Mark Allen Peterson v. Stephanie Marie Peterson ( 2022 )

RENDERED: DECEMBER 22, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2021-CA-1335-MR
MARK ALLEN PETERSON APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MASON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE STOCKTON B. WOOD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 20-CI-00104
STEPHANIE MARIE PETERSON APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; JONES AND L. THOMPSON,
JUDGES.
CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE: Mark Allen Peterson (“Mark”) appeals from the
Mason Circuit Court’s maintenance award in his dissolution of marriage action.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mark and Stephanie Marie Peterson (“Stephanie”) married on April
28, 2012, and separated in April 2020, with Stephanie moving out of the marital
home in October 2020. Stephanie petitioned the circuit court for a dissolution of
marriage on June 24, 2020. The parties ultimately entered into a separation
agreement dividing all assets and debts but reserving the issue of maintenance (the
“Separation Agreement”).
Under the Separation Agreement, Stephanie received a 2011 Ford
Explorer valued at $6,000 and with no debt; approximately $10,000 in personal
property; $20,540 for her one-half of the marital equity in the parties’ home; her
retirement accounts of approximately $6,800; a one-half interest in Mark’s 401(k),
which interest was valued at $5,572.50; and a one-half interest in Mark’s employee
stock option program less the offset by Stephanie’s retirement accounts, which
interest at the time of the hearing was valued at approximately $78,013.
Stephanie sought maintenance of $1,500 per month for three (3) years.
The Domestic Relations Commissioner (“DRC”) conducted a contested
evidentiary hearing on the issue of maintenance on June 21, 2021. In the DRC’s
report filed on July 6, 2021, the DRC found that throughout the marriage,
Stephanie had made approximately $23,000 per year, and her net monthly
employment income was $1,638.92. The DRC found that Mark made
approximately $82,000 per year, and his net monthly employment income was
approximately $4,994.90.
-2-
The DRC found that Stephanie had an associate degree in
bookkeeping and accounting but was currently working as a bank teller. Mark’s
testimony at the DRC hearing was that Stephanie did not want to work in
accounting or bookkeeping because she was uncomfortable handling other
people’s finances. Stephanie testified that she would like to pursue a bachelor’s
degree at Maysville Community and Technical College but that she had yet to take
any steps to determine the cost or time involved.
In addition to her employment income, the DRC found that Stephanie
had a child support order in another state for her two minor children of $407 per
month, which she received every third month, as Iowa entertains motions for
contempt for child support that is three (3) months behind. Moreover, Stephanie
received Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) benefits of $700
per month and had no health insurance costs for her or her children. She also
received a $2,774 tax refund in 2020, which added $219.67 per month to her
income. Moreover, beginning in July 2021, the DRC noted that Stephanie would
receive $600 per month until December 2021 from the COVID-19 relief package.
The DRC determined that Stephanie’s monthly expenses were
$1,681.95, exceeding her net monthly employment income by $43.03. However,
the DCR determined that Stephanie had extra monthly income from various other
-3-
sources that would enable her to cover the shortfall. Thus, the DCR determined
that Stephanie had sufficient monies to cover her monthly expenses.
The DRC determined that Mark’s monthly expenses totaled $4,724.90
and noted that Mark had testified that he could not meet his needs and also pay
maintenance to Stephanie. Accordingly, based on the preceding findings, the DRC
recommended that the circuit court deny Stephanie’s motion for maintenance.
The circuit court entered an order on November 10, 2021, modifying
certain portions of the DRC’s findings of fact and determining that Stephanie
should be awarded maintenance for a short duration to allow her to upgrade her
experience in bookkeeping and accounting. Thus, the circuit court awarded
Stephanie $500 per month in maintenance for two (2) years to allow Stephanie to
pursue additional education and seek better employment.
