Clifton Eldred v. Stacy Eldred ( 2022 )

Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-0775-DG
CLIFTON ELDRED AND AVERY APPELLANTS
ELDRED
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
v. FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KAREN A. CONRAD, JUDGE
NO. 19-XX-00005
STACY ELDRED APPELLEE
ORDER
DISMISSING
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BEFORE: ACREE, COMBS, AND MAZE, JUDGES.
ACREE, JUDGE: This appeal involves four members in three generations of the
Eldred family. Appellant Clifton Eldred is the paternal grandfather to the youngest
member, Intervening Appellant Avery Eldred, and her brother, Tristan Eldred.
Avery’s and Tristan’s father, Tyler Eldred, was married to Avery’s mother,
Appellee Stacy Eldred, when Tyler died, leaving behind substantial real property
that would pass to her as his surviving spouse and to his children.1
Grandfather Clifton took an interest in Mother Stacy’s management of
Avery’s inheritance after Mother was appointed Avery’s guardian. He was
allowed to intervene in the Oldham District Court guardianship case to challenge
Mother’s management of her daughter’s inheritance, but he had no success. He
appealed the district court’s final order to the Oldham Circuit Court.
In affirming, the Oldham Circuit Court summarized the proceedings
by saying:
The District Court chose not to remove the guardian
in this case. In addition, the District Court was satisfied
with the accounting provided by the guardian to the Court
as was the guardian ad litem representing the interest of
the child. As this Court believes Appellant [Grandfather
Clifton] was incorrectly granted leave to intervene in this
case, Appellant was not entitled to discovery, subpoenas
or to depose the guardian.
For the above reasons, the Court DISMISSES this
appeal.
(Order, p. 6 (Oldham Cir. Ct. May 11, 2020).)
Upon Grandfather Clifton’s petition, this Court granted discretionary
review. However, a change in circumstances necessarily affects our review.
1
Before this appeal was filed, Tristan reached the age of majority or was otherwise emancipated
and is not a party.
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During the pendency of this appeal, Avery successfully petitioned for
her express emancipation. Carricato v. Carricato, 384 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Ky. 1964)
(quoting Nichols v. Harvey & Hancock, 206 Ky. 112, 114, 266 S.W. 870, 871
(1924) (“Express emancipation results when the parent and child voluntarily agree
that the child, able to take care of himself, may go out from his home and make his
own living, receive his own wages and spend them as he pleases.”)). “[W]hen a
child has been emancipated, he occupies the same legal relation towards the parent
as if he has arrived at full age.” Id. The effect of emancipation on the legal
relation towards the grandparent can be no different.
Avery’s emancipation led to the parties’ filing of three motions now
pending before the Court and their resolution has dispositive effect.
First, Appellee Mother Stacy filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that Avery’s emancipation meant Grandfather Clifton lacked standing to pursue
her interests as next friend or otherwise. Alternatively, she sought to have Avery,
as the real party in interest, substituted for Grandfather Clifton as the proper
Appellant to pursue the appeal of the case Grandfather Clifton lost when
representing her interest in the district and circuit courts. That motion was passed
to this merits panel.
Before that motion could be decided, Avery succeeded in intervening
in this appeal as a second Appellant or Intervening Appellant. She then filed her
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own verified motion to dismiss the appeal asserting “Appellant, Clifton Eldred has
no standing to act on Ms. Avery Eldred’s behalf. To be clear, Ms. Eldred has no
desire for Mr. Eldred to act on her behalf.” She then cited authority that Appellant
Clifton Eldred is no longer an “[i]nterested person or entity” as defined in the
chapter of Kentucky Revised Statutes governing guardianships, Kentucky Revised
Statute (KRS) 387.010(2). She also represented that “she has reviewed and is IN
FAVOR of the Appellee Stacy Eldred’s previously filed Motion to Dismiss” and
that she “respectfully moves this Honorable Court to DISMISS this Appeal.”
Appellant Avery has since filed a “Notice” of her “Desire to Abandon
Appeal and Re-Newed Motion to Dismiss[,]” repeating but not adding additional
authority to the grounds for dismissal in her original motion.
Appellant Clifton Eldred responds by arguing the motions to dismiss
are untimely and that this Court should undertake a merits review of the denial of
relief by the two courts that previously denied relief.
We conclude Appellant has lost standing to demand an accounting on
behalf of Intervening Appellant. “[S]tanding is a constitutional requirement to
prosecute any action in the courts of this Commonwealth[.]” Cabinet for Health &
Fam. Servs. v. Sexton, 566 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Ky. 2018) (citing Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992)). Standing
may be conferred by statute; “‘[s]tatutory standing’ refers to ‘whether a statute
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creating a private right of action authorize[d] a particular plaintiff to avail herself
of that right of action.’” Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cty. Hum. Rights Comm’n v.
Hands On Originals, 592 S.W.3d 291, 296 (Ky. 2019) (quoting Lawson v. Off. of
Att’y Gen., 415 S.W.3d 59, 67 (Ky. 2013)). “‘Dismissal for lack of statutory
standing is properly viewed as dismissal . . . for failure to state a claim [upon
which relief may be granted].’” Sexton, 566 S.W.3d at 191 (quoting 13A CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 353 (3d ed.)).
No matter what novel questions a ruling on this appeal may have
resolved, Appellant now lacks standing to pursue his perception of Avery’s
interests; she is legally capable of doing so for herself. We need not address even
whether Avery’s emancipation would exempt her from being considered a minor
under KRS Chapter 387 because she turned eighteen years old on September 5,
2022. Avery is no longer a minor as far as the applicable provisions of KRS
Chapter 387 are concerned, and Appellant is no longer an interested person under
the Act.
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal.
ENTERED: __________________
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.
Jonathan S. Ricketts
Christopher D. Bush
Louisville, Kentucky
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