Barbara Nooner v. Kentucky Retirement Systems ( 2022 )

RENDERED: MARCH 4, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2019-CA-1382-MR
BARBARA NOONER APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 16-CI-00210
KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS;
AND BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
KENTUCKY RETIREMENT
SYSTEMS APPELLEES
AND
NO. 2019-CA-1488-MR
KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 16-CI-00210
BARBARA NOONER CROSS-APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: JONES, LAMBERT, AND K. THOMPSON, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, K., JUDGE: In appeal No. 2019-CA-1382-MR, Barbara Nooner
contests an order of the Franklin Circuit Court affirming the denial by Kentucky
Retirement Systems (Systems) of her claim for disability retirement benefits. In
cross-appeal No. 2019-CA-1488-MR, Systems asserts that Nooner’s appeal is
untimely and must be dismissed due to what it views as her untimely service of a
post-judgment Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.05 motion. Upon
review, we affirm regarding each of these matters.
CROSS APPEAL NO. 2019-CA-1488-MR
We review Systems’s cross-appeal first because it involves the
question of whether we have the jurisdiction to resolve Nooner’s appeal. The
circuit court entered its order affirming the administrative denial of Nooner’s
application for disability retirement benefits, and thus dismissed Nooner’s action
before it, on March 26, 2019. Afterward, Nooner moved the circuit court to alter,
amend, or vacate its decision pursuant to CR 59.05. The controversy in this appeal
involves the operative effect of Nooner’s motion.
Generally, only final judgments are appealable. See CR 54.01.
However, a timely CR 59.05 motion converts a final judgment into an
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interlocutory judgment until the motion is adjudicated. Johnson v. Smith, 885
S.W.2d 944, 947 (Ky. 1994).
As was proper, Nooner waited until after the circuit court resolved her
CR 59.05 motion to file her notice of appeal in this matter. The circuit court
denied Nooner’s CR 59.05 motion on August 14, 2019, and Nooner subsequently
timely filed her notice of appeal on September 12, 2019, within the thirty-day
deadline in accordance with CR 73.02(1)(a).
However, Systems contested the timeliness of Nooner’s CR 59.05
motion. In its April 15, 2019 motion to that effect, Systems noted that CR 59.05
motions “shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the final judgment”
and, it argued, substantial evidence indicated Nooner’s motion had exceeded that
deadline. Systems pointed out that the ten-day deadline would have expired on
Friday, April 5, 2019, but Nooner’s CR 59.05 motion indicated it had been
electronically filed on Monday, April 8, 2019. Additionally, Systems included as
an exhibit to its motion a copy of the envelope in which Nooner’s CR 59.05
motion had arrived at its address, which indicated it was postmarked on Sunday,
April 7, 2019.
Systems argued that consequently, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction
to resolve Nooner’s CR 59.05 motion and, because Nooner’s motion was
ineffective, it could not convert a final order into an interlocutory one. Therefore,
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Systems argued Nooner had thirty days from the date the circuit court entered its
March 26, 2019 order to file a notice of appeal if she wished to do so.
Responding, Nooner observed that at least part of Systems’s argument
about the timeliness of her CR 59.05 motion misread the rule: CR 59.05 requires a
motion to alter, amend, or vacate to be served within ten days of the final
judgment, not filed. Thus, Systems’s contention about the April 8, 2019 filing date
of her motion was irrelevant. Regarding Systems’s argument about service,
Nooner also pointed out that some evidence indicated her service was timely. In
particular, she noted the certificate of service on her CR 59.05 motion, as signed by
her attorney, recited that a true and correct copy had been mailed to Systems on
April 5, 2019, that CR 5.02 provides that service may be made by mail and is
“complete upon mailing,” and that CR 5.03 further provides that proof of service
“may be by certificate of a member of the bar of the court.”
The circuit court ultimately resolved this dispute in Nooner’s favor
through an order entered April 29, 2019. Its order focused on the question of
whether the motion was timely filed, concluding it was timely filed because the
clerk indicated it was e-filed on April 5, 2019, returned/rejected on April 8, 2019,
but this attempted filing of the identical document to the e-filing on April 8, 2019,
was sufficient to make the filing timely. The circuit court opined Nooner made a
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clerical error in the e-filing but that it did not prejudice Systems to the extent to
warrant dismissal.
