Jeffrey A. Streeval v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Company ( 2022 )


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  •                    RENDERED: MARCH 4, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    Commonwealth of Kentucky
    Court of Appeals
    NO. 2021-CA-0533-MR
    JEFFREY A. STREEVAL                                                  APPELLANT
    APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
    v.               HONORABLE BRIAN C. EDWARDS, JUDGE
    ACTION NO. 16-CI-002639
    ALLSTATE PROPERTY &
    CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY                                              APPELLEE
    OPINION
    AFFIRMING
    ** ** ** ** **
    BEFORE: ACREE, McNEILL, AND L. THOMPSON, JUDGES.
    THOMPSON, L., JUDGE: Jeffrey A. Streeval appeals from an order granting
    summary judgment in favor of Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Company.
    Appellant argues that he is entitled to insurance benefits, contrary to the conclusion
    of the trial court. We find no error and affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On May 17, 2015, Appellant was involved in a motor vehicle
    collision. Appellant was not at fault. Appellant suffered some injuries and was
    treated by a chiropractor. Appellant was diagnosed with lumbar and thoracic
    sprains and strains. Appellant sought basic reparations benefits from his auto
    insurer, Allstate. All of Appellant’s medical bills were submitted to Allstate for
    payment. Appellant did not personally pay any of the bills.
    Allstate did not pay any of the bills submitted to it, believing some of
    the treatment was unnecessary. On June 7, 2016, Allstate filed a petition in the
    Jefferson Circuit Court requesting that Appellant submit to an examination under
    oath. Allstate claimed that Appellant did not report any injuries at the scene of the
    accident and did not discuss any injuries with Allstate when it interviewed him
    shortly after the accident. The petition was granted and Appellant testified under
    oath in September of 2016. The day after the examination under oath, Appellant
    filed a counterclaim against Allstate. Appellant alleged that Allstate improperly
    refused to pay the medical bills and that he was entitled to the bills being paid,
    interest on the amounts owed, and attorney fees.
    The case then underwent intense and lengthy litigation. On
    September 19, 2019, Allstate filed a notice with the court that the chiropractor had
    waived all amounts owed. In other words, the chiropractor had written off
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    Appellant’s medical bills and Appellant owed nothing more. On January 22, 2020,
    Allstate then moved for summary judgment. Allstate argued that since Appellant
    no longer owed any amount in medical bills, Appellant was not entitled to basic
    reparations benefits, interest, or attorney fees. The trial court agreed and granted
    summary judgment in favor of Allstate. This appeal followed.
    ANALYSIS
    On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting
    summary judgment because there are still genuine issues of material fact.
    Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in concluding that he was not
    entitled to benefits, interest, and attorney fees because his medical provider waived
    the amounts owed.
    The standard of review on appeal of a summary
    judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that
    there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and
    that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law. . . . “The record must be viewed in a light
    most favorable to the party opposing the motion for
    summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in
    his favor.” Summary “judgment is only proper where the
    movant shows that the adverse party could not prevail
    under any circumstances.” Consequently, summary
    judgment must be granted “[o]nly when it appears
    impossible for the nonmoving party to produce evidence
    at trial warranting a judgment in his favor[.]”
    Scifres v. Kraft, 
    916 S.W.2d 779
    , 781 (Ky. App. 1996) (citations omitted).
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    We believe that the trial court did not err in granting summary
    judgment in favor of Allstate. Appellant argues that he is entitled to basic
    reparations benefits, interest, and attorney fees even though his medical provider
    waived all bills and Appellant expended none of his own money on medical care.
    We disagree with Appellant’s argument.
    “Basic reparation benefits” mean benefits providing
    reimbursement for net loss suffered through injury
    arising out of the operation, maintenance, or use of a
    motor vehicle, subject, where applicable, to the limits,
    deductibles, exclusions, disqualifications, and other
    conditions provided in this subtitle. The maximum
