Steven Dale Eversole v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2020 )

REND
2018-SC-000656-MR
STEVEN DALE EVERSOLE APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
V. HONORABLE MICHAEL O. CAPERTON, JUDGE
NO. 18-CR-00146
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE WRIGHT
REVERSING, VACATING, AND REMANDING
A Laurel Circuit Court jury found Appellant, Steven Dale Eversole, guilty
of first-degree fleeing or evading, first-degree wanton endangerment, reckless
driving, and being a first-degree PFO. The trial court sentenced him to twenty
years’ imprisonment in accordance with the jury’s recommendation.1 He
appeals to this Court as a matter of right, Ky; Const. §110(2) (b). Eversole
raises five issues on appeal, alleging the trial court erred by: (1) depriving him
of counsel at a critical stage of trial, (2) failing to grant his motions for directed
verdict, (3) denying him a unanimous verdict, (4) admitting evidence of
uncharged prior bad acts, and (5) providing the jury with improper penalty-
1 The jury recommended sentences of three years for first-degree wanton
endangerment and four years for first-degree fleeing or evading, enhanced to twenty
years by the PFO. The jury also recommended a $100 fine for reckless driving.
phase jury instructions. Agreeing with Eversole that the trial court erred in
depriving him of the right to be represented during a critical stage of the trial,
we reverse his conviction, vacate the corresponding sentence, and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We address his remaining
arguments only insofar as they concern motions for directed verdict.2
I. BACKGROUND
Sergeant John Inman and Deputy Shannon Jones from the Laurel
County Sheriffs Office were investigating the theft of a Cadillac Escalade on
January 26, 2018. They had received a call from the vehicle’s owner indicating
the vehicle’s GM OnStar™ had pinged at a remote location in a rural part of
Laurel County—a field near the end of Lockaby Lane, a single-lane, narrow
country road that ended in a one-lane gravel driveway. At midnight, Sergeant
Inman arrived in his police cruiser where the blacktop ended, and the gravel
driveway began. Deputy Jones was in his cruiser some distance behind
Sergeant Inman on Lockaby Lane.
Sergeant Inman saw a white pickup truck on the gravel driveway slowly
approach him and he turned his emergency lights on and off to make sure the
driver of the white pickup truck knew he was there and to identify himself as
an officer. Sergeant Inman pulled his vehicle slightly off the one-lane road, so
the pickup truck could pull up beside him. Both vehicles had their headlights
on and for a few seconds were window-to-window. Sergeant Inman got a look
2 Errors concerning motions for directed verdict have double jeopardy
implications if the motions should have been granted. See Mayes v. Commonwealth,
2014-SC-000714-MR, 2016 WL 4488308, at *2 (Ky. Aug. 25, 2016). Therefore, we
must address those alleged errors.
at the driver when he said “hey” to the driver of the white truck in an attempt
to get him to stop. Sergeant Inman assumed the driver was the owner of the
property and was attempting to ask him where the Escalade may be in the
field. However, in spite of Inman’s attempts, the pickup did not stop moving.
Once past Sergeant Inman’s vehicle, the truck took off at a high rate of speed
for the conditions of the one-lane road. By the time Sergeant Inman turned his
vehicle around and gave chase, the white pickup truck was out of sight.
Sergeant Inman radioed Deputy Jones informing him the white pickup
truck was headed in his direction. Lockaby Lane was a single-lane road and
the white pickup truck rapidly reached Deputy Jones’s location. As soon as
the deputy saw the truck, he activated his emergency lights. Deputy Jones
saw the truck crest a hill, accelerate, and continue down the road straight
toward his cruiser. Deputy Jones said the white pickup truck never slowed
down. To avoid a head-on collision, Deputy Jones drove his vehicle almost
completely off the road and into a ditch. The truck left the scene and the driver
was not apprehended that night.
