David Khazai v. Anita Ahmadi ( 2023 )

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 3, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-0264-ME
DAVID KHAZAI APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE ANGELA JOHNSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 21-D-503524-001
ANITA AHMADI APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CETRULO, JONES, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
JONES, JUDGE: David Khazai appeals from a domestic violence order (DVO)
entered against him in favor of his former stepdaughter, Anita Ahmadi. In sum, he
argues the operative statutes that guided the family court’s analysis are
unconstitutional; the family court failed to make sufficient findings of fact; and
that insufficient evidence supported the family court’s decision. We find no error
and affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 11, 2021, Anita Ahmadi moved the Jefferson Family
Court for an emergency protective order (EPO) against her then-stepfather, David
Khazai. In her motion, she alleged:
My mother has filed for divorce and he believes it is my
fault. He currently is stalking us, calling me, leaving
threatening messages, saying he is going to kill me.
ARMED + DANGEROUS → when my mother served
the EPO he told the sheriffs he has no weapons but I was
able to find 5. I believe there may be more.
There is a long history of abuse. A couple incidents are
documented through CPS. I have received medical
treatment before due to his abuse. He has been
physically abusive to me for the past 17 years. He would
use various objects to abuse me. Many MANY threats of
violence and killing me.
The family court granted Anita’s motion that same day, and David
was served with Anita’s EPO the day afterward. In relevant part, the EPO
prohibited David from making any communication with Anita; directed him to
remain at least 500 feet from her; and further restrained him from going within 500
feet of Anita’s workplace. On November 3, 2021, the family court amended the
EPO consistently with an agreement of the parties, specifying it would remain in
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force until February 9, 2022; and that if no violations of the EPO had occurred as
of that date, then the EPO would expire.
However, when the family court revisited this matter during a hearing
on February 9, 2022, Anita asserted David had committed several violations of the
EPO since November 3, 2021. Accordingly, the family court kept the EPO in
effect, and held a two-day evidentiary hearing to determine whether a domestic
violence order (DVO) should issue. At the evidentiary hearing, the family court
considered testimony from Anita and David, as well as Shahpar Shahab – Anita’s
mother and David’s ex-wife. On February 16, 2022, when the hearing concluded,
the family court granted Anita a DVO against David, effective for the next three
years. The family court’s handwritten findings underlying its decision were as
follows:
The ct. finds by the preponderance of the evidence that
DV occurred and could occur again. Specifically, the ct.
finds the Respondent inflicted fear of imminent physical
harm when he threatened her, attempted intimidation and
called incessantly.
This appeal followed. Additional facts will be discussed as necessary
in the context of our analysis.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.740(1) provides
that “[f]ollowing a hearing ordered under KRS 403.730,
if a court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
domestic violence and abuse has occurred and may again
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occur, the court may issue a domestic violence order[.]”
KRS 403.720(1) defines “[d]omestic violence and abuse”
as “physical injury, serious physical injury, stalking,
sexual abuse, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent
physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, or
assault between family members or members of an
unmarried couple[.]”
Ashley v. Ashley, 520 S.W.3d 400, 403-04 (Ky. App. 2017).
The preponderance of the evidence standard is satisfied
when sufficient evidence establishes the alleged victim
was more likely than not to have been a victim of
domestic violence. Baird v. Baird, 234 S.W.3d 385, 387
(Ky. App. 2007). . . . The standard of review for factual
determinations is whether the family court’s finding of
domestic violence was clearly erroneous. [Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)] 52.01; Reichle v. Reichle,
719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Ky. 1986). Findings are not
clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial
evidence. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky.
2003).
Caudill v. Caudill, 318 S.W.3d 112, 114-15 (Ky. App. 2010).
“[S]ubstantial evidence” is “[e]vidence that a reasonable
mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion”
and evidence that, when “taken alone or in the light of all
the evidence, . . . has sufficient probative value to induce
conviction in the minds of reasonable men.” Regardless
of conflicting evidence, the weight of the evidence, or the
fact that the reviewing court would have reached a
contrary finding, “due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses” because judging the credibility of
witnesses and weighing evidence are tasks within the
exclusive province of the trial court. Thus, “[m]ere doubt
as to the correctness of [a] finding [will] not justify [its]
reversal,” and appellate courts should not disturb trial
court findings that are supported by substantial evidence.
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Moore, 110 S.W.3d at 354 (citations omitted).
