Sanitation District 1 v. Daniel Louis Weinel ( 2020 )


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  •                  RENDERED: OCTOBER 2, 2020; 10:00 A.M.
    TO BE PUBLISHED
    Commonwealth of Kentucky
    Court of Appeals
    NO. 2019-CA-1002-DG
    SANITATION DISTRICT NO. 1                                          APPELLANT
    ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
    v.            HONORABLE DANIEL J. ZALLA, JUDGE
    ACTION NO. 18-XX-00008
    DANIEL LOUIS WEINEL                                                  APPELLEE
    OPINION
    REVERSING AND REMANDING
    ** ** ** ** **
    BEFORE: ACREE, COMBS, AND MAZE, JUDGES.
    MAZE, JUDGE: Sanitation District No. 1 (SD1) brings this matter on
    discretionary review from an order of the Campbell Circuit Court. The circuit
    court affirmed an order of the Campbell District Court finding that SD1 was not
    authorized to impose a stormwater drainage fee on property within its service area
    owned by Daniel Louis Weinel. We conclude that Weinel’s property must be
    construed as a user of SD1’s stormwater drainage plan because his property drains
    to a watershed within SD1’s service area. Therefore, the district court clearly erred
    in finding that SD1 was not authorized to impose the fee. Hence, we reverse the
    opinion and order of the Campbell Circuit Court, and remand with directions to the
    Campbell District Court to enter a judgment for SD1 in the amount of the arrearage
    for unpaid fees.
    The underlying facts of this matter are not in dispute. Weinel is the
    owner of residential property located at 9122 Heritage Court in Alexandria,
    Campbell County, Kentucky. SD1 is a sanitation district established pursuant to
    KRS1 Chapter 220. SD1 encompasses the Kentucky counties of Boone, Campbell,
    and Kenton, and its service area includes Weinel’s property. Pursuant to its
    statutory mandate, SD1 operates both sanitary sewer and stormwater drainage
    systems throughout the district.
    SD1 assessed stormwater service fees of approximately $5.04 per
    month against Weinel’s property. Weinel refused to pay the assessments, resulting
    in a past-due balance of $792.70. SD1 brought an action in the small claims
    division of Campbell District Court to collect the arrearage. Weinel responded that
    SD1 was not authorized to collect such fees because he receives no sanitation or
    stormwater services from SD1.
    1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.
    -2-
    After hearing testimony and taking evidence from both sides, the
    district court agreed with Weinel. The court found that under KRS 220.510 and
    220.515, a sanitation district only has the power to make and collect charges from
    “users” of its sanitary works. The court further found that SD1 may only charge
    fees to non-users if it has begun work on plans and specifications for the
    improvement of services to the non-user’s property. Since Weinel’s property is not
    served by any sanitary sewers and SD1 has no plan in place to provide such
    services to his property, the district court concluded that SD1 was not authorized to
    impose service fees on his property.
    SD1 then appealed this decision to the Campbell Circuit Court. On
    review, the circuit court affirmed the district court’s conclusions. This Court
    accepted SD1’s motion for discretionary review of the circuit court’s opinion and
    order. Additional facts will be set out below as necessary.
    The sole question presented in this case concerns SD1’s authority to
    impose stormwater drainage fees on Weinel’s property. As this matter was tried
    before the district court without a jury, our review of factual determinations is
    under the clearly erroneous rule. CR2 52.01. A finding of fact is not clearly
    erroneous if it is supported by substantial evidence, which is “evidence of
    substance and relevant consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the
    2
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
    -3-
    minds of reasonable men.” Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 
    976 S.W.2d 409
    , 414 (Ky. 1998) (citations omitted). It is within the province of the
    trial court as the fact-finder to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the
    weight given to the evidence. Frances v. Frances, 
    266 S.W.3d 754
    , 756 (Ky.
    2008). However, matters of statutory interpretation are issues of law, which we
    review de novo. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Fell, 
    391 S.W.3d 713
    , 718 (Ky.
    2012).
    The question in this case comes down to whether Weinel is a “user”
    of SD1’s stormwater drainage system. A sanitation district, such as SD1, has the
    authority to charge fees for sanitary sewage collection and for stormwater drainage
    systems. Wessels Co., LLC v. Sanitation Dist. No. 1, 
    238 S.W.3d 673
    , 676-77 (Ky.
    App. 2007) (citing KRS 220.030, 220.110, 220.280, 220.510, and 220.515).
    Specifically, KRS 220.515 provides:
    The district may establish a surcharge or other rate, fee,
    or charge to be made applicable to users in areas where
    facilities are to be acquired, constructed, or established,
    and to amortize part or all of the costs thereof, in addition
    to the charge authorized by KRS 220.510. The
    surcharges, rates, fees, or charges shall be determined on
    the basis of one (1) or more of the factors stated in KRS
    220.510, and may include, at the discretion of the district,
    a finance charge not to exceed ten percent (10%). In
    carrying out any rate, fee, or charge classification, the
    district shall follow the procedures set forth in KRS
    220.593(2).
    (Emphasis added.)
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    The “charge authorized by KRS 220.510” is predicated upon the
    following factors:
    The board of directors shall, by resolution, determine the
    rates and compensation or rentals to be charged for the
    use of the sanitary works. The board of directors may
    provide for a sewer service charge to be imposed and
    collected, beginning at the time the plan for the
    improvement has been approved by the Energy and
    Environment Cabinet and work is begun on plans and
    specifications for the improvement. The rates shall at all
    times be reasonable, taking into account the cost of the
    works, the cost of operation and maintenance, and the
    amount necessary for the amortization of the bonds
    issued to finance the works. The same schedule of rates
    and charges shall apply to all users of the same class.