In its cross-appeal, Systems reasserts its argument that Nooner’s
motion was ineffectively served, and that it accordingly could not have converted
the circuit court’s March 26, 2019 final order into an interlocutory one, thereby
making Nooner’s September 12, 2019 notice of appeal untimely. However, we
disagree that Nooner’s appeal must be dismissed as untimely because Systems
failed to raise the pertinent issue before the circuit court which underlies its claim
of error now, that the circuit court neglected to make any factual findings as to
whether Nooner properly served her CR 59.05 motion within the time allowed by
the rule.
As indicated, CR 5.03 provides that proof of service “may be by
certificate of a member of the bar of the court.” See Huddleson v. Murley, 757
S.W.2d 216 (Ky.App. 1988) (applying this rule). Such proof, however, is not
conclusive. Where, as here, it is attacked with evidence tending to show that
service was not timely, the trial court may disregard the certification. Although
generally findings of fact are not required for the disposition of CR 59.05 motions
(see CR 52.01), where findings are clearly implied, they may be disturbed on
appeal only if clearly erroneous. CR 52.01. Cf. Clark Equipment Company, Inc. v.
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Bowman, 762 S.W.2d 417 (Ky.App. 1988) (adopting clearly erroneous standard of
review for findings underlying CR 11 ruling).
Here, due to the conflicting proof as to whether the motion was served
timely, the necessity of a finding regarding the timeliness of Nooner’s service of
her CR 59.05 motion was clearly implied by the parties’ dispute. As explained in
CR 52.04:
A final judgment shall not be reversed or remanded
because of the failure of the trial court to make a finding
of fact on an issue essential to the judgment unless such
failure is brought to the attention of the trial court by a
written request for a finding on that issue or by a motion
pursuant to Rule 52.02.
(Emphasis added.) See Eiland v. Ferrell, 937 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Ky. 1997)
(interpreting CR 52.04). “The appellate court reviews for errors, and a nonruling
cannot be erroneous when the issue has not been presented to the trial court for
decision.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 542 S.W.3d 276, 285 (Ky. 2018) (citation
omitted).
As indicated, the circuit court failed to make any such finding about
the timeliness of service. After the circuit court found in Nooner’s favor, Systems
therefore became obligated to bring this failure “to the attention of the trial court”
and its failure to do so has deprived this Court of authority to assess the timeliness
of Nooner’s service of her CR 59.05 motion. Consequently, we have nothing to
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review, cannot reverse the circuit court’s decision on this point, and must
accordingly affirm.
APPEAL NO. 2019-CA-1382-MR
Nooner is a member of the Systems and was employed as an
Administrative Specialist II with the Cabinet for Health and Family Services
(Cabinet). Her employment date (and membership date with the Systems) was
September 1, 2000 and her last day of paid employment was July 31, 2012.
Accordingly, Nooner has less than sixteen years of total service credit. The
primary job duties of an Administrative Specialist II consisted of receiving claims
and assigning them to adjudicators, opening boxes of claims and stacking them on
shelves, and assisting in the mailroom. As accommodated, however, Nooner’s job
duties consisted solely of computer work, and the Cabinet allowed her to work part
time, three days per week, beginning March 1, 2011. Thus, her position with the
Cabinet was considered “sedentary” within the meaning of Kentucky Revised
Statute (KRS) 61.600(5)(c)1.
On October 26, 2012, at 54 years of age, Nooner applied for
nonhazardous disability retirement benefits pursuant to KRS 61.600, alleging
permanent incapacity from “end stage COPD/emphysema.”1 On her application,
1
At the administrative level, Nooner initially contended she was also permanently incapacitated
due to: (1) major depressive disorder; (2) anxiety disorder; and (3) fibromyalgia. Nooner
subsequently abandoned these contentions, and we need not address them.
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Nooner alleged the onset of this condition had occurred in the fall of 2009, and she
explained why she believed it had rendered her permanently disabled: “I can’t
function because lack of oxygen has affected my brain. I get dizzy and am prone
to falling often. I can’t walk very far without going into distress.”
Upon review, the Kentucky Retirement Systems Medical Review
Board recommended denying Nooner’s application. Each of its three members
noted that because Nooner had less than sixteen years of service credit, she could
not claim permanent incapacity due to any condition that preexisted her
membership date (i.e., September 1, 2000). See KRS 61.600(3)(d). Each of the
members also concluded that the approximately 275 pages of medical records
Nooner submitted with her application failed to demonstrate that her
emphysema/COPD did not stem from a preexisting condition.