“[I]n reviewing the decision of a trial court the test is not
whether we would have decided it differently, but
whether the findings of the trial judge were clearly
erroneous or that he abused his discretion.” Cherry v.
Cherry, 634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1982) (citation
omitted). Abuse of discretion occurs when a court’s
decision is unreasonable, unfair, arbitrary or capricious.
Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Ky. 1994)
(citations omitted).
Caudill, 318 S.W.3d at 115.
III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, David dedicates one sentence of his brief to arguing either
KRS 403.730 or KRS 403.740 are “void for vagueness.” It is unnecessary to
address this point beyond stating it is improperly before us: David did not raise it
below, nor has he ever notified the Attorney General of Kentucky about his
contention. See Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Ky.
1989) (“The Court of Appeals is without authority to review issues not raised in or
decided by the trial court.”); see also Benet v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 528,
532 (Ky. 2008) (citations omitted) (explaining “strict compliance with the
notification provisions of KRS 418.075 is mandatory[,] meaning that even in
criminal cases, we have refused to address arguments that a statute is
unconstitutional unless the notice provision of KRS 418.075 had been fully
satisfied.”).
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David also complains “[t]he Court’s Order does not make reference to
when David inflicted fear of harm, or how the threatened harm was imminent.”
However, David did not request additional findings. CR 52.04 states:
A final judgment shall not be reversed or remanded
because of the failure of the trial court to make a finding
of fact on an issue essential to the judgment unless such
failure is brought to the attention of the trial court by a
written request for a finding on that issue or by a motion
pursuant to Rule 52.02.
In other words, we are unable to reverse and remand for the failure of the trial
court to be more specific.
Lastly, David argues there was insufficient evidence supporting the
family court’s findings that, pursuant to KRS 403.740(1), domestic violence and
abuse occurred and may again occur.1 This issue is subject to review regardless of
1
In his seven-page brief, David offers little insight or discussion regarding the evidence adduced
during the evidentiary hearing relative to the DVO, and he also focuses upon evidence the family
court did not consider at all. For example, David insists “he had nothing to do with a website
that had inappropriate pictures of Anita posted” during the effective period of the EPO, but it is
unclear why he raises this point: Anita attempted to introduce evidence in this vein below, but
the family court declined to accept her evidence after sustaining an objection from David; there
is no indication from the record that the family court nevertheless based its DVO upon this
“website”; nor, for that matter, does Anita address this issue in her appellee brief.
As an aside, Anita has moved this Court to strike David’s brief as deficient in this
respect. We have denied her motion by separate order but would have considered granting it had
the record been more voluminous and the issues more complex. It is not the responsibility of this
Court to search the record to find support for David’s arguments, assuming it exists. Smith v.
Smith, 235 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. App. 2006). Nor is it the responsibility of this Court to research and
make David’s arguments for him. See, e.g., Harris v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 117, 131 (Ky.
2012).
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the family court’s lack of specific findings in its order. See CR 52.03.
Nevertheless, we disagree.
Beginning with whether domestic violence and abuse occurred, the
family court’s focus was upon the history of Anita’s relationship with David,
which culminated into an incident in August 2021. When the family court granted
Anita the EPO on October 11, 2021, Anita was twenty-two years old. Regarding
Anita’s prior history with David, Anita and Shahpar each testified that in the
seventeen years Anita lived with David, David would make strict rules for her to
follow and would meet any objection or disobedience from her with physical
violence or threats of physical violence. Anita testified that the “actual physical”
abuse occurred while she was a minor. She recalled, for example, being taken to
urgent care when she was about six years old after David twisted and bruised her
arm for acting up at the Philadelphia airport; and that when she was a child and
acted up at home, David would place pencils between her fingers, then crush and
grind them into her hand as a form of punishment. Anita and Shahpar testified that
when Anita was ten years old, David purchased an expensive, Persian cat for her
that she loved; and that he killed the cat shortly afterward because Anita failed to
follow his rules regarding the cat.2
2
Regarding the cat he allegedly killed, David testified:
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Anita testified that on one occasion, while she was a freshman in high
school and was sleeping in the car while David was driving her to school, David
pinched her to wake her up; she shrugged him off; and that David consequently
punched her “numerous” times on the back of her head with a closed fist hard
enough that she needed her mother to take her home from school shortly thereafter.
