Ronald Jones v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2022 )

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 25, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-1146-MR
RONALD JONES APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE ERNESTO M. SCORSONE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 18-CR-00471
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT, McNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: Ronald Jones appeals from an August 26, 2020, Final
Judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court which, in conformity with Jones’
conditional guilty plea, convicted him of various drug-related offenses1 and
1
Specifically, Ronald Jones was convicted of violating Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
527.040 (possession of firearm by convicted felon); KRS 218A.1430 (trafficking in synthetic
drugs, first offense); and KRS 532.080 (persistent felony offender, first degree).
sentenced him to ten-years’ imprisonment, probated for five years. Prior to
entering his conditional guilty plea, Jones moved to suppress evidence discovered
at his residence by Lexington Metro Police Department (LMPD) officers and
Probation and Parole officers through a warrantless search. The court conducted
an evidentiary hearing and the motion was denied by order entered August 5, 2019.
The circuit court’s denial of Jones’ motion to suppress is the sole issue before this
Court on appeal. For the reasons stated, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
The relevant facts to this appeal are as follow. In February of 2018,
an LMPD officer was investigating complaints that synthetic drugs were being sold
at a hospital parking lot. During the officer’s surveillance, a vehicle being driven
by Jones was identified by the officer in the parking lot. Jones was on parole at
this time from a previous conviction. Upon receiving information from an
informant about potential drug activity by Jones, the officer subsequently contacted
Jones’ parole officer. The parole officer then scheduled a home visit and search
which was conducted by two other parole officers, who were accompanied by
LMPD officers. A search of Jones’ residence produced synthetic drugs hidden in a
refrigerator along with a firearm. Upon being charged with trafficking in synthetic
drugs, persistent felony offender in the first degree, and possession of a handgun
by a convicted felon, Jones entered into his conditional plea. This appeal followed.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court’s standard of review of a circuit court’s denial of a motion
to suppress requires a two-step analysis. First, the circuit court’s factual findings
are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Milam v. Commonwealth, 483
S.W.3d 347, 349 (Ky. 2015). Second, the court’s application of the law to those
facts is reviewed de novo. Simpson v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Ky.
2015). Our review proceeds accordingly.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Jones asserts: (1) Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and the Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution, the
law enforcement officials who conducted the search of his home were required, as
a prerequisite, to have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; (2) in his view, no
such reasonable suspicion existed; and therefore (3) the circuit court should have
granted his motion and excluded the evidence gleaned from the search of his
residence.
As a general rule, the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Section 10 of Kentucky’s Constitution provide protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and evidence obtained in a search violative of
those provisions is not admissible in court. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 625 S.W.3d
252, 255 (Ky. App. 2021).
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However, as the circuit court observed in its order denying Jones’
motion to suppress, that rule has no application in this case due to Jones’ status as a
parolee. As our Supreme Court further explained in Bratcher v. Commonwealth,
424 S.W.3d 411, 415 (Ky. 2014),
Under the Fourth Amendment analysis set forth in
Samson [v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 126 S. Ct. 2193,
165 L. Ed. 2d 250 (2006)], it is immaterial whether the
information available to the officers who searched
Appellant’s residence rose to the standard of reasonable
suspicion. The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a
police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a
parolee. Samson, 547 U.S. at 857, 126 S. Ct. 2193.
Without a constitutional right underpinning his motion to
suppress, Appellant has no basis for application of the
exclusionary rule. Copley v. Commonwealth, 361
S.W.3d 902, 905 (Ky. 2012) (“Suppression of evidence
pursuant to the exclusionary rule applies only to searches
that were carried out in violation of an individual’s
constitutional rights.”).
In response, Jones argues Bratcher is contrary to the law and should
be overturned, noting that a federal judge in Jones v. Lafferty, 173 F.Supp.3d 493(E.D. Ky. 2016), disagreed with Bratcher, stating:
Lafferty relies upon the Kentucky Supreme Court’s
statement that “the Fourth Amendment presents no
impediment against a warrantless and suspicionless
search of a person on parole.” Bratcher, 424 S.W.3d at
415. With due respect to our sister court, that conclusion
misapprehends the holdings and the reasoning of the
Supreme Court precedent upon which it relies.
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Jones, 173 F.Supp.3d at 496-97.2
Nevertheless, “[a]s an intermediate appellate court, this Court is
bound by published decisions of the Kentucky Supreme Court. SCR [Supreme
Court Rule] 1.030(8)(a). The Court of Appeals cannot overrule the established
precedent set by the Supreme Court[.]” See Kindred Healthcare, Inc. v. Henson,
481 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Ky. App. 2014). As Bratcher, 424 S.W.3d 411, remains the
law in Kentucky, we are duty bound to follow it. Having no authority to overrule
Kentucky Supreme Court precedent, Jones’ arguments have no merit before this
Court.
Based on our review, the circuit court’s findings of fact are supported
by substantial evidence in the record, and we find no error in the court’s ruling
thereon. The Final Judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kayla D. Deatherage Daniel Cameron
Assistant Public Advocate Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
Thomas A. Van De Rostyne
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
2
However, in Unites States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001), the United States Supreme
Court held that “[w]hen an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search
condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is
occurring that an intrusion on the probationer’s significantly diminished privacy interests is
reasonable.” The search in this case clearly meets this constitutional guideline.
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