Nooner chose not to submit additional medical records to the Medical
Review Board for purposes of reconsideration. See KRS 61.665(2)(f). Instead,
she appealed the Medical Review Board’s determination by filing a request for a
formal hearing. Thereafter, a hearing was held, and the hearing officer entered a
recommended order denying Nooner’s request for disability retirement benefits
after determining Nooner had failed to demonstrate her condition of
COPD/emphysema: (1) was not preexisting; and (2) qualified as permanently
incapacitating within the meaning of KRS 61.600(5)(a)1. Subsequently, the
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Disability Appeals Committee of the Board of Trustees of the Kentucky Employee
Retirement Systems (the Board) adopted the hearing officer’s recommended order
with minor modification. Nooner then filed an original action in Franklin Circuit
Court contesting the Board’s decision. After Nooner and the Systems submitted
briefs in support of their respective positions, the circuit court affirmed the Board’s
determination and consequently dismissed Nooner’s action. This appeal followed.
Upon review of an administrative agency’s adjudicatory decision, an
appellate court’s authority is limited. The judicial standard of review is generally
whether the agency’s findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence and
whether the agency correctly applied the law to the facts. See Thompson v. Ky.
Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 85 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Ky.App. 2002). Additionally,
we note that when the Board enters an order denying retirement benefits, it must
nevertheless “base” its order on substantial evidence. See KRS 61.665(3)(d); KRS
13B.150(2)(c). In administrative proceedings, the claimant bears the burden of
proving entitlement to a benefit by a preponderance of the evidence, and likewise
carries the risk of non-persuasion. KRS 13B.090(7). See Kentucky Ret. Sys. v.
West, 413 S.W.3d 578, 581 (Ky. 2013) (explaining “[t]he Systems may or may not
present evidence to rebut the claimant’s proof. Regardless, the burden [of proof]
does not shift to the Systems.”).
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The Board’s denial of benefits will be “based on substantial evidence”
within the meaning of KRS 61.665(3)(d) if it rests upon an assessment – supported
by the record – of a claimant’s credibility, or the quality of the claimant’s
evidence, or the quality of countervailing evidence. See, e.g., Ky. Retirement Sys.
v. Ashcraft, 559 S.W.3d 812, 822 (Ky. 2018) (applying this approach).
Conversely, if a claimant presents a prima facie case for benefits, and the Board
denies the claim but provides no basis supported by the record for doing so, the
Board’s decision will be reversed. Id. at 819 (explaining “[i]f there had been an
absence of substantial evidence supporting the Board’s opinion [denying a claim
for benefits], that alone would have required reversal under the statutory
standard.”).
Lastly, where the record can fairly be read as containing substantial
evidence in favor of both sides,
Kentucky law is clear that the fact-finding agency is
charged with making the “call” in those difficult cases
and outlining the grounds for the result reached. Simply
put, the agency is the decider on issues of fact. Thus,
under the McManus [v. Ky. Retirement Sys., 124 S.W.3d
454, 458 (Ky.App. 2003),] standard, a court cannot
substitute its judgment on those contested issues of fact
but if the appealing party has not met his burden of proof
with the fact-finder, the court can properly, indeed must,
consider whether that party’s proof was so compelling
that no reasonable person could have failed to be
persuaded. If this high standard is met, so is KRS
13B.150(2)(d) which allows for reversal when a final
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order is “[a]rbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an
abuse of discretion.”
Ashcraft, 559 S.W.3d at 819-20.
With that said, we now turn to the overarching question presented in
this appeal: whether the Board properly denied Nooner’s application for benefits.
Again, the reasons for the Board’s decision were two-fold: it determined Nooner
insufficiently demonstrated her emphysema/COPD was: (1) not preexisting; or (2)
permanently incapacitating. Either finding alone was sufficient to deny Nooner’s
application for benefits.
We first discuss whether Nooner established that her
emphysema/COPD was permanently incapacitating. As part of her claim, Nooner
was required to demonstrate that emphysema/COPD incapacitated her from
performing the job, or jobs of like duties, from which she received her last paid
employment. KRS 61.600(3)(a). Likewise, Nooner’s incapacitation was required
to be “permanent,” meaning “it is expected to result in death or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12) months from the person’s
last day of paid employment in a regular full-time position.” KRS 61.600(5)(a)1.