She testified that while she was still a minor, David would often lock her in the
basement; would confine her to the basement in the summertime while she was off
school and he was home; and that while he was at work over the summer, he would
only permit her to be in the garage, where there was no food and only a garden
hose as a source of water. Anita and Shahpar also testified, consistently with what
Anita represented in her EPO motion, about two instances where child protective
services had investigated David for allegedly abusing Anita. The allegations were
ultimately unsubstantiated. Shahpar testified the allegations were reported by
DAVID: I did not kill the cat. This happened about twelve years
ago or something like that. I took the cat and put it in another
neighborhood. They know it and I know it.
COUNSEL: So, you got angry, and you got rid of the cat?
DAVID: I didn’t get angry, so you’re putting words in my mouth.
This incident was happening over and over and over again, and we
made a deal that if the cat keeps doing this, the cat is gone. It was
an agreement.
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individuals other than Anita and herself,3 and that “if we were going to report, I’m
talking about, we would have more than twenty cases now.”
Anita testified David’s actual physical abuse of her gradually subsided
as she became older, adding that “since then I have been very careful to make sure
to not do anything to cause a reaction from him again.” However, as she and her
mother further testified, David’s abuse then became more psychological. Shahpar
testified Anita needed to be constantly aware of David’s comings and goings
because if he caught Anita “not doing something” in the house, she would get in
trouble with him; and he would threaten to kill Anita if she failed to complete
household chores, timely answer her phone, or did not otherwise “stay in line.”
Anita testified:
ANITA: He would say, if I take one step out of line, he
would kill me, which he wasn’t worried about. He said if
he had to go to jail, so be it, he still wanted to make sure
he could punish me.
COUNSEL: About how frequently would you say he
made threats like that?
ANITA: Very frequently, as it was a very casual thing
for him to say.
COUNSEL: And how recently has he made a threat like
that to you, directly to you?
3
Anita testified one of the investigations had been prompted by the report of a pediatrician who
had treated her after David had punished her by grinding pencils into her hand.
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ANITA: Directly to my face? Right before he left for
Turkey, which was in August of this past year, 2021.
David testified he frequently told Anita that he would kill her, but
minimized his statements as being “a manner of speech,” innocuous expressions of
his frustration, and encouragement for Anita to (as he represents in his brief) “learn
the right way to do things.” Notwithstanding his subjective intentions, Anita
testified his statements scared her, and for objective reasons. Recall, Anita
attributed the lack of any physical abuse from David in her adult life to being “very
careful to make sure to not do anything to cause a reaction from him again.” Both
she and her mother testified about two recent incidents where care was not
exercised, the first of which occurred on Christmas Day of 2020.4 Anita described
it as follows:
ANITA: David was, um, fat-shaming and degrading [his
biological daughter], and she stood up for herself, and
they started verbally fighting. And then because she
stood up for herself, he chased her out of the house,
saying “I’m going to beat your ass.” And I got in
between them, and I was holding the door so that [his
biological daughter] could escape the house while I was
holding David back from going after her.
COUNSEL: Seeing that, how did that make you feel?
4
David acknowledged an incident between his biological daughter and himself had occurred on
Christmas Day of 2020, but his version of it was different from Anita’s and more abridged. He
testified, “After she started screaming at me and calling me names, I asked her to leave the
house.”
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ANITA: It made me very scared, and it taught me not to
ever say anything and object.
The second incident – which the family court ultimately determined
over the course of its oral findings was an instance of David’s prior domestic
violence toward Anita – occurred shortly before David left for Turkey in August of
2021 for an extended business trip. It was also, according to Anita, what prompted
David to most recently state, at least directly to her face, that he would kill her.
She testified:
ANITA: It was like six o’clock, I hadn’t woken up on
time to make his coffee and clean the kitchen. He started
screaming at me. He said, pardon my language, “Get the
fuck out of my house. Get the fuck out of my life.” Um,
which, when I for once stood up and said, “Why are you
so upset with me?” which is when he lunged at me.
Thankfully, my mother was there.
COUNSEL: Okay. So, when you say, “lunged at me,”
what do you mean?
ANITA: He started coming at me and yelling at me.
COUNSEL: And did he hit you?
ANITA: Thankfully, no, but my mother was in between
us and didn’t allow that to happen.
Consistently with what is set forth above, Anita testified that before
David left for Turkey, he forbade her from residing in his house any longer.