    amount of basic reparation benefits payable for all
    economic loss resulting from injury to any one (1) person
    as the result of one (1) accident shall be ten thousand
    dollars ($10,000), regardless of the number of persons
    entitled to such benefits or the number of providers of
    security obligated to pay such benefits. Basic reparation
    benefits consist of one (1) or more of the elements
    defined as “loss.”
    Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 304.39-020(2).
    (5) “Loss” means accrued economic loss consisting only
    of medical expense, work loss, replacement services loss,
    and, if injury causes death, survivor’s economic loss and
    survivor’s replacement services loss. Noneconomic
    detriment is not loss. However, economic loss is loss
    although caused by pain and suffering or physical
    impairment.
    (a) “Medical expense” means reasonable charges
    incurred for reasonably needed products, services,
    and accommodations, including those for medical
    care, physical rehabilitation, rehabilitative
    occupational training, licensed ambulance services,
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    and other remedial treatment and care. . . .
    Medical expense shall include all healing arts
    professions licensed by the Commonwealth of
    Kentucky. There shall be a presumption that any
    medical bill submitted is reasonable.
    KRS 304.39-020(5).
    We believe the case of Medlin v. Progressive Direct Insurance
    Company, 
    419 S.W.3d 60
     (Ky. App. 2013), is directly on point. In that case,
    another panel of this Court held that basic reparations benefits “are reimbursement
    for losses suffered due to an automobile accident. Losses are defined by statute as
    ‘accrued economic loss.’” 
    Id. at 63
     (emphasis in original). The Court in Medlin,
    in interpreting KRS 304.39-020, held that an insurer is to either pay a medical
    provider directly or to reimburse an insured for medical expenses he or she has
    expended. 
    Id.
    In the case at hand, Appellant’s medical provider has waived all past
    amounts owed. Additionally, Appellant has not accrued any economic loss
    because he did not personally pay any medical bills. Without an economic loss,
    Appellant is not entitled to basic reparations benefits. Medlin is determinative of
    this issue.
    As for the issue of interest, KRS 304.39-210(2) states that “[o]verdue
    payments bear interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, except that if
    delay was without reasonable foundation the rate of interest shall be eighteen
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    percent (18%) per annum.” Appellant argues that the delay in getting his benefits
    was unreasonable; therefore, he is entitled to 18% interest. The trial court held that
    because he was not entitled to benefits, he was also not entitled to interest. We
    agree. If there is no amount owed to Appellant, there can be no interest. This is
    true even if the delay in making payments was unreasonable.
    Finally, as to attorney fees, KRS 304.39-220(1) states:
    If overdue benefits are recovered in an action against the
    reparation obligor or paid by the reparation obligor after
    receipt of notice of the attorney’s representation, a
    reasonable attorney’s fee for advising and representing a
    claimant on a claim or in an action for basic or added
    reparation benefits may be awarded by the court if the
    denial or delay was without reasonable foundation.
    As with the interest issue, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled to attorney
    fees. KRS 304.39-220(1) states that attorney fees are available if benefits are
    recovered from an insurance company. Here, no benefits were recovered from
    Allstate because Appellant’s medical provider waived all amounts owed. Even if
    the delay in paying Appellant’s medical bills was unreasonable, Appellant is still
    not entitled to attorney fees because neither he nor his medical provider recovered
    benefits from this action.
    CONCLUSION
    Based on the above discussed statutes, Appellant was not entitled to
    benefits because he suffered no economic loss. In addition, he is not entitled to
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    interest and attorney fees because he recovered no benefits. There are no set of
    facts which would allow Appellant to recover benefits in this case and Allstate was
    entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. We affirm the judgment of the
    trial court.
    ALL CONCUR.
    BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
    Michael A. Landisman                     Eric S. Rice
    Louisville, Kentucky                     Daniel S. Gumm
    R. Christian Garrison
    Louisville, Kentucky
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Document Info

Docket Number: 2021 CA 000533

Filed Date: 3/3/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/11/2022