Several days later, the Laurel County Sheriff’s Office got a tip that
Eversole would be at a truck stop in northern Laurel County. Eversole was
arrested on a separate charge and a deputy at the scene sent a picture to
Sergeant Inman, who positively identified Eversole as the driver of the white
pickup truck from Lockaby Lane. Eversole was never charged with any
offenses concerning the stolen Escalade.
At trial, both Sergeant Inman and Deputy Jones testified. Eversole
testified in his own defense. Prior to Eversole taking the stand, a bailiff
informed the trial court a juror needed to speak with the judge. Outside the
presence of the jury and with counsel in the courtroom, but not at the bench
where the discussion was taking place, the juror advised the trial court that an
older man approached her and offered her $50 to change her “jury selection.”
The juror said the man did not indicate if he wanted her to vote guilty or not
guilty—or even the name of the case in which he was interested. The trial
judge thanked the juror for letting him know, sent her to her seat in the jury
box, and resumed the trial. Eversole was not in the courtroom when the
exchange occurred at the bench between the judge and the juror. No follow-up
concerning what the juror reported appears in the record, and no objections or
further inquiries were made.
Eversole moved for a directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth’s
case and the close of all evidence. The trial court overruled those motions. The
court instructed the jury and guilty verdicts were returned on all charges. The
court conducted a joint PFO/penalty phase. The jury found Eversole to be a
first-degree PFO and recommended a twenty-year sentence after the PFO
enhancement.
Additional facts will be developed as necessary.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Ex Parte Conversation with Juror
Eversole claims the trial court erred when it conducted an ex parte
interview with a juror outside his presence. During a lunch break, the juror in
question had spoken with the bailiff and, off the record, the bailiff advised the
trial judge that the juror needed to speak with him. While counsel was present
in the courtroom and some of the jurors were beginning to return to the jury
box, Eversole was not yet present in the courtroom when the trial judge asked
the juror in question to approach the bench. The trial court did not ask
counsel to approach the bench for the conversation. Eversole’s attorney and
the attorney for the Commonwealth remained seated at their respective tables.
There is no indication the attorneys overheard what the juror said or sought to
approach the bench to be included in the interview. The trial court did not call
the attorneys to the bench after speaking with the juror to discuss the contents
of the discussion. There is no indication in the record of what action, if any,
the trial court took regarding the information from the juror.
Juror 262 and the trial court engaged in the following exchange at the
bench:
Judge: You are juror number?
Juror: 262.
Judge 262. And I understand, from the bailiff, that someone
approached you in the parking lot and was on the
sidewalk?
Juror: Yes.
Judge: Where about on the side?
Juror: About halfway down. I had parked on the bottom and
I went halfway down. And he walked past and offered
me $50 to change my juiy selection.
Judge: To change your jury vote?
Juror: (nods) He didn’t say guilty or not guilty or anything
like that. Didn’t mention no names.
Judge: Okay. Can you describe him?
Juror: He’s an older gentleman, had gray hair, gray beard. I
can remember he had a hat and he had on an orange
shirt.
Judge: Orange shirt. How long a gray beard would he have
had? Was it a long beard?
Juror: About here (motions from chin to shirt collar).
Judge: About a six-inch beard. Any other identifying marks?
Juror: I can’t remember if he had a tattoo or not.
Judge: Okay. We appreciate you reporting that and your
juror number again is?
Juror: 262.
Judge: 262. Thank you veiy much. You did exactly what
you’re supposed to do.
Shortly after this bench conference ended, Eversole entered the
courtroom from the side door behind counsel table and sat next to his attorney.
Trial resumed and Eversole was called to the witness stand on his own behalf.
Prior to the jury’s deliberations, one juror was randomly selected as an
alternate and excused. Juror 262 remained on the panel that deliberated and
decided the case. There was no admonition directing the juror not to discuss
the events in question with her fellow jurors and she was not directed that
what happened outside the courtroom should not be part of the jury’s
deliberations.