Shahpar provided a consistent description of the August 2021 incident during her
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own testimony, adding that she believed David would have physically injured
Anita had she not intervened.5
We have discussed the evidence regarding whether domestic violence
and abuse occurred. We now proceed to the evidence regarding whether it was
likely to reoccur. Anita testified what eventually caused her to once again fear
imminent physical injury from David – to the extent it warranted an EPO – was
another of his death threats, this one made during the week David returned from
Turkey. While David was in Turkey, Shahpar filed a petition to dissolve her
marriage with him. Anita testified she was not involved with her mother’s
decision and did not wish to be involved with whatever ensued; but a few days
after her mother had filed the petition, David called Anita from Turkey and, in a
voicemail message introduced as evidence, he accused her of being ungrateful and
motivating Shahpar to divorce him.
David returned from Turkey on the evening of October 6, 2021. On
that date, Shahpar was granted an EPO against him. By then, according to
Shahpar, she and Anita had vacated the marital residence and were in the process
of finding an apartment. As to the threat that encouraged Anita to also seek an
5
David, for his part, only acknowledged “yelling” at Anita during the August 2021 incident. To
the extent that he further elaborated on the incident, he testified that by obligating Anita to make
his coffee by 6 a.m., he was helping her to better herself; and that he was not angry with her, but
“when you break your agreement, there is consequences.”
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EPO against David, Anita testified that on or about October 11, 2021, she was
provided a recording of a conversation between David and one of her maternal
aunts, spoken in Farsi, that had occurred earlier in the week; and that over the
course of the recorded conversation, David had explained in detail his plan to
“come after,” “punish,” and “kill” her for motivating Shahpar to divorce him.6
Anita testified this particularly scared her because David apparently
believed she had defied him, and because she knew David well enough to know
that her defiance would cause him to attempt to physically abuse her. Moreover,
she feared how far he would take things this time because she and her mother were
no longer appeasing him, and his constant refrain up to that point had been that he
was unafraid of going to jail for punishing her. Anita was also aware David owned
firearms, and – as she stated in her EPO petition, which she incorporated into her
testimony – “when [her] mother served [her] EPO he told the sheriffs he has no
weapons but [Anita] was able to find 5.”
That said, the family court’s basis for determining domestic violence
was likely to reoccur – for purposes of entering its DVO – was the evidence of
David’s conduct toward Anita while its EPO remained in force. For example, the
6
The recorded conversation between David and Anita’s maternal aunt was never admitted into
evidence because Anita was unable to secure the services of a Farsi translator. However, what
Anita and Shahpar related about the recorded conversation was largely cumulative of and
consistent with what they had already related about David’s history with Anita; and in any event,
while relevant to Anita’s mental state in seeking her EPO against David, it was not the focus of
the family court’s analysis in granting Anita a DVO.
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EPO prohibited David from making any communications with Anita; but, as the
family court found, David disregarded the EPO’s prohibition and called Anita
incessantly. Substantial evidence also supported the family court’s finding. Anita
introduced call logs from her private and workplace telephones demonstrating that
between November 12 through November 29, 2021, she received a total of twenty-
four calls that had originated from what she testified were David’s personal or
workplace telephones; and that she continued receiving calls from those numbers
as recently as January of 2022. Anita also testified that when she would answer
these calls, all that she would hear from the caller would be “snickering” or
breathing, which she recognized as David’s.
David, for his part, admitted Anita and her mother were familiar with
his personal telephone number and the phone numbers associated with his
business. He admitted that no legitimate purpose would have justified any calls
from his business to Anita’s workplace on or after November 12, 2021. But, he
denied having any control over a phone associated with a number ending in “7730”
– a number that frequently appeared in the call logs Anita presented. He also
denied making any calls to Anita on or after November 12, 2021, testifying:
DAVID: Now, if a phone call, a hang-up is threat, okay.
I’m yours.
COUNSEL: Did, did you, are, did you call and do that?
DAVID: No. Of course not.
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However, the family court deemed Anita the more credible witness –
particularly after Anita impeached David regarding his representation that he had
no control over the phone associated with the number ending in “7730.” In that
vein, during the evidentiary hearing, Anita introduced a recorded message that her
mother, Shahpar, had received from that number; and David admitted on cross-
examination that it was a recording of him singing along to a love song. When
pressed further about how a phone he claimed to have no control over had been
used to leave a recording of his singing in Shahpar’s voicemail, David suggested
that the “7730” number might belong to a former acquaintance of his – an
individual he described as a manic-depressive quantum physicist with a messiah
complex – and that his acquaintance might have recorded him singing at some
point and decided, for reasons unknown, to send the recording to Shahpar. In its
oral findings at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the family court
indicated that it did not believe David. Certainly, that was its prerogative.
