Estate of Kendrick Bell, Jr. by and Through Lenise Bell as Administratrix v. Laurie Craycroft, M.D. ( 2022 )

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 30, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-0360-MR
ESTATE OF KENDRICK BELL, JR.
BY AND THROUGH LENISE BELL
AS ADMINISTRATRIX APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JUDITH MCDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 19-CI-001148
LAURIE CRAYCROFT, M.D.;
JEWISH HOSPITAL & ST. MARY’S
HEALTHCARE, INC. D/B/A STS. MARY
& ELIZABETH HOSPITAL; ASHLEY
WILLIAMSON, R.N.; MARNISHA
METHENY, R.N.; AND SOUTHEASTERN
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, LLC APPELLEES
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: GOODWINE, MAZE, AND L. THOMPSON, JUDGES.
MAZE, JUDGE: The Estate of Kendrick Bell, Jr., by and through Lenise Bell as
Administratix (the Estate), appeals from a summary judgment of the Jefferson
Circuit Court dismissing its medical-negligence claims against Jewish Hospital &
St. Mary’s Healthcare, Inc., d/b/a Sts. Mary & Elizabeth Hospital; Southeast
Emergency Physicians, LLC; Laurie Craycroft, M.D.; Ashley Williamson, R.N.;
and Marnisa Metheny, R.N. (collectively, the Hospital defendants). The trial court
concluded that the Estate’s complaint was untimely. Based upon Smith v. Fletcher,
613 S.W.3d 18 (Ky. 2020), we conclude that the statute of limitations was tolled
by operation of KRS1 413.270. Hence, we vacate the summary judgment and
remand for further proceedings on the merits of the Estate’s claims.
The relevant facts of this appeal are not in dispute. On July 28, 2017,
Kendrick Bell, Jr. was admitted to Sts. Mary & Elizabeth Hospital Emergency
Room (ER) for a drug overdose. The Hospital discharged Bell following
treatment. However, Bell was returned to the ER later that day. After several days
in a coma, Bell died from an anoxic brain injury.
On October 4, 2017, Bell’s sister, Lenise, was appointed
administratrix of the Estate. Thereafter, on July 25, 2018, the Estate filed a
proposed complaint against the Hospital defendants with the Cabinet for Health
and Family Services’ Medical Review Panel (MRP). While the proposed
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Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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complaint was submitted, the Kentucky Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Commonwealth v Claycomb, 566 S.W.3d 202 (Ky. 2018), holding the MRP
requirement to be unconstitutional in its entirety. Claycomb became final on
February 14, 2019, and the Estate filed its complaint in Jefferson Circuit Court on
February 20, 2019.
In response, the Hospital defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that the complaint was not filed within the one-year statute of
limitations. KRS 413.180. In an order entered on February 12, 2020, the trial
court agreed and granted the motion. The trial court concluded that, since the
Kentucky Supreme Court held the Medical Review Panel Act (MRPA), KRS
216C.005 et seq., to be unconstitutional in its entirety, compliance with the MRP
requirement could not operate to toll the running of the statute of limitations. The
trial court further concluded KRS 413.270(1) had no impact on the statute of
limitations because an MRP was not a “court” within the meaning of that statute.
Subsequently, the trial court denied the Estate’s motion to alter, amend, or vacate,
CR2 59.05, and this appeal followed.
After the trial court entered summary judgment, the Kentucky
Supreme Court accepted transfer of Smith v. Fletcher, No. 2019-SC-0503-TG, 613
S.W.3d 18, to address this issue. Thereafter, on December 17, 2020, the Supreme
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Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Court issued its decision in Smith, supra, definitively resolving the question. In
Smith, as in the current case, the plaintiffs filed a timely complaint with the MRP.
The filing of their claim with the MRP served to toll the applicable statute of
limitations on their claims. See KRS 216C.040(1); Smith, 613 S.W.3d at 21.