A determination of permanency must be based on the medical evidence and the
claimant’s “capacity for work activity on a regular and continuing basis.” KRS
61.600(5)(a)2. and (5)(b). With that in mind, whether Nooner has effectively
addressed these points on appeal is questionable. In her brief, the extent to which
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she presents an argument or describes any of her evidence in this vein is as
follows:
Nooner’s Proof at Her Formal Hearing as to Being
Disabled.
In order to prove that she was disabled, Ms. Nooner
introduced the uncontradicted objective medical evidence
of Dr. James Meuller [sic], which showed that Ms.
Nooner was disabled by COPD as of her last day of paid
employment. (See Claimant’s 08/20/15 Submission of
Medical Records).
Nooner’s Proof at Her Formal Hearing as to Her
Disability Being Permanent.
Dr. Meuller’s [sic] uncontradicted objective medical
evidence also showed that Ms. Nooner would continue to
be totally permanently disabled by COPD. (See again
Claimant’s 08/20/15 Submission of Medical Records).
To be clear, Nooner submitted roughly fifty pages of medical
documents generated by her treating pulmonologist, Dr. Joseph Mueller, with her
“08/20/15 Submission of Medical Records.” This Court does not function as an
advocate for any party; we will not dissect the evidence on behalf of a party who
has chosen not to do so, nor go on a fishing expedition to find support for
underdeveloped arguments. See Milby v. Mears, 580 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Ky.App.
1979) (noting that “a reviewing court will . . . confine itself to errors pointed out in
the briefs and will not search the record for errors.”).
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Perhaps belatedly recognizing this point, Nooner then includes six
pages of new arguments in part “A” of the appendix in her reply brief regarding
what she asserts is the permanently incapacitating nature of her
emphysema/COPD. But this, in turn, is an attempt to make two more wrongs into
a right: reply briefs and appendices are not vehicles for raising new arguments.
As explained in Milby, “[t]he reply brief is not a device for raising new issues
which are essential to the success of the appeal.” Id. at 728. See CR
76.12(4)(c)(vii) (clarifying with respect to appendices that “materials and
documents not included in the record shall not be introduced or used as exhibits in
support of briefs.”).
However, in the interest of completely addressing Nooner’s
arguments, we consider the arguments she raises in her reply relative to the
medical evidence.2 Nooner points to medical evidence that Dr. Mueller reported
after examining her on May 23, 2012:
PFT shows very severe obstruction. No prior pulmonary
function tests. No significant response to bronchodilator,
though there is a 20% response. This does not meet
technical requirements for significant improvement.
2
In the six pages of new arguments she has included with her appendix, Nooner also points to
vocational evidence and employment records she adduced in relation to a social security award
she received due to emphysema/COPD. We will not address that evidence because: (1) she
made no reference to it at all in her primary brief; and (2) it is not “objective medical evidence”
within the meaning of KRS 61.510(33). See 105 Kentucky Administrative Regulation (KAR)
1:210 § 8(1) (“The hearing officer shall consider only objective medical records contained within
the determination and shall not consider vocational factors or be bound by factual or legal
findings of other state or federal agencies.”).
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Chest Xray done today showed severe emphysematous
changes A: 1. very severe chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease, possible asthmatic component. 2. ongoing
tobacco abuse. 3. exercise induced hypoxia. 4.
abnormal pulmonary function tests. 5. allergic rhinitis.
6. unexplained weight loss, possible pulmonary cachexia.
(20). A follow up chest CT showed “Chronic pulmonary
changes.”
Nooner also relies on her general physician, Dr. Strunk, noting that her emphysema
and dyspnea had gradually worsened and the breath sounds in both lungs had
decreased, that Dr. Mueller found Nooner had an abnormal overinflated chest,
abnormal auscultation of lungs with “decereased [sic] breath sounds diffusely . . .
Diminished breath sounds over both apices,” and swelling and pitting of both her
ankles and lower legs. Nooner also notes that her pulmonary function test showed
“severe obstruction, with no significant responses to bronchoilator [sic]” and that
Dr. Mueller referred her for a lung transplant.
Nooner emphasized that in January 15, 2015, Dr. Mueller diagnosed
her as follows: “Chronic respiratory failure, Emphysema/COPD -A. Stage IV
COPD with chronic respiratory failure. B. Hypoxemia, on home oxygen 3L with
activity and 2 L at night.” She also noted that Dr. Mueller in his responses to the
Social Security Questionnaire “made it absolutely clear that Nooner has been and
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will continued [sic] to be totally permanently disabled by COPD from at least
[May3] 2012.”
