Samantha Krueger v. Janet Campbell ( 2023 )

RENDERED: APRIL 14, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-0924-ME
SAMANTHA KRUEGER APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE SHELLEY M. SANTRY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 22-D-502041-001
JANET CAMPBELL APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: COMBS, LAMBERT, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Samantha Krueger appeals from a domestic violence order
(DVO) entered by the Jefferson Family Court in favor of her mother, Janet
Campbell. We affirm.
On June 20, 2022, Campbell filed a petition for an emergency order of
protection (EPO) against Krueger; Campbell alleged that Krueger:
Calls or texts, arguing, threat[en]ing, coming to the house
wanting to fight, argue all hours of the night, threatening
myself and other family members. She is bipolar and has
said she at least has kept herself from shooting me in the
head. This has been an issue with her most of her life
and she needs help. She refuses to take medication. Her
father just passed 7 months ago from covid and she
seems more angry now. I just don’t want any more
trouble.
The EPO was granted to Campbell, and the matter proceeded to a hearing on July
5, 2022. At the hearing, the family court, after placing Campbell under oath, read
the petition, and Campbell affirmed that she wished to adopt the allegations as her
testimony. Campbell stated that Krueger’s behavior seems exacerbated by alcohol
and that she blamed her mother for allowing the father to pass away. Campbell
also alleged that Krueger had also contemplated suicide. According to Campbell,
Krueger’s husband owned guns but Krueger herself did not.
On cross-examination by Krueger’s counsel, Campbell admitted that
there had been no further trouble since the petition was signed. Campbell, her son,
and Krueger all live within a couple of blocks of each other.
Krueger did not wish to testify on her own behalf, but she answered
questions posed to her by the family court. Krueger did not deny making the
threatening statements to her mother. Nor did she dispute that she was off her
medication. In response to the family court’s questions about it, Krueger
acknowledged that she had taken herself off the prescriptions in 2015 but claimed
that it was so that she could return to work and no longer be considered disabled.
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She did not volunteer where she works or for how long she had been employed.
Krueger also claimed to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder “from growing
up with her” (and pointing toward her mother). Krueger also stated that she does
“really well as long as [she] doesn’t have anything to do with [her] family.” She
admitted that she became “very emotional” because she felt excluded during her
father’s funeral by not being permitted to sit with the family. But she insisted that
she would never do anything to hurt her mother. Krueger further stated that she
has sought counseling but did not wish to return to taking prescription medication.
The family court issued a one-year DVO which included a no contact
provision “in the hopes that things resolve themselves and there is no further need
for court intervention.”
Krueger appeals, arguing that the family court erred by entering the
DVO without sufficient evidence that acts of domestic violence had occurred and
may occur again.
We begin by stating our standard of review, namely:
We review the entry of a DVO for whether the trial
court’s finding of domestic violence was an abuse of
discretion. McKinney v. McKinney, 257 S.W.3d 130, 133
(Ky. App. 2008). Our review of the trial court’s factual
findings is limited to whether they were clearly
erroneous. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”)
52.01; Hall v. Smith, 599 S.W.3d 451, 454 (Ky. App.
2020). A trial court’s factual determination is not clearly
erroneous if it is supported by substantial evidence,
which is evidence of sufficient probative value to induce
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conviction in the minds of reasonable people. Moore v.
Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003).
“A trial court is authorized to issue a DVO if it
‘finds by a preponderance of the evidence that domestic
violence and abuse has occurred and may again
occur[.]’” Castle v. Castle, 567 S.W.3d 908, 915 (Ky.
App. 2019) (quoting Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”)
403.740(1)). “The preponderance of the evidence
standard is satisfied when sufficient evidence establishes
the alleged victim was more likely than not to have been
a victim of domestic violence.” Caudill v. Caudill, 318
S.W.3d 112, 114 (Ky. App. 2010) (citing Baird v. Baird,
234 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Ky. App. 2007)). In Caudill, this
Court addressed the DVO process and discussed the
construction of DVO statutes:
While domestic violence statutes should be
construed liberally in favor of protecting
victims from domestic violence and
preventing future acts of domestic
violence[,] the construction cannot be
unreasonable. Furthermore, we give much
deference to a decision by the family court,
but we cannot countenance actions that are
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.
Id. at 115 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Johnston v. Johnston, 639 S.W.3d 428, 431 (Ky. App. 2021).
Domestic violence includes not just acts of violence but words or
actions creating a fear of such violence. KRS 403.720(2)(a) (which contains “the
infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse,
strangulation, or assault between family members or members of an unmarried
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couple”). Here Krueger’s threat to shoot her mother in the head formed sufficient
basis for the family court to enter the DVO. When coupled with Krueger’s mental
health diagnosis and her refusal to take prescribed medication, along with her
conceded emotional state subsequent to the father’s death, the likelihood of another
incident existed. The record supports the findings, and Kentucky law supports the
holding. Gomez v. Gomez, 254 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Ky. App. 2008).
The order of the Jefferson Family Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.
John Olash
Louisville, Kentucky
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