Cynthia Hayes as of the Estate of Donna Ann Hayes v. Colgate-Palmolive Company ( 2021 )

RENDERED: JANUARY 29, 2021; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2019-CA-1343-MR
CYNTHIA HAYES, as Executrix of the Estate
of DONNA ANN HAYES APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE ANGELA MCCORMICK-BISIG, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 16-CI-003503
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE COMPANY
and JOHNSON & JOHNSON APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART,
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; GOODWINE AND KRAMER,
JUDGES.
KRAMER, JUDGE: For decades, Donna Hayes used talcum powder products
manufactured by appellees Johnson & Johnson (“J&J”) and Colgate-Palmolive
Company (“Colgate”). On December 17, 2016, Donna passed away due to
mesothelioma. Cynthia Hayes, as the executrix of Donna’s estate, filed suit against
J&J and Colgate in Jefferson Circuit Court, alleging their talcum powder products
contained asbestos; that the asbestos caused Donna’s mesothelioma; and that J&J
and Colgate were therefore liable for Donna’s death. Her suit ultimately
progressed to a jury trial, which culminated in a defense verdict.
On appeal, Cynthia raises three issues which, respectively, relate to
(1) the jury instructions; (2) the trial court’s decision to permit J&J to adduce what
could be characterized as “personal use” testimony from its corporate
representative; and (3) the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence relating to a
scientific article Cynthia wished to adduce. Upon review, we find no error relative
to her first and third points. But, we hold that the trial court committed reversible
error with respect to the second. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand for a new trial with respect to J&J.
I. Jury Instructions
Cynthia takes issue with how the trial court instructed the jury
regarding her claims of negligence against the appellees. Alleged errors in jury
instructions are reviewed “de novo to determine whether the instructions were
based upon the evidence and whether they properly and intelligibly state the law.”
Combs v. Stortz, 276 S.W.3d 282, 288 (Ky. App. 2009). “An error in a court’s
instructions must appear to have been prejudicial to the appellant’s substantial
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rights or to have affected the merits of the case or to have misled the jury or to
have brought about an unjust verdict in order to constitute sufficient ground for
reversal of the judgment.” Miller v. Miller, 296 S.W.2d 684, 687-88 (Ky. 1956)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, the trial court’s instruction was as
follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 1
NEGLIGENCE
It was the duty of Defendants Colgate-Palmolive and
Johnson & Johnson to exercise ordinary care in the
manufacture and distribution of the talcum powder
products at issue in this case. “Ordinary care” means
such care as you would expect an ordinarily prudent
company engaged in the same type of business as
Defendants to exercise under the same or similar
circumstances. To find in favor of Plaintiff, Cynthia
Hayes, you must be satisfied from the evidence that:
A. Donna Hayes was exposed to asbestos from one or
more of the products designed, specified, prepared,
manufactured, distributed, sold, and/or marketed by one
or both of the Defendants;
AND
B. One or more of the talcum powder products at issue
in this case were not in a reasonably safe condition at the
time they were sold by Colgate-Palmolive and/or Johnson
& Johnson;
AND
C. In the exercise of ordinary care, Colgate-Palmolive
and/or Johnson & Johnson should have been aware of the
product’s unsafe condition;
-3-
AND
D. The product’s unsafe condition was a substantial
factor in causing Donna Hayes’ injury.
(Emphasis added.)
Cynthia’s arguments take issue with what is emphasized above. Her
first argument, in the words of her brief, is that “[a] finding that Appellees’ product
[sic] ‘were not in a reasonably safe condition at the time they were sold’ is an
element of strict liability, not negligence. Thus, it was error to include this element
in the negligence instruction.”
Cynthia is incorrect. Any products liability theory based upon either
strict liability or negligence is grounded in the principle that “[t]he manufacturer
has a non-delegable duty to provide a product reasonably safe for its foreseeable
uses[.]” Montgomery Elevator Co. v. McCullough, 676 S.W.2d 776, 782 (Ky.
1984); see also Ostendorf v. Clark Equipment Co., 122 S.W.3d 530, 535 (Ky.
2003) (“[U]nder either theory, it is the legal duty of a manufacturer to use
reasonable care to protect against foreseeable dangers.”). Thus, contrary to
Cynthia’s understanding, both theories are conditioned upon the existence of a
defective product (i.e., a product that is not reasonably safe for its foreseeable
uses). Instead, the difference between strict liability and negligence lies in the
element of knowledge: “[N]egligence turns on actual knowledge of a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous, or a condition which, under the exercise of
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ordinary care, should have been discovered or foreseen. Conversely, strict liability
may be imposed where the eventual defect or resulting harm was merely
speculative or hypothetical at best.” Worldwide Equipment, Inc. v. Mullins, 11
S.W.3d 50, 55 (Ky. App. 1999).
