Connie Towns v. James Judkins ( 2022 )

RENDERED: MAY 6, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2021-CA-0697-MR
CONNIE TOWNS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE BRYAN D. GATEWOOD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 20-CI-501120
JAMES JUDKINS; EDWARD BIBB;
J.J., A CHILD; STEPHANIE
FELDNER; AND WHITNEY BIBB APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS AND GOODWINE, JUDGES.
COMBS, JUDGE: The Appellant, Connie Towns, appeals from the dismissal of
her petition to be declared de facto custodian of a minor child due to her lack of
standing. After our review, we affirm.
As a preliminary observation, we note that no Appellee’s brief has
been filed. CR1 76.12(8)(c) provides that we may elect among three courses of
action in such an event. We may opt to: “(i) accept the appellant’s statement of
the facts and issues as correct; (ii) reverse the judgment if appellant’s brief
reasonably appears to sustain such action; or (iii) regard the appellee’s failure as a
confession of error and reverse the judgment without considering the merits of the
case.” That is a matter which lies in our discretion. Roberts v. Bucci, 218 S.W.3d
395 (Ky. App. 2007). Because of the sensitive and serious nature of cases
involving the custody of children, we have elected to address the merits.
On May 20, 2020, Towns filed a combined petition to be declared de
facto custodian of a minor child, to be awarded custody, and to reverse immediate
entitlement to custody. According to her petition, the child, J.J., was born on
September 26, 2015. Towns alleged that she is related to the biological father
without stating or elaborating on the nature of her relationship. After J.J. was
removed from her biological parents at birth, she was placed in the custody of her
paternal grandmother, Sonseeahray Judkins.
Towns alleged that J.J. began living with her (Towns) in February
2016 and claimed that between February 2016 and August 2019, Towns effectively
became J.J.’s primary caregiver and source of financial support. In August 2019,
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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J.J. was removed from the paternal grandmother and was placed in the temporary
custody of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services following an investigation
by Child Protective Services. Towns’s petition recites that since September 2019,
the child has been in the temporary custody of “the Respondents, Edward and
Whitney Bibb . . . who currently resided [sic] in Indiana . . . . as a result of a
Jefferson County dependency, neglect and abuse action against both of the
parents.”
By an order entered on August 3, 2020, the trial court appointed Amy
Harrington as J.J.’s guardian ad litem (GAL). She was the child’s GAL in the
dependency, neglect, and abuse (DNA) action. On September 9, 2020, the GAL
filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that Towns lacked standing.
J.J. had been in the Bibbs’ permanent custody for more than a year as well as
having been in her grandmother’s custody previously.
On September 11, 2020, Towns filed an objection to the GAL’s
motion and contended that permanent custody had not been achieved because the
Bibbs had not had J.J. for more than a year. Although she claims that a copy of the
temporary custody order was attached, the only attachment to Towns’s objection in
the record before us is a “Standard Power of Attorney for Medical/School Decision
Making” (POA). Towns maintained that J.J.’s “former permanent custodian” --
i.e., her grandmother, Ms. Judkins -- “relinquished custody” to Towns and gave her
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the POA. The POA was dated June 15, 2017, but it stated that J.J. was residing
with Judkins -- contradicting the allegations in Towns’s petition that J.J. had
begun living with her in February 2016.
On September 15, 2020, Towns moved for a hearing on her petition.
By an order entered on October 8, 2020, the trial court scheduled a case
management conference “on the Petition to be Declared Defacto Custodian” for
December 7, 2020.
On December 7, 2020, the trial court conducted a Zoom conference
which lasted nearly half an hour. The court heard counsel’s arguments. Towns
also had the opportunity to speak at the conference -- although she did not present
sworn testimony. The court explained that it did not see how Towns could get past
the issue of standing, but it announced that it would review the DNA file and issue
a ruling on standing.
On April 16, 2021, the trial court entered an order dismissing with
prejudice as follows:
This case came before the Court [on] December 7,
2020[,] on Petitioner’s motion to be determined a
DeFacto Custodian of [J.J.], a child. Present were the
Petitioner, Ms. Connie Towns with counsel, . . . and the
child’s [GAL] from the [DNA] action . . . . The Court
heard arguments from both counsel and has reviewed
both this action and the entire DNA action regarding this
child and rules as follows:
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Towns is asking for a determination by this Court
declaring her to be a Defacto Custodian of the above
named child. The GAL strongly objects and submits the
case of Wethington v. Coffey [sic], No. 2011-CA-
000555-ME [2012 WL 4744200 (Oct. 5,] (2012). That
case speaks to the issues of whether the Petitioners had
the standing to bring forth that action, and ultimately the
Court said No they did not as they did not meet the
requirements of KRS[2] 403.822(1)(b) “person acting as
parent” [sic]. This case is on point to this action.
