Genaro Herrera Hernandez v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2019 )

IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.”
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
MODIFIED: MAY 28, 2020
RENDERED: DECEMBER 19, 2019
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky
2018-SC-000492-DG
GENARO HERRERA HERNANDEZ APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
V. HONORABLE AUDRA JEAN ECKERLE, JUDGE
NO. 13-CR-001336
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Genaro Herrera Hernandez, an indigent criminal defendant from
Guatemala, struck a motorcyclist and passenger with his vehicle while he was
intoxicated, killing the driver and injuring the passenger. On September 25,
2015, he entered unconditional guilty pleas to manslaughter in the second
degree, assault in the first degree and misdemeanor offenses, and received a
ten-year sentence. On March 7, 2016, Hernandez filed a notice of appeal from
the trial court’s February 4, 2016, order which declined to amend its previous
August 5, 2015, order approving a reduced fee submitted by a Spanish
interpreter for services rendered in Hernandez’s defense. On appeal,
Hernandez argued that the trial court abused its discretion by not authorizing
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payment of the full amount of the interpreter’s invoiced bill. Ultimately, the
Court of Appeals granted the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss the appeal,
on grounds that the appeal was not timely filed and an indispensable party (the
interpreter) was not named in the notice of appeal. We affirm the Court of
Appeals’ determination that the appeal was untimely filed, and thus need not
reach the indispensable party issue.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
Prior to pleading guilty, Hernandez was appointed a public defender and
sought to suppress statements he made during a police interview. He received
permission from the trial court to retain the services of a Spanish-language
interpreter, Ilse Apestequi, for out-of-court interpretive services. The court’s
order authorized payment on proof of “all reasonable fees for out-of-court
interpretive services incurred by the defendant . . . up to $5,000.” The trial
court approved the interpreter’s first bill for $777, and the third bill for
$339.43. However, the trial court questioned the interpreter’s second bill for
$2,520, which represented charges for interpretation and written translation of
Hernandez’s audiotaped interview with police which lasted a total of 69
minutes. The court found the amount of this invoice to be unreasonable and
unnecessary and reduced it to $1,200 by order entered August 5, 2015.
Seven weeks later, on September 25, 2015, Hernandez entered
unconditional guilty pleas to manslaughter in the second degree, assault in the
first degree and misdemeanor offenses; waived filing of the Presentence
Investigation Report; was sentenced; and final judgment was entered that day.
On October 12, 2015 - 17 days after entry of the final judgment - Hernandez
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tendered a Motion for Reconsideration of Expert Witness Fees and requested an
ex parte hearing to address the trial court’s reduction of the interpreter’s fees
from $2,520 to $1,200. The trial court agreed to reconsider the fee request,
but ultimately declined to approve additional funds, setting forth its reasons in
an order entered February 4, 2016, which the court designated as final and
appealable.1 On March 7, 2016, Hernandez filed a notice of appeal from that
order, claiming the trial court abused its discretion by only approving a
reduced fee for the interpreter. Following the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the
appeal on procedural grounds, this Court granted Hernandez’s petition for
discretionary review.
II. Analysis.
On September 25, 2015, when Hernandez’s final judgment was entered,
all matters in his case, including the trial court’s August 5, 2015, order
approving a reduced fee for the interpreter, became final. At that point,
Hernandez could have filed a motion to alter, amend or vacate the final
judgment, or filed a timely notice of appeal, if he wished for the trial court, or
an appellate body, to further address the issue of the interpreter’s fees. He did
neither.
Instead, he waited until October 12, 2015 to file a Motion for
Reconsideration of Expert Witness Fees. However, the trial court lost
jurisdiction of this case on October 5, 2015 - ten days after entry of the final
1 The trial court’s February 4, 2016, Order states that “defendant has not
provided the Court with any authority that this Order is final and appealable for
himself, the Office of the Public Defender, the Interpreter, and/or the Finance Cabinet.
However, to allow further review of the issues by an appellate body, the Court will
designate this Order as final and appealable. Defendant is once again free to proceed
in forma pauperis, here and on appeal.”
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judgment - because no motion to alter, amend or vacate was filed.
Commonwealth v. Steadman, 411 S.W.3d 717, 721 (Ky. 2013). As a result,
Hernandez’s October 12, 2015, motion and the trial court’s subsequent orders
were null and void, as the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider any
additional motions or issue any further orders after the 10 days had passed to
alter, amend or vacate the final judgment.
Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue the February 4, 2016,
order, Hernandez’s notice of appeal from that order was inconsequential. Had
Hernandez wished to appeal the trial court’s decision to approve a reduced fee
for the interpreter, he would have had to file a notice of appeal within 30 days
from entry of the September 25, 2015, final judgment, although whether his
appeal would have proceeded is debatable. See Windsor v. Commonwealth, 250
S.W.3d 306, 307 (Ky. 2008) (holding that an unconditional guilty plea waives
the right to appeal with limited exceptions including “competency to plead
guilty; whether the plea complied with the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 244, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969); subject matter
jurisdiction and failure to charge a public offense; and sentencing issues[]”
(footnotes omitted)).
Unconditional guilty pleas aside,
except in limited circumstances . . . an appeal to the Court of
Appeals is allowed only from a circuit court’s final order or
judgment. See KRS[2] 22A.020(1) (allowing appeal of “conviction,
final judgment, order, or decree in any case in Circuit Court”). . . .
A final order or judgment is one “adjudicating all the rights of all
the parties in an action or proceeding, or a judgment made final
2 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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under Rule 54.02.” CR[3] 54.01. In a criminal case, this is
ordinarily the judgment of conviction and sentence, or a similarly
named document.
. . . Thus, to comply with the rules, a notice of appeal must
identify the final order or judgment being appealed; naming
another type of order, such as an interlocutory or post-trial order,
is insufficient.
Cassetty v. Commonwealth, 495 S.W.3d 129, 131–32 (Ky. 2016).
RCr4 12.04(3) provides that “[t]he time within which an appeal may be
taken shall be thirty (30) days after the date of entry of the judgment or order
from which it is taken[.]” Therefore, procedurally, Hernandez’s failure to file a
notice of appeal within 30 days of the September 25, 2015, final judgment was
fatal. See Cassetty, 495 S.W.3d at 132 (holding that while the doctrine of
substantial compliance applies with respect to some notice-of-appeal errors,
dismissal is strictly required for failure to timely file the notice of appeal) (citing
Ready v. Jamison, 705 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Ky. 1986) (discussing the amended
CR 73.02)). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals properly dismissed Hernandez’s
appeal as untimely.
III. Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals’ opinion is affirmed.
Minton, C.J.; Hughes, Keller, Lambert, VanMeter and Wright, JJ., sitting.
All concur. Nickell, J., not sitting.
3 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
4 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Cicely Jaracz Lambert
Chief Appellate Defender
Louisville Metro Public Defender’s Office
Leo Gerard Smith
Louisville Metro Public Defender
Louisville Metro Public Defender’s Office
Euva D. May
Assistant Appellate Defender
Louisville Metro Public Defender’s Office
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel Jay Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky
James Daryl Havey
Assistant Attorney General
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