With that in mind, we now turn to whether the Board’s denial of
Nooner’s claim was based on substantial evidence. Rejecting Nooner’s claim that
her emphysema/COPD was permanently incapacitating as of July 31, 2012 (her
last day of paid employment), the hearing officer’s order, as adopted by the Board,
primarily focused upon three points. First, the Board considered whether Nooner
had taken reasonable steps to recover from her condition or alleviate her problems
at her work.4 Here, because Nooner had admittedly refused to follow her treating
physician’s instructions to address the symptoms of her emphysema/COPD, the
Board found her claim of permanent incapacity dubious.
As noted earlier, Nooner alleged in her application for benefits that
her condition made it difficult to breathe, and that she was consequently unable to
3
In her reply brief, Nooner represents Mueller indicated in his responses to the Social Security
Questionnaire that she was “totally permanently disabled by COPD from at least March 2012.”
We assume “March” was a typo on her part, because Mueller wrote “May” on that document.
4
Nooner argues that her failure to follow the recommendations of her treating physicians should
not detract from her claim that her emphysema/COPD was expected to be permanently
incapacitating. In support, she notes that KRS 61.600 does not specify that it should. But,
nowhere does KRS 61.600 specify that it shouldn’t. And, where the General Assembly does not
use language that addresses the specific question at issue, the standard of review for an agency’s
interpretation of unclear, ambiguous language in a statute is whether the agency used “a
permissible construction of the statute” to reach its adjudicative decision. Metzinger v. Ky. Ret.
Sys., 299 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Ky. 2009) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). Here, we find
nothing impermissible about the Board’s decision in that vein.
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work “because lack of oxygen has affected my brain, I get dizzy.” During the
administrative hearing, she added that her breathing problems would cause her to
become fatigued, explaining that she began having these difficulties in 2011.
However, Nooner testified at the administrative hearing that Dr.
Mueller had directed her to use supplemental oxygen and had provided her with a
supplemental oxygen tank since March 2011. She testified that Dr. Mueller had
directed her to use the supplemental oxygen “24/7,” and that he and virtually all
her other treating physicians since at least 1999 had also instructed her to quit her
decades-long habit of smoking approximately one package of cigarettes per day.
Despite that, Nooner conceded that as of July 31, 2012, she had never used her
prescribed supplemental oxygen at work and had not quit smoking. Indeed, an
August 15, 2012 treatment note from Dr. Mueller states: “Still smoking despite
my encouragement and recommendation to quit. Claims she wears O2 regularly,
but didn’t wear it to this appt.”
Second, the Board noted that while the medical documentation
indicated Nooner’s emphysema/COPD had gradually worsened between the date
of her diagnosis (late 2009) and her last date of paid employment, it also indicated
her condition had not been affected by any acute processes before or shortly after
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her last day of paid employment;5 it was able to be managed through oxygen,
prescription medications, and inhalers; and that it had been subject to few
exacerbations and considered “stable,” particularly after she began receiving
pulmonary rehabilitation treatment in February 2013.6
Third, the Board noted that no physician had ordered Nooner to stop
working due to emphysema or COPD or had placed her on any work restrictions or
limitations due to those conditions. We also note that when Nooner properly
raised an argument below about Dr. Mueller’s “responses to the Social Security
Questionnaire found at Nooner’s 08/20/15 Submission of Medical Records,” and
thus provided the Systems an opportunity to respond to this evidence, the Systems
pointed out:
Since Dr. Mueller began treating [Nooner] prior to her
last day of paid employment, he could have removed her
from work if he thought it was necessary to do so.[7]
(Claimant’s Position Statement, p. 17 and Ex. 1).
Moreover, the Questionnaire isn’t credible. It indicates
Claimant can only sit for 15 minutes at one time before
5
In particular, the Board emphasized that a chest x-ray dated August 8, 2012 revealed “no acute
pulmonary disease.”
6
As the Board noted in its order, after Nooner began receiving pulmonary rehabilitation
treatment in February 2013, Dr. Mueller noted Nooner’s emphysema/COPD was stable with no
exacerbations when she later presented to him on May 31, 2013, September 5, 2013, February
11, 2014, and May 20, 2014. In these latter two notes, Dr. Mueller respectively stated Nooner
“has been participating in pulmonary rehabilitation, reports that her exercise tolerance has
improved. She feels better overall” and that she “has completed pulmonary rehabilitation and
overall feels much better.”