Next, Cynthia notes that “not reasonably safe” is largely
interchangeable with the phrase “unreasonably dangerous” in the context of
negligence.1 And, citing Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., Inc., 602 S.W.2d 429,
433 (Ky. 1980), she asserts that the Kentucky Supreme Court “requires” the phrase
“unreasonably dangerous” to be defined in jury instructions. As such, she reasons
the trial court erred by failing to define “not reasonably safe” in the jury
instructions.
To be sure, the phrases “unreasonably dangerous” or “not reasonably
safe” do contemplate a variety of evidentiary factors, such as “feasibility of making
a safer product, patency of the danger, warnings and instructions, subsequent
maintenance and repair, misuse, and the products’ inherently unsafe
characteristics[.]” McCullough, 676 S.W.2d at 780 (Ky. 1984). However,
attempting to define those phrases in jury instructions can do more harm than
1
See, e.g., Boland-Maloney Lumber Co., Inc. v. Burnett, 302 S.W.3d 680, 691 (Ky. App. 2009)
(“When not used in the product liability context, the term ‘unreasonably dangerous’ is typically
found in premises liability cases and is synonymous or interchangeable with such terms or
phrases as ‘reasonably safe’ or ‘unreasonable risk of harm.’”)
-5-
good, which is a point Nichols highlights. There, contrary to Cynthia’s
understanding of that strict liability matter, the trial court was not reversed for
failing to define “unreasonably dangerous.” It was reversed for providing an
inaccurate definition which improperly limited the meaning of that phrase.2
In other words, Nichols typifies why our Supreme Court cautions
against “instructions getting into evidentiary matters, subquestions which better
practice suggests should be omitted from the instructions and left to the lawyers to
flesh out in closing arguments.” Ford Motor Co. v. Fulkerson, 812 S.W.2d 119,
123 (Ky. 1991); see also Cox v. Cooper, 510 S.W.2d 530, 535 (Ky. 1974) (“Our
approach to instructions is that they should provide only the bare bones, which can
be fleshed out by counsel in their closing arguments if they so desire.”).
Lastly, re-emphasizing her prior two arguments, Cynthia contends the
jury instruction set forth above caused her to suffer prejudicial error. To
summarize, however, the use of “not reasonably safe” in the instruction did not
misrepresent the applicable law; Cynthia cites no authority indicating the
instructions were required to define that phrase; and, Cynthia was free to flesh out
2
See Nichols, 602 S.W.2d at 432-33 (“It is clear that instruction four limited the jury to finding
the product unreasonably [dangerous] if, and only if, it was more dangerous than an ordinary
adult would expect it to be. . . . We believe that consumer knowledge, the factor considered
below, is only one of the factors that should be before the jury in determining whether a product
is unreasonably dangerous.”).
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the meaning of “not reasonably safe” in her closing arguments. Accordingly, no
error occurred in this respect.
II. Personal use testimony
Cynthia takes issue with what she asserts was improper testimony
from J&J’s witness, John Hopkins, Ph.D. Hopkins is a toxicologist who was not
employed by J&J, but rather by various J&J subsidiaries (i.e., Johnson and Johnson
United Kingdom; Johnson and Johnson Consume Inc.; and Johnson and Johnson
France) for approximately twenty years during the 1970s through the 1990s. J&J
did not offer him as an expert at trial. Instead, J&J offered him as its corporate
representative and as the witness most qualified to speak on its behalf regarding (1)
what it knew about the health hazards of asbestos exposure; (2) the general topic of
cosmetic talc; and (3) J&J’s policy that there is no place for asbestos in cosmetic
talc. As to Dr. Hopkins’ testimony at issue, the trial court permitted J&J, on direct
examination, to ask Dr. Hopkins about his personal use of its product; and it
allowed him to answer by stating he had no concerns about the safety, and by
describing, at length, that he had not only used J&J’s baby powder on himself
throughout his lifetime but had also used it for decades on his three children and
eight grandchildren.
J&J adduced this evidence of Dr. Hopkins’ personal use of its talc
products because, in its view, it was relevant to rebut Cynthia’s punitive damages
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claim. J&J asserted Cynthia had put its state of mind, intent, and motive directly at
issue by contending it knew there was asbestos in its products and had concealed
that information from the public and the FDA.3 J&J argued that because Dr.
