Frances Jane Embry v. Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-6 U.S. Bank National Association, as Indenture Trustee ( 2022 )


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  •                  RENDERED: FEBRUARY 11, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    Commonwealth of Kentucky
    Court of Appeals
    NO. 2021-CA-0493-MR
    FRANCES JANE EMBRY AND
    BOBBY R. EMBRY                                                          APPELLANTS
    APPEAL FROM LARUE CIRCUIT COURT
    v.            HONORABLE JOSEPH GUINAN BALLARD, JUDGE
    ACTION NO. 18-CI-00104
    TOWD POINT MORTGAGE TRUST
    2015-6 U.S. BANK NATIONAL
    ASSOCIATION, AS INDENTURE
    TRUSTEE                                                                    APPELLEE
    OPINION
    AFFIRMING
    ** ** ** ** **
    BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS AND JONES, JUDGES.
    COMBS, JUDGE: Bobby R. Embry and Frances Jane Embry, his wife, appeal
    from the summary judgment and order of sale granted by the LaRue Circuit Court
    in a foreclosure action brought by Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-6, U.S. Bank
    N.A. as Indenture Trustee (“Towd Point”). The Embrys argue that Towd Point
    failed to establish its standing as the real party in interest capable of bringing an
    action on the note seeking foreclosure on the property. They also challenge the
    sufficiency of the affidavits provided by Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., Towd
    Point’s servicing agent for the loan. After our review, we affirm.
    On September 7, 2007, Bobby Embry executed a note in the amount
    of $91,500.00 to Select Mortgage Group Ltd. The note was secured by real
    property located at 400 Mill Road in Magnolia, Kentucky. Later, the mortgage,
    executed by both Bobby and Frances Embry, was assigned to Towd Point. On
    November 1, 2017, with the note in default, the Embrys entered into a loan
    modification agreement with Towd Point.
    On June 25, 2018, Towd Point filed this in rem action claiming that
    the note remained in default. It sought to foreclose its mortgage lien. Towd Point
    attached a copy of the original note and the various assignments of the mortgage to
    its complaint.
    The Embrys answered and contended that Towd Point had failed to
    prove “by credible documentation” that it possessed the original note. They also
    challenged the amount owed, but they failed to provide any basis for their
    conclusion that the calculations were erroneous.
    On December 4, 2018, Towd Point filed a motion for summary
    judgment. It filed a memorandum in support of the motion and attached several
    exhibits: (1) a copy of the original note executed by Bobby Embry to Select
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    Mortgage Group, Ltd., and an allonge; (2) an assignment of the mortgage to Towd
    Point, dated January 23, 2017; and (3) an affidavit from Towd Point’s servicing
    agent, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (“SPS”), stating that information of the prior
    servicer had been integrated accurately into the business records of SPS and setting
    out the amounts of the unpaid balance and accrued interest. Towd Point argued
    that there were no genuine issues of material fact concerning the Embrys’ breach
    of the note’s provisions, the amounts owed, or its right to foreclosure.
    In response, the Embrys filed a motion to stay the proceedings while
    they attempted to negotiate another loan modification agreement. The motion for
    summary judgment was rescheduled for a hearing on April 1, 2019, and then again
    on April 15, 2019. The motion was finally heard on June 17, 2019. However, on
    July 25, 2019, Towd Point withdrew its motion for summary judgment because a
    loss mitigation plan had been established for the Embrys.
    Thereafter, on December 27, 2019, Towd Point filed an amended
    motion for summary judgment. It explained that the Embrys had breached the
    terms of the parties’ recent loan modification agreement. The matter was
    scheduled to be heard on February 3, 2020; March 2, 2020; March 16, 2020; and
    April 20, 2020. On April 14, 2020, Towd Point again withdrew its motion for
    summary judgment on the basis that it was attempting to negotiate a new payment
    plan with the Embrys.
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    On March 5, 2021, Towd Point filed a second amended motion for
    summary judgment. It filed SPS’s affidavit recapitulating the methods by which
    its calculations were maintained and updating the amounts owed.
    On April 5, 2021, the Embrys filed their response to the motion for
    summary judgment. The Embrys argued that Towd Point had not shown that it
    was the real party in interest by producing the original note. They also challenged
    the sufficiency of the affidavits filed with the motion for summary judgment.
    Towd Point filed a reply. It explained that the original note had been
    negotiated by Select Mortgage Group Ltd., to CitiMortgage, Inc., and that
    CitiMortgage, Inc., had thereafter endorsed the note in blank. Counsel represented
    that Towd Point was in possession of the original note -- now bearer paper -- and
    that it would be available for inspection by the court and the Embrys’ counsel.
    Following a hearing, the LaRue Circuit Court concluded that Towd Point was
    entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment and an order of sale
    were entered April 7, 2021. This appeal followed.
    On appeal, the Embrys argue that the circuit court erred by granting
    summary judgment because Towd Point failed to show that it is the real party in
    interest. They argue that Towd Point was required to produce the original note to
    establish its standing to pursue the litigation. They also contend that the affidavit
    of SPS was inadequate to support the judgment because it refers to payment
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    information that was merely “integrated” into the business records of SPS. They
    argue that the affidavit: failed to claim that Towd Point possesses the note; failed
    to verify the servicing agent’s calculations; and failed to itemize the advances that
    Towd Point claimed had been made to the Embrys.
