penalties to which he was subjecting himself by
confessing or acquiescing to the state's charges and those to which
he would be subjected if he lost at trial, i.e., those matters within
the direct sentencing authority of the trial court.20
In contrast, “[m]atters outside the trial court's sentencing authority, [including]
parole eligibility . . . have been deemed ‘indirect’ or ‘collateral’ consequences of
the plea” that do not affect the validity of the plea.21
For example, in Edmonds, Todd Edmonds pled guilty to several charges,
some of which required him to be classified as a “violent offender” under KRS
439.3401.22 This meant that he would be required to serve 85% percent of his
sentence before becoming eligible for parole.23 The trial court accepted
Edmond’s guilty plea after conducting a Boykin hearing.24 After the guilty plea
was accepted, but prior to sentencing, Edmonds moved to withdraw his guilty
plea.25 The trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion;
19 Pridham, 394 S.W.3d at 876 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
755 (1970)) (emphasis added).
20 Pridham, 394 S.W.3d at 877.
21 Id.
22 Edmonds, 189 S.W.3d at 566-67.
23 Id. at 567.
24 Id. at 565-66.
25 Id. at 566.
13
rather, “having already conducted the Boykin hearing when the plea was
entered, [the court] denied the motion and simply referred to its previous
Boykin colloquy in finding that [Edmond’s] plea was voluntarily entered.”26
On appeal, Edmonds asserted that his guilty plea was involuntary, in
relevant part, because “he was misinformed by defense counsel regarding when
he would be released from the penitentiary.”27 He claimed that his defense
counsel sent him a letter prior to his plea colloquy which “assured him that he
would be released, rather than merely eligible for parole, at the expiration of
85% of his sentence, and that he relied on this assurance in pleading guilty.”28
This Court disagreed, noting that “[a] defendant’s eligibility for parole is
not a ‘direct consequence’ of a guilty plea the ignorance of which would render
the plea involuntary.”29 The Court further discussed that any incorrect
information Edmond’s attorney may have provided him was remedied during
his plea colloquy wherein his attorney and the trial court discussed his
sentence and parole eligibility.30 The court held that the trial court did not err
by denying Edmond’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea because there was
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 567.
29 Id. See also Stiger v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Ky. 2012)
(holding that that the trial court’s failure to advise the defendant that he would be
ineligible for parole until he served 85% of his sentence did not render his plea
involuntary because parole is not a direct consequence of a guilty plea).
30 Edmonds, 189 S.W.3d at 567-68.
14
“substantial evidence to support the trial court’s determination that the plea
was voluntary and intelligent.”31
It should also be noted that a similar outcome was reached by this Court
in Pridham, supra, wherein defendant Jason Cox’s counsel “not only failed to
advise him of the potential parole consequences attaching to sex offender
treatment but incorrectly assured him that the sex offense would not affect his
parole eligibility.”32 Upon learning that sex offender treatment was a
prerequisite to parole eligibility, Cox filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea
which the trial court denied.33
On appeal to this Court, Cox argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Padilla v. Kentucky,34 “utterly invalidated the distinction between
the direct and collateral consequences of a guilty plea, and imposed on defense
counsel a constitutional duty to offer accurate advice about any and all
consequences that might bear on a reasonable defendant’s plea decision.”35 In
Padilla, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the collateral versus direct distinction
as it related to the deportation consequences of a guilty plea and concluded
that such a severe penalty should not be categorically removed from counsel’s
constitutional duty to advise by simply dubbing it a “collateral consequence.”36
31 Id. at 568.
32 Pridham, 394 S.W.3d at 881.
33 Id. at 874.
34 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
35 Pridham, 394 S.W.3d at 881.
36 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366.
15
The Pridham Court rejected Cox’s argument under Padilla. The Court
explained, in relevant part:
we understand Padilla as invalidating the collateral consequences
rule for deportation and for consequences “like” deportation in
their punitive effect, their severity, and their intimate relationship
to the direct criminal penalties where the consequence is easily
determined from a clear and explicit statute. The deferral of Cox’s
parole eligibility until he completes sex offender treatment is not
like deportation in any of these respects.
To begin with, sex offender treatment is not a punishment or a
penalty. It is a rehabilitative measure the General Assembly has
deemed important enough to make mandatory. As then-Judge,
now Justice, Schroder observed for the Court of Appeals in
Garland v. Commonwealth, 997 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. App. 1999), the
fact that sex offender treatment has been made a condition
precedent to parole does not affect a defendant’s underlying
sentence and does not enhance his punishment, even where the
effect of the condition precedent is to delay his parole eligibility.37
The Pridham Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Cox’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.38
Based on the foregoing, we disagree with Minix’s contention that his
misunderstanding of when he would be eligible for parole rendered his plea
involuntary and hold that based on the totality of the circumstances,
substantial evidence supported the circuit court’s finding that his plea was
voluntary. During his plea colloquy, the court discussed the direct
consequences of his plea: the court discussed the trial-related constitutional
rights Minix was waiving by entering a guilty plea, and he stated he understood
37 Pridham, 394 S.W.3d at 881–82.
38 Id. at 886.
16
those rights.39 In addition, the Commonwealth’s offer on a plea of guilty, which
was signed by both Minix and his counsel, clearly laid out “the potential
penalties to which he was subjecting himself by confessing or acquiescing to
the state's charges and those to which he would be subjected if he lost at
trial[.]”40 Moreover, Minix unequivocally stated that he was pleading guilty
because he was guilty; that he was satisfied with his counsel’s services; that he
had sufficient time to consult his counsel regarding the evidence, potential
defenses, and the plea agreement itself; and that he had no questions for the
court regarding the plea agreement. The circuit court was also highly
complementary of his counsel and felt that he had received adequate
representation.