Hopkins had been employed at various J&J subsidiaries for purposes of evaluating
the safety of its talc products, he would have been aware of testing results on the
talc used in J&J’s products and would not have intentionally used an asbestos-
containing product on himself and his family. The inference J&J sought to draw
from Dr. Hopkins’ personal use testimony was that Dr. Hopkins believed J&J’s
cosmetic talc products were safe. And, because Dr. Hopkins had been designated
J&J’s corporate representative and had been authorized to testify on its behalf, J&J
reasoned his beliefs were effectively J&J’s beliefs; and that this therefore indicated
J&J lacked the motive or intent to knowingly conceal asbestos contamination.
Prior to trial, Cynthia sought to exclude this testimony as irrelevant
and unduly prejudicial. To that effect, she pointed out in her motion in limine and
at a related hearing that no evidence suggested Dr. Hopkins, who had only worked
at J&J subsidiaries, had ever been a corporate decisionmaker at J&J; had ever
personally tested J&J’s talc for asbestos; or that J&J had even been aware of his
personal use of its products. She argued that regardless of whether the jury was
informed of Dr. Hopkins’ status as a purely fact witness, his extensive experience
3
United States Food and Drug Administration.
-8-
as a toxicologist, taken in conjunction with the insinuation that he believed J&J’s
talc products were safe, could nevertheless confuse jurors into treating him as an
expert opining that J&J’s talc products are safe. Further, she argued it would be
impossible to effectively cross-examine Dr. Hopkins regarding the truth or
consequences of his and his family’s use of J&J’s talc products without conducting
what could amount to several collateral mini-trials.
As indicated, the trial court ultimately overruled Cynthia’s objection.
Moreover, the trial court limited the scope of what Cynthia could ask Dr. Hopkins
about his personal use testimony on cross-examination, stating during the July 15,
2019 hearing on Cynthia’s motion in limine, “I will not allow it to go into a mini-
trial to go into whether [Dr. Hopkins] actually used it or not. I think the question
should be asked, he can answer, and we can move on.” The trial court further
elaborated upon its decision, stating:
Somebody has to speak on behalf of a corporate,
corporation, and the corporate rep is designated for that
and can bind the corporation. I think to the extent that
Mr. [sic] Hopkins can say that he used it on whoever in
his own family, you can certainly impeach him, if you
think it can’t possibly be the product that Ms. Hayes
used, or in the time frame, or that. You can impeach him
on that, but again, I think it’s relevant to show intent,
motive, bias.
Consistent with the trial court’s decision, J&J thereafter alluded to Dr.
Hopkins’ above-described personal use testimony in its opening arguments;
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elicited it at trial; and, in its closing arguments, J&J summarized and characterized
it as follows:
Let’s talk about Vermont. You heard a lot from Dr.
Hopkins about this because by the time he was starting to
join the company, it was Vermont that was the source [of
J&J’s talc], so he has much more personal knowledge
about that. Started working at Johnson and Johnson in
1976. And I put up here “actions speak louder than
words” because I’m going to talk a little bit about that
with Dr. Egilman,[4] too. He worked there, he’s a
toxicologist, he was intimately involved in talc safety
issues. He used this product on himself, on his children,
and on his grandkids. One of the questions you’re gonna
be asked here, and we’ll get to that a little later, is
punitive damages – the idea that you’re just grossly
reckless, did not care whether they hurt people. If that’s
true, how can that be true when you’re using it on your
own kids? We’ve heard from Mr. Satterley the idea that
somehow he didn’t know anything about talc when he
was using it. This timeline shows you that’s not true. By
the time he was using it on his grandkids, he had been in
multiple positions in charge of talc issues, been at the
company for a, you know, decades.
On appeal, Cynthia asserts the trial court erred in admitting Dr.
Hopkins’ personal use testimony, and for the reasons she asserted prior to trial (i.e.,
that it was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial). We agree.
We note at the onset that during the hearing on J&J’s motion in
limine, J&J’s counsel acknowledged that litigation similar to this matter has taken
place elsewhere in the United States; and that this was not the first time in this type
4
Dr. David Egilman was Cynthia’s causation expert.
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of litigation that it has attempted to elicit testimony from Dr. Hopkins about his use
of J&J talc products on himself and his family. As its counsel stated, “There have
been cases where it’s been let in, and there’s been cases where it hasn’t been let
in.” Notwithstanding, the legal arguments surrounding its admission have been
largely consistent with the legal arguments put forth here.5 And, the arguments
against its admission are compelling.
We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.
Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Ky. 2007) (citing Woodard v.
Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 63 (Ky. 2004)). “The test for an abuse of discretion
is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles.” Id. (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000)).
As discussed, Cynthia argues Dr. Hopkins’ testimony was irrelevant
and thus inadmissible. See KRE6 401 and 402. To review, J&J argued Dr.
Hopkins’ testimony was a relevant reflection of its corporate state of mind for
purposes of punitive damages. But, apart from citing caselaw delineating the
general standard for admitting or excluding evidence, its argument was premised
5
See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 2018-CP-40-001781, 2019 WL 2358784 (S.C.
