Commonwealth of Kentucky, Transportation Cabinet, Department of Highways v. Leah Atkinson ( 2023 )


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  •             RENDERED: MARCH 17, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    Commonwealth of Kentucky
    Court of Appeals
    NO. 2021-CA-1461-MR
    COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,                          APPELLANT
    TRANSPORTATION CABINET,
    DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
    APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
    v.          HONORABLE THOMAS M. SMITH, JUDGE
    ACTION NO. 13-CI-00788
    LEAH ATKINSON; ALICE TURNER;                       APPELLEES
    ALLEN BARRE A/K/A ALLEN M.
    BARR; ALLEN VAN TURNER;
    ANITA GIBSON; ANTHONY
    GIBSON; ARNOLD BRENT TURNER;
    ARNOLD TURNER, JR.; BRENDA
    COOK; CASSIE FRIEND; CHAD
    DUNLAPP; CHERYL MARTIN;
    CLAUDE MCKENZIE, JR.; DAVID
    BRIAN GIBSON; DAVID GIBSON;
    DAVID RICH; DEMORIS MARTIN;
    DONNIE RAY MARTIN; DOUG
    TURNER; EDWARD BILLIPS;
    ELHANAN PETE GRIGSBY III;
    ELIZABETH LYNNE BARRE A/K/A
    ELIZABETH LYNN BARR;
    ELIZABETH TURNER; EUGENE
    TURNER; FLOYD COUNTY
    RESOURCES, INC.; FRED B.
    ANDERSON; GERI E. GRIGSBY;
    HENRY WRIGHT; JAMES E.
    WALTER; JAMES R. TURNER;
    JENNIFER MARTIN; JEWELL
    TURNER; JOAN CHAFFINS; JOE
    TURNER; JOSEPH R. TURNER;
    JOYCE TURNER HOWELL; JULIUS
    MARTIN; KAREN GESWEIN (A/K/A
    KAREN M. LOVE); KARENLYNN
    TURNER; KENNETH HENRY; LEE
    MAJAKEY; LISA RENEE CHAFFINS;
    LORA CHAFFINS (LONG); LOUISE
    MARIE WALTER; MACHELE
    GRIGSBY; MARGARITE MARTIN;
    MARTHA JUNE MCKENZIE; MARY
    ROSE MARTIN; MAYTIFERN
    WRIGHT; MELINDA GAYE
    MAJAKEY; NORA LOU RICH;
    NORMA TURNER; PETE GRIGSBY,
    II; PRISCILLA HENRY; RALPH
    TURNER; RICK JONES; ROSE MARY
    RICE; SAM MARTIN, III; SANDRA
    SUE SLONE MARTIN; SAS
    RESOURCES, INC.; SKYE
    GOODMAN CRAMER A/K/A SKYE
    WEBER; TED TURNER; TERESA
    BILLIPS; TERESA MARTIN; TERRY
    TURNER; TIM MARTIN; TIMMY
    MARTIN; TIMOTHY K. STEPHENS;
    TODD DUNLAPP; UNKNOWN
    RESPONDENTS, BEING THE
    UNKNOWN OWNERS, IF ANY,
    HEIRS AT LAW, GRANTEES,
    DEVISEES, SECCESSORS, AND/OR
    ASSIGNS, IF ANY; BEING ANY AND
    ALL UNKNOWN PERSONS,
    SPOUSES AND/OR ENTITIES IF
    ANY, ENTITLED TO AND/OR
    CLAIMING AN INTEREST IN
    AND/OR TITLE TO; VIOLET
    ELIZABETH ROWE; WALLACE G.
    -2-
    COOK; PEGGY DAVIS; AND WILMA
    FAYE MARTIN
    OPINION
    AFFIRMING
    ** ** ** ** **
    BEFORE: CALDWELL, DIXON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
    TAYLOR, JUDGE: The Commonwealth of Kentucky, Transportation Cabinet,
    Department of Highways (Transportation Cabinet) brings this appeal from a July
    28, 2021, Trial Order and Judgment and a November 4, 2021, Amended Judgment
    of the Floyd Circuit Court in an eminent domain proceeding. We affirm.
    On September 9, 2013, the Transportation Cabinet filed a petition1 in
    the Floyd Circuit Court to condemn sub-surface mineral interests owned by
    appellees in approximately thirty acres of real property (condemned real property).
    The condemned real property contained primarily coal. The property was needed
    to complete a road connector in Floyd County.
    Pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 416.580, the circuit
    court appointed three commissioners to determine the fair market value of the
    condemned real property. The commissioners’ reports fixed the fair market value
    of the condemned real property (excluding oil and gas) before the taking at $500
    1
    An amended petition was filed on September 28, 2015.
