Shelley Mattingly v. Jewish Hospital and St. Mary's Healthcare, Inc. D/B/A Frazier Rehab ( 2023 )

RENDERED: JANUARY 6, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2021-CA-1353-MR
SHELLY MATTINGLY APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE ANNIE O’CONNELL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 19-CI-006069
JEWISH HOSPITAL AND ST. MARY’S
HEALTHCARE, INC., d/b/a FRAZIER
REHAB; AND LYNN CORYELL, PT, DPT APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: GOODWINE, MAZE, AND K. THOMPSON, JUDGES.1
MAZE, JUDGE: Shelly Mattingly (Mattingly) appeals from the September 21,
2021, order of the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing her complaint. Following a
1
Judge Irv Maze authored this Opinion prior to his retirement from the Court of Appeals. Judge
Kelly Thompson concurred in part and dissented in part in this Opinion before his tenure with
the Kentucky Court of Appeals expired on December 31, 2022. Release of this Opinion was
delayed by administrative handling.
thorough review of the record, briefs, and law, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In her complaint filed October 1, 2019, Mattingly asserted claims
against Jewish Hospital and St. Mary’s Healthcare, Inc., d/b/a Frazier Rehab
(Frazier), and Lynn Coryell, PT, DPT (Coryell) for negligent treatment of
Mattingly by Coryell while the latter was employed as a physical therapist at
Frazier. Pursuant to CR2 12.02, Coryell and Frazier moved the trial court to
dismiss the complaint based on Mattingly’s failure to comply with KRS3 411.167
(“certificate of merit statute”). The issue was fully briefed, and her complaint was
dismissed. Mattingly’s subsequent motion to alter, amend, or vacate was denied
by order entered October 21, 2021.
On appeal, Mattingly argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her
complaint because the certificate of merit statute does not apply to physical
therapists such as Coryell nor does it apply to her as an employee of Frazier. It is
also Mattingly’s position that the statute is inapplicable to vicarious liability claims
against Frazier. Finally, she asserts that the certificate of merit statute only applies
to pro se plaintiffs. Alternatively, she argues that even if the statute does apply,
she has complied with its provisions by inserting in Paragraph VII of her
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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complaint, her counsel’s “declaration” that her “action is meritorious although the
negligence involved in this case likely does not require expert testimony.”
As an initial matter, the Court notes that slightly different arguments
were presented to the trial court. In her response to the motion to dismiss filed by
Coryell and Frazier, Mattingly argued that the certificate of merit statute was
inapplicable to physical therapists because they are not specifically enumerated in
the statute. However, she also contended that Frazier is not a hospital but a
rehabilitation center.
Mattingly’s assertions that the certificate of merit statute is
inapplicable to hospital employees and to vicarious liability claims were made in
her subsequent motion to alter, amend, or vacate. As held in Ford v. Ford, 578
S.W.3d 356, 366 (Ky. App. 2019), “there is no appeal from the denial of a CR
59.05 motion.” Therefore, arguments which were only raised in Mattingly’s
motion to alter, amend, or vacate will not be considered on appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Statutory interpretation is an issue of law. KL & JL Invs., Inc. v.
Lynch, 472 S.W.3d 540 (Ky. App. 2015). As such, the matter is subject to a de
novo standard of review and requires no deference to the trial court’s
determination. Cinelli v. Ward, 997 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. App. 1998).
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ANALYSIS
KRS 411.167(1) specifically states that its provisions apply to “[a]
claimant commencing any action identified in KRS 413.140(1)(e),4 or against a
long-term-care facility as defined in KRS 216.510 . . . .” KRS 413.140(1)(e) does
not list “physical therapists” as among the medical providers to which it applies.
However, in Evans v. Baptist Health Madisonville, 643 S.W.3d 105 (Ky. App.
2022), the Court made clear that where hospital staff are alleged to have been
negligent or to have engaged in malpractice while acting in the scope of their
employment, the certificate of merit statute applies. Indeed, as the trial court stated
there is “no reason to hold that the Legislature, in attempting to reduce frivolous
malpractice lawsuits, would intend to protect the institution, but not its
employees.”
