Eugene Collins v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2021 )

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 24, 2021; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-0129-MR
EUGENE COLLINS, JR. APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OWEN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE R. LESLIE KNIGHT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00008
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, COMBS, AND MAZE, JUDGES.
MAZE, JUDGE: Eugene Collins, Jr. (Collins) appeals from a judgment of the
Owen Circuit Court dismissing his post-conviction request for DNA testing of
biological evidence. We conclude that the trial court properly applied KRS1
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
422.285 and did not err by denying Collins’ request for post-conviction DNA
testing. Hence, we affirm.
On August 31, 2005, Collins pled guilty to murder,2 first-degree
rape,3 first-degree burglary,4 and tampering with physical evidence.5 On
September 29, 2005, the court sentenced him to life imprisonment.
On September 24, 2019, Collins filed a motion asking the court to
order DNA testing of a sexual assault kit taken from the victim. Collins
acknowledges that this kit has already been tested and the results were
inconclusive. However, he argues that the previous test “was performed during the
infantile stage of recognition in the development of DNA testing,” and should the
test be performed today, it will “allow for a definitive result.”
The trial court refuted Collins’ claim that DNA testing in 2005 was in
the “infantile stage” because the DNA testing employed had been in use since at
least 1988.6 The trial court further explained that Collins is not entitled to post-
2
KRS 507.020.
3
KRS 510.040.
4
KRS 511.020.
5
KRS 524.100.
6
See JUSTICE MING W. CHIN, MICHAEL CHAMBERLAIN, AMY ROJAS & LANCE GIMA, FORENSIC
DNA EVIDENCE: SCIENCE AND THE LAW § 2:1 (2019) (“The first use of nuclear DNA evidence
(i.e., analysis of DNA patterns in the nuclei of cells) for forensic identification purposes took
place in a 1988 Florida case. At the time, DNA sequencing and comparison had been in
development and use for about ten years, but its application had been largely limited to the
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conviction DNA testing under KRS 422.285. Under the statute, a defendant who
was not sentenced to death would only be entitled to post-conviction DNA testing
had he been “convicted of the offense after a trial or after entering an Alford
plea[.]”7 The court reasoned that, because Collins was not sentenced to death, nor
did he enter an Alford8 plea, his petition for DNA testing pursuant to KRS 422.285
should be denied.
We begin by reviewing the standard to be used when handling a
petition for post-conviction DNA testing. The standard of review for a court’s
denial of DNA testing pursuant to KRS 422.285 is for abuse of discretion. Moore
v. Commonwealth, 357 S.W.3d 470, 492 (Ky. 2011). The test for abuse of
discretion is “whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair,
or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000). A trial court abuses its discretion
when its decision rests on an error of law (such as the application of an erroneous
legal principle or a clearly erroneous factual finding), or when its decision cannot
be located within the range of permissible decisions allowed by a correct
diagnosis, treatment and study of genetically inherited diseases. The first California appellate
opinion on the admissibility of forensic DNA evidence was issued in 1991.”) (quotation marks
and citations omitted).
7
KRS 422.285(5)(d).
8
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).
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application of the facts to the law. Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 915 n.11
(Ky. 2004).
On appeal, Collins urges this Court to find that the trial court abused
its discretion by denying his request for post-conviction DNA testing of preserved
biological evidence. To be eligible for post-conviction DNA testing, the court
must find that the defendant satisfied KRS 422.285. Section (1) of the statute
identifies individuals convicted of a capital offense, a Class A felony, a Class B
felony, or any offense designated a violent offense under KRS 439.3401 as entitled
to seek post-conviction DNA testing. Here, Collins satisfies section (1) of the
statute.
Furthermore, to be eligible for post-conviction DNA testing, the court
must find that the defendant satisfied all six subsections under either KRS
422.285(5) or (6). Section (5) sets out the circumstances where DNA testing is
required, whereas section (6) sets out the circumstances where the court has
discretion to allow for DNA testing.
Under KRS 422.285(5), the court shall order DNA testing and
analysis if the court finds:
(a) A reasonable probability exists that the petitioner
would not have been prosecuted or convicted if
exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA
testing and analysis;
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(b) The evidence is still in existence and is in a condition
that allows DNA testing and analysis to be conducted;
(c) The evidence was not previously subjected to DNA
testing and analysis or was not subjected to the testing
and analysis that is now requested and may resolve an
issue not previously resolved by the previous testing
and analysis;
(d) Except for a petitioner sentenced to death, the
petitioner was convicted of the offense after a trial or
after entering an Alford plea;
(e) Except for a petitioner sentenced to death, the testing
is not sought for touch DNA, meaning casual or
limited contact DNA; and
(f) The petitioner is still incarcerated or on probation,
parole, or other form of correctional supervision,
monitoring, or registration for the offense to which the
DNA relates.