    -3-
    and the fair market value of the condemned real property (excluding oil and gas)
    after the taking at $500.2 So, effectively, the commissioners did not believe that
    the condemned real property’s fair market value was affected by the taking.
    Numerous appellees filed exceptions and argued that the commissioners failed to
    properly appraise the fair market value of the condemned real property, thus
    denying them just compensation.
    The circuit court subsequently rendered an Interlocutory Order and
    Judgment.3 Therein, the circuit court ordered that the Transportation Cabinet had a
    right to take through eminent domain the condemned real property owned by
    appellees. The amount of compensation due to appellees for the taking of said
    property was reserved for a jury trial. KRS 416.620.
    Prior to the jury trial on the issue of just compensation, the
    Transportation Cabinet filed a motion to exclude certain testimony from appellees’
    expert witness, Samuel Johnson. Relying upon Gulf Interstate Gas Company v.
    Garvin, 
    303 S.W.2d 260
     (Ky. 1957) and Gulf Interstate Gas Company v. Garvin,
    
    368 S.W.2d 309
     (Ky. 1963), the Transportation Cabinet argued that Johnson’s
    valuation of the condemned real property improperly included prospective royalty
    2
    The commissioners’ original report, filed on November 5, 2013, contained a clerical error. An
    amended report was filed on November 21, 2013.
    3
    The Interlocutory Order and Judgment condemning the subject mineral property interest was
    entered on March 25, 2014.
    -4-
    income and must be excluded. In response, appellees argued that Johnson, a
    mining engineer, utilized an income approach to value the condemned real
    property, which included as a factor prospective royalty income that would be
    derived from the mining of the coal therefrom. Appellees maintained that such a
    valuation method was permitted in Big Rivers Electric Corporation v. Barnes, 
    147 S.W.3d 753
     (Ky. App. 2004). The circuit court denied the Transportation
    Cabinet’s motion to exclude Johnson’s appraisal opinion.
    A jury trial was held on July 6, 2021, and July 7, 2021. The Cabinet
    called as an expert, Dixon Nunnery, who testified that his appraisal of the fair
    market value of the condemned real property before the taking as $380,600 and
    after the taking as $235,000, by using the sales comparison method. Nunnery
    opined that the taking by the Transportation Cabinet resulted in a $145,600 loss to
    the owners of the property. Appellees presented the testimony of Johnson.
    According to Johnson, the fair market value of the condemned real property was
    $2,428,000 before the taking, and after the taking, it had no value. Based on
    Johnson’s testimony, appellees suffered a $2,428,000 loss. The jury found that the
    fair market value of the condemned real property before the taking was $1,083,000
    and the fair market value after the taking was $533,000, resulting in a loss of
    $550,000 in fair market value. By trial order and judgment and amended
    -5-
    judgment, the circuit court awarded appellees $550,000 as just compensation for
    the taking of the condemned real property. This appeal follows.
    On appeal, the Transportation Cabinet contends the circuit court
    erroneously admitted the testimony of appellees’ expert, Johnson, as to his
    valuation of the condemned real property. The Transportation Cabinet alleges that
    Johnson impermissibly utilized prospective royalty income that appellees would
    have received from the mining of coal they owned in reaching his fair market value
    calculations. Citing to Gulf Interstate, 
    303 S.W.2d 260
     and Gulf Interstate, 
    368 S.W.2d 309
    , the Transportation Cabinet argues that the royalty income may not be
    utilized to determine the fair market value of condemned real property that
    contains valuable minerals. Instead, the Transportation Cabinet maintains that
    condemned real property containing valuable minerals must simply be valued by
    using a sales comparison approach, as performed by its expert.
    The primary issue in this appeal looks to the court’s evidentiary ruling
    in allowing the admission of Johnson’s testimony. The proper standard of review
    of a trial court’s evidentiary ruling is abuse of discretion. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
    Co. v. 
    Thompson, 11
     S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2000). The same standard applies
    under Kentucky Rules of Evidence 702 regarding the testimony of expert
    witnesses. 
    Id.
     Our review proceeds accordingly.
    -6-
    When private property is taken by eminent domain, the state must pay
    the owner just compensation. Kentucky Constitution § 13 and § 242. To
    determine just compensation, we look to the fair market value of the real property
    immediately before the taking and the fair market value after the taking. KRS
    416.660(1). Fair market value is defined as “the amount in cash that a willing
    buyer would pay to a willing seller[.]” Paducah Independent School District v.