We carefully searched the record for further discussions about this
conversation between the judge and juror, actions taken in response to this
conversation, or even a further mention of it, but there is nothing else in the
record regarding the ex parte communication between Juror 262 and the trial
court. The above transcript is the entirety of what is contained in the record on
appeal related to this issue. Eversole filed no post-conviction motions for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. From all indications, it
appears that the conversation between the judge and the juror came to light
only during the appellate process (likely when appellate defense counsel
watched the video recording of the trial).
The video record reveals references to three in-chamber conferences that
occurred after the conversation with the juror. These conferences between the
trial court and counsel concerned jury instructions and were not recorded or
otherwise made part of the record. If during any of the three in-chambers
discussions, the trial court told the attorneys what the juror said, there is no
indication of that in the record.
Eversole acknowledges that this claim of error is unpreserved by
contemporaneous objection. However, it is clear from the record that the
Commonwealth, defense counsel, and Eversole were never made aware of the
information provided by the juror. Without that information, we would not
expect to find a timely objection in the record, as Eversole (who was out of the
courtroom at the time) and his counsel (who was present in the courtroom, but
not included in the bench conference with the juror) had no reason to know the
discussion even involved Eversole’s case. As far as Eversole and his counsel
knew, the juror could have been discussing a personal issue with the judge
which may interfere with the trial schedule for the next day.
Eversole was not afforded the opportunity to question the juror to
determine whether her interaction with the man in the parking lot had biased
her for or against either party. Neither party raised or briefed that issue, but
the possibility of juror bias tainting this trial compels our attention. An
impartial jury, free of bias, is critical to a fair trial.
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and
Sections Seven and Eleven of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky guarantee the right to an impartial jury. Structural error occurs
when that right is denied. Hayes v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 574, 586 (Ky.
2005). A denial of an impartial jury would not be subject to harmless error
analysis because that would not be appropriate where a substantial right such
as this is involved. Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Ky. 2007)
(“Harmless error analysis is simply not appropriate where a substantial right is
involved and is indeed logically best suited to the effect of evidence on a verdict,
though some procedural errors may also be reviewed in this light.”) “[T]he
defining feature of a structural error is that it ‘affect[s] the framework within
which the trial proceeds,’ rather than being ‘simply an error in the trial process
itself.’” Commonwealth v. Douglas, 553 S.W.3d 795, 799-800 (Ky. 2018).
Failing to remove a biased juror taints the entire trial. Id. at 800. Here,
Eversole was denied the opportunity to determine whether the juror was biased
as he was neither present nor represented at that critical stage of the trial.3
The trial court had clear indications that what the juror needed to speak
to the court about was more than a run-of-the-mill problem with scheduling or
a sudden inability of a family member to pick up a child after school. Based on
3 We need not determine whether Eversole’s actual presence would have been
necessary in this case. Here, he was neither personally present in the courtroom nor
represented by counsel at the bench conference involving the juror. We will address
this as a deprivation of counsel.
what a court bailiff told the trial judge off the record, the judge had a strong
indication that this juror had something important to tell him. There was no
reason for the trial court to undertake an ex parte conversation with this juror
without counsel’s presence.
If the information from this juror turned out to be inconsequential, time
would not have been wasted having counsel present. However, if what the
juror had to say turned out to be relevant to the case—as it was here—then the
trial court and counsel could have handled it at the bench conference.
Regardless of whether the information ultimately proved insignificant, based on
what it appeared the bailiff related to the trial court, counsel should have been
included in the conversation from the outset. “When an ex parte
communication relates to some aspect of the trial, the trial judge generally
should disclose the communication to counsel for all parties.” Rushen v. Spain,
104 S. Ct. 453, 456 (1983).
The trial court’s failure to take action to include counsel in the colloquy
or provide an admonition to the juror was improper. The juror described being
offered a bribe. This was not an ordinary occurrence. Counsel’s presence in
the courtroom, without knowledge of what was being disclosed during the
bench conference, was insufficient to protect Eversole’s right to a fair trial—as
guaranteed by his rights to representation and right to be present at all critical
stages of trial. “While it goes without saying that an attorney’s actual physical
absence at a critical stage constitutes denial of counsel, it is also true that a
complete denial of counsel may occur when, despite being physically present at
the critical stage, counsel is prevented from providing assistance to the
accused.” Commonwealth v. Tigue, 459 S.W.3d 372, 385 (Ky. 2015). The
result of the trial court’s failure to include counsel in the conversation with the
juror effectively denied Eversole of his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of
counsel.