Com. Pl.) (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (April 5, 2019); Cabibi v. Johnson &
Johnson, No. BC665257, 2019 WL 9630553 (Cal. Super.) (Trial Motion, Memorandum and
Affidavit) (July 22, 2019).
6
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
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upon little more; namely: (1) a broad reference to CR7 30.02(6), which permits an
entity to designate a person “to testify on its behalf . . . as to matters known or
reasonably available to the organization”; (2) its own understanding that “corporate
knowledge and opinions” are relevant to punitive damages in Kentucky; and (3) its
limited reading of Bose Corp. v. Ejaz, 732 F.3d 17, 27 (1st Cir. 2013), which, as
J&J emphasizes, stated:
Bose points to several material differences between its
Australian products and the American products that Ejaz
sold in Australia. Those differences include region
coding, which will keep an American DVD player from
playing Australian DVDs and vice versa; electrical power
requirements, which prevent American electronics from
functioning on Australian power supplies and vice versa;
capabilities of the remote controls; durations of the
products’ warranties; and the design and functionality of
the products’ radio tuners. Evidence in the record, such
as Bose’s corporate representative’s testimony based on
his personal experience and Ejaz’s testimony in his
deposition, as well as Ejaz’s later admissions, supports
that there are material differences in the products.
(Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.)
As an aside, the corporate representative in Ejaz provided “personal
experience” testimony to reflect his knowledge (i.e., what he knew of the objective
differences between Bose’s American and Australian products). Indeed,
knowledge is the common thread between Ejaz, CR 30.02(6), and Kentucky’s
7
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure.
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punitive damages statute, KRS8 411.186. And, there is little controversy in the
principle that a corporation’s knowledge may be ascertained through the
knowledge of its agents. See Devasier v. James, 278 S.W.3d 625, 631 (Ky. 2009)
(noting “the general principle of law that knowledge or notice to an agent is
imputed to the principal.”).
Knowledge was likewise at issue in Cynthia’s punitive damages claim
against J&J. Specifically, KRS 411.186(a)-(e) required the trier of fact to assess
whether J&J – as a corporate whole – had made an informed decision to sell what
it deemed a safe product. To that end, the science relating to J&J’s product was
relevant, e.g., what J&J knew, when it knew it, and the extent to which it kept itself
informed.
But, Dr. Hopkins’ personal choice to use J&J’s talc products had no
bearing upon J&J’s mindset, or upon what the trial court characterized as J&J’s
“intent, motive, bias.” Indeed, none of J&J’s cited authorities stand for the
proposition that – like knowledge – the subjective belief, opinion, or personal
choice of an agent is imputed to the principal; after all, an individual stating a
personal choice is speaking for himself, not as the representative of someone else.
Dr. Hopkins’ testimony was likewise irrelevant because a company
executive’s reasons for using the company’s product may reflect a myriad of
8
Kentucky Revised Statute.
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interests that have nothing to do with a collective corporate conscious
determination that the product is safe. Executives might have a greater tolerance
for risk, for example; or, they might wish to display loyalty to the company above
other concerns. This type of self-serving anecdotal evidence has no evidentiary
value, given the numerous reasons why a company executive or long-time
employee might use their company’s product regardless of the risks to themselves
and their families – or at least claim that they did so under direct examination by
the company’s attorneys.
Additionally, Cynthia argued Dr. Hopkins’ testimony was unduly
prejudicial. See KRE 403. And, while no Kentucky authority has addressed the
subject of a corporate representative’s “personal use” testimony in relation to KRE
403, we agree. Citing equivalent federal law, federal decisions have explained
how personal use testimony by defense witnesses leads to unwarranted and lengthy
mini-trials and a substantial risk of confusing the jury.9
9
Despite the unpublished status of the various federal orders cited herein, we cite them as
persuasive authority regarding KRE 403. Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 403 is “virtually
identical” to KRE 403. See Anderson v. Commonwealth, 281 S.W.3d 761, 764, n.10 (Ky. 2009).
“It is well established that Kentucky courts rely upon Federal caselaw when interpreting a
Kentucky rule of procedure that is similar to its federal counterpart.” Hensley v. Haynes
Trucking, LLC, 549 S.W.3d 430, 436, n.4 (Ky. 2018) (citations omitted). And, in accordance
with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) 32.1, “A court may not prohibit or restrict the
citation of federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have
been: (i) designated as “unpublished” . . . and (ii) issued . . . after January 1, 2007.” While
Kentucky courts are not bound by FRAP 32.1 or federal cases interpreting Kentucky law, the
federal judiciary has determined that all of its opinions rendered after January 1, 2007, have
equally persuasive import without regard to their designation as unpublished.
