James R. Thomas v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2021 )


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  •                          RENDERED: JULY 9, 2021; 10:00 A.M.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    Commonwealth of Kentucky
    Court of Appeals
    NO. 2017-CA-0714-MR
    JAMES R. THOMAS                                                       APPELLANT
    APPEAL FROM OWEN CIRCUIT COURT
    v.                    HONORABLE R. LESLIE KNIGHT, JUDGE
    ACTION NO. 12-CR-00018
    COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE
    OPINION
    REVERSING & REMANDING
    ** ** ** ** **
    BEFORE: CALDWELL, JONES, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
    CALDWELL, JUDGE: Appellant James R. Thomas appeals the Owen Circuit
    Court’s denial of his motion for relief pursuant to RCr1 11.42 relief. We reverse
    the circuit court’s order and remand this matter with instructions.
    1
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
    FACTS
    James R. Thomas (Thomas) was convicted in the Owen Circuit Court
    of manufacturing methamphetamine, first-degree possession of a controlled
    substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of marijuana, and the
    jury found him to be a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). He was
    sentenced to a total of twenty-three years’ imprisonment and assessed a
    $1,000 fine. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by
    the Kentucky Supreme Court in 2013-SC-0550-MR, in an unpublished
    Opinion rendered on October 29, 2015.
    In 2016, Thomas filed a pro se motion for relief pursuant to RCr
    11.42, alleging several instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
    Thomas alleged counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate
    and prepare a defense for trial. Specifically, Thomas complained that his
    counsel did not review phone records which would have refuted allegations
    made during a pre-trial suppression hearing and failed to conduct a proper
    investigation prior to the hearing. Such investigation could have provided
    evidence to contest the allegation that incriminating evidence was found in
    plain view by police. He also alleged that counsel should have introduced a
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    recorded interview conducted of him and his wife, which would have been
    exculpatory of his role in the crimes charged.
    In response, the circuit court issued an order denying relief. The
    order contained no findings of fact or conclusions of law. It simply held that
    because Thomas had been found guilty by a jury and that conviction had been
    upheld on appeal by the Kentucky Supreme Court, his claims in the post-
    conviction motion were without merit. When Thomas filed a motion
    requesting specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, such was
    summarily denied. He appealed.2
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    A denial of an RCr 11.42 motion is reviewed on appeal for an abuse
    of the circuit court’s discretion. Bowling v. Commonwealth, 
    981 S.W.2d 545
    , 548
    (Ky. 1998). Abuse of discretion has been defined as being arbitrary, unreasonable,
    unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. Commonwealth v. English, 
    993 S.W.2d 941
    , 945 (Ky. 1999) (citations omitted).
    2
    Although the circuit court appointed Thomas counsel in his appeal of the denial of post-
    conviction relief, because the Owen Circuit Clerk did not transmit the record to the Court of
    Appeals, the Department of Public Advocacy (DPA) was not timely notified of the appointment.
    Once it was made aware, DPA filed a motion for belated appeal, which was denied. A motion
    for discretionary review was filed, by appointed counsel, and the Kentucky Supreme Court
    reversed the Court of Appeals and Thomas now, through counsel, prosecutes this appeal.
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    ANALYSIS
    When a motion filed pursuant to RCr 11.42 alleges instances of
    ineffectiveness of counsel, the veracity of which cannot be refuted by a review of
    the record of proceedings, an evidentiary hearing must be held. Such is axiomatic.
    In Fraser v. Commonwealth, the Kentucky Supreme Court clearly laid
    out a roadmap for review of post-conviction motions seeking relief from
    conviction for collateral matters, highlighting when evidentiary hearings and
    appointments of counsel are required.
    These provisions establish the following procedural steps
    with respect to an evidentiary hearing and the
    appointment of counsel:
    1. The trial judge shall examine the motion to see if it is
    properly signed and verified and whether it specifies
    grounds and supporting facts that, if true, would warrant
    relief. If not, the motion may be summarily dismissed.
    Odewahn v. Ropke, Ky., 
    385 S.W.2d 163
    , 164 (1964).