Because she was denied access to critical information about what the
juror said, Eversole’s counsel could not seek to further question the juror, to
remove the juror by having her selected as the alternate or to have the juror
admonished. Instead, Juror 262 remained on the panel that deliberated, found
Eversole guilty, and recommended the maximum possible sentence. The trial
court’s actions—or, rather, inactions—were unsupported by sound legal
principles.
The improper conversation in the parking lot in which an unknown man
offered the juror a bribe was not a simple inadvertent “hello” outside the
courthouse during a lunch break. Asking the juror to change her vote in
exchange for money, qualified as a Class D felony in violation of KRS 524.060,
bribing a juror. That statute reads: “A person is guilty of bribing a juror when
he offers, confers or agrees to confer any pecuniary benefit upon a juror with
intent to influence the juror’s vote, opinion, decision or other action as a juror.”
At the very least, further inquiry about what effect the offered “bribe”
may have had on the juror was important to Eversole. As it is, we have no way
of knowing if the juror felt that one side or the other was responsible for the
improper communication with her. We have no way to determine if the juror
felt harassed or threatened—or how the interaction may have impacted her
ability to remain unbiased in the case. If Eversole’s counsel had been privy to
the bench conference, then Juror 262 could have been examined concerning
possible bias. At that point, had she been found to be untainted and allowed
to remain on the panel, the trial court could have then admonished her not to
speak with the other jurors about the attempted bribe. However, because the
trial court did not have counsel approach during the bench conference, none of
those safeguards were provided here. And furthermore, no inquiry was made
as to whether any other jurors had been similarly approached.
In Bartley v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.3d 714 (Ky. 2013), we provided
direction on how courts and jurors should handle circumstances in which
jurors hear something they should not. In that case, a nurse testified about
impermissible cigarette bum evidence. Our guidance in that case is helpful
herein: “[t]he jurors were admonished, not to forget what they had heard, but
rather to disregard it, Le., that whatever they thought about the nurse's
cigarette-bum testimony they were to base their decisions solely on other
evidence.” Id. at 736. We noted, “[p]eople disregard what they know or what
they think they know all the time.” Id.
In this case, however, the juror who was offered a bribe was not
admonished to disregard her encounter; nor did the trial court instruct her not
to discuss the attempted bribe with her fellow jurors. We cannot reasonably
expect this juror to forget being offered a bribe; however, as in Bartley a clearly
worded admonition could reasonably be expected to guide the juror, ameliorate
the damage, and maintain a fair trial. Without such an admonition or ability
for counsel to question the juror regarding any potential bias, we cannot know
whether the incident was considered during deliberations either by Juror 262
or any other jurors with whom she may have discussed her encounter. It is
entirely possible that she may have assumed Eversole had something to do
with the attempted bribe and could have been biased against him for that
reason. We cannot determine that, however, as the parties were not afforded
the opportunity to question the juror in this regard.
To be clear, we are not directing trial courts to automatically exclude a
juror whenever an issue such as this arises during trial. We are confident that
trial courts can properly exercise their discretion concerning issues—no matter
their severity—that come up during a trial. However, we are directing judges to
adopt the better practice of making counsel aware of ex parte juror
conversations with the trial court, either by including counsel in the
conversation with a juror from the outset of the conversation or informing
counsel immediately after the conversation occurs.