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In re Yasmin and Yaz,10 for example, involved claims that Bayer had
manufactured harmful oral contraceptives. There, Bayer proffered “testimony
from its present and former employees pertaining to the employees’ personal use
(or their family members’ personal use) of the oral contraceptives[.]” Id. at *1.
The court found that this type of personal use testimony was inadmissible because:
Even if one were to conclude that such evidence was
relevant, the Court finds that the prejudice to the
plaintiffs far outweighs any probative value gleaned from
introducing the evidence. It would be highly prejudicial
for the jury to hear from some people who say they take
the product, have their daughters take the product and
haven’t [had] one day of health problems as a result of it.
On the other hand, where is the probative value from
anecdotally taking an infinitesimal number of patients out
of the entire patient population who have not had any
problems with the product when the theory is not that
every patient has problems, but that more than is
advertised or warned will have problems and more than
the FDA was led to believe would have problems? On
balance, the evidence should not come in.
Id. The Court also added that if such defense testimony were allowed, it would
effectively require an equivalent amount of mini-trials for purposes of
impeachment and rebuttal. The plaintiffs would be permitted to discover and
prove “the relevant medical histories of each current or former employee that has
10
In re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Marketing, Sales Practices and Relevant Products
Liability Litigation, No. 3:09-MD-02100-DRH, 2011 WL 2650948 (S.D. Ill. June 29, 2011).
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testified regarding personal use of the subject drugs or any witness that Bayer
intends to offer at trial for that purpose.” Id. at *2.
In In re Xarelto,11 the defendants were sued for manufacturing an
allegedly harmful anticoagulant drug. The defendants proffered testimony about
“the anticoagulant use (including Xarelto) and the associated medical treatment
and condition of their employees including Dr. Theodore Spiro and Dr. Peter
Dibattiste, as well as the family members of certain employees including Dr.
Spiro’s wife, Dr. Gary Peters’ wife, Nauman Shah’s mother, and Susan Geiger’s
father.” Id. at *1. The Xarelto Court similarly excluded the proffered testimony as
unfairly prejudicial, while allowing for potential reconsideration only if the
defendants produced all relevant medical records pertaining to the defense
witnesses and their families for purposes of cross-examination, explaining:
Each person who takes Xarelto is different, and the
circumstances are different. In fairness, there ought to be
some testing of the specific circumstances of that person
if the Defendants wish to bring up this issue at trial.
Accordingly, Defendants will not be permitted to elicit
information about a witness’ family member taking
Xarelto without producing their medical records.
Id. at *2.
11
In re Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Products Liability Litigation, No. MDL 2592, 2017 WL 2780760
(E.D. La. May 26, 2017).
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Likewise, in In re: Tylenol,12 where manufacturers of Tylenol were
sued because Tylenol caused liver damage, the defendants also proffered personal-
use testimony by their employees. Id. at *3-4. Drawing a distinction from the
plaintiff’s own relevant personal use of the product, the Tylenol Court found that
the defense witnesses’ personal use testimony was inadmissible because “the
prejudice that such testimony may cause substantially outweighs any probative
value it may have.” Id. at *4. Accordingly, the Court excluded it for the same
reasons elucidated in Yasmin and Xarelto.
Here, the trial court unduly prejudiced Cynthia’s case against J&J. It
allowed J&J to elicit irrelevant personal and family use testimony from its witness,
Dr. Hopkins. His irrelevant testimony gave rise to an unnecessary distraction by
putting the medical histories of those individuals at issue. Further compounding its
error, the trial court then effectively shielded Dr. Hopkins’ testimony by precluding
Cynthia from examining the medical histories of the individuals implicated in Dr.
Hopkins’ testimony and instead limiting the scope of Cynthia’s permissible cross-
examination to, in the trial court’s words, “the extent that Mr. [sic] Hopkins can
say that he used it on whoever in his own family, . . . [or] if you think it can’t
possibly be the product that Ms. Hayes used, or in the time frame, or that.”
12
In re: Tylenol (Acetaminophen) Marketing, No. 2:12-cv-07263, 2016 WL 3125428 (E.D. Pa.
June 3, 2016).
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In its appellate brief, J&J downplays the significance of Dr. Hopkins’
testimony:
Plaintiff is wrong in arguing that this testimony was
unduly prejudicial. Plaintiff first asserts that this
testimony encouraged the jury to disregard the experts on
issues of contamination and safety. But J&J’s position
was amply supported by extensive expert evidence
regarding both the safety of J&J cosmetic talc and the
thoroughness and reliability of J&J’s testing. Further,
both J&J and plaintiff’s counsel reminded the jury that
Dr. Hopkins was not an expert.
(Record citations omitted.)
