Michelle Walcott Coffey v. Bradley Dwight Coffey, Jr. ( 2022 )

RENDERED: JANUARY 7, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2021-CA-0319-MR
MICHELLE WALCOTT COFFEY APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WAYNE CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JENNIFER UPCHURCH EDWARDS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 19-CI-00020
BRADLEY DWIGHT COFFEY, JR. APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: COMBS, DIXON, AND MAZE, JUDGES.
DIXON, JUDGE: Michelle Walcott Coffey appeals from the findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and judgment following a decree of dissolution of marriage
entered on May 1, 2020, and an order denying her motion to alter, amend, or
vacate same entered on February 23, 2021, by the Wayne Circuit Court. Following
careful review of the record, briefs, and law, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Michelle Walcott Coffey and Bradley Dwight Coffey, Jr., were
married on May 17, 2014. Shortly after the marriage, Bradley withdrew $49,500
from his retirement account, which he deposited into his checking account. He
used more than the $49,500 from that checking account to: (1) purchase land on
which to build a house for the couple, (2) purchase household furnishings, and (3)
apply toward construction of the house. On July 16, 2014, the couple purchased
seven acres of land from Bradley’s family on which they built their house and
tended cattle. The couple obtained a real estate mortgage for $140,000 to finance
the home. They also purchased cattle,1 a hay tedder, a cattle handling facility, a
creep feeder, a grain bin, a disc mower, and a 2014 Dodge Ram truck.
On or about January 22, 2019, less than five years into their marriage,
the couple separated. On January 25, 2019, Michelle petitioned the court for
dissolution of the parties’ marriage. After the parties exchanged discovery and
attended an unsuccessful mediation, a final hearing was held on December 18,
2019, at which the parties testified as to their valuations of marital and nonmarital
property. The trial court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
judgment on May 1, 2020, classifying the parties’ marital and nonmarital property
1
Bradley had cattle prior to the marriage; however, neither party knew exactly how many.
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and dividing it between the parties. Michelle moved the court to alter, amend, or
vacate its order, but her motion was denied. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On review, “we defer to the trial court’s factual findings, upsetting
them only if clearly erroneous or if unsupported by substantial evidence, but we
review without deference the trial court’s identification and application of legal
principles.” Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 340 (Ky.
App. 2001). “Substantial evidence has been conclusively defined by Kentucky
courts as that which, when taken alone or in light of all the evidence, has sufficient
probative value to induce conviction in the mind of a reasonable person.” Bowling
v. Nat. Res. & Env’t. Prot. Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Ky. App. 1994).
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Michelle first argues the court erred in its valuation of
nonmarital funds contributed by Bradley to the construction of the marital
residence, asserting that Bradley contributed only $22,000 in nonmarital funds
toward the home.
It is well-established that when an item of property consists of both
nonmarital and marital components, the trial court “must determine the parties’
separate nonmarital and marital shares or interests in the property on the basis of
the evidence before the court.” Travis v. Travis, 59 S.W.3d 904, 909 (Ky. 2001).
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Further, “Kentucky courts have typically applied the ‘source of funds’ rule to
characterize property or to determine parties’ nonmarital and marital interests in
such property.” Id. (footnote omitted).
At the final hearing, Bradley testified that he withdrew $49,500 from
his retirement account and deposited the funds into his checking account. He
further testified that he later used funds from his checking account to pay for land,
household items, and construction expenses for the parties’ marital residence. This
was supported by bank statements showing the deposit and copies of the checks
demonstrating funds were used for said expenses. Two of these checks were
written specifically and solely for payments toward the home in the amounts of
$35,200 and $25,000. Thus, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred or abused
its discretion in tracing $49,500 of Bradley’s nonmarital funds and assigning same
as his nonmarital interest in the house.
Michelle further maintains the trial court erred in determining the
value of the marital residence. Bradley produced a receipt for payment of the 2019
property tax bill in which the assessed value of the real estate was listed as
$130,000. Bradley also produced a copy of the 2019 assessment from the Property
Valuation Administrator which valued the residence at $130,000. Bradley testified
that he believed that was a fair and accurate reflection of the value of the property
given its remote location. Michelle, however, claims the property is worth
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$170,000 because the parties borrowed $140,000 for its construction and paid
$5,784 for the land, and she contends Bradley contributed $22,000 toward
construction of the residence.2
The trial court determined Bradley’s valuation was too low and the
valuation proffered by Michelle was too high. Accordingly, the court assigned the
value of the property at the amount of the original mortgage because there was no
evidence of any significant appreciation or depreciation since that time. Contrary
to Michelle’s assertions, we cannot say the court’s determination and valuation of
the residence was arbitrary as it was supported by substantial evidence, namely the
mortgage.