As we have held, “[t]he test is whether, after having heard all of the
evidence, the prospective juror can conform his views to the requirements of
the law and render a fair and impartial verdict.” Mabe v. Commonwealth, 884
S.W.2d 668, 671 (Ky. 1994). Given the lack of the presence of counsel during
the bench conference and the lack of questions posed by the trial court, the
trial judge had no evidence on which to determine whether the “prospective
juror could conform [her] views to the requirements of the law and render a fair
and impartial verdict.” Id. The trial court should have permitted counsel to
make reasonable requests and motions in response to the information the juror
provided. Herein, the trial court should have conducted further questioning
about potential bias due to the attempted bribe—or allowed counsel to do so.
Trial courts routinely empanel alternate jurors for just such contingencies as
occurred here. Trial courts cannot be expected to prevent all inappropriate
communications with jurors from happening; however, trial courts are
expected to take reasonable steps in response to those communications.
We hold that Eversole was denied representation at a critical stage of his
trial through the trial court’s ex parte discussion with a juror who had been
offered a bribe. This amounted to structural error as it denied him of his right
to an impartial jury. We reverse Eversole’s conviction, vacate the
corresponding sentence, and remand this matter to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
B. Directed Verdict
Eversole asserts the trial court erred when it failed to grant directed
verdict motions for first-degree wanton endangerment and first-degree fleeing
or evading. The issue was preserved by Eversole’s motions for directed verdict
at the close of the Commonwealth’s case and at the close of evidence. After
careful review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the directed verdict motions.
The legal standards for a directed verdict motion are clear: “[i]f under the
evidence as a whole it would not be clearly unreasonable for a juiy to find the
defendant guilty, he is not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.” Trowel v.
Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 530, 533 (Ky. 1977). “The trial court must draw
all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the party
opposing the motion, and a directed verdict should not be given unless the
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The evidence presented must
be accepted as true. The credibility and the weight to be given the testimony
are questions for the jury exclusively.” Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S. W.2d
3, 5 (Ky. 1983). The standard for appellate review is equally clear: “[o]n
appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a
whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a juiy to find guilt, only then the
defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.” Commonwealth v.
Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991).
1. Identity
Eversole’s first claim is the Commonwealth failed to prove he was the
driver of the white pickup truck and, therefore, it should have granted his
motion for directed verdict as to both fleeing or evading and wanton
endangerment. A review of the record reveals the Commonwealth relied
entirely on Sergeant Inman’s identification of Eversole as the driver of the white
pickup truck. Sergeant Inman testified that he was 100% certain Eversole was
the driver he saw when the vehicles were window-to-window on the one-lane
country road.
In deciding a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. As noted above, the
trial court must accept the evidence as true. Id. at 186. The jury may find the
evidence to be otherwise; however, that is solely the jury’s prerogative. In this
case, Eversole’s counsel thoroughly cross-examined Sergeant Inman on
available lighting, time of night, shortness of time to observe, failure to obtain a
truck make, model or, license plate number, and the single-photograph
identification made three days later. The jury could have found reasonable
doubt for all those reasons, but the trial court is required to view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and Sergeant Inman’s
testimony was sufficient to rule on directed verdict motions—and it did so in
this case. The trial court did not err in denying the motion on the basis of the
Commonwealth’s proof that Eversole was the driver of the truck.
2. Fleeing or Evading
Eversole’s next claim is that the trial court erred in denying his motion
for a directed verdict on the fleeing or evading charge.
a. Direction to stop
Included in this argument is his assertion that there was insufficient
proof that Eversole failed to obey a direction to stop his vehicle or that there
was even any proof he was directed to stop. Lacking sufficient evidence of a
direction to stop, Eversole insists the trial court erred in denying his motion for
a directed verdict on the fleeing or evading charge. We will begin with the
fleeing or evading statute in analyzing this claim of error. KRS 520.095 states,
in pertinent part:
(1) A person is guilty of fleeing or evading police in the first degree:
(a) When, while operating a motor vehicle with intent
to elude or flee, the person knowingly or wantonly
disobeys a direction to stop his or her motor
vehicle, given by a person recognized to be a police
officer, and at least one (1) of the following
conditions exists:
4. By fleeing or eluding, the person is the
cause, or creates substantial risk, of
serious physical injury or death to any
person or property; or
Sergeant Inman testified he did not expressly tell the truck driver to stop;
rather, he turned his emergency lights on and off and he pulled over enough
for the pickup truck to pass his cruiser, side-by-side on the one-lane road.
