Eric Glenn Beck v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2020 )

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 6, 2020; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2019-CA-1192-MR
ERIC GLEN BECK APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE BRIAN WIGGINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 19-CR-00123
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
AND NO. 2019-CA-1413-MR
STEFFANY L. TEAGUE APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE BRIAN WIGGINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 19-CR-00122
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: GOODWINE, MCNEILL, AND L. THOMPSON, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, L., JUDGE: Eric Beck and Steffany Teague (hereinafter referred to
collectively as “the appellants”) appeal from orders of the Muhlenberg Circuit
Court which denied their motions to suppress. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Detective Troy Gibson of the Pennyrile Narcotics Task Force was
contacted by a confidential informant (hereinafter referred to as “CI”) with
information that Treasia Griffin had been using methamphetamine and was buying
it from a house across the street. Detective Gibson picked up the CI in order to try
and make contact with Griffin. Detective Gibson drove the CI to the area of the
residence and dropped him off near the residence. Detective Gibson was
concerned he might be recognized and chose not to get near the Griffin residence
or stay in the immediate area. Detective Gibson then went to a nearby Walmart to
wait for the CI.
Griffin was not at home so the CI went into the residence across the
street. The occupant of that residence allowed the CI inside. While inside, the CI
saw a methamphetamine pipe laying on the table and a container with apparent
methamphetamine in it. The CI did not buy methamphetamine at that time and
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was not wearing any recording devices. When the CI made contact with Detective
Gibson, he informed the detective of the container of methamphetamine and the
methamphetamine pipe. The CI also informed the detective that a few weeks prior
he witnessed in that same residence a freezer bag containing methamphetamine.
The CI described the residence’s inside and outside layouts to the detective and
described a vehicle parked in the driveway. The CI also indicated there was a man
and a woman present in the residence.
The next day, Detective Gibson called his dispatch and tried to
discover the names of the people living there, but was unable to. The CI informed
the detective that he believed the name of the man in the residence to be Troy
Donovan. Another detective then drove by the residence to confirm the vehicle
was present and that the outside of the residence looked the way it was described
by the CI. After confirming these details, the detective then went to the county
attorney’s office to fill out an affidavit for a search warrant. After this affidavit
was completed the detective was able to obtain a search warrant.
The detective then executed the search warrant. The detective
testified that the inside of the residence was as the CI described it. Inside the
residence the detective found 15 grams of methamphetamine, a methamphetamine
pipe, pills, and marijuana. The appellants were present in the house and they were
both arrested. There was no Troy Donovan there. The detective later asked the CI
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about the discrepancy of Mr. Beck being at the residence and not Troy Donovan.
The CI informed the detective that the man he met at the house he called Troy and
was not corrected. The theory at the suppression hearing was either Troy Donovan
was at the residence the day the CI was there, but not there the day the search
warrant was executed, or that the CI mistakenly believed Mr. Beck’s name was
Troy Donovan.
The appellants later filed motions to suppress the evidence seized due
to false or misleading information in the search warrant affidavit and that the
affidavit lacked probable cause to issue a search warrant. A hearing was held on
June 24, 2019, where Detective Gibson testified about the facts surrounding the
investigation, the obtaining of the search warrant, and the execution of the search
warrant. The trial court denied the motions to suppress orally from the bench. On
July 5, 2019, the trial court entered an order denying the motions. The court held
that there were no intentionally false and misleading statements in the warrant
affidavit and that there was probable cause to issue the search warrant.
Mr. Beck then entered into a conditional guilty plea in which he
pleaded guilty to first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance,
methamphetamine in an amount of two grams or more.1 Ms. Teague also entered
into a conditional guilty plea in which she pleaded guilty to first-degree trafficking
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 218A.1412(1)(b).
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in a controlled substance, methamphetamine in an amount less than two grams. 2
The appellants reserved their right to appeal the orders denying their motions to
suppress. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
The appellants argue on appeal that there were false and misleading
statements in the affidavit and that the affidavit did not establish probable cause to
issue the search warrant. The appellants also take issue with Detective Gibson
only relying on the CI’s information and taking no steps to independently
investigate the information.