    2. After the answer is filed, the trial judge shall determine
    whether the allegations in the motion can be resolved on
    the face of the record, in which event an evidentiary
    hearing is not required. A hearing is required if there
    is a material issue of fact that cannot be conclusively
    resolved, i.e., conclusively proved or disproved, by an
    examination of the record. Stanford v. Commonwealth,
    Ky., 
    854 S.W.2d 742
    , 743-44 (1993), cert. denied, 
    510 U.S. 1049
    , 
    114 S.Ct. 703
    , 
    126 L.Ed.2d 669
     (1994); Lewis
    v. Commonwealth, Ky., 
    411 S.W.2d 321
    , 322 (1967).
    The trial judge may not simply disbelieve factual
    allegations in the absence of evidence in the record
    refuting them. Drake v. United States, 
    439 F.2d 1319
    ,
    1320 (6th Cir.1971).
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    3. If an evidentiary hearing is required, counsel must be
    appointed to represent the movant if he/she is indigent
    and specifically requests such appointment in writing.
    Coles v. Commonwealth, Ky., 
    386 S.W.2d 465
     (1965). If
    the movant does not request appointment of counsel, the
    trial judge has no duty to do so sua sponte. Beecham v.
    Commonwealth, Ky., 
    657 S.W.2d 234
    , 237 (1983).
    4. If an evidentiary hearing is not required, counsel need
    not be appointed, “because appointed counsel would [be]
    confined to the record.” Hemphill v. Commonwealth,
    Ky., 
    448 S.W.2d 60
    , 63 (1969). (However, the rule does
    not preclude appointment of counsel at any stage of the
    proceedings if deemed appropriate by the trial judge.)
    
    59 S.W.3d 448
    , 452-53 (Ky. 2001) (emphasis added).
    In the present case, though Thomas does not so argue, the circuit court
    wholly failed to indicate in the order denying relief that the factual allegations
    Thomas made in his pro se motion were refutable by the record. Rather, the circuit
    court displayed that it applied a wholly incorrect analysis by stating “[t]he
    Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on October 29, 2015. These
    issues have been appealed and the jury verdict affirmed. This [c]ourt finds the
    movant’s claims are totally without merit and therefore DENIES the Motion.”
    The allegations raised in a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42 involve
    issues not commonly dealt with on direct appeal of a conviction, i.e., concerns
    about the adequacy of the representation provided by counsel, rather than errors at
    trial. Trial errors often involve jurisdiction, procedure, the quantum of evidence,
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    and jury issues. The failure of counsel to object at trial to an anomaly in one of
    these areas could be the standard for a post-conviction allegation of ineffective
    assistance of counsel, but the anomaly itself is properly before the court on direct
    appeal. The standard by which assistance of counsel is adjudged is whether the
    attorney’s particular conduct was deficient as measured by the objective standard
    of reasonableness under “prevailing professional norms,” and, if it is found to be
    so, whether counsel’s error resulted in a reasonable probability that the outcome
    would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 688, 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 2065, 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
     (1984); Gall v. Commonwealth, 
    702 S.W.2d 37
    (Ky. 1985), as modified on denial of reh’g (Feb. 6, 1986).
    When the circuit court stated that relief was denied because the
    Kentucky Supreme Court had affirmed the conviction, such was simply not an
    appropriate analysis of the allegations contained in the RCr 11.42 motion. The
    errors alleged in the motion involved matters not presented on direct appeal, nor
    were they issues that would have properly been presented on direct appeal.
    We note that Thomas did not frame the issue as we have analyzed it,
    rather focusing on the lack of adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law
    contained in the order. In any event, it is the “findings” articulated in the order
    with which we disagree, both their content and their breadth.
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    CONCLUSION
    We reverse the order of the circuit court and remand for a proper
    analysis of the claims raised in the RCr 11.42 motion. We caution the circuit court
    that if the claims cannot be refuted by the record, an evidentiary hearing must be
    held. Fraser, supra, at 452.
    ALL CONCUR.
    BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
    Andrea Reed                               Daniel Cameron
    Frankfort, Kentucky                       Attorney General of Kentucky
    Ken W. Riggs
    Assistant Attorney General
    Frankfort, Kentucky
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