Shauntez Washington v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2022 )

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 23, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2021-CA-1097-MR
SHAUNTEZ WASHINGTON APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE THOMAS L. TRAVIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 18-CR-01421
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; JONES AND L. THOMPSON,
JUDGES.
THOMPSON, L., JUDGE: Shauntez Washington appeals from an order of the
Fayette Circuit Court which denied his motion to suppress evidence. We find no
error and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 6, 2018, Officer Jesse Mascoe and other officers of the
Lexington Police Department responded to a complaint of homeless people
sleeping in the parking lot of a Valvoline Instant Oil Change. As they were
attending to the homeless people, Appellant drove his vehicle into the parking lot
of the oil change service station and began waiting for his turn to receive an oil
change. Soon after the arrival of Appellant’s vehicle, Officer Mascoe smelled the
odor of marijuana. Officer Mascoe believed the odor was coming from
Appellant’s vehicle.
After finishing with the homeless individuals, Officer Mascoe and
another officer approached Appellant’s vehicle. Upon approaching the vehicle,
Officer Mascoe observed that the passenger door and the sunroof were open. Once
Officer Mascoe got to the vehicle, Appellant rolled down the driver’s side window
and spoke with the officer. Officer Mascoe informed Appellant that he smelled
marijuana coming from his vehicle. Officer Mascoe then began questioning
Appellant. At one point, Officer Mascoe instructed the other officer to check the
vehicle in front of Appellant’s for the smell of marijuana. That officer opened the
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door of the other vehicle and smelled inside. According to that officer, there was
no marijuana odor.1
Officer Mascoe eventually ordered Appellant to exit the vehicle so he
could search it. During the search, the officers found a large quantity of cocaine
and a small quantity of marijuana. Appellant was then indicted for one count of
first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance2 and one count of third-degree
possession of a controlled substance.3
Appellant later moved to suppress the evidence found during the
search. A suppression hearing was held and Officer Mascoe testified.4 Officer
Mascoe testified to the facts of the investigation and was adamant that he smelled
marijuana coming from Appellant’s vehicle. The officer’s body camera footage
was also shown and the officer’s statements on camera also indicated that he was
certain the marijuana smell was emanating from Appellant’s vehicle.
The trial court entered an order denying Appellant’s motion. The
court held that Officer Mascoe had probable cause to search the vehicle based on
1
Later, an employee of the oil change center informed police that he witnessed a large amount of
narcotics inside this other vehicle. Around one hour later, this vehicle was stopped by different
police officers who did smell marijuana inside that vehicle. The vehicle was searched, but no
narcotics were found.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1412.
3
KRS 218A.1417.
4
Officer Mascoe was the only person who testified at the hearing.
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the smell of marijuana. Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to the charges
and reserved the right to appeal the suppression issue. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that there was insufficient probable cause to search
his vehicle. Specifically, he argues that it is impossible to smell the small amount
of marijuana that was found in Appellant’s vehicle. In addition, he argues that
Officer Mascoe was not certain the smell was coming from Appellant’s vehicle
because he had another officer smell the interior of the vehicle in front of
Appellant’s. Finally, he claims that this other vehicle was later stopped and
reportedly also smelled like marijuana; therefore, it was the likely source of the
smell.
Our standard of review of a circuit court’s decision
on a suppression motion following a hearing is twofold.
First, the factual findings of the court are conclusive if
they are supported by substantial evidence. The second
prong involves a de novo review to determine whether
the court’s decision is correct as a matter of law.
Stewart v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 376, 380 (Ky. App. 2000) (footnotes and
citations omitted).
The Court of Appeals . . . [is] entitled to set aside
the trial court’s findings only if those findings are clearly
erroneous. And, the dispositive question that we must
answer, therefore, is whether the trial court’s findings of
fact are clearly erroneous, i.e., whether or not those
findings are supported by substantial evidence.
“[S]ubstantial evidence” is “[e]vidence that a reasonable
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mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion”
and evidence that, when “taken alone or in the light of all
the evidence, . . . has sufficient probative value to induce
conviction in the minds of reasonable men.” Regardless
of conflicting evidence, the weight of the evidence, or the
fact that the reviewing court would have reached a
contrary finding, “due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses” because judging the credibility of
witnesses and weighing evidence are tasks within the
exclusive province of the trial court. Thus, “[m]ere doubt
as to the correctness of [a] finding [will] not justify [its]
reversal,” and appellate courts should not disturb trial
court findings that are supported by substantial evidence.
Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 353-54 (Ky. 2003) (footnotes and citations
omitted).
“All warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable and
unlawful, requiring the Commonwealth to bear the burden of justifying the search
and seizure under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Dunn v.
Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 775, 776 (Ky. App. 2006) (internal quotation marks,
footnote, and citation omitted). One such exception is the “automobile exception,
which allows police to search a legitimately stopped automobile where probable
cause exists that contraband or evidence of a crime is in the vehicle.” Id. (internal
quotation marks, footnote, and citation omitted). In Kentucky, the smell of
marijuana coming from a vehicle gives an officer probable cause to search that
vehicle. Id. at 777; Mayfield v. Commonwealth, 590 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Ky. App.
2019). This is referred to as the “plain smell doctrine.”
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Here, Officer Mascoe testified that he was certain the smell of
marijuana was emanating from Appellant’s vehicle and his body camera footage
corroborated that testimony. He also testified that he had the other officer smell
the interior of the other vehicle in order to reduce the possibility of a confrontation
with Appellant. The trial court believed Officer Mascoe’s testimony that a
marijuana smell was coming from Appellant’s vehicle. The officer’s testimony
was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm. The trial court did not err in
denying Appellant’s motion to suppress because Appellant’s vehicle was properly
searched.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jerry L. Wright Daniel Cameron
Noel Caldwell Attorney General of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky
Christina L. Romano
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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