    Summary judgment is properly granted where
    the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
    stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the
    affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
    any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
    judgment as a matter of law.
    CR1 56.03.
    On appellate review, we must consider whether the circuit court
    correctly determined that Towd Point was the real party in interest and that there
    were no genuine issues of material fact concerning its right to foreclose the
    mortgage lien. See Scifres v. Kraft, 
    916 S.W.2d 779
     (Ky. App. 1996). Because
    summary judgment involves only questions of law and not the resolution of
    disputed material facts, we do not defer to the trial court’s decision. Goldsmith v.
    Allied Building Components, Inc., 
    833 S.W.2d 378
     (Ky. 1992). Instead, we review
    the trial court’s interpretations of law de novo. Cumberland Valley Contrs., Inc. v.
    Bell County Coal Corp., 
    238 S.W.3d 644
     (Ky. 2007).
    1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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    The Embrys contend that the circuit court erred by concluding that
    Towd Point was the real party in interest entitled to foreclose on the mortgage. We
    disagree.
    Kentucky’s rules of civil procedure provide that an action must be
    prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. CR 17.01. In foreclosure
    actions, the real party in interest is the current holder of the note and mortgage.
    Acuff v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 
    460 S.W.3d 335
     (Ky. App. 2014). KRS2 355.1-
    201(2)(u)1. defines a “holder” as “[t]he person in possession of a negotiable
    instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the
    person in possession[.]” When a note is endorsed in blank, it becomes a bearer
    instrument. See Caruth v. Thompson, 
    55 Ky. 572
    , 575, 
    16 B. Mon. 572
     (1856) (a
    blank endorsement enables the holder of a note to negotiate, collect, or transfer it
    to another by mere delivery). If a negotiable instrument is payable to bearer, it
    may be negotiated by transfer of possession of the instrument alone. KRS 355.3-
    201. Lawful possession of the note is sufficient to entitle the holder to enforce the
    obligation secured by it. Stevenson v. Bank of America, 
    359 S.W.3d 466
     (Ky. App.
    2011).
    The record reflects that CitiMortgage endorsed the original note in
    blank, converting it to bearer paper. Towd Point asserts that it is the holder of the
    2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.
    -6-
    note and in lawful possession of it. It attached copies of all relevant documents to
    its complaint and to its several motions for summary judgment. Counsel offered to
    produce the original note. The Embrys never challenged the authenticity of the
    documents produced by Towd Point; they never alleged that the note or mortgage
    had been acquired unlawfully; and they never asked to inspect the original note.
    Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that Towd Point failed to establish
    adequately that it was lawfully in possession of the note when it brought the
    foreclosure action. Moreover, the assignment of the mortgage to Towd Point was
    additional proof that it was the holder of the note. Consequently, there was
    sufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s conclusion that Towd Point was
    the real party in interest with standing to bring the foreclosure action.
    Next, the Embrys challenge the sufficiency of the affidavits submitted
    by Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., Towd Point’s servicing agent for the loan.
    Summary judgment may be granted on the basis of affidavits alone. Critser v.
    Critser, 
    591 S.W.3d 846
     (Ky. App. 2019). “If ‘uncontroverted affidavits fairly
    disclosing the facts show that a genuine issue does not exist,’ the opposing party
    must produce at least some evidence that amounts to more than mere allegations in
    order to survive summary judgment.” Id. at 850 (quoting Hill v. Fiscal Court of
    Warren County, 
    429 S.W.2d 419
    , 423 (Ky. 1968)). A party opposing a properly
    supported motion for summary judgment must present some “affirmative evidence
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    demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of material fact[.]” Hubble v. Johnson,
    
    841 S.W.2d 169
    , 171 (Ky. 1992) (citing Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center,
    Inc., 
    807 S.W.2d 476
     (Ky. 1991)).
    In its affidavits, SPS included statements attesting to the accuracy of
    its records and an accounting of the amounts due. The attachments to the affidavits
    included: copies of hundreds of pages of loan history; advance calculations; loan
    status reports; foreclosure reports; a bailee agreement from Select Mortgage
    Group, Ltd., to CitiMortgage delivering the original note; an endorsement of the
    note by CitiMortgage in blank; and a bailee agreement from SPS to counsel
    conveying the original assignment.
    Despite a period of written discovery, the Embrys made no showing
    that the sworn statements of SPS were untrue or inaccurate. In the absence of
    countervailing proof or any reason whatsoever to believe that SPS’s records,
    statements, or calculations were untrustworthy, the submitted affidavits were
    sufficient evidence to support the motion for summary judgment.
    Because there were no genuine issues of material fact, the circuit
    court properly granted summary judgment and ordered a sale of the real property.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and order of the LaRue Circuit Court.
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    ALL CONCUR.
    BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
    Robert Frederick Smith    Sarah S. Mattingly
    Prospect, Kentucky        K. Cassandra Carter
    Louisville, Kentucky
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