Thereafter, Mark filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate, arguing
that the circuit court had not followed the requirements of Kentucky Revised
Statutes (“KRS”) 403.200 and had failed to make findings of fact as to Stephanie’s
entitlement to maintenance or to support its conclusion that Stephanie was entitled
to the maintenance which it awarded.
The circuit court subsequently entered an order expanding on its
findings of fact and conclusions of law but did not ultimately change its
maintenance order. This appeal followed.
-4-
We will discuss further facts as they become relevant.
ANALYSIS
a. Standard of Review
As discussed by a separate panel of this Court, “[t]he determination of
questions regarding maintenance is a matter which has traditionally been delegated
to the sound and broad discretion of the trial court[.]” Barbarine v. Barbarine, 925
S.W.2d 831, 832 (Ky. App. 1996) (citations omitted). Only when the circuit court
has “abused its discretion or based its decision on findings of fact that are clearly
erroneous” may we disturb the circuit court’s decision. Powell v. Powell, 107
S.W.3d 222, 224 (Ky. 2003) (citation omitted).
A circuit court abuses its discretion when its decision is “arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Artrip v. Noe, 311
S.W.3d 229, 232 (Ky. 2010) (citation omitted). Additionally, findings of fact
supported by substantial evidence are not erroneous. Barbarine, 925 S.W.2d at
832 (citations omitted). “[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind
would accept as adequate to support a conclusion and evidence that, when taken
alone or in the light of all the evidence, . . . has sufficient probative value to induce
conviction in the minds of reasonable men.” Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336,
354 (Ky. 2003) (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). Stated another
way, findings of fact are clearly erroneous if the circuit court’s findings are
-5-
“clearly contrary to the weight of evidence.” Clark v. Clark, 782 S.W.2d 56, 58
(Ky. App. 1990) (citations omitted).
b. Discussion
Mark argues that the circuit court’s findings of fact were clearly
erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence and that the circuit court
abused its discretion in awarding Stephanie maintenance. Before a circuit court
may award maintenance, it must first find that the spouse seeking maintenance
“[l]acks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him, to
provide for his reasonable needs[.]” KRS 403.200(1)(a). Secondly, the spouse
seeking maintenance must be “unable to support himself through appropriate
employment[.]” KRS 403.200(1)(b). If either factor is not met, the circuit court
may not award maintenance. Drake v. Drake, 721 S.W.2d 728, 730 (Ky. App.
1986).
Additionally, Kentucky courts have determined that the “appropriate
employment” component discussed in KRS 403.200(1)(b) is based on “the
standard of living established during the marriage.” Drake, 721 S.W.2d at 730(citation omitted); see also Lovett v. Lovett, 688 S.W.2d 329, 334 (Ky. 1985), and
Casper v. Casper, 510 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Ky. 1974).
In this case, under KRS 403.200(1)(a), the circuit court found that
Stephanie lacked significant property to support herself. Specifically, the circuit
-6-
court noted that she received half of the couple’s furniture, a vehicle, half of
Mark’s 401(k) – which Stephanie could not withdraw without penalty for quite
some time – and a portion of her equity interest in the marital home, or $20,540.
The record supports these findings, and we do not find them to be clearly
erroneous.
Additionally, we do not find that the circuit court abused its discretion
in determining that such property was not significant enough to support Stephanie.
Appellate courts will not uphold a circuit court’s maintenance determination that is
arbitrary or unsupported by sound legal principles. Naramore v. Naramore, 611
S.W.3d 281, 286 (Ky. App. 2020). A circuit court’s failure to properly apply the
factual findings to the maintenance statute, or to consider relevant portions of the
statute altogether, is an abuse of discretion. See Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266,
270 (Ky. App. 1979). In this case, Stephanie would be relying almost entirely on
her earnings as a bank teller to support herself and her two children.
As to the second factor contained in KRS 403.200(1)(b), in this case,
the circuit court found that the couple had established a comfortable standard of
living during the marriage, as the couple had a substantial joint income during the
marriage, little debt outside of their vehicles and mortgage, and the marital home
was valued at $295,000. Further, the circuit court found that the standard of living
established during the marriage included the ability to save for retirement and that
-7-
Stephanie’s current earning capacity would cause a drastic reduction in the lifestyle
established during the marriage. We can deduce no clear error in these findings.