Further, the certificate of merit statute applies to Frazier, since this
case involves a claim of “negligence” against a “hospital licensed pursuant to KRS
216 . . . .” KRS 216 is titled “Health Facilities and Services.” In KRS 216.2920(6)
a “[h]ospital” is defined as “a facility licensed pursuant to KRS Chapter 216B as
either an acute-care hospital, psychiatric hospital, rehabilitation hospital, or
4
“An action against a physician, surgeon, dentist, or hospital licensed pursuant to KRS 216, for
negligence or malpractice . . . .”
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chemical dependency treatment facility[.]” It is further defined in KRS
216B.015(13) as including:
[H]ospitals, psychiatric hospitals, physical
rehabilitation hospitals, chemical dependency
programs, nursing facilities, nursing homes, personal care
homes, intermediate care facilities, family care homes,
outpatient clinics, ambulatory care facilities, ambulatory
surgical centers, emergency care centers and services,
ambulance providers, hospices, community mental health
centers, home health agencies, kidney disease treatment
centers and freestanding hemodialysis units, and others
providing similarly organized services regardless of
nomenclature . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
Mattingly, by filing an action alleging that Coryell negligently injured
her during the scope of her employment as a physical therapist at Frazier, has
become a “claimant” for purposes of the certificate of merit statute. However, she
argues that she need not comply with its requirements, since it only applies to pro
se litigants.
KRS 411.167(2)(a)-(c) sets forth three alternative methods of
compliance, each of which requires the claimant to file an “affidavit or
declaration” at the time the complaint is filed. First, the claimant may certify that
she has consulted with at least one expert who has found that there is a “reasonable
basis to commence the action . . . .” This means of compliance may be undertaken
by the claimant or her counsel. If she cannot obtain such a consultation and the
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statute of limitations is about to run, she may certify such and then supply the
necessary affidavit/declaration within sixty days of the date on which the
complaint was served. This portion of the statute is silent on the participation of
counsel. Finally, if the claimant has made three attempts to consult with an expert
and has been unable to do so, she may certify that fact, so long as none of the
experts contacted had opined that the case had no “reasonable basis . . . .” Once
again, this section provides for compliance by the claimant or her counsel.
As noted in Jefferson County Board of Education v. Fell, 391 S.W.3d
713, 718-19 (Ky. 2012), the primary goal of statutory interpretation is to determine
the legislature’s intent from the language employed. Indeed, “[t]he particular
word, sentence or subsection under review must also be viewed in context rather
than in a vacuum . . . .” Clearly, had the legislature intended to limit the duty to
comply to only those individuals who were unrepresented by counsel, there would
have been no necessity to use the qualifying phrase “or her counsel” in KRS
411.167(2)(a) and (c). This Court must conclude that the certificate of merit
statute was intended to apply to litigants regardless of their representation.5
Finally, we turn to Mattingly’s alternative argument, that she has, in
fact, complied as provided in KRS 411.167(4) by providing “an affidavit or
5
Another panel of this Court reached the same conclusion in Sanchez v. McMillin, No. 2020-
CA-0052-MR, 2022 WL 981843 (Ky. App. Apr. 1, 2022), discretionary review granted (Oct. 12,
2022).
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declaration” that no expert testimony is required. The distinction between the two
types of statement is that the former is sworn, while the latter is not. Although
counsel’s unsworn statement in Paragraph VII of Mattingly’s complaint could
conceivably be deemed a declaration, it merely states that her claim is not “likely”
to require expert proof. The statute requires an assertion that “no cause of action is
asserted for which expert testimony is required.” This Court cannot find such a
minimal statement to constitute compliance.
Accordingly, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court’s order of
dismissal.
GOODWINE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
THOMPSON, K., JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART, DISSENTS IN
PART, AND FILES A SEPARATE OPINION.
THOMPSON, K., JUDGE: Respectfully, I concur in part and dissent
in part. I concur that Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 411.167 applies to this
situation even though physical therapists are not specifically mentioned in the
statute, employees of hospitals have been construed to come under its provisions. I
also concur that KRS 411.167 is not limited to only applying to pro se plaintiffs.
However, I dissent in part because I believe it is premature to order the dismissal
of this case prior to there being any decision made as to whether an expert witness
is indeed required for Shelly Mattingly to prove her case. The dismissal of this
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case, without the court first determining whether expert testimony was required,
puts the cart before the horse.
