Demarcus Carter v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2022 )

RENDERED: JULY 1, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2021-CA-0384-MR
DEMARCUS CARTER APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE ANDREW C. SELF, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 16-CR-00117 AND 17-CR-00141
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: DeMarcus Carter, pro se, appeals from an Order entered June
17, 2020, by the Christian Circuit Court, denying his Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure (CR) 60.02(f) and CR 60.03 motion to suspend or modify his sentence.
We affirm.
Carter is serving a sentence of imprisonment resulting from his
convictions in 2018 by the Christian Circuit Court of various offenses including,
but not limited to, first-degree burglary and first-degree wanton endangerment. On
May 14, 2020, he filed a pro se motion in Christian Circuit Court to amend his
final judgment pursuant to CR 60.02(f), CR 60.03, and the Eighth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. He cited the COVID-19 pandemic as the basis of
his motion, arguing his underlying medical conditions put him at increased risk of
contracting the disease while in prison, and that he was accordingly entitled to
relief from the remainder of his sentence in the form of probation and GPS
monitoring, or home incarceration. The Commonwealth objected to Carter’s
motion; and, without holding an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court ultimately
entered an order denying his motion. Carter then filed this appeal, pro se.
At the onset, we note that arguments roughly identical to what Carter
presents in this appeal were recently addressed and rejected by this Court in Martin
v. Commonwealth, 639 S.W.3d 433 (Ky. App. 2022). Bearing that in mind, we
first address Carter’s contention that he was entitled to relief under CR 60.02(f),
which permits a trial court to relieve a defendant from a final judgment upon a
showing of a “reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief.” We review
denials of motions under CR 60.02 for abuse of discretion. White v.
Commonwealth, 32 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Ky. App. 2000) (citation omitted). “The test
-2-
for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Foley v.
Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Ky. 2014) (citation omitted).
CR 60.02 “functions to address significant defects in the trial
proceedings.” Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 453 S.W.3d 738, 739 (Ky. App. 2014)
(citing Wine v. Commonwealth, 699 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Ky. App. 1985)). A
successful motion under CR 60.02(f) must relate to defects in the trial proceedings
or undiscovered evidence not presented at trial. Wine, 699 S.W.2d at 754. Results
of incarceration, including illnesses which occur during confinement, do not relate
to those issues and thus do not qualify as claims of an “extraordinary nature”
entitling a defendant to relief under CR 60.02(f). Wine, 699 S.W.2d at 754; see
also Ramsey, 453 S.W.3d at 739. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Carter’s motion to the extent it relied upon CR 60.02(f). See
Martin, 639 S.W.3d at 435-36 (rejecting the same argument).
Next, we address Carter’s contention that he was entitled to relief
under CR 60.03, which provides:
Rule 60.02 shall not limit the power of any court to
entertain an independent action to relieve a person from a
judgment, order or proceeding on appropriate equitable
grounds. Relief shall not be granted in an independent
action if the ground of relief sought has been denied in a
proceeding by motion under Rule 60.02, or would be
barred because not brought in time under the provisions
of that rule.
-3-
The plain language of CR 60.03 requires a separate, independent
action, which Carter did not file. Because his argument is based upon the same
core grounds that failed to satisfy CR 60.02(f), he is not entitled to relief under CR
60.03. Foley, 425 S.W.3d at 888 (quoting CR 60.03) (“Appellant is not entitled to
relief under CR 60.02. As such, in effect, the ‘relief sought [in his CR 60.03
action] has been denied in a proceeding by motion under Rule 60.02.’ It follows
that Appellant is not entitled to relief under CR 60.03.”). As indicated in Martin,
639 S.W.3d at 436, this Court has consistently rejected similar CR 60.03
arguments made by other inmates during the COVID-19 pandemic on this basis.
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to the
extent it relied upon CR 60.03.
Finally, Carter is not entitled to relief from his sentence under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, which
prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. His claim fails because it involves
conditions of confinement and does not arise from the trial proceedings below.
Thus, he asserts a claim that may not be properly brought before a sentencing
court, but rather must be brought in a separate civil action against the warden of his
institution. Martin, 639 S.W.3d at 436-37. Additionally, because claims relating
to conditions of confinement are civil in nature, an inmate must first exhaust
administrative remedies before seeking relief through a civil action. Ramsey, 453
-4-
S.W.3d at 739; Kentucky Revised Statutes 454.415. Therefore, the circuit court
did not err in denying Carter’s motion on this basis, either.
For the foregoing reasons, the June 17, 2020, Order of the Christian
Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
DeMarcus Carter, pro se Daniel J. Cameron
West Liberty, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Joseph A. Beckett
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-5-