Lfucg Police Department v. Deborah Hurt ( 2023 )


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  •                RENDERED: FEBRUARY 10, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    Commonwealth of Kentucky
    Court of Appeals
    NO. 2022-CA-1310-WC
    LFUCG POLICE DEPARTMENT                                           APPELLANT
    PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
    v.             OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
    ACTION NO. WC-13-89089
    DEBORAH HURT; BLUEGRASS
    ORTHOPEDICS; DR. HARRY
    LOCKSTADT; HONORABLE JOHN
    B. COLEMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE
    LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS
    COMPENSATION BOARD                                                 APPELLEES
    OPINION
    AFFIRMING
    ** ** ** ** **
    BEFORE: ACREE, COMBS, AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.
    COMBS, JUDGE: This is an appeal from a Workers’ Compensation case
    involving a post-award medical fee dispute filed by the Appellant, LFUCG Police
    Department (LFUCG), contesting a proposed surgery by Dr. Lockstadt. The
    Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the surgery compensable, and the
    Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. Finding no error after our review, we
    affirm the Board.
    The underlying claim arose out of a February 17, 2013, work-related
    motor vehicle accident. Hurt and LFUCG settled the claim in 2015, and pursuant
    to KRS1 342.020, Hurt’s right to medical benefits was left open.
    On September 20, 2021, Dr. Lockstadt requested approval for a C3-4,
    C4-5 posterior cervical decompression and fusion surgery. Dr. Farrage performed
    utilization review and found no apparent medical necessity for the proposed
    surgery.
    LFUCG filed a motion to reopen resulting in a medical fee dispute.
    LFUCG challenged the proposed surgery on grounds of reasonableness, necessity,
    and work-relatedness. Dr. Kriss evaluated Hurt at LFUCG’s request and found no
    indication for decompression surgery, but he did recommend non-operative
    treatment.
    Hurt testified by deposition and at the final hearing. She testified to
    ongoing pain in her neck since the accident. Hurt submitted records from Dr.
    Lockstadt as evidence and took his deposition. Dr. Lockstadt diagnosed
    spondylosis or degenerative arthritis at C4-5, C5-6, and C6-7. Dr. Lockstadt
    1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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    testified that he has found the proposed surgical procedure to be quite successful
    relating to arthritis in the back of the neck. He explained that it is performed by
    means of a tiny cut with x-rays and through tubes, and small spacers are then
    placed in the painful arthritic joints in the neck -- resulting often in dramatic
    improvement in neck pain.
    The crux of this appeal involves a portion of Dr. Lockstadt’s
    testimony. Dr. Lockstadt was asked whether he could state within the realm of
    reasonable medical probability whether the subject procedure was related to the
    subject accident or to pre-existing problems. Dr. Lockstadt responded, “I don’t
    know the answer to that. There is no way to determine the answer. What we’ve
    had previously, we had this special fund where 50 percent was attributed to the car
    accident, 50 percent to other causes.”
    On June 28, 2022, the ALJ rendered a detailed opinion and order as
    follows in relevant part:
    [A] review of Dr. Lockstadt’s records reveals the note of
    August 24, 2020, wherein it was indicated the
    symptomatic cervical spondylosis was felt to relate back
    to the 2013 injury event. In his testimony, Dr. Lockstadt
    noted the relatedness question was now difficult to
    answer, but that previously under the “Special Fund” it
    would be apportioned 50/50. Of course, this is a
    reference to the prior version of KRS 342.120, which
    placed one-half of the liability for income benefits on the
    Special Fund when an injury was found to be the result of
    the arousal of pre-existing degenerative conditions into
    disabling reality. To the undersigned, this statement by
    -3-
    Dr. Lockstadt is tantamount to his offering the opinion
    the need for the surgery is the result of the arousal of pre-
    existing degenerative changes into disability reality by
    the work-related event. This, along with Hurt’s own
    testimony regarding the continuation of her symptoms
    following her work-related automobile accident and the
    statements in the medical record from August 24, 2020,
    persuades me the symptoms and the request for treatment
    are related to the effects of the work injury.
    As the posterior cervical fusion is conditionally
    recommended, the request must be accompanied by
    sound medical reasoning. I am persuaded Dr. Lockstadt
    has offered sound medical reasoning for his surgical
    recommendation. He clearly stated in his surgery request
    and his deposition testimony that conservative treatment
    options have been maximized[.] . . . He discussed the
    recommendation for the placement of spacers, which is
    noted to be supported in the ODG.[2] After considering
    the entirety of the evidence, not only as summarized
    above, but as contained in the entire record, I am
    persuaded the recommended surgical procedure is
    causally related to the work injury in 2013, and is
    reasonable and necessary. Therefore, it is compensable
    under KRS 342.020.
    LFUCG filed a petition for reconsideration and argued that the ALJ
    had “mistakenly relied” upon Dr. Lockstadt. By order rendered July 29, 2022, the
    ALJ denied LFUCG’s petition as a re-argument of the evidence.
    2
    Occupational Disability Guidelines. The ALJ discussed Kentucky’s adoption of the treatment
    guidelines contained in 803 Kentucky Administrative Regulations (KAR) 25:260, noting that
    medical treatment which is “not recommended” under the ODG may be found compensable if
    the medical provider articulates sound medical reasoning for the treatment.