After Claycomb became final, the MRP dismissed the action, and the
plaintiffs filed their complaint in circuit court. The defendants, like the Hospital
defendants in this case, moved to dismiss because the complaint was not filed in
circuit court within one year. The plaintiffs argued, among other things, that: (1)
KRS 216C.040(1) still tolled the statute of limitations on their claims because
Claycomb did not apply retroactively; (2) KRS 413.270 acted to toll the statute of
limitations; and (3) the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled. Like the
trial court in this case, the trial court in Smith held that: (1) KRS 216C.040(1)
could not apply because Claycomb held the MRPA to be void ab initio; (2) the
savings statute, KRS 413.270, did not apply because the MRP was not a court or
quasi-judicial tribunal; and (3) the equitable tolling doctrine did not apply because
the plaintiffs could have brought their complaint in circuit court prior to the
running of the statute of limitations. Smith, 613 S.W.3d at 22-23.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that KRS 413.270 operated to
toll the one-year statute of limitations. The Court first addressed the language used
in KRS 413.270, which provides as follows:
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(1) If an action is commenced in due time and in good
faith in any court of this state and the defendants or any
of them make defense, and it is adjudged that the court
has no jurisdiction of the action, the plaintiff or his
representative may, within ninety (90) days from the time
of that judgment, commence a new action in the proper
court. The time between the commencement of the first
and last action shall not be counted in applying any
statute of limitation.
(2) As used in this section, “court” means all courts,
commissions, and boards which are judicial or quasi-
judicial tribunals authorized by the Constitution or
statutes of the Commonwealth of Kentucky or of the
United States of America.
The central issue in Smith concerned whether the MRP was a “court”
within the meaning of the statute. The Supreme Court concluded that, while the
MRP was not an adjudicative body, it performed a quasi-judicial role, in that the
agency was “required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for [its]
official action.” Smith, 613 S.W.3d at 25-26 (quoting Roach v. Kentucky Parole
Board, 553 S.W.3d 791, 794 (Ky. 2018)).
Medical review panels were tasked with reviewing
evidence submitted by the parties, including
“nonprivileged medical records, X-rays, lab tests,
excerpts of treatises, depositions of witnesses including
parties, and affidavits.” KRS 216C.160(2). They had the
power to “issue administrative subpoenas and subpoenas
duces tecum in aid of the taking of depositions and the
production of documentary evidence for inspection or
copying, or both.” KRS 216C.160(4). Further, KRS
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216C.170(2) bestowed the following rights on medical
review panels:
(a) The panel has the right and duty to
request all necessary and relevant
information.
(b) The panel may consult with medical
authorities.
(c) The panel may examine reports of other
health care providers necessary to fully
inform the panel regarding the issue to be
decided.
(d) All parties shall have full access to any
material submitted to the panel.
(e) The panel may conduct a hearing to
question counsel or ask the parties to answer
specific questions.
Finally, after reviewing all of the evidence,
[t]he panel has the sole duty to express the
panel’s opinion as to whether or not the
evidence supports the conclusion that a
defendant or defendants acted or failed to
act within the appropriate standards of care
as charged in the complaint and whether any
such failure was a substantial factor in
providing a negative outcome for that
patient.
KRS 216C.180(1). The panel’s opinion was its final
action, and after it gave its opinion as to each defendant,
“the panel is dissolved and shall take no further action.”
KRS 216C.180(4).
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It is clear that the medical review panels
investigated facts and weighed evidence. They were
permitted to hold hearings and subpoena witnesses.
Panel members used their discretion in reaching a
conclusion, and their final official action was the
issuance of an opinion. As such, we conclude that
medical review panels were quasi-judicial in nature.
The defendants next argue that medical review
panels were not tribunals, as they were not “a court or
other adjudicatory body.” Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc.
v. County of Boone, 180 S.W.3d 464, 468 (Ky. 2005)
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999)).