Additionally, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that Stephanie could not support herself through appropriate
employment “according to the standard of living established during the marriage.”
McGowan v. McGowan, 663 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Ky. App. 1983) (emphasis added).
As previously discussed, the circuit court found the couple’s standard of living to
be comfortable during the marriage and included the ability to save for retirement
to be a part of the standard of living the couple maintained throughout the
marriage. Thus, because the circuit court believed that Stephanie needed further
training or education to be self-sufficient, to not be on government benefits, and to
save for her retirement, she was entitled to an additional amount which, coupled
with her reasonable earnings, permitted her to obtain the necessary education to
upgrade her degree.
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the circuit
court’s finding that Stephanie’s salary as a bank teller, even when combined with
her portion of the marital assets, was not appropriate to provide for her according
to the standard of living established during the couple’s marriage. McGowan, 663
S.W.2d at 224; see also Casper, 510 S.W.2d at 255. Indeed, maintenance is
designed “to facilitate one’s transition from dependence upon [a] former spouse to
-8-
independence.” Shafizadeh v. Shafizadeh, 444 S.W.3d 437, 448 (Ky. App. 2012)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As stated by the Kentucky
Supreme Court, “403.200 seeks to enable the unemployable spouse to acquire the
skills necessary to support himself or herself in the current workforce so that he or
she does not rely upon the maintenance of the working spouse indefinitely.”
Powell, 107 S.W.3d at 224.
Considering the nonmarital and marital property assigned to
Stephanie, her annual income, and the standard of living established by the parties
during their marriage, we find no abuse of discretion by the circuit court in
awarding maintenance to Stephanie.
Mark further argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in
determining the amount and duration of the maintenance award. In determining
the amount and duration of the maintenance, we turn to KRS 403.200(2)(a)-(f).
Specifically, a circuit court is required to consider certain factors, including:
(a) The financial resources of the party seeking
maintenance, including marital property apportioned to
him, and his ability to meet his needs independently, . . . ;
(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or
training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find
appropriate employment;
(c) The standard of living established during the
marriage;
(d) The duration of the marriage;
-9-
(e) The age, and the physical and emotional condition of
the spouse seeking maintenance; and
(f) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is
sought to meet his needs while meeting those of the
spouse seeking maintenance.
In this case, as previously discussed, the circuit court determined that,
based on Stephanie’s financial resources, she would need short-term maintenance
from Mark to meet her needs independently. KRS 403.200(a). Additionally, the
circuit court determined that two years of maintenance would provide Stephanie
with “[t]he time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable” her
to find appropriate employment. KRS 403.200(2)(b). We have already discussed
the comfortable standard of living established during the nine-year marriage. KRS
403.200(2)(c) and (d). Moreover, the circuit court discussed that Stephanie was
relatively young and would greatly benefit from increased training or education to
find a more appropriate job. KRS 403.200(2)(e). Finally, the circuit court found
that Mark could meet his needs while paying Stephanie maintenance. KRS
403.200(2)(f). The circuit court noted that, although the DRC found that Mark did
not have excess income to pay maintenance, the circuit court reduced Mark’s
monthly expenses to $4,098.71 by reducing Mark’s monthly grocery and eating out
expenses. Based on his income of approximately $4,994.90 gross per month, the
circuit court found that Mark had the available funds to provide Stephanie with the
-10-
maintenance payments. In this case, we see no abuse of discretion regarding the
duration or amount of the maintenance award.
Mark’s final argument is moot, as we have determined that the circuit
court’s award, in this case, is appropriate in all respects.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Mason Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Rebekah J. Rice Jeffrey L. Schumacher
Maysville, Kentucky Maysville, Kentucky
-11-