Tony Bryant v. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission ( 2022 )


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  •                     RENDERED: JULY 1, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    Commonwealth of Kentucky
    Court of Appeals
    NO. 2021-CA-0846-MR
    TONY BRYANT                                                        APPELLANT
    APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
    v.                HONORABLE JOHN D. SIMCOE, JUDGE
    ACTION NO. 21-CI-00260
    KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT
    INSURANCE COMMISSION AND
    DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY                                             APPELLEES
    OPINION
    VACATING AND
    DISMISSING
    ** ** ** ** **
    BEFORE: ACREE, COMBS, AND MAZE, JUDGES.
    COMBS, JUDGE: Appellant, Tony Bryant (Bryant), appeals from an order of the
    Hardin Circuit Court affirming a decision of the Kentucky Unemployment
    Insurance Commission (Commission). The Commission found that Bryant is
    disqualified from receiving benefits because he was discharged for misconduct
    connected to his work. After our review, we vacate the order of the Hardin Circuit
    Court and dismiss this appeal for the reasons set forth below.
    Bryant worked as a human resource assistant for the Department of
    the Army’s Civilian Human Resources Agency at Fort Knox, Kentucky. His job
    duties entailed processing applications for benefits for military widows in the
    Army’s Survivor Benefits Program. Bryant was fired for borrowing money from
    one of the widows in the program. Bryant subsequently filed a claim with the
    Kentucky Office of Unemployment Insurance, which determined that he was
    disqualified to receive benefits because he was discharged for misconduct
    connected with the work. Bryant appealed. Following an evidentiary hearing, the
    Referee affirmed.
    Bryant appealed to the Commission, which affirmed the Referee’s
    decision on April 28, 2020.
    Bryant then sought judicial review pursuant to KRS1 341.450(1),
    which provides as follows:
    Except as provided in KRS 341.460, within twenty (20)
    days after the date of the decision of the commission, any
    party aggrieved thereby may, after exhausting his
    remedies before the commission, secure judicial review
    thereof by filing a complaint against the commission in
    the Circuit Court of the county in which the claimant
    was last employed by a subject employer whose
    reserve account or reimbursing employer account is
    1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.
    -2-
    affected by such claims. Any other party to the
    proceeding before the commission shall be made a
    defendant in such action. The complaint shall state fully
    the grounds upon which review is sought, assign all
    errors relied on, and shall be verified by the plaintiff or
    his attorney. The plaintiff shall furnish copies thereof for
    each defendant to the commission, which shall deliver
    one (1) copy to each defendant.
    (Emphasis added.)
    Although Bryant was last employed by the Department of the Army in
    Hardin County, he filed his complaint in Meade Circuit Court.2 On June 16, 2020,
    the Commission and the Department of the Army, now Appellees, jointly filed a
    response and contended that Bryant had failed to strictly comply with KRS
    341.450(1) by failing to file his complaint in the proper court within the requisite
    time -- an error which was fatal to his appeal pursuant to the statute. On January
    13, 2021, the Meade Circuit Court entered an order transferring the action “to
    Hardin Circuit Court, the appropriate venue.”
    The Hardin Circuit Court proceeded to decide the case on its merits
    and affirmed the Commission’s ruling by order entered June 24, 2021.
    On July 23, 2021, Bryant filed a notice of appeal to this Court. Bryant
    again argues that his actions did not constitute misconduct. If this case were
    properly before us, we would affirm the Commission’s ruling without hesitation
    2
    Bryant resides in Meade County.
    -3-
    based upon our review of the record. However, we cannot reach the merits. We
    agree with the Commission that Bryant’s complaint should have been dismissed by
    the Meade Circuit Court for lack of jurisdiction.
    In his reply brief, Bryant contends that the Commission’s
    jurisdictional argument was not preserved. However, it is well settled that
    “jurisdiction may be raised by the parties or the court at any time and cannot be
    waived. Moreover, the issue may be raised for the first time on appeal.” Cabinet
    for Health and Family Services v. J.T.G., 
    301 S.W.3d 35
    , 39 (Ky. App. 2009)
    (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
    KRS 341.450(1) required that Bryant secure judicial review by filing
    a complaint in the circuit court of the county where he was last employed within
    20 days after the date of the Commission’s decision. Bryant failed to comply with
    this statutory prerequisite by filing his complaint in Meade Circuit Court rather
    than Hardin Circuit Court. Therefore, Meade Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction ab
    initio to consider Bryant’s appeal.