Our standard of review of a circuit court’s decision
on a suppression motion following a hearing is twofold.
First, the factual findings of the court are conclusive if
they are supported by substantial evidence. The second
prong involves a de novo review to determine whether
the court’s decision is correct as a matter of law.
Stewart v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 376, 380 (Ky. App. 2000) (footnotes and
citations omitted). When reviewing a motion to suppress, we use the totality of
circumstances analysis set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317,
76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983).
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,
including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of
persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
2
KRS 218A.1412(1)(e).
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probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing
court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a
“substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]” that probable
cause existed.
Id., 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 S. Ct. at 2332 (citation omitted). Generally, “a judge is
bound by the four corners of the affidavit when determining whether to issue or
deny a search warrant.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 323 S.W.3d 748, 753 (Ky. App.
2009). An exception to this four-corner rule is if a defendant can show that the
affidavit contained false or misleading statements.
[W]here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary
showing that a false statement knowingly and
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was
included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the
allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of
probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a
hearing be held at the defendant’s request. In the event
that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless
disregard is established by the defendant by a
preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s
false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining
content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the
search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search
excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was
lacking on the face of the affidavit.
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2676, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667
(1978).
Here, the appellants argue that Detective Gibson using the name
“Troy Donovan” in the affidavit was false and misleading because no Troy
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Donovan was found in the house when it was searched. The trial court found this
argument without merit and we agree. Here, there was no evidence that Detective
Gibson intentionally mislead the issuing judge by using the name Troy Donovan.
The evidence presented at the suppression hearing indicated that either the CI truly
believed the man he met the night he entered the residence was named Troy
Donovan and was mistaken, or that the CI met Troy Donovan the night he entered
the residence and Mr. Donovan was not present when the search warrant was
executed.
The trial court also held that even if it were to remove the name Troy
Donovan from the affidavit, there would still be probable cause to issue the
warrant. Again, we agree with the trial court. The CI relayed information to the
detective that methamphetamine was being sold from the residence at issue, that
methamphetamine was present the night he entered the residence, and that he had
seen methamphetamine in that residence in the past. The CI was also a long-term
informant who had been used by Detective Gibson in the past. All of this
supported the probable cause determination by the issuing judge that contraband or
evidence of a crime would be found in the residence at issue.
The appellants also take issue with the lack of an independent
investigation by Detective Gibson. For example, there was no evidence that the
detective ran the license plate of the car in the driveway, no follow-up about the
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current owner of the residence aside from calling the detective’s dispatch and
inquiring into ownership, and no surveillance of the residence. In addition, the
detective did not personally witness the CI go into the residence and the CI was not
wearing a video or audio recording device.
While an independent investigation by the detective could have
provided more evidence to support probable cause and would have been valuable,
Gates, 462 U.S. at 242, 103 S.Ct. at 2334, it was not necessary here.
Typically, a bare and uncorroborated tip received
from a confidential informant, without more, would be
insufficient to establish probable cause for a search
warrant. . . . As stated supra, the totality of the
circumstances test requires a balancing of the relative
indicia of reliability accompanying an informant’s tip.
Thus, while a court may question an informant’s motives,
an “explicit and detailed description of alleged
wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was
observed first-hand, entitles [the informant’s] tip to
greater weight than might otherwise be the case.”
Lovett v. Commonwealth, 103 S.W.3d 72, 78 (Ky. 2003) (citations omitted). Here,
the CI specifically described the residence and vehicle in the driveway which
allowed the police to drive by, corroborate the location, and get the address, which
was included in the affidavit. The CI also specifically described the drugs in the
residence and where they were located. This was sufficient to meet probable
cause.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
After reviewing the totality of the circumstances in this case it is clear that the
finding of probable cause was supported by substantial evidence.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT ERIC BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:
GLEN BECK:
Daniel Cameron
Adam Meyer Attorney General of Kentucky
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy Lauren Lewis
Frankfort, Kentucky Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
STEFFANY L. TEAGUE:
Molly Mattingly
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kenutucky
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