7
Because it is undated, it is also unclear when Dr. Mueller completed his “responses to the
Social Security Questionnaire found at Nooner’s 08/20/15 Submission of Medical Records[.]”
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needing to get up, yet Claimant sat throughout her
administrative hearing that lasted one hour and 5 minutes
without taking a break or getting up.
The Board’s order denying Nooner benefits rests upon an assessment
– supported by the record – of her credibility, the quality of her evidence, and the
quality of countervailing evidence. Thus, it was based on substantial evidence of
record. KRS 61.665(3)(d). The Board simply had a different interpretation of the
medical evidence that Nooner submitted than she had. Moreover, we cannot say
that what Nooner presented to the contrary is “so compelling that no reasonable
person could have failed to be persuaded.” Ashcraft, 559 S.W.3d at 820.
Accordingly, we have no basis to reverse on this issue.
Although this is sufficient to affirm, we briefly consider whether
Nooner demonstrated that her emphysema/COPD was not preexisting. While
Nooner was not diagnosed with emphysema/COPD prior to her employment, the
medical records revealed she had an extensive history of respiratory infections and
breathing difficulties prior to and following her September 1, 2000 membership
date. Each of the three examining members of the Medical Review Board
attributed this history as indicating early symptomatology of COPD even though
Nooner’s diagnosis came much later. They also opined that the advanced state of
her disease indicated its genesis was likely prior to her membership and pointed to
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the lack of evidence that her lungs were free and clear of disease prior to her
membership date.
Upon consideration, the Board agreed with the assessment of its
Medical Review Board members that because the nature of Nooner’s symptoms of
congestion, respiratory infection, and difficulty breathing were indicative of
emphysema/COPD, and because Nooner had repeated instances of those symptoms
in 1999, Nooner had failed to demonstrate that her emphysema/COPD was not
“objectively discoverable by a reasonable person” prior to her September 2000
employment and membership date. Kentucky Retirement Systems v. Brown, 336
S.W.3d 8, 14-15 (Ky. 2011).
The circuit court agreed with the Board, noting that Nooner’s records
showed that she had congestion issues for two years prior to the July 19, 1999
appointment and that she has been treated about twice a year for bronchitis, thus
indicating that she was symptomatic of COPD and emphysema prior to her
membership date and, thus, her COPD is a direct or indirect result of a preexisting
condition. The circuit court specifically stated that the opinions of the Medical
Review Board interpreting Nooner’s medical records as showing that she was
symptomatic prior to her membership date could properly be used as substantial
evidence to support the Board’s finding.
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Nooner argues this interpretation of her medical records is incorrect
and once again notes that she was not diagnosed with emphysema/COPD until
October 2009. Nooner relies on a letter from Dr. Allen Haddix, a physician who
reviewed the same records Nooner produced with her application for benefits to
the Medical Review Board, who concluded that at the time of her membership,
Nooner “did not have a medical condition which resulted in or progressed to the
COPD which I understand disables her today.” Dr. Haddix opined that Nooner’s
prior history of acute respiratory illness was not part of her COPD.
We disagree with Nooner that Dr. Haddix’s opinion compels that we
reverse. Dr. Haddix’s opinion simply demonstrates that Nooner’s medical records
are subject to more than one interpretation, rather than that Dr. Haddix’s opinion is
the only possible one. The Board had substantial evidence to support its
conclusion that Nooner’s condition, although not diagnosed until much later, was
symptomatic and preexisted her membership in Systems. Therefore, reversal is not
warranted on this basis.
Accordingly, in appeal No. 2019-CA-1488-MR, we affirm the
Franklin Circuit Court’s ruling that Nooner’s CR 59.05 motion was timely served.
In appeal No. 2019-CA-1382-MR, we affirm the Franklin Circuit Court’s decision
affirming the denial of Nooner’s claim for disability retirement benefits because
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Nooner insufficiently demonstrated her emphysema/COPD was not preexisting or
permanently incapacitating.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSS- BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-
APPELLEE: APPELLANT KENTUCKY
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS:
Roy Gray
John Gray Carrie B. Slayton
Frankfort, Kentucky Frankfort, Kentucky
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