Minix next argues that the circuit court committed reversible error by
refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing before denying his motion to
withdraw. We disagree. To begin, the plain language of RCr 8.10 imposes no
such mandate. That statute simply provides, in relevant part: “At any time
before judgment the court may permit the plea of guilty or guilty but mentally
ill, to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.”41 And, while
Rodriguez states that “[g]enerally, an evaluation of the circumstances
supporting or refuting claims of coercion and ineffective assistance of counsel
requires an inquiry into what transpired between attorney and client that led to
39 See Id. at 877.
40 Id.
41 RCr 8.10.
17
the entry of the plea, i.e., an evidentiary hearing[,]”42 there is no categorical
requirement as Minix alleges. Decisions by both this Court and the Court of
Appeals rendered after both Rodriguez and Rigdon have upheld a trial court’s
denial of a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea even though the trial
court did not conduct a separate evidentiary hearing on the motion, including
Edmonds, supra; Stiger v. Commonwealth, supra;43 Williams v.
Commonwealth;44 and Elkins v. Commonwealth.45
Indeed, even though the Court of Appeals in Rigdon reiterated that a
separate evidentiary hearing is the preferred course, it stated in dicta that a
failure to do so did not necessarily constitute reversible error. In Rigdon, Larry
Rigdon pled guilty to two charges following a Boykin colloquy.46 Prior to
sentencing, Rigdon filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the
ground that it was involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel; Rigdon
alleged that his attorney had failed to communicate with him, refused to
properly investigate, and did not advise him of the options to file a motion in
limine to exclude certain evidence or to enter a conditional guilty plea.47 “No
separate evidentiary hearing was conducted. However, at the. . . sentencing
42 87 S.W3d at 11 (emphasis added).
43 To be clear, even though Stiger’s motion was a post-conviction RCr 11.42
claim, the standard for relief is the same as a motion filed under RCr 8.10. See
Pridham, 394 S.W.3d 867 at 874.
44 233 S.W.3d 206, 210 (Ky. App. 2007).
45 154 S.W.3d 298, 299 (Ky. App. 2004).
46 144 S.W.3d at 285-86.
47 Id. at 286.
18
hearing, Rigdon was given the opportunity before sentencing to explain to the
circuit court why he should be permitted to withdraw his plea and how he had
suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel.”48 The circuit court summarily
denied his motion to withdraw, finding that his plea was entered intelligently
and voluntarily.49
The Court of Appeals upheld the denial and, regarding the lack of
separate evidentiary hearing, noted:
In the instant case, no evidentiary hearing was conducted. Rigdon
and his attorney were both given the opportunity to speak about
the allegations Rigdon raised in his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea at the sentencing hearing, although neither was placed under
oath or subjected to cross-examination. Notably, Rigdon has not
alleged that this informal hearing was procedurally inadequate or
prejudiced him in anyway. Therefore, this matter is not before the
Court. We observe that even if it were before us, we would find
that this informal hearing conducted was sufficient under these
circumstances for the circuit court to determine the totality of
circumstances surrounding Rigdon's guilty plea. Nevertheless,
conducting an evidentiary hearing would have been the more
prudent course since Rodriguez indicates that such a hearing is
generally necessary.50
Furthermore, more recent case law has refined the standard for a separate
evidentiary hearing by stating that “[m]otions adequately alleging valid claims
not refuted by the record entitle the movant to an evidentiary hearing,”51 but
“[m]otions which fail adequately to specify grounds for relief may be summarily
48 Id.49 Id. at 287.
50 Id. at 290.
51 Pridham, 394 S.W.3d at 877 (citing Rodriguez, supra).
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denied, as may be motions asserting claims refuted or otherwise resolved by
the record.”52
Here, as discussed, Minix alleged that his plea was involuntary because
of his misunderstanding regarding when and how he would attain parole
eligibility. But, as parole eligibility is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea,
it could not have affected the voluntariness of his plea. His motion therefore
did not allege a valid claim of involuntariness and the circuit court did not
abuse its discretion in summarily denying it.
B. Minix’s Eighth Amendment argument is not properly before this Court.
Minix also argues that the Adair County Jail violated his rights under the
Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution against cruel and unusual
punishment due to what he alleges were poor living conditions. As the
Commonwealth correctly argues in response, a conditions of confinement claim
under the Eighth Amendment must be brought in a separate civil action.53
Moreover, KRS 454.415(1)(d) directs that “No [civil] action shall be brought by
or on behalf of an inmate, with respect to . . . A conditions-of-confinement
issue[] until administrative remedies as set forth in the policies and procedures
of the Department of Corrections, county jail, or other local or regional
correctional facility are exhausted.” This issue is therefore not properly before
us, and we decline to address it.
52 Pridham, 394 S.W.3d at 877 (citing Edmonds, 189 S.W.3d at 569).
53 Martin v. Commonwealth, 639 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Ky. App. 2022).
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III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, substantial evidence supported the Adair Circuit
Court’s finding that Minix’s guilty plea was voluntarily entered and did not
abuse its discretion by denying Minix’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea
without first holding an evidentiary hearing. We accordingly affirm.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Scott Lanzon
Hindman & Lanzon
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel J. Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew Robert Krygiel
Assistant Attorney General
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