Conspicuously, though, J&J stops short of arguing that Cynthia did
not also adduce expert evidence in support of her contrary positions “regarding
both the safety of J&J cosmetic talc and the thoroughness and reliability of J&J’s
testing,” or that it was otherwise entitled to judgment as a matter of law based upon
the sufficiency of the evidence presented. And that, in turn, highlights the primary
reason why Dr. Hopkins’ testimony was unduly prejudicial and why the trial
court’s error in admitting it was substantial.13 Despite his non-expert disclaimer14
and regardless of any words that Cynthia’s experts offered to the effect that J&J’s
13
See CR 61.01.
14
It is unclear whether J&J considers its concession to the jury – namely, that Dr. Hopkins was
not an expert – qualified as some form of curative limiting instruction with respect to his
personal use testimony. If so, J&J is incorrect. Limiting instructions only apply where evidence
“which is admissible as to one (1) party or for one (1) purpose but not admissible as to another
party or for another purpose is admitted[.]” KRE 105(a). As set forth above, Dr. Hopkins’
personal use testimony was not, as presented at trial, admissible for any purpose.
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products were unsafe, the jury was made aware that Dr. Hopkins is a preeminent
toxicologist who evaluated safety issues concerning J&J’s talc products. The jury
heard about Dr. Hopkins’ actions, i.e., that he was so certain of the safety of J&J’s
talc products that he essentially staked the health of his family on it for decades.
And, as J&J’s counsel repeatedly emphasized during closing arguments, “actions
speak louder than words.” Stated differently, Dr. Hopkins’ non-expert personal
use testimony unfairly detracted from the weight of Cynthia’s expert testimony.
Expert testimony was the sine qua non of this litigation.
The trial court abused its discretion in allowing this testimony, and
this error was not harmless. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
III. Exclusion of “The Gordon Paper”
The last issue Cynthia raises on appeal involves what Cynthia refers
to as the “Gordon Paper.” It is a 2014 article entitled “Asbestos in Commercial
Cosmetic Talcum Powder as a Cause of Mesothelioma in Women,” authored by
Ronald E. Gordon, Sean Fitzgerald, and James Millette, and published in volume
20, pp. 318-332 of the International Journal of Occupational and Environmental
Health. The article’s stated purpose was to “investigate one historic brand of
cosmetic talcum powder associated with mesothelioma in women.” While not
identified in the article, the parties in this matter acknowledge the “brand”
purportedly “investigated” in the article was Colgate’s Cashmere Bouquet – a
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product at issue in this litigation that Donna allegedly used from 1963 through the
1970s. The article also confirms that one of the talc sources for the brand tested
was Val Chisone, Italy – one of the two sources of talc used in the J&J products at
issue here. In sum, the Gordon Paper combines and details testing performed by
the three authors in their respective laboratories on “50 containers of this cosmetic
talcum powder product of different sizes and colors, produced over a 50-year time
span to determine the presence of asbestos.”
Specifically, Gordon analyzed 50 samples “using transmission
electron microscope (TEM) methods;” Fitzgerald “assessed asbestos releasability”
of three samples using his “glovebox” method; and Millette tested nine samples,
and further conducted “air testing” in a simulated bathroom. The authors reported
that each of them “confirmed in multiple tests the presence of asbestiform
anthophyllite and asbestiform tremolite in the talcum powder products.” The
authors also reported the results of their analyses of “[t]issue samples from a
woman with no other known exposure to asbestos other than her use of the product
tested[.]” Based on these results, the article concluded that the tested brand
“contained asbestos and the application of talcum powder released inhalable
asbestos fibers.”
Prior to trial, the appellees moved to preclude Cynthia from
introducing the Gordon Paper as substantive evidence of her claims, either by
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discussing it with her experts during their trial testimony or by utilizing it for
cross-examination purposes. They noted the article was undisputedly hearsay and
further argued that KRE 803(18) and KRE 703 – the two evidentiary rules
advocated by Cynthia for nevertheless admitting the article as substantive evidence
– were inapplicable for “lack of foundation.”
As an aside, both KRE 703 and KRE 803(18) permit hearsay to be
placed before a jury at trial, subject to foundational requirements. One such
requirement – reliance – was a predominant focus of the appellees’ motions in
limine. In relevant part, KRE 703 provides:
(b) If determined to be trustworthy, necessary to
illuminate testimony, and unprivileged, facts or data
relied upon by an expert pursuant to subdivision (a) may
at the discretion of the court be disclosed to the jury even
though such facts or data are not admissible in evidence.
Upon request the court shall admonish the jury to use
such facts or data only for the purpose of evaluating the
validity and probative value of the expert’s opinion or
inference.
(Emphasis added.)