KRS 411.167 generally requires that a certificate of merit be filed for
certain medical malpractice actions. However, recognizing that not every medical
malpractice action requires expert proof, the General Assembly provided an
exception in KRS 411.167(4), which states:
A certificate of merit is not required where the claimant
intends to rely solely on one (1) or more causes of action
for which expert testimony is not required, including
claims of res ipsa loquitur and lack of informed consent,
in which case the complaint shall be accompanied by an
affidavit or declaration that no cause of action is asserted
for which expert testimony is required.
Mattingly’s complaint, which was signed by counsel, specifically
states that “[t]he undersigned declares in accordance with KRS 411.167 that this
action is meritorious although the negligence involved in this case likely does not
require expert testimony.”
The majority Opinion dismisses in a single paragraph Mattingly’s
alternative argument that if the statute applied to her action, she complied with it
through an appropriate declaration. While acknowledging that the statement by
counsel “could conceivably be deemed a declaration,” it takes issue with
Mattingly’s use of the word “likely” and states this prevents her “minimal
statement” from complying with the statute. I disagree.
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First, there is a basis for believing that Mattingly’s action is the sort of
case that does not require expert testimony. Mattingly alleged in her complaint
that her physical therapist failed to follow her physician’s specific orders as to her
care and that she was thereby harmed.
At oral argument, Mattingly clarified that the physical therapist did
not follow the physician’s orders and performed therapies that were harmful
instead of beneficial. Mattingly argues that performing therapies contrary to a
physician’s orders does not require an expert on the standard of care as the
standard of care is simply that the physical therapist follows the physician’s orders.
The circuit court never made a determination that Mattingly was incorrect and that
an expert was in fact necessary for her to prove her claim of negligence.6
Second, Mattingly’s declaration complied with notice pleading. It is
well established that Kentucky is a notice pleading jurisdiction where claims do
not have to be stated with technical precision; instead, pursuant to the requirements
of Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 8.01(1), a “bare-bones” approach
stating the cause of action and entitlement to relief is sufficient. Russell v. Johnson
6
Mattingly noted during oral argument that prior to filing suit she did in fact have an expert
review the matter, and the expert opined that an expert witness was not necessary for this case;
however, no statement to that effect was included in the complaint.
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& Johnson, Inc., 610 S.W.3d 233, 240-41 (Ky. 2020). Mattingly fully informed
the defendants that she was relying on her case not requiring expert testimony.
Third, Mattingly’s declaration, if not a word-for-word recitation of the
statutory language, was appropriate. I believe the “shall” contained in KRS
411.167(4), did not require an exact parroting of the statutory language for
compliance. While I believe that it was mandatory that an affidavit or declaration
clarify that expert testimony would not be required, I do not believe the statute
requires any specific wording for such a statement to be valid and effective.
The use of the word “shall” is not determinative of whether a statutory
provision is mandatory (requiring strict compliance) or directory (requiring only
substantial compliance). Knox Cnty. v. Hammons, 129 S.W.3d 839, 842-43 (Ky.
2004). Instead, “if the directions given by the statute to accomplish a given end are
violated, but the given end is in fact accomplished, without affecting the real merits
of the case, then the statute is to be regarded as directory merely.” Skaggs v. Fyffe,
266 Ky. 337, 98 S.W.2d 884, 886 (1936) (quoting Varney v. Justice, 86 Ky. 596, 6
S.W. 457, 459 (1888)). “Substantial compliance occurs when the purpose of a
statute is accomplished and no harm results.” E.L.T. v. Cabinet for Health and
Family Services, 647 S.W.3d 561, 566 (Ky. App. 2022).
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Therefore, in Hammons, the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that
the statutory publication requirement which specified that a summary for
ordinances “shall” be certified was directory as:
The obvious intent of KRS 67.077(2) is to ensure that no
county ordinance is passed in secret or without
reasonable notice to the public. . . . It can only be
assumed that certification by fiscal court is required to
ensure that the published summary is not misleading and
provides sufficient detail as to put the public on notice of
the nature of the ordinance. We do not believe that the
fiscal court’s certification of the summary is absolutely
necessary to accomplish the purpose of KRS 67.077(2),
where the summary in fact accurately and sufficiently
describes the ordinance. Even without following the
precise directives of KRS 67.077(2) and KRS 67.075(2),
a resulting ordinance may nonetheless satisfy the intent
of the statutes and, therefore, the statute is directory.