When the pickup truck was even with his cruiser, Sergeant Inman said “hey” in
an attempt to start a conversation with the truck’s driver. However, the driver
did not respond to Inman or stop to hear the rest of the attempted
conversation. The rate of speed he employed on the one-lane country road
while leaving was a clear indication that he knew the officer wanted Eversole to
stop and speak with him—and of Eversole’s intention to disregard the officer’s
attempt to get him to stop. Furthermore, Sergeant Inman was not the only
officer that evening who attempted to stop the white pickup truck.
When the pickup truck encountered Deputy Jones on Lockaby Lane, the
deputy had his emergency lights on and his cruiser blocking the single-lane
road. Addressing a vehicle approaching a cruiser or other emergency vehicle
sitting in such a posture, KRS 189.930 provides in pertinent part:
(5) Upon approaching a stationary emergency vehicle or
public safety vehicle, when the emergency vehicle or public
safety vehicle is giving a signal by displaying alternately
flashing yellow, red, red and white, red and blue, or
blue lights, a person who drives an approaching vehicle
shall, while proceeding with due caution:
(a) Yield the right-of-way by moving to a lane not adjacent to
that of the authorized emergency vehicle, if:
1. The person is driving on a highway having at least four (4)
lanes with not fewer than two (2) lanes proceeding in the
same direction as the approaching vehicle; and
2. If it is possible to make the lane change with due regard
to safety and traffic conditions; or
(b) Reduce the speed of the vehicle, maintaining a safe speed
to road conditions, if changing lanes would be impossible or
unsafe.
Here, since changing lanes was impossible on a single-lane road,
pursuant to KRS 189.930, the driver of the truck should have reduced his
speed, maintaining a safe speed for a one-lane road in the dark. However, the
driver did no such thing. Once the deputy saw the white pickup truck was not
going to stop or even slow down (and was, indeed, accelerating), he was forced
to drive his cruiser out of the way and into a ditch to avoid a head-on collision.
It is reasonable inference that Deputy Jones obviously wanted the pickup truck
to stop—and “maintaining a safe speed” pursuant to KRS 189.930 would have
included Eversole stopping the truck completely once he neared the cruiser
which was blocking the road with emergency lights activated.
We have previously said about reasonable inferences:
An inference is the act performed by the jury of inferring or
reaching a conclusion from facts or premises in a logical manner
so as to reach a conclusion. A reasonable inference is one in
accordance with reason or sound thinking and within the bounds
of common sense without regard to extremes or excess. It is a
process of reasoning by which a proposition is deduced as a logical
consequence from other facts already proven.
Martin v. Commonwealth, 13 S.W.3d 232, 235 (Ky. 1999).
A reasonable inference that can be drawn from a police cruiser blocking
a single-lane road with its emergency lights on is that approaching vehicles
should stop—not proceed at an unsafe speed for the roadway and conditions,
and even accelerate head-long into the stopped emergency vehicle. The logical
consequence of these facts was a visible, non-verbal direction to approaching
drivers to stop their vehicles.
b. Substantial risk of injury or death
Eversole also asserts that the proof was insufficient as to the element of
the fleeing or evading charge requiring the jury to find a substantial risk of
injury or death. In his brief, Eversole points to other cases where the risk and
actual injuries were severe and, by implication, the risk in this case paled in
comparison. While Sergeant Inman may have not been placed at a substantial
risk of serious physical injury or death (as Eversole passed him at a low rate of
speed, only speeding up once he had passed Inman’s cruiser) the same is not
true of the risk created toward Deputy Jones. Jones had to move his cruiser
almost completely off the road and into a ditch because the one-lane country
road was too narrow for two cars to pass.