Whereas, KRE 803(18) provides:
Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of
an expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon
by the expert witness in direct examination, statements
contained in published treatises, periodicals, or
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other
science or art, established as a reliable authority by the
testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert
testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the
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statements may be read into evidence but may not be
received as exhibits.
(Emphasis added.)
Here, with respect to the Gordon Paper, the appellees maintained that
KRE 703 and KRE 803(18) were inapplicable for the same reasons: None of
Cynthia’s experts had relied upon it to form their own opinions, and none of their
own experts deemed it reliable authority. Absent that, the appellees were
concerned Cynthia was merely attempting to introduce the Gordon Paper as a
means of injecting into the trial the expert opinions – on the ultimate issues
presented in this matter – of three non-testifying experts who would not be subject
to cross-examination.
Ultimately, the trial court granted the appellees’ motions, agreeing
that Cynthia lacked a foundation. During the February 28, 2019 hearing on the
appellees’ motions in limine on this subject, the trial court elaborated upon its
ruling:
Let’s say these three write this report, and you’re saying
the court shouldn’t discount it even if it was written for
what we would call “plaintiff’s lawyers.” I would agree
with you that that wouldn’t exclude it.[15] But if it goes
15
Undisputedly, the three authors of the Gordon Paper – Gordon, Fitzgerald, and Millette – have
functioned as expert witnesses for plaintiffs in asbestos litigation. As the article itself explicitly
sets forth, they also “became aware of one another’s work through litigation,” and their
respective contributions to the article were “paid for by attorneys for litigation purposes.” This
point, among others, was cited by the appellees as a separate basis for not regarding the Gordon
Paper as a “learned treatise” pursuant to KRE 803(18), and the appellees make the same
argument on appeal. But, as what is quoted tends to indicate, this point was not the focus of why
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to, if the source of this Gordon article, and from reading
your papers I thought it may, it’s not being relied upon
by an expert, from what I can tell, for general scientific
information about a principle that’s at issue in this case.
But, the conclusions of the paper go to the very issue that
the jury would have to decide, which is whether there
was asbestos in the talc, whether there’s evidence to
show that it would have been in Ms. Hayes.
And so, to me, it seems somewhat different if you’re
looking at an opinion that goes to the very issues of the
case that’s being offered by someone outside of court
verses an opinion that is foundational, or somehow
underlies, a doctor’s analysis of an issue. And that’s the
difference I see.
So it’s not necessarily the purpose for which it’s created
because I think scientists, hopefully, are going to be
scientists, and regardless of who’s asking them to do the
work or write the paper, they’re looking at what the
science tells them, but I guess the issue I had when I read
these papers, with the Gordon Paper, is just that the
conclusions are conclusions that are helpful, but aren’t
necessarily part and parcel of a bigger conclusion by Dr.
Eigleman, but a conclusion that you would like. And if
you would, then, present someone to say that, rather than
have him give the conclusions of their paper. It really
goes to the subject matter of the paper and what, for what
purpose you are proffering that evidence. So, if you are
proffering it for the purpose of a doctor’s reliance
because of his conclusions, to me that’s different than if
you are proffering it for the purpose to prove or disprove
an issue that the jury needs to make a determination
about.
the trial court excluded the Gordon Paper; and because we agree with why the trial court did
exclude the Gordon Paper, we need not address it.
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In short, the trial court found no indication that Cynthia’s experts, in
reaching their own conclusions regarding respirable asbestos in the appellees’
products, had relied upon any “facts or data” set forth in the Gordon Paper; and it
found every indication that Cynthia only wished to introduce the Gordon Paper for
its ultimate conclusions. Accordingly, the trial court excluded the Gordon Paper.
Rather than “illuminating” the opinion testimony of Cynthia’s experts per KRE
703(b), the trial court believed the introduction of the Gordon Paper would only
serve to obscure it.
Now on appeal, Cynthia asserts the trial court erred in this respect. In
her brief, she argues:
The trial court acknowledged the Gordon Paper
addressed a central issue in the case: whether Colgate’s
talc contained respirable asbestos fibers. Moreover, the
Appellees, particularly Colgate, never denied the Gordon
Paper was relevant.
Indeed, the Gordon Paper is relevant because it rendered
critical genuine issues of fact more probable. It
demonstrated that cosmetic talc contains asbestos. It
proves that respirable asbestos fibers were released when
Donna used cosmetic talc. It also proved that the
asbestos fibers in her tissue were the kind detected in
both Appellees’ products.