    The rates shall be binding upon all users of the system.
    The board may alter and revise the rates in its discretion.
    In case of failure of any user to pay for services rendered,
    the board may compel payment and may enjoin further
    use until the payment is made, or it may institute an
    action in any court having jurisdiction for the recovery of
    charges for services rendered . . . .
    KRS 220.510(1) (emphasis added).
    Weinel argued, and the lower courts agreed, that he is not a “user” of
    SD1’s sanitary sewer or stormwater drainage system. Weinel’s property is served
    by a septic system and there was no evidence of a drain on his property leading
    directly to a stormwater drainage system maintained by SD1. The lower courts
    held that KRS 220.510(1) authorizes SD1 to impose reasonable fees or rates on
    users of its system. However, the courts concluded that KRS 220.515 only
    -5-
    authorizes SD1 to impose such fees or rates where it actually provides drainage
    systems or where a “plan for improvement” has been made and approved, and
    “work is begun on plans and specifications for the improvement.” Since SD1 did
    not present any evidence of such plans or work begun on serving Weinel’s
    property, the courts determined that SD1 was not authorized to impose any fee.
    Weinel finds support for this interpretation in Stierle v. Sanitation
    District Number 1 of Jefferson County, 
    243 S.W.2d 678
    (Ky. 1951). However,
    Stierle involved an unusual situation and is distinguishable on several factual and
    legal grounds. Most significantly, the property owner lived in the sanitation
    district’s service area but had contracted with a city agency for sewer service. The
    sanitation district and the city agency contracted to allow the city agency to extend
    sewers into the sanitation district’s service area. But subsequently, a dispute arose
    between the city agency, the sanitation district, and the property owner over who
    was authorized to bill for sewer service.
    Id. at 679-80.
    The former Court of Appeals first concluded that the contract
    allowing the city agency to extend sewers into the sanitation district’s territory was
    beyond the statutory authority of either entity to make.
    Id. at 680.
    On the other
    hand, the Court also held that KRS 220.510 did not give a sanitation district the
    power to collect charges from persons who were not using its sanitary works.
    Id. at 680-81.
    The Court recognized that these holdings left ownership of the sewer
    -6-
    system in dispute. But the Court concluded that the city agency could continue
    collecting sewer service charges until that issue was resolved.
    Id. at 682.
    Unlike in Stierle, the current case does not involve a dispute regarding
    the statutory authority of different agencies. Rather, Weinel’s property is clearly
    within the service area of SD1 even though no sanitary or stormwater sewers have
    been extended to his property. SD1 takes the position that all properties within its
    service area are benefited by its system, even if there is no drain on the subject
    property. SD1 notes that, in Curtis v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan
    Sewer District, 
    311 S.W.2d 378
    (Ky. 1958), the former Court of Appeals stated
    that “any property that [geographically] is a part of the watershed or drainage basin
    may properly be considered to be benefited by the project through the general
    improvement of conditions of health, comfort and convenience in the area and the
    resulting general enhancement of values in the area.”
    Id. at 382.
    In Curtis, the Court was addressing the constitutionality of former
    KRS 76.260, which established a presumption that all land within the designated
    improvement area will receive some benefit and, therefore, is subject to
    assessment. SD1 concedes that this section has since been repealed. Nevertheless,
    it argues that the presumption remains applicable because its statutory mandate
    requires it to manage stormwater drainage throughout the district. We agree.
    -7-
    As discussed in Wessels, the General Assembly enacted KRS 220.030
    to authorize sanitation districts, such as SD1, to assume responsibility for
    management of stormwater within its boundaries. 
    Wessels, 238 S.W.3d at 674-75
    .
    In 1994, the General Assembly granted sanitation districts this authority to comply
    with federal regulations intended to address public health risks associated with
    stormwater runoff,
    which had been shown to contain high levels of
    sediments and other pollutants such as phosphorus and
    nitrogen from fertilizers, pesticides, petroleum products,
    and construction chemicals that “can be toxic to aquatic
    organisms and degrade water for drinking and water-
    contact recreation.” 57 Fed.Reg. at 41344, 41345
    (September 9, 1992). A large influx of storm water into
    sanitary sewage systems had also been shown to dilute
    the system’s ability to properly treat sanitary waste.
    Id. at 675.
    SD1 is tasked with the management of stormwater drainage for all
    properties within its service area. This responsibility also includes drainage for all
    public roads owned by cities and counties within the service area. Unlike sanitary
    sewer systems, which only serve connected properties, SD1’s stormwater drainage
    plan serves all watersheds within its service area.
    Given SD1’s statutory mandate to manage stormwater drainage, we
    conclude that KRS 220.510 must be construed broadly to effectuate the purposes
    of the enactment. Since Weinel’s property clearly drains to a watershed within
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    SD1’s service area, we conclude that the property is a “user” of SD1’s stormwater
    drainage plan, even though it is not physically connected to a sewer system.
    Therefore, we find that SD1 was authorized to impose stormwater drainage fees on
    Weinel’s property.
    Accordingly, we reverse the opinion and order of the Campbell
    Circuit Court affirming the order of the Campbell District Court dismissing SD1’s
    complaint for past-due assessments against Weinel’s property. We remand this
    matter to the circuit court for entry of an order directing the district court to enter a
    judgment for SD1 against Weinel in the amount of $792.70.
    ALL CONCUR.
    BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
    Jeffrey C. Mando                            Christopher Wiest
    Olivia F. Amlung                            Crestview Hills, Kentucky
    Covington, Kentucky
    ORAL ARGUMENT FOR                           ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
    APPELLANT:                                  APPELLEE:
    Jeffrey C. Mando                            Christopher Wiest
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