Petitioner Towns provided a Power of Attorney
document signed on June 15, 2017, . . . however that
document does not show any physical possession of the
child changing from the custodian at that time and even
states on the document that the child resides with the then
custodian [Ms. Judkins] at her home.
The Court has thoroughly reviewed the DNA action
and can find no mention of this Petitioner being involved
with this child in that case. Nor is there any mention by
the Cabinet for Health and Family Services about her
involvement with the child. There has been nothing
provided to this Court to show that the Petitioner meets
the requirements of KRS 403.822(1)(b)[3] and therefore
could not reach the designation of De Facto for this child.
On April 26, 2021, Towns filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate
pursuant to CR 59.05, contending that she was entitled to a hearing; that the court
erred in concluding that she did not have standing; and that Wethington, supra, is
distinguishable. On May 3, 2021, Towns filed a motion to set aside the trial
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
3
It appears that the reference in this sentence to KRS 403.822(1)(b) may be a typographical
error. The designation of de facto custodian is governed by KRS 403.270(1)(a).
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court’s order pursuant to CR 60.01 and 60.02 on grounds that the court erroneously
relied upon Wethington v. Coffey, supra, which had been reversed in Coffey v.
Wethington, 421 S.W.3d 394, 398 (Ky. 2014). Towns again argued that she had
standing and was entitled to proceed.
By an order entered on May 19, 2021, the trial court denied her
motions, concluding that Towns failed to prove that relief was appropriate under
CR 59.05 and/or CR 60.02. That order set forth as follows:
[Towns] assert[s] that the Court mistakenly relied upon
the case of Wethington v Coffey . . . .
The Court disagrees with [Towns’s] position that
[she was] not afforded an opportunity to be heard.
Counsel presented argument at the case management
conference as standing is a preliminary, procedural issue
which must be determined prior to the matter going
forward.
....
After hearing from counsel during the case management
conference, reviewing the record of the DNA action and
applying applicable statutory and case law, the Court
concluded that Petitioners do not have standing. . . .
The Court is satisfied that it did not misinterpret or
misapply KRS 403.800 or the language contained in
Wethington.
(Emphases original.)
Towns appeals. She contends that she is entitled to a hearing in order
to demonstrate that she is entitled to standing as a de facto custodian under KRS
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403.270 and as “a person acting as a parent” under KRS 403.800(13), arguing that
the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the matter for lack of standing.
We address her two arguments together.
Our Court analyzed the relevant statutes in Lambert v. Lambert, 475
S.W.3d 646, 650-51 (Ky. App. 2015), as follows:
Prior to adoption of the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), KRS
403.800 et seq. standing to bring a custody action was
limited to “a parent, a de facto custodian of the child, or a
person other than a parent only if the child is not in the
physical custody of one of the parents.” B.F. v. T.D., 194
S.W.3d 310 (Ky. 2006). However, “[t]he current statute
confers standing on the child’s parent(s) or ‘a person
acting as a parent.’” Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d
569, 574–75 (Ky. 2010). Achieving de facto custodian
status is no longer necessary to bring an action for child
custody; under the UCCJEA, one must only qualify as a
“person acting as a parent” in order to have standing to
bring such an action.
KRS 403.800(13) states:
“Person acting as a parent” means a person, other
than a parent, who:
(a) Has physical custody of the child or has had
physical custody for a period of six (6) consecutive
months, including any temporary absence, within
one (1) year immediately before the
commencement of a child custody proceeding; and
(b) Has been awarded legal custody by a court or
claims a right to legal custody under the law of this
state[.]
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“While the UCCJEA was originally adopted to address issues regarding interstate
custody disputes, [our Supreme] Court held in Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d
569, 575 (Ky. 2010) that is also applied to intrastate matters.” Coffey v.
Wethington, 421 S.W.3d at 397.