Michelle also contends the court erred in determining the number of
cattle considered marital property. She claims all cattle should have been deemed
marital property because the parties’ testimony on the issue at the hearing was
vague. However, based on the testimony, as well as the records presented to the
court regarding purchase of cattle during the marriage, the trial court found that 21
cattle and one bull were marital property. Even so, the court ordered all cattle and
the bull sold and the proceeds applied to the parties’ indebtedness. After reviewing
the record, we fail to find clear error or abuse of the court’s discretion on this issue
2
The sum of these figures totals $167,784; thus, it is clear Michelle rounded up to arrive at her
valuation of the residence.
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because its determination of the number of cattle deemed to be marital property
was supported by substantial evidence, and its order that all cattle and the bull be
sold to pay the parties’ debt was not arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported
by sound legal principles. See Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945
(Ky. 1999).
Michelle’s final argument is the trial court abused its discretion in its
division of marital property. “[A] trial court has wide discretion in dividing
marital property; and we may not disturb the trial court’s rulings on property-
division issues unless the trial court has abused its discretion.” Smith v. Smith, 235
S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky. App. 2006), as modified (Feb. 10, 2006). KRS3 403.190 governs
the division of property in dissolution of marriage actions. Michelle acknowledges
that the trial court was simply required to divide the parties’ property in just
proportions, considering the factors enumerated by statute, and not necessarily in
equal proportions.
The trial court followed KRS 403.190(4) concerning the parties’
retirement accounts. In pertinent part, that subsection provides that, “If the
retirement benefits of one spouse are excepted from classification as marital
property, or not considered as an economic circumstance during the division of
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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marital property, then the retirement benefits of the other spouse shall also be
excepted, or not considered, as the case may be.”4
The trial court allowed the parties to retain the furniture each had in
his or her possession, which appears to be fair and just under the circumstances.
The trial court awarded Bradley the marital residence valued at $140,000, giving
him credit for his $49,500 nonmarital interest in same, but also acknowledging the
property was encumbered by a mortgage of approximately $98,428.59 at the time
of the final hearing, and that any remaining debt associated therewith was to be
fully assumed by Bradley. In addition, the trial court awarded Bradley the farm
equipment, most of which was also encumbered by debts against it. The cattle and
2014 Dodge Ram truck were ordered to be sold to cover their indebtedness. The
court did not require that Bradley reimburse Michelle for receipt of their 2018
income tax refund in the amount of $12,000 as he used those funds to pay marital
indebtedness, nor was Michelle required to reimburse Bradley for his payment of
4
Michelle made an unsupported statement in her brief that the trial court did not consider the
great disparity between the retirement accounts of the parties and a listing of those accounts.
However, she failed to make any argument as to the result or how the trial court had erred in this
regard. We will not search the record to construct Michelle’s argument for her, nor will we go
on a fishing expedition to find support for her underdeveloped arguments. “Even when briefs
have been filed, a reviewing court will generally confine itself to errors pointed out in the briefs
and will not search the record for errors.” Milby v. Mears, 580 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Ky. App.
1979). Michelle concedes in her reply brief this alleged error is insufficient to merit reversal.
Reply Brief at pg. 3.
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her health and dental insurance premiums since the separation of $4,792 and $503,
respectively.
Based on the foregoing division of property, it is unclear how the
record could support Michelle’s contention that the judgment of the trial court “is
extremely unfair[.]” It appears that neither party is substantially better or worse off
than prior to the marriage. The division of property was not arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. See English, 993
S.W.2d at 945. Accordingly, and for the reasons previously discussed, we further
disagree with Michelle’s claim that “it is crystal clear that the trial court abused its
discretion.”
CONCLUSION
Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the orders entered by the
Wayne Circuit Court are AFFIRMED.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James M. Frazer Travis W. Bell
Monticello, Kentucky Monticello, Kentucky
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