Under KRS 422.285(6), the court may order DNA testing and analysis
if the court finds:
(a) A reasonable probability exists that either:
1. The petitioner’s verdict or sentence would have
been more favorable if the results of DNA testing
and analysis had been available at the trial
leading to the judgment of conviction; or
2. DNA testing and analysis will produce
exculpatory evidence;
(b) The evidence is still in existence and is in a condition
that allows DNA testing and analysis to be conducted;
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(c) The evidence was not previously subject to DNA
testing and analysis or was not subjected to the testing
and analysis that is now requested and that may
resolve an issue not previously resolved by the
previous testing and analysis;
(d) Except for a petitioner sentenced to death, the
petitioner was convicted of the offense after a trial or
after entering an Alford plea;
(e) Except for a petitioner sentenced to death, the testing
is not sought for touch DNA, meaning casual or
limited contact DNA; and
(f) The petitioner is still incarcerated or on probation,
parole, or other form of correctional supervision,
monitoring, or registration for the offense to which the
DNA relates.
The relevant subsections to be analyzed are (a) and (d) under both
sections (5) and (6). First, we address Collins’ contention that the trial court failed
to adequately analyze the reasonable probability consideration pursuant to KRS
422.285(5)(a) and (6)(a). Collins alleges that the trial court improperly dismissed
his request prior to deciding on the reasonable probability consideration. Next,
Collins asserts that the DNA contained in the sexual assault kit is not his, but
instead belongs to a third party. Further, Collins contends that testing the DNA
now would render a definite result after technological advances have been made
and exclude him as the DNA’s source. Therefore, Collins argues that such a test
result would have made a difference to his decision to plead guilty, because the
updated DNA test result would have prevented the Commonwealth from proving
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first-degree rape, thus eliminating the aggravating factor required to make him
eligible to receive the death penalty.
However, the statute requires a hearing only if there is a “reasonable
probability that the DNA evidence the petitioner seeks would have made a
difference had it been available at or before trial[.]” Owens v. Commonwealth, 512
S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. App. 2017). To successfully obtain a hearing on the matter under
KRS 422.285, a defendant “must show that ‘the evidence sought would either
exonerate [him], lead to a more favorable verdict or sentence, or otherwise be
exculpatory. To do this, the [defendant] must describe the role the evidence would
have had if available in the original prosecution.’” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 381
S.W.3d 180, 190 (Ky. 2012) (quoting Bowling v. Commonwealth, 357 S.W.3d 462,
468 (Ky. 2010)). In this case, Collins did not satisfy this burden of proof.
Here, Collins fails to show how a more favorable DNA result would
prevent the Commonwealth from proving first-degree rape or eliminate “the
aggravating factor” required for death penalty eligibility. While the DNA results
presented at trial were not conclusive, the Commonwealth has overwhelming and
compelling evidence that Collins did rape the victim. A note found near the
victim’s body linked Collins to the crime scene, and previous rape victims of his
testified that this crime matched his modus operandi.9 Finally, Collins would have
9
See Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
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been eligible for the death penalty regardless of the Commonwealth’s ability to
prove first-degree rape because convictions for first-degree burglary and murder
alone qualify a defendant for the death penalty.10 Therefore, denying Collins’
motion was appropriate because it is not reasonably probable that a new DNA test
result would have changed his sentencing.
Furthermore, Collins was not eligible for post-conviction DNA testing
because he also failed to meet the additional standards for eligibility as required by
KRS 422.285, specifically (5)(d) and (6)(d). Both sections provide that, except for
a petitioner sentenced to death, the petitioner must show he was convicted of the
offense after a trial or after entering an Alford plea. Here, Collins was not found
guilty following a jury trial, and did not enter an Alford plea.
We conclude that Collins failed to satisfy all the requirements of KRS
422.285, making him ineligible for post-conviction DNA testing. Therefore, the
Owen Circuit Court correctly dismissed Collins’ petition without an evidentiary
hearing because he was not within the category of convicted felons entitled to post-
conviction DNA testing pursuant to KRS 422.285.
Accordingly, we affirm the Owen Circuit Court’s order.
10
KRS 532.025(2)(a)2.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Eugene Collins, Jr., pro se Daniel Cameron
Beattyville, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Robert Baldridge
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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