Again, the defendants focus their argument too much on
the lack of a final adjudication from the medical review
panel. Although Black’s Law Dictionary still defines
“tribunal” as “a court or other adjudicatory body,” it also
defines “administrative tribunal.” One definition of
“administrative tribunal” is “an administrative agency
exercising a quasi-judicial function.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Under this definition, we
are again called upon to define “quasi-judicial function,”
and again define it in such a way as to include medical
review panels, for all the reasons previously stated.
Id. at 26.
The Supreme Court further held that the MRP properly exercised
jurisdiction over the complaint until Claycomb held the MRPA to be
unconstitutional. When the MRPA was struck down as unconstitutional in
Claycomb, the MRP no longer had jurisdiction over medical malpractice claims to
prevent their filing in circuit court, as they no longer had “power to do anything at
all.” Smith, 613 S.W.3d at 27. The Court concluded:
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We believe the above interpretation of KRS
413.270 is consistent with its remedial nature and its
intention to allow parties to obtain a trial on the merits
despite some kind of mistake in location of filing. See
Jent [v. Commonwealth, Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet, 862 S.W.2d 318, 320
(Ky. 1993)]; D. & J. Leasing, Inc. [v. Hercules Galion
Products, Inc., 429 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Ky. 1968)]. We
find this particularly true in this case where the “mistake
of location” was one created by statute and the plaintiff’s
proper reliance on the statute and was not created by the
plaintiff’s own error. It is also consistent with the
overarching purpose behind statutes of limitations.
“Statutes of limitations ‘promote justice by preventing
surprises through [plaintiffs’] revival of claims that have
been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost,
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.’”
CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 8-9, 134 S. Ct.
2175, 189 L. Ed. 2d 62 (2014) (quoting [Order of]
Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
321 U.S. 342, 348-349, 64 S. Ct. 582, 88 L. Ed. 788(1944)). In a case such as this, no surprise or injustice is
created by a holding that the Smiths’ claims were timely
filed in circuit court. These claims were litigated and
defended during the medical review panel process. The
defendants knew the nature of the claims and the facts
underlying those claims; these claims were not left to
“slumber” in a manner that placed the defendants’ ability
to defend the claims against them at risk.
Id.Turning back to the current case, the Hospital defendants concede that
the holding of Smith v. Fletcher is determinative as to the outcome of this appeal.
We fully recognize that the trial court did not have the benefit of that decision
when the summary judgment motion was submitted. Consequently, we cannot
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fault the trial court for failing to anticipate that decision. Nevertheless, we are
bound to follow controlling precedent issued by our Supreme Court. SCR3
1.030(8)(a). See also Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 642 (Ky. 1986).
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in determining that
the Estate’s claim was untimely. Pursuant to Smith, KRS 413.270 operated to toll
the running of the one-year statute of limitations for ninety days after Claycomb
became final on February 14, 2019. Since the Estate filed its complaint only five
days thereafter, the trial court erred by dismissing it as untimely.
Finally, we note that, in Smith, the plaintiffs filed their claims with the
MRP against the individual defendants, but not the hospital or entity defendants.
The Supreme Court held that KRS 413.270 did not toll the statute of limitations
against the latter defendants because no claim was pending against them in the
MRP. Here, the Hospital defendants concede that the Estate named the entity and
the individual defendants in the complaint filed with the MRP. Therefore, we
conclude that the Estate is entitled to proceed on the merits of its claims against all
defendants.
Accordingly, we vacate the summary judgment of the Jefferson
Circuit Court, and we remand this matter for further proceedings on the merits of
the Estate’s claims.
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Kentucky Rules of the Supreme Court.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Lonita K. Baker Patricia C. Le Meur
Louisville, Kentucky Susan D. Phillips
Louisville, Kentucky
Joey A. Wright
Eleanor M.B. Davis
Louisville, Kentucky
David A. Trevey
Melanie S. Marrs
Lexington, Kentucky
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