Helen Land v. Bryan Zachary Land ( 2023 )

RENDERED: MARCH 10, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-0470-MR
HELEN LAND APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JEREMY MICHAEL MATTOX, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 20-CI-00815
BRYAN ZACHARY LAND; CHERYL
L. LAND; KATHERINE Y. SHORT;
AND UNKNOWN SPOUSE OF
KATHERINE Y. SHORT APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: JONES, KAREM, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
KAREM, JUDGE: Helen Land appeals from the Scott Circuit Court’s order
dismissing her quiet title action for failure to state a claim. Finding no error, we
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case involves a dispute between siblings over real property
owned by their parents. George Land, Jr. and Dorothy C. Land were married and
had two children – Helen and Bryan Land. On March 2, 1959, George and
Dorothy Land purchased property at 566 Crumbaugh Road in Georgetown,
Kentucky (the “Property”) in fee simple and with the right of survivorship.
In 1968, George and Dorothy executed a Joint Will (the “Joint Will”).
The pertinent terms of the Joint Will are as follows:
It is the will of each of us that on the death of
either of us, all of the property of the deceased party,
whether real or personal, and wheresoever situate, shall
descend to and become the sole property of the surviving
party.
...
In the event we should die in a common disaster,
or from a common cause, we give, bequeath and devise
all of our estate, real and personal, of every kind and
description, wheresoever situate, to the surviving
children born of our marriage, absolutely and in equal
shares and in fee simple.
...
This Joint Will is made in performance of a written
contract entered into simultaneously with the execution
of this Will and by the terms of which each of us
contracted with the other to execute this Will; and by the
further term of which we, and each of us, contracted that
we should not revoke this Will in whole or in part, or
attempt to do so.
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George and Dorothy also executed a separate agreement on the same day (the
“Agreement”). The Agreement was recorded with the Joint Will and stated in
pertinent part:
1. That each party shall devise and bequeath to the other
all of his or her estate, real and personal property,
wheresoever situate, to be the surviving party’s
property absolutely and in fee simple.
2. That in the event the parties hereto shall die in a
common disaster, then and in that event, said Last
Will and Testament shall provide that all the property
of the parties hereto, real and personal, wheresoever
situate, shall be the property of the surviving children
born of the marriage of the parties hereto, to be theirs
absolutely and in equal shares and in fee simple.
....
6. Said Will shall further provide that neither party shall
revoke said Will in whole, or in part, nor attempt to
do so, except with the written permission of both
parties.
While George passed away in 1986, Dorothy lived for approximately thirty more
years, passing away on August 26, 2016.
Beginning in 1999 and continuing until 2011, Dorothy divided the
Property into separate lots. She transferred ownership of all the parcels to herself,
Bryan, and Bryan’s wife, Cheryl, in fee simple with the right of survivorship.
Additionally, Bryan and Cheryl sold a portion of the Property to Katherine Short in
fee simple in 2017 after Dorothy’s death.
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On December 29, 2020, Helen filed a complaint requesting, among
other relief, that the circuit court enter an order quieting title to the property and
determining that she had an ownership interest in the property under the Joint Will.
Bryan, Cheryl, and Katherine filed motions to dismiss, and the circuit court held a
hearing on March 4, 2021. Thereafter, the circuit court entered an order
concluding that Helen’s complaint against Bryan, Cheryl, and Katherine had failed
to state a claim upon which the court could grant relief related to any interest she
may have in the Property. Thus, the circuit court dismissed Helen’s quiet title
claims with prejudice.
Helen filed a motion for reconsideration, which the circuit court
denied on March 28, 2022. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
a. Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim de novo. Barnett v. Central Kentucky Hauling, LLC, 617 S.W.3d 339, 341
(Ky. 2021). Moreover, like the trial court, it must take the material, factual
allegations in the complaint as true. Id. Indeed, “[i]n ruling on a motion to
dismiss, the pleadings should be liberally construed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff[.]” Morgan v. Bird, 289 S.W.3d 222, 226 (Ky. 2009) (citation
omitted). Thus, a court properly dismisses a complaint for failure to state a claim
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where the plaintiff “appears not to be entitled to relief under any set of facts which
could be proven in support of his claim.” Id. (citation omitted).
b. Discussion
In Kentucky, “a plaintiff seeking to establish title must sustain his
claim either by record title or adverse possession; he must recover on the strength
of his title and not upon the weakness of his adversary’s title[.]” Gabbard v.
Lunsford, 308 Ky. 836, 215 S.W.2d 985, 986 (1948).
Thus, we must first determine whether the circuit court correctly
dismissed Helen’s complaint for failing to allege facts sufficient to establish a
claim of title to the Property under the Joint Will. In construing the pleadings in
favor of Helen, we will assume that, upon George’s death, the Joint Will became
irrevocable, and Dorothy could not dispose of the Property in a manner other than
under the terms of the Joint Will.
Therefore, we must examine the language of the Joint Will to
determine how the parties intended to dispose of the Property under the Joint Will.
“[T]he intention of a testator, as gathered from the four corners of the will, is the
one to be adopted and enforced by the court” and “in applying that rule, the
language that the testator used, and not the language he might have used, controls.”
Underwood v. Underwood, 273 Ky. 654, 117 S.W.2d 596, 598 (1938).
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In this case, the Joint Will’s language, whether it is read
independently or together with the Agreement, is unambiguous: George and
Dorothy intended that the surviving spouse receive the entire estate if the spouses
did not pass away “in a common disaster” or “from a common cause.” While the
Joint Will did not use the words “in fee simple,” that was clearly what was
intended by the phrase “become the sole property of the surviving party.”
Moreover, the Joint Will contained no language of intention that the
surviving spouse was only to have a life estate in the Property. See Smith v.
Newton, 308 Ky. 136, 213 S.W.2d 1002 (1948) (the Court found no indication that
the parties intended a devise to a married brother to be a life estate based on the
clear testamentary language in the joint will). Here, the parties used no language
in the Joint Will to designate how the parties intended the remainder of the
surviving spouse’s property to be distributed. Instead, it is clear from the
documents that George and Dorothy meant for the survivor to have full ownership
of the Property and to inherit their estates solely, absolutely, and in fee simple. It
was only in the event of the spouse’s joint death from a “common disaster,” or a
“common cause” should the children of their marriage share equally in their
estates.
Thus, upon George’s death thirty years after executing the Joint Will,
Dorothy became the owner of his entire estate, including the Property, in fee
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simple. The fact that the deed to the Property was held by the spouses jointly with
right of survivorship further attests to their intentions regarding their estate plan.
In sum, Helen “appears not to be entitled to relief under any set of
facts which could be proven in support” of her claim, and the circuit court properly
granted the motion to dismiss her complaint. Morgan, 289 S.W.3d at 226 (citation
omitted).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Scott Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Jason M. Obermeyer Meredith Schuh Fannin
Georgetown, Kentucky John P. Watz
G. Edward Henry, II
Lexington, Kentucky
D. Barry Stilz
Lexington, Kentucky
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