    “It is a firmly rooted concept of law in this state that the courts have
    no jurisdiction over an appeal from an administrative agency action unless every
    statutory precondition is satisfied.” Taylor v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins.
    Comm’n, 
    382 S.W.3d 826
    , 831 (Ky. 2012).
    As a general rule, “[t]here is no appeal to the courts from
    an action of an administrative agency as a matter of right.
    -4-
    When grace to appeal is granted by statute, a strict
    compliance with its terms is required.” Board of
    Adjustments of City of Richmond v. Flood, 
    581 S.W.2d 1
    ,
    2 (Ky. 1978) (citations omitted). Statutory preconditions
    for vesting courts with the authority to engage in judicial
    review cannot be satisfied by substantial compliance.
    See City of Devondale v. Stallings, 
    795 S.W.2d 954
    , 957
    (Ky. 1990) (“It is only [when defects are
    nonjurisdictional in nature] that a discussion of
    substantial compliance . . . is appropriate.”).
    Consequently, at least with respect to the
    jurisdictional requirements for invoking judicial
    review of an administrative agency ruling, we have no
    substantial compliance exception to a statute which
    grants the right to appeal. See Kentucky
    Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Carter, 
    689 S.W.2d 360
    , 361-362 (Ky. 1985).
    Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Wilson, 
    528 S.W.3d 336
    , 339
    (Ky. 2017) (emphasis added).
    We agree with the Commission that the Meade Circuit Court’s order
    transferring the case to Hardin Circuit Court did not -- and could not -- cure the
    jurisdictional defect.
    A long line of Kentucky cases have [sic] held that where
    appeal from an administrative agency decision is
    permitted by statute, the requirements of the statute are
    mandatory, and a circuit court does not obtain
    jurisdiction to hear the appeal unless the statutory
    requirements have been met.
    Cabinet for Human Resources v. Holbrook, 
    672 S.W.2d 672
    , 675 (Ky. App. 1984)
    (emphasis added).
    -5-
    Directly on point is the venerable old case of Jackson v. Wernert, 
    30 S.W. 412
     (Ky. 1895), which involved an appeal of a judgment of the justice of the
    peace that was filed in Jefferson Circuit Court instead of quarterly court as required
    by a statute in effect at the time. On its own motion, the circuit court transferred
    the case to its proper venue in quarterly court. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky
    held that “[a]s the circuit court had no jurisdiction of the cause of action between
    the parties, it follows that it had no power to transfer the same to the quarterly
    court, and should have dismissed the appeal.” Id. at 413 (emphasis added).
    In the case before us, the Meade Circuit Court had no jurisdiction over
    the action between the parties. Therefore, it follows that the Meade Circuit Court
    had no power to transfer the case to the Hardin Circuit Court and that it should
    have dismissed the appeal. It also follows that the Hardin Circuit Court had no
    jurisdiction because the Meade Circuit Court’s transfer order was void ab initio
    and was, therefore, a legal nullity. So, too, is the Hardin Circuit Court’s June 24,
    2021, order affirming the ruling of the Commission.
    It is well established in Kentucky law that any order
    issued by a court that did not have proper jurisdiction is
    “void ab initio . . . is not entitled to any respect or
    deference by the courts.” S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 
    265 S.W.3d 804
    , 833 (Ky. App. 2008) (internal citations omitted).
    Moreover, [such an] order is considered “a legal nullity,
    and a court has no discretion in determining whether it
    should be set aside.” 
    Id.
     (citing Foremost Ins. Co. v.
    Whitaker, 
    892 S.W.2d 607
    , 610 (Ky. App. 1995)); see
    also Wedding v. Lair, 
    404 S.W.2d 451
     (Ky. 1966).
    -6-
    Cabinet for Health and Family Services v. J.T.G., 
    301 S.W.3d 35
    , 39 (Ky. App.
    2009).
    Accordingly, we vacate the June 24, 2021, order of the Hardin Circuit
    Court, and we dismiss this appeal.
    ALL CONCUR.
    BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                   BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
    KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT
    Douglas E. Miller                       INSURANCE COMMISSION:
    Radcliff, Kentucky
    Joshua R. Hurley
    Frankfort, Kentucky
    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
    DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY:
    L. Jay Gilbert
    Louisville, Kentucky
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