Thomas Leonard v. American Alternative Insurance Company ( 2021 )

RENDERED: AUGUST 20, 2021; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-0950-MR
THOMAS LEONARD APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE TIMOTHY KALTENBACH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 20-CI-00255
AMERICAN ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE COMPANY APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: MAZE, TAYLOR, AND K. THOMPSON, JUDGES.
MAZE, JUDGE: Appellant, Thomas Leonard, appeals from the McCracken
Circuit Court order dismissing his claim. Following a careful review, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 10, 2018, Leonard suffered an allergic reaction to chicken he
ate at an O’Charley’s restaurant. An ambulance operated by Mercy Regional
Emergency Medical Systems, LLC took Leonard to the hospital. However, the
ambulance transported Leonard in a non-emergent fashion, which means it did not
use its flashing lights or sirens and followed standard traffic rules and regulations.
Upon arriving at the hospital, medical personnel treated Leonard for anaphylaxis.
The emergency room doctor opined that the ambulance transporting Leonard non-
emergently “led to more deterioration” of Leonard’s condition.
Over one year later, on March 15, 2019, Leonard filed suit against
Mercy Regional for negligently transporting him to the hospital in a non-emergent
fashion, which contributed to his injuries. Mercy Regional moved for summary
judgment claiming Leonard’s suit was barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
While Mercy Regional’s motion for summary judgment was pending, Leonard
filed a separate lawsuit against Mercy Regional’s insurer and Appellee, American
Alternative Insurance Company (AAIC) for basic reparations insurance benefits.
The circuit court subsequently granted Mercy Regional’s motion for summary
judgment, which is currently on appeal to this Court in No. 2020-CA-0722.
In his lawsuit against AAIC, Leonard claims that the emergency
medical personnel “carelessly and negligently operated the vehicle in such a
manner that resulted in life-threatening injuries” to him. Leonard sought basic
reparation benefits from AAIC under the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA)
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KRS1 304.39. Thereafter, AAIC moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim
because the MVRA did not apply to it in this case and, even if it did, Leonard’s
claims were time-barred.
After hearing oral arguments, the circuit court granted AAIC’s motion
to dismiss. The court reasoned that Leonard’s claim was not within the purview of
the MVRA because it is intended for motor vehicle accident victims, and even if
Leonard did have a claim under MVRA, it was barred by KRS 304.39-230(1).
This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court should only grant a motion to dismiss if “it appears the
pleading party would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be
proved in support of his claim.” Benningfield v. Petit Envtl., Inc., 183 S.W.3d 567,
570 (Ky. App. 2005) (citation omitted). “Since a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted is a pure question of law, a
reviewing court owes no deference to the trial court’s determination; instead, an
appellate court reviews the issue de novo.” Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky.
2010).
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Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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ANALYSIS
I. The MVRA does not apply.
KRS 304.39-030(1) provides that, “[i]f the accident causing injury
occurs in this Commonwealth every person suffering loss from injury arising
out of maintenance or use of a motor vehicle has a right to basic reparation
benefits” under the MVRA. In interpreting the MVRA, the Kentucky Supreme
Court provides that its specific objective is “to insure continuous liability
insurance coverage in order to protect the victims of motor vehicle accidents
and to insure that one who suffers a loss as the result of an automobile accident
would have a source and means of recovery.” Mitchell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 244
S.W.3d 59, 63 (Ky. 2008) (emphasis added). Moreover, in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company v. Rains, 715 S.W.2d 232, 233 (Ky. 1986), the
Supreme Court held that the MVRA only applies if: (1) the injured persons
were motor vehicle accident victims, and (2) their injuries arose out of the use
of a motor vehicle.
In this case, Leonard alleges that his allergic reaction was exacerbated
by Mercy Regional’s non-emergent transportation of him to the hospital, and
thus, his alleged injury falls under the purview of the MVRA. He was not in a
motor vehicle accident while in the ambulance. And, his injury did not arise
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out of the use of a motor vehicle. Accordingly, the MVRA does not apply to
the facts of this case.
II. The MVRA’s statute of limitations does not apply to this case.
Leonard also argues that the two-year statute of limitations under the
MVRA applies to his case. However, the circuit court did not dismiss Leonard’s
case based on the statute of limitations. Instead, the circuit court held that Leonard
did not have a claim for basic reparations benefits under the MVRA, so the two-
year limitation period under KRS 304.39-230(1) was not a basis for dismissing his
complaint. As we have held that the MVRA did not apply, Leonard’s argument
that the statute of limitations under the MVRA applies is moot. See Interlock
Indus., Inc. v. Rawlings, 358 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Ky. 2011) (holding “an action must
first fall under the MVRA before the statute of limitations based on [basic
reparation benefits] can apply.”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the
McCracken Circuit Court dismissing the complaint.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David V. Oakes Emily L. Startsman
Paducah, Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky
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