Deputy Jones testified that he saw the white pickup truck crest a hill
and accelerate toward him at an estimated speed of 40-45 miles per hour. The
truck never swerved or veered and kept heading straight toward his cruiser,
forcing Deputy Jones to drive out of the way and into a ditch. Due to a height
differential between the pickup truck and his cruiser, Deputy Jones was
concerned that if there were a collision, the truck would come over the top of
his car’s hood and straight into the cab of his cruiser. In his testimony,
Deputy Jones expressed concern over the outcome of that collision and his
chances of surviving it. The fleeing or evading statute does not require risk to
multiple persons or even actual injuiy. The risk of death or serious physical
injury to Deputy Jones was substantial and sufficient to survive the motion for
directed verdict.
Eversole argues that the Commonwealth’s proof was insufficient to
support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The two officers’
testimony was relatively short in length, but clear as to what happened on
Lockaby Lane. Both officers readily acknowledged the gaps in the investigation
including not being able to determine the make and model of the truck or the
license plate number. However, those shortcomings do not mean the juiy
could not find proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
“Our courts have long held that a jury is free to believe the testimony of
one witness over the testimony of others.” Minter v. Commonwealth, 415
S.W.3d 614, 618 (Ky. 2013). “The testimony of a single witness is enough to
support a conviction.” Id. at 618 (citing Gerlaugh v. Commonwealth, 156
S.W.3d 747, 758 (Ky. 2005)). Further, “(t]he testimony of even a single witness
is sufficient to support a finding of guilt, even when other witnesses testified to
the contrary if, after consideration of all of the evidence, the finder of fact
assigns greater weight to that evidence.” Commonwealth v. Suttles, 80 S.W.3d
424, 426 (Ky. 2002).
Under the evidence presented it would not “be clearly unreasonable for a
jury to find guilt.” Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187. Therefore, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in its denial of Eversole’s motions for directed verdict.
3. Wanton Endangerment
Eversole also argues the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for
a directed verdict as to wanton endangerment. KRS 508.060(1) provides: “A
person is guilty of wanton endangerment in the first degree when, under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life,
he wantonly engages in conduct which creates a substantial danger of death or
serious physical injury to another person.”
Eversole argues that there was insufficient evidence that his behavior
occurred under “circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life.” However, we disagree. As noted in the previous subsection,
Deputy Jones testified that Eversole drove a truck which sat high enough to
come into the cab of his cruiser at a speed around 40-45 miles per hour.
Jones said Eversole was accelerating as he approached his cruiser, which was
blocking the road and had its emergency lights activated. Just as his conduct
created a substantial risk of serious physical injury or death to support the
fleeing or evading charge, it created “substantial danger of death or serious
physical injury” as to the wanton endangerment charge. Furthermore, we have
“held that whether wanton conduct demonstrates extreme indifference to
human life is a question to be decided by the trier of fact.” Brown v.
Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 922, 924 (Ky. 1998).
We hold that there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to submit
this issue to the jury. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying
Eversole’s motion for a directed verdict.
C. Unanimous Verdict, Uncharged Prior Bad-Acts Evidence and Penalty-
Phase Jury Instructions
Because we are reversing on other grounds, we will not address
Eversole’s remaining issues. A court must instruct the jury based on the
evidence presented in the case before it. We will not speculate as to what that
evidence will be on remand, and, therefore, will not decide these issues today.
III. CONCLUSION
After careful review of the issues presented, we reverse Eversole’s
convictions, vacate their corresponding sentences, and remand to the trial
court for further proceedings consisted with this opinion.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Shannon Renee Dupree
Assistant Public Advocate
Jared Travis Bewley
Assistant Public Advocate
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel Jay Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky
Kristin Leigh Conder
Assistant Attorney General