Teresa Spicer v. James Nathan (Rebel) Combs ( 2022 )

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 9, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2021-CA-1080-MR
TERESA SPICER APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BREATHITT CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE LISA HAYDEN WHISMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 21-CI-00083
JAMES NATHAN (“REBEL”) COMBS APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: CETRULO, LAMBERT, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
MCNEILL, JUDGE: This case arises from the death of Tiara Combs (Tiara),
resulting from injuries sustained from an all-terrain vehicle wreck. Appellant,
Teresa Spicer (Spicer), was Tiara’s mother. Appellee, James Nathan “Rebel”
Combs (Combs), was Tiara’s husband, and was operating the vehicle during the
underlying incident. It is undisputed that he was intoxicated at that time.
Spicer and Combs were co-administrators of Tiara’s Estate. On July
20, 2020, Spicer, on behalf of the Estate, entered into a Full Release of All Claims
With Indemnity Agreement (hereafter, the Release), thereby releasing Combs from
liability arising from the underlying incident. Thereafter, Spicer filed a wrongful
death claim against Combs on behalf of the Estate. It was subsequently dismissed
on the basis that it was barred by the Release. On April 28, 2021, Spicer filed a
second claim in her individual capacity against Combs alleging intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Combs filed a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, which was granted by the circuit court on the basis that it was
barred by the Release. Spicer appeals to this Court as a matter of right arguing that
the circuit court erred as to its application of the Release and that it misconstrued
the elements of IIED. For the following reasons, we reverse the circuit court and
remand.
ANALYSIS
“Since a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted is a pure question of law, a reviewing court owes no
deference to a trial court’s determination; instead, an appellate court reviews the
issue de novo.” Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, “the pleadings should be liberally construed in the light most
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favorable to the plaintiff, all allegations being taken as true.” Id. We now turn to
the Release, which provides in relevant part as follows:
The undersigned, [Plaintiff] (“Releasor”), as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Tiara Kinder Combs
(“Estate”), being of lawful age, for and in consideration
of the sum of Twenty Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000),
the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby
acknowledged, does on behalf of the Estate and for its
principals, agents, successors, heirs, personal
representatives, executors, administrators and assigns,
knowingly release, acquit, and forever discharge [Mr.
Combs] . . . and all other persons and entities of any
kind or nature liable or who may be claimed to be
liable, of and from any and all actions, causes of
action claims, demands, damages, costs, loss of services,
loss of consortium, expenses, compensation and liability
of any kind, including but not limited to wrongful death
and survivor actions, on account of, or any way
growing out of, any and all known and unknown
personal and bodily injuries and death resulting or to
result from the [Incident] . . . .
(Emphasis added.) The Release is a contract governed by the basic principles of
contract law.
Where a contract is ambiguous or silent on a vital
matter, a court may consider parol and extrinsic evidence
involving the circumstances surrounding execution of the
contract, the subject matter of the contract, the objects to
be accomplished, and the conduct of the parties. Absent
an ambiguity in the contract, the parties’ intentions must
be discerned from the four corners of the instrument
without resort to extrinsic evidence. A contract is
ambiguous if a reasonable person would find it
susceptible to different or inconsistent interpretations.
The fact that one party may have intended different
results, however, is insufficient to construe a contract at
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variance with its plain and unambiguous terms.
Generally, the interpretation of a contract, including
determining whether a contract is ambiguous, is a
question of law for the courts and is subject to de
novo review. However, once a court determines
that a contract is ambiguous, areas of dispute
concerning the extrinsic evidence are factual issues
and construction of the contract become subject to
resolution by the fact-finder.
Cantrell Supply, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 94 S.W.3d 381, 385 (Ky. App. 2002)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In the present case, the language employed in the Release is all
encompassing. See Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ruschell, 834 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Ky.
1992) (“the scope of a release is determined primarily by the intent of the parties as
expressed in the release instrument . . . .” (citation omitted)). However, it is all
encompassing as to claims brought on behalf of the Estate, not Spicer individually.
This is clear considering the subject matter of the Release and the objects to be
accomplished by its execution. See Cantrell, 94 S.W.3d at 385. For example, the
Release was entered into by Spicer as “Personal Representative of the Estate[,]”
not in her individual capacity. Nothing in the Release disclaims Spicer’s right as
an individual to bring a tortious claim that is entirely independent of the Estate and
her role as its representative. And while the elements of IIED may present a
difficult standard to satisfy moving forward, having reviewed the complaint in the
present case and in consideration of the applicable legal standards, we conclude
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that Spicer has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Kroger Co. v.
Willgruber, 920 S.W.2d 61, 65 (Ky. 1996) (citing Craft v. Rice, 671 S.W.2d 247,
249 (Ky. 1984)).1 See also Keaton v. G.C. Williams Funeral Home, Inc., 436
S.W.3d 538, 544-45 (Ky. App. 2013) (providing examples of conduct that has been
held to be sufficiently and insufficiently outrageous).
Spicer’s complaint presents, inter alia, very specific allegations
concerning Combs’ extreme intoxication on the day of the incident as well as his
acts of deceit and active concealment of the circumstances surrounding Tiara’s
death. Spicer further alleges that she “suffered severe and extreme emotional
distress, had to seek medical assistance, and has to take a medication to deal with
the extreme anxiety and grief she has experienced as the result of the events
described in this complaint that [Combs] caused.” Considering the Release and the
entirety of the allegations underlying the complaint, we conclude that the circuit
court erred by dismissing the present case prematurely.
1
The elements of IIED are as follows:
(1) [t]he wrongdoer’s conduct must be intentional or reckless;
(2) [t]he conduct must be outrageous and intolerable in that it offends against the
generally accepted standards of decency and morality;
(3) [t]here must be a causal connection between the wrongdoer’s conduct and the
emotional distress; and
(4) [t]he emotional distress must be severe.
Gilbert v. Barkes, 987 S.W.2d 772, 777 (Ky. 1999).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE The Breathitt Circuit
Court’s order of dismissal entered on August 30, 2021, and REMAND this case to
the circuit court for additional proceedings consistent with this decision.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Ned Pillersdorf Jason S. Morgan
Prestonsburg, Kentucky Betsy R. Catron
Lexington, Kentucky
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