More importantly, the Gordon study directly refutes the
Appellees’ defenses that exposure to cosmetic talcum
powder does not cause mesothelioma. Both in opening
and closing argument, J&J vehemently argued that talc
did not cause mesothelioma because “millions of people”
use talc yet mesothelioma was a rare disease. The
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Gordon Paper refutes this argument by demonstrating
dozens of talc users developed mesothelioma from their
use of cosmetic talcum powder. Because it tended to
prove Cindy’s claims and refuted the Appellees’ key
defenses, its exclusion was unduly prejudicial.
(Internal footnotes omitted; emphasis added.)
Also, Cynthia adds throughout her brief the Gordon Paper was
“reliable” because it was “peer reviewed and published.”
To be clear, however, “peer reviewed and published” are not the
magic words of admissibility. Suffice it to say – without delving into the several
questions the appellees have raised regarding who the peer reviewers of the
Gordon Paper were, and where the article was published – that peer review and
publication are simply some of the factors for the trial court to consider when
exercising its discretion to admit or exclude scientific evidence. See, e.g.,
Thompson, 11 S.W.3d at 578-79. Furthermore, where the Gordon Paper appeared,
or who paid its authors to write it, are not the issue.
The running theme of Cynthia’s argument on appeal continues to be
that the Gordon Paper should have been admissible because it was “reliable” and
accomplished the above-emphasized evidentiary feats all by itself. However, the
dispositive issue is not whether the Gordon Paper was reliable, but whether and
how it was relied upon. The crux of the trial court’s ruling, and the proper state of
the law, is that absent judicial notice – which was not forthcoming in this matter –
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KRE 703 and KRE 803(18) only apply to material actually relied upon or
recognized by the testifying experts, either to form or explain their own opinions;
and that an expert does not rely upon that material if he only parrots it, or cites it
for the mere proposition that some other non-testifying expert arrived at the same
ultimate conclusion. See, e.g., Mike’s Train House, Inc. v. Lionel, L.L.C., 472 F.3d
398, 409 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the premises that FRE16 703, the federal
corollary to KRE 703, “extends so far as to allow an expert to testify about the
conclusions of other experts[,]” or “bolster his opinion testimony by testifying that
a non-testifying expert’s conclusions were essentially the same[,]” or “circumvent
the rules of hearsay by testifying that other experts, not present in the courtroom,
corroborate his views.” (citations omitted)).
Furthermore, as illustrated in Hawkins v. Rosenbloom, 17 S.W.3d 116
(Ky. App. 1999), it is difficult to overstate the substantial prejudice that can result
from allowing an expert witness or “learned treatise” to effectively become a
conduit for the opinion of a non-testifying expert. There, the successful party at
trial had obtained a letter from his non-testifying expert, Dr. Ellison; the letter set
forth Dr. Ellison’s opinions on one of the central issues of the case (i.e., the
applicable standard of care); and during trial, the successful party was permitted to
read from the letter and effectively introduce Dr. Ellison’s expert opinions for
16
Federal Rule of Evidence.
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purposes of cross-examination. Upon review, this Court explained that
“[e]ssentially, Dr. Ellison was allowed to testify without . . . counsel listing him as
an expert witness or providing Civil Rule 26 disclosure[,]” which effectively
permitted “Dr. Ellison to testify in court without being subject to cross-
examination[.]” Id. at 121.
Here, to the extent that Cynthia insinuates any of her own experts
relied upon the Gordon Paper to form or explain their own opinions in this matter,
she provides only a single unsupported and perfunctory statement on the last page
of her brief, i.e., that that one of her experts, Dr. William Longo, “would have
advised he modified his methodology based upon this peer reviewed paper.” That
is not enough. Absent any examination of the testimony Dr. Longo may have
given – by avowal or otherwise – regarding whether or in what way he may have
relied upon the Gordon Paper to form or explain his own opinion, this Court cannot
say that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the Gordon Paper, or that
the exclusion of the Gordon Paper affected Cynthia’s substantial rights. See CR
61.01. And, it is not the responsibility of this Court to search the enormous record
before us to find support for her contentions, assuming it exists. Smith v. Smith,
235 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. App. 2006). Consequently, the trial court’s decision to
exclude the Gordon Paper is not a basis of reversible error.
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CONCLUSION
Consistent with what is set forth above, we AFFIRM IN PART,
REVERSE IN PART, and REMAND for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, COLGATE-
PALMOLIVE COMPANY:
Joseph D. Satterley
Paul J. Kelley J. Wesley Earnhardt
Paul J. Ivie New York, New York
J. Eric Kiser
J. Garrett Cambron Matthew W. Breetz
Louisville, Kentucky Bethany A. Breetz
Frederick R. Bentley III
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, JOHNSON
AND JOHNSON:
Robert M. Loeb
Upnit K. Bhatti
Washington, D.C.
Darren Pouliot
New York, New York
Brantley C. Rowlen
R. Scott Masterson
Savannah, Georgia
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