    -4-
    LFUCG appealed to the Board and again argued that the ALJ’s
    interpretation of Dr. Lockstadt’s testimony was “nothing more than an
    unsubstantiated guess” as to what the doctor meant and that the other evidence
    cited by the ALJ did not support the reasonableness, necessity, or work-relatedness
    of the proposed surgery.
    By opinion rendered October 14, 2022, a unanimous Board affirmed
    as follows:
    We note LFU[CG] argued it bears the burden of proof
    regarding reasonableness and necessity of treatment, but
    that Hurt bears the burden of proof regarding causation
    and the work-relatedness of the treatment. LFU[CG]
    cites Addington Resources, Inc. v. Perkins, 
    947 S.W.2d 421
     (Ky. App. 1997) for this proposition. The Board
    notes, however, the Kentucky Supreme Court has since
    acknowledged the burden of proof regarding work-
    relatedness in a post-award medical fee dispute is on the
    employer in two unpublished cases. C&T Hazard v.
    Stollings, 2012-SC-000834-WC, 
    2013 WL 5777066
     (Ky.
    Oct. 24, 2013); Conifer Health v. Singleton, No. 2020-
    SC-0609-WC, 
    2021 WL 4487772
     (Ky. Sept. 30, 2021).
    KRS 342.735(3) also states, in relevant part: “However,
    the employee has the burden of proof to show the
    medical expenses are related to the injury, reasonable and
    necessary prior to an application of benefits being filed
    and before an award or order of benefits. Thereafter, the
    burden is upon the employer.”
    Since it bore the burden of proof and was
    unsuccessful before the ALJ, LFUCG must demonstrate
    the evidence compelled a different result. Snawder v.
    Stice, 
    576 S.W.2d 276
     (Ky. App. 1979). For evidence to
    be compelling, it must be so overwhelming that no
    reasonable person could reach the same conclusion as the
    -5-
    ALJ. REO Mechanical v. Barnes, 
    691 S.W.2d 224
     (Ky.
    App. 1985).
    ....
    LFUCG . . . contends the proposed surgery is not causally
    related to the work injury. It places particular emphasis on
    the deposition testimony of Dr. Lockstadt. . . . The ALJ
    inferred Dr. Lockstadt was referring to a prior version of
    KRS 342.120 when apportionment for income benefits
    would accrue one-half to the special fund when a dormant
    pre-existing condition was aroused into disabling reality by
    a work injury. The ALJ has “the sole discretion to
    determine the quality, character, weight and credibility and
    substance of the evidence, and to draw reasonable
    inferences from the evidence.” Bowerman v. Black
    Equipment Co., 
    297 S.W.3d 858
    , 866 (Ky. App. 2009). . . .
    Dr. Lockstadt’s records included his note from
    August 24, 2020 indicating [Hurt’s] symptoms since 2013,
    when her work-related injury occurred, always related to
    her neck. Hurt also testified her symptoms were ongoing
    since the 2013 work-related MVA. Dr. Lockstadt also
    specifically testified he was not recommending this
    procedure when he treated Hurt previously in 2008. The
    ALJ found Hurt successfully proved the surgery was work-
    related and that finding was supported by substantial
    evidence; hence, the Board will not disturb the ALJ’s
    findings.
    On appeal, LFUCG contends that Dr. Lockstadt’s apportionment
    comment shows his “complete lack of understanding of th[e] prior law as
    apportionment of income benefits had nothing to do with compensability of
    -6-
    medicals under KRS 342.020.”3 However, this argument pertains to the weight of
    the evidence -- a matter which lies within the ALJ’s sole discretion. Bowerman,
    supra.
    Once again, LFUCG argues that the ALJ’s conclusion about what Dr.
    Lockstadt meant is nothing more than an unsubstantiated guess. It also contends
    that the other evidence upon which the ALJ relied -- Dr. Lockstadt’s August 24,
    2020, note and Hurt’s testimony -- cannot support the reasonableness, necessity, or
    work-relatedness of the proposed surgery. However, the Board concluded that
    substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination. In essence, LFUCG is
    asking us to second-guess the Board. That is not our function.
    The standard of our review is well-settled:
    The function of further review of the [Board] in the Court
    of Appeals is to correct the Board only where [this] Court
    perceives the Board has overlooked or misconstrued
    controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error in
    3
    Derr Construction Company v. Bennett, 
    873 S.W.2d 824
    , 827 (Ky. 1994), more fully explains
    the prior law:
    KRS 342.120(4) [now KRS 342.120(6)] specifically
    exempts the employer from paying income benefits for prior,
    active disability or for disability resulting from the arousal of a
    previously dormant condition. However, KRS 342.020 contains
    no such exemption regarding medical benefits. Liability for
    medical expenses requires only that an injury was caused by work
    and that medical treatment was necessitated by the injury.
    Regardless of whether an injured worker’s disability actually was
    caused by the arousal of a previously dormant condition rather than
    by the work-related injury, itself, the employer has been held
    liable for the payment of medical benefits relative to the injury.
    (Emphases added.)
    -7-
    assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross
    injustice.
    Western Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 
    827 S.W.2d 685
    , 687-88 (Ky. 1992).
    We perceive no such error in the case before us. On the contrary, we
    agree with the Board’s sound analysis.
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    ALL CONCUR.
    BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
    Marcel Smith                              James Martin
    Lexington, Kentucky                       Lexington, Kentucky
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Document Info

Docket Number: 2022 CA 001310

Filed Date: 2/9/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/17/2023