    Putnam & Sons, LLC, 
    520 S.W.3d 367
    , 376 (Ky. 2017) (quoting Baston v. County
    of Kenton, 
    319 S.W.3d 401
    , 406 (Ky. 2010)). And, there are three generally
    accepted methods to determine the fair market value of real property in a
    condemnation proceeding - the sales comparison approach, the cost approach, and
    the income approach. Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. R.J. Corman R.R.
    Co., 
    116 S.W.3d 488
    , 495 (Ky. 2003). Relevant to this appeal is the income
    approach. Under this approach, fair market value is appraised “by analyzing a
    property’s capacity to produce income and converting this potential into an
    indication of fair market value.” R.J. Corman, 116 S.W.3d at 495 (quoting 7
    Nichols on Eminent Domain § 4.04[3] (3rd ed., 1999)). Most importantly, the
    income method can only be utilized where the income is “derived from the
    intrinsic nature of the real estate itself, as distinguished from the profits derived
    from a business operated on the land.” R.J. Corman, 116 S.W.3d at 496 (quoting
    27 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain § 431).
    -7-
    The income approach has been approved by the Kentucky Supreme
    Court for valuation of condemned real property containing coal reserves in Big
    Rivers, 
    147 S.W.3d 753
    . In Big Rivers, an expert opined that the highest and best
    use of the condemned real property was as a coal reserve and testified:
    [O]nce coal reached $25.00 a ton, surface mining would
    be feasible with a twenty cent royalty split evenly
    between the surface owner and the mineral owners.
    Using the “recoverable coal” estimates from the . . .
    (engineer/surveyor) report, times the royalty, and
    discounting the future income for the time waiting to
    mine, he estimated the present value would be less than
    ten cents on the dollar of future sales. [The expert] then
    concluded that the present value of the coal reserves
    before the taking was $742,000.00, and the value after
    the taking was $675,000.00, for a difference of
    $67,000.00.
    
    Id. at 759
     (footnotes omitted).
    Similar to the expert testimony in Big Rivers, 
    147 S.W.3d at 758-59
    ,
    Johnson testified that the highest and best use of the condemned real property was
    for coal mining.4 Johnson also stated that the comparable sales approach was
    insufficient to arrive at a fair market value of the condemned real property due to
    the lack of comparable sales. So, Johnson concluded that the income approach
    would best determine the fair market value of the condemned real property.
    Under the income approach, Johnson stated that he used a mining plan prepared by
    4
    The parties do not dispute on appeal that the highest and best use of the mineral interest subject
    to the condemnation is for coal mining.
    -8-
    Gary Ousley, a mining engineer hired by appellees. Ousley determined the tons of
    coal in place, mineable seams, and the method to extract the coal. Ousley
    estimated that the condemned real property contained 1,122,437 tons of coal and
    609,643 tons of mineable coal. By utilizing Ousley’s opinions and mining plan,
    Johnson conducted a marketability analysis to determine the sale price of the coal
    and then discounted the royalty income therefrom to present value. In the end,
    Johnson testified that the fair market value of the condemned real property before
    condemnation was $2,428,000 and after condemnation was zero.
    Upon review of his testimony, Johnson clearly utilized the income
    approach to reach a fair market value of the condemned real property and did
    consider prospective royalty income among other factors. Johnson’s approach was
    substantially similar to the expert valuation testimony approved in Big Rivers, 
    147 S.W.3d 753
    . Therein, the expert witness also utilized the income method and
    considered prospective royalty income. And, as in Big Rivers, 
    147 S.W.3d 753
    ,
    the income considered herein was “derived from the intrinsic nature of the real
    estate” and not from a business located thereupon. See R.J. Corman, 116 S.W.3d
    at 496 (quoting 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain § 431).
    Additionally, we do not interpret Gulf Interstate, 
    303 S.W.2d 260
     or
    Gulf Interstate, 
    368 S.W.2d 309
    , so broadly as to exclude Johnson’s testimony
    concerning fair market value. Both cases simply prohibit a valuation of fair market
    -9-
    value based solely upon the royalty income and number of acres. Rather, in the
    case sub judice and in Big Rivers, 
    147 S.W.3d at 758-59
    , the income valuation
    analysis considered a variety of factors, including royalty income, minable coal,
    present value, and marketability.
    Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its
    discretion by admitting Johnson’s testimony as to the fair market value of the
    condemned real property.
    We view any remaining contentions of error as moot or without merit.
    For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Order and Judgment and
    Amended Judgment entered by the Floyd Circuit Court are affirmed.
    ALL CONCUR.
    BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEES, LEAH
    ATKINSON AND SAS
    Stacy D. Conley                           RESOURCES, LLC:
    Pikeville, Kentucky
    John M. Williams
    Melanie J. Kilpatrick
    Lexington, Kentucky
    -10-