In order to establish de facto status, a person must meet the
requirements set forth in KRS 403.270. The version of the statute in effect when
Towns filed her petition provided in relevant part that:
(1) (a) As used in this chapter and KRS 405.020, unless
the context requires otherwise, “de facto custodian”
means a person who has been shown by clear and
convincing evidence to have been the primary
caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a child who
has resided with the person for a period of six (6)
months or more if the child is under three (3) years of
age and for a period of one (1) year or more if the
child is three (3) years of age or older or has been
placed by the Department for Community Based
Services. Any period of time after a legal proceeding
has been commenced by a parent seeking to regain
custody of the child shall not be included in
determining whether the child has resided with the
person for the required minimum period.
(b) A person shall not be a de facto custodian until a
court determines by clear and convincing evidence
that the person meets the definition of de facto
custodian established in paragraph (a) of this
subsection. Once a court determines that a person
meets the definition of de facto custodian, the court
shall give the person the same standing in custody
matters that is given to each parent under this section
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and KRS 403.280, 403.340, 403.350, 403.822, and
405.020.
We cannot agree that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing
this matter on standing without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Clearly, Towns
was afforded an opportunity to be heard.
Additionally, any alleged error is not properly before us. The trial
court stated at the case management conference that it would review the DNA file
and make a decision on standing. At that point, Towns voiced no objection to the
decision’s being made prior to an evidentiary hearing.
This court has held time and time again that, in
order to be considered on appeal, a specific objection
must have been raised in the trial court[.] Since [mother]
did not object … to the entry of a custody decree prior to
her opportunity to present her case, we may not consider
this alleged error on appeal.
Lambert, 475 S.W.3d at 651 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Towns is correct that Wethington v. Coffey, supra, cited by the trial
court, was indeed reversed in Coffey v. Wethington, 421 S.W.3d 394.
Nevertheless, we find no error in the court’s determination that Towns did not
meet the requirements of a “person acting as parent.” The facts in Coffey are
materially distinguishable from those in the case before us. In Coffey, our Supreme
Court explained that:
[I]n order to be considered “a person acting as a parent”
one must either have physical custody of the child or
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have had physical custody for a period of six consecutive
months within one year of the commencement of the
child custody proceeding. The six-month requirement
does not apply to those currently in physical custody
of the child . . . .
Id. at 398 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court reversed because the appellants
in Coffey were in physical custody of the child at the commencement of that action.
By contrast, it was uncontroverted that Towns did not have physical
custody of J.J. when she filed her petition on May 20, 2020. Nor did Towns have
physical custody of the child for six consecutive months within one year
immediately prior to filing her petition because J.J. was placed in the Cabinet’s
custody in August 2019 and then in the custody of the Bibbs. Thus, Towns cannot
satisfy the requirements of a person “acting as a parent” under KRS 403.800(13).
Towns contends that because no hearing was held and no sworn
testimony was provided, the record consists only of the pleadings which contain
allegations sufficient to meet the requirements for de facto custodianship. We
disagree.
“The status of de facto custodian is not permanent and must be
established each time the status is asserted.” Maynard v. Pinson, No. 2020-CA-
1107-MR, 2021 WL 4126010, at *2 (Ky. App. Sep. 10, 2021). When Towns filed
her petition in May 2020, J.J. was four years of age. Thus, Towns had to establish
that the child had resided with her for a year or more. In Cherry v. Carroll, 507
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S.W.3d 23, 28 (Ky. App. 2016), this Court explained that KRS 403.270(1)(a)
“contemplates residency of one year or more with the same person who is the
primary caregiver and financial supporter . . . . The phrase ‘period of one (1) year
or more” must be read to mean twelve continuous months . . . .’ J.J. had not
resided with Towns since August 2019 when she was placed in the Cabinet’s
custody -- nine months before the petition was filed. Thus, she had not resided
with Towns for twelve continuous months before May 20, 2020.
Moreover, in reaching its decision the trial court considered the DNA
file -- although it was not made a part of the record on appeal. “It has long been
held that, when the complete record is not before the appellate court, that court
must assume that the omitted record supports the decision of the trial court.”
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 697 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Ky. 1985); Lawrence v.
Bingham Greenebaum Doll, L.L.P., 599 S.W.3d 813, 823 (Ky. 2019).
Accordingly, we are bound to assume that the DNA file supports the
trial court’s decision dismissing this case for lack of standing.
We affirm the dismissal of the petition by the trial court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.
Bethanni Forbush-Moss
Louisville, Kentucky
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