The EPO also prohibited David from being within 500 feet of Anita.
However, over the course of its oral findings, the family court indicated David had
violated this directive, too. Specifically, the family court lent credence to Anita’s
testimony that, shortly after she began driving home from work on November 16,
2021, David had followed her; and that when she later idled at what she testified
was the street around the corner from her workplace, David – who was driving the
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opposite way – stopped his vehicle, rolled down his window, and purposefully
glared at her from across the median that separated them. Much of this incident is
undisputed because Anita introduced into evidence three pictures she had taken
from her cellular phone on November 16, 2021, that depict David, from inside his
vehicle and with his window rolled down, looking directly at the camera from a
short distance away and from across a median. Additionally, the family court gave
no weight to David’s rebuttal that the incident was unintentional and had been a
complete surprise to him, i.e., he testified, “The window was down, I am driving,
and I turn, and she’s there and she’s taking pictures.”
As discussed, the family court issued oral findings at the close of its
evidentiary hearing. After considering the evidence, it explained in relevant part:
Did he inflict fear of imminent harm by his actions? So,
to review the facts and what I’ve heard today and the
other week, essentially there’s a history of, the allegation
rather is that there’s a history of violence, the threat of
violence, abuse, control. And not just to this particular
petitioner, but her mother, her stepsister. And so, that
knowledge to the petitioner, in addition to his most recent
behavior, caused her to fear. That’s her allegation, she
feared imminent harm, given all of these things put
together, the history of violence, the history of threats,
the history of abuse, and then the most recent incident.
He denies it, he says “no, I was just being a father, I was
being tough on her so she could reach these heights.”
Um, “this is tough love so she could turn out to be
whatever it is that she wants to be.”
And so, the court is then forced to look at credibility, and
to weigh that. And then we have the witness, her mother,
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the petitioner’s mother. Her testimony was very similar
to that of what the petitioner’s mother’s was, in that
there’s a history of domestic control and abuse in that
home. So, back to the point where they were fearful that
the respondent would find the petitioner idle; she had to
be working all the time. Mother testified that she
observed the particular incident where he threatened to
harm the petitioner because she did not rise early enough
to prepare his coffee. Obviously, his version of the
events were different, it was not to make his coffee, but
to better herself with the whole purpose of him, you
know, “agreeing” as he put it, that she would rise early.
And then we have his testimony. There was evidence
presented from the petitioner regarding these messages,
voicemail messages, the singing. He denied that he had
any control over a particular phone number, but then we
hear the singing, and there was what the court found to
be, um, and interesting explanation for why he’s on the
phone singing. Something about this gentleman that
actually has the phone somehow recorded his singing and
his sadness and forwarded it to the wife, and that’s how
we learned that he, first he said he didn’t in fact have the
phone number, then he said no, it was just that instance.
The court does not find that persuasive, and finds that it
was in fact his phone. He was sending those messages,
he was sending them to the petitioner.
And so, the court has the discretion to believe one party
over the other, one witness over the other, and quite
frankly I believe the petitioner. The court believes that
the petitioner has established by the preponderance of the
evidence that domestic violence occurred and could
occur again in the future. Specifically, the court finds
that the respondent’s behavior of calling her incessantly,
of pulling up and staring at her with the purpose of
intimidation, of threatening to kill her because she failed
to rise timely, all of that culminates to a history and
inflicted fear of imminent harm, and the petitioner, this
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will be a three-year no-contact order, and he is not to
have a gun.
Upon review, we find no instance of clear error. Consistently with
what is set forth above, substantial evidence supported the family court’s finding
that David committed an act of domestic violence against Anita in August 2021.
Likewise, substantial evidence demonstrated when, where, and how David violated
the terms of the EPO; and it could be reasonably inferred from the willful and
frequent nature of David’s violations that, more likely than not, his violative
conduct toward Anita – considering their shared history – was designed to place
Anita in fear of imminent physical injury; that he succeeded in doing so; and that
his behavior would continue if left unchecked.
IV. CONCLUSION
David presents nothing indicating the Jefferson Family Court erred or
otherwise abused its discretion by entering a DVO in favor of Anita. We therefore
AFFIRM.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
C. Thomas Hectus Samantha Jo Hall
Louisville, Kentucky Louisville, Kentucky
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