Accordingly, having determined that KRS
67.077(2) is directory, substantial compliance may
satisfy its provisions.
Hammons, 129 S.W.3d at 843.
It is evident that the purpose of KRS 411.167 is generally to help stop
frivolous lawsuits by keeping cases which require expert proof from proceeding
without establishing that an expert is likely to support the merits of the action (or at
least a valid attempt was made to get an expert to consider the matter), as
established through the submission of a certificate of merit. The purpose of KRS
411.167(4) is to allow a matter that does not require an expert to proceed without
requiring a certificate of merit. But by such a suit proceeding, it is understood that
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the plaintiff intends to prove a breach of the standard of care without the need for
expert testimony.
Whether or not Mattingly’s declaration perfectly matched the wording
of the statute, so long as it provided appropriate notice that she did not believe an
expert to be needed for her claims and served to waive her right to proceed without
expert testimony if it was later determined to be needed (as she had not complied
with the certification requirements of KRS 411.167(1) and (2)), her notice served
its purpose. There would only be a problem if our Court were to permit
Mattingly’s declaration to allow her to escape from the requirements of KRS
411.167 and be a “work around” to filing a certificate of compliance, yet still allow
her to call an expert later.
Fourth, I agree with Mattingly that based on what we know of her
claim at this time, such a case likely does not require expert testimony. However, I
also believe at this juncture in this medical malpractice suit that it would have been
inappropriate for counsel to conclusively assert that no expert was required,
knowing that the circuit court could later determine that expert testimony would be
required. This provides yet another reason why the declaration should be
interpreted to satisfy substantial compliance.
It is well established that “[t]he Kentucky Rules of Professional
Conduct, [Rules of the Supreme Court] SCR 3.130, et seq., are mandatory for all
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Kentucky lawyers.” Holt v. Commonwealth, 219 S.W.3d 731, 732 (Ky. 2007).
These rules provide in relevant part that: “A lawyer shall not knowingly: . . .
make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal[,]” “[i]n the course of
representing a client a lawyer: . . . shall not knowingly make a false statement of
material fact or law to a third person[,]” and that “[i]t is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to: . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation[.]” SCR 3.130 (3.3(a)(1)), SCR 3.130 (4.1(a)), and SCR 3.130
(8.4(c)). See Harris v. Jackson, 192 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Ky. 2006) (quoting
Kentucky Bar Association v. Geisler, 938 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Ky. 1997) (explaining
that our “[s]tandards of ethics require greater honesty, greater candor, and greater
disclosure, even though it might not be in the interest of the client”)).
I believe that requiring counsel to make definitive representation at
this juncture that an expert would not be required, would conflict with counsel’s
ethical duty of candor with the court and third parties.7 While it may have been
better for Mattingly if her counsel had simply claimed that expert testimony was
not required using the exact language provided in the statute (given the reaction of
7
For over forty years, attorneys in the Commonwealth have been on notice that they owe
medical providers the duty to investigate the facts and law prior to filing a malpractice action and
that proceeding without an expert can evince a “lack of probable cause” in filing a complaint.
Such conduct can, and oftentimes does, lead to medical providers “turning the tables” and suing
attorneys for malicious prosecution. See Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895, 902 (Ky. 1981),
abrogated on other grounds by Martin v. O’Daniel, 507 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2016).
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the circuit court and the majority opinion that anything else violates the mandatory
nature of the statute), without further discovery a definitive answer would be
premature and unethical, running afoul of well-established professional duties. I
cannot condone requiring strict compliance under such circumstances.
I believe dismissal is premature. I would reverse and remand to allow
limited discovery. After that has taken place, the circuit court could then
appropriately rule on whether an expert witness is required for Mattingly to
establish that her physical therapist (and thereby the hospital), was negligent.
Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Jeffrey T. Sampson Lon S. Hays
Louisville, Kentucky Joseph A. Wright
Abbie C. O’Brien
Louisville, Kentucky
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