Antonio D. Adams v. Kentucky Parole Board ( 2023 )

RENDERED: MAY 12, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2021-CA-1169-MR
ANTONIO D. ADAMS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 21-CI-00365
KENTUCKY PAROLE BOARD;
DANIEL AKERS, WARDEN OF THE
LEE ADJUSTMENT CENTER; DANIEL
CAMERON, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, IN
HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; KENTUCKY
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
MARY NOBLE AND COOKIE CREWS,1
JUSTICE AND PUBLIC SAFETY
CABINET; AND RANDY WHITE,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
1
Appellant’s notice of appeal states that the “appellee shall be all respondents.” Although not
named specifically in the notice of appeal, Cookie Crews filed an appellee’s brief herein. We
have included Crews in this Opinion pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Appellate (“RAP”) 2(B)(2).
BEFORE: CALDWELL, GOODWINE, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
GOODWINE, JUDGE: Antonio D. Adams (“Adams”) appeals the order
dismissing his petition for declaration of rights by the Franklin Circuit Court. We
affirm.
Adams pled guilty to robbery in the first degree2 and was sentenced to
twenty-four years’ imprisonment. Under KRS 439.3401(1)(n), he was designated
a violent offender, requiring him to serve eighty-five percent of his sentence. KRS
439.3401(3)(a). Adams, pro se, petitioned the circuit court for a declaration of
rights, arguing KRS 439.3401, the violent offender statute, is unconstitutional
because it violates his right to equal protection under the law. The court dismissed
his action under CR3 12.02(f). This appeal followed.
“We review dismissals under CR 12.02(f) de novo.” Hardin v.
Jefferson County Board of Education, 558 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. App. 2018) (citation
omitted). When considering dismissal, the pleadings must be “liberally construed
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff,” and we must assume all allegations in the
complaint are true. Littleton v. Plybon, 395 S.W.3d 505 (Ky. App. 2012) (citation
omitted).
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 515.020, a Class B felony.
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-2-
On appeal, Adams, pro se, argues KRS 439.3401 violates his right to
equal protection because (1) it differentiates between individuals convicted of
robbery in the first degree and those convicted of burglary of the first degree, and
(2) it treats sex offenders more favorably than individuals convicted of robbery in
the first degree.4
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Kentucky Constitution guarantee individuals equal
protection under the law.
[E]qual protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of
legislative classification only when the classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class. Unless a classification
requires some form of heightened review because it
jeopardizes the exercise of a fundamental right or
categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect
characteristic, the equal protection clause of the federal
constitution requires only that the classification rationally
further a legitimate state interest.
Commonwealth v. Howard, 969 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Ky. 1998) (citing Massachusetts
Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 49 L. Ed. 2d 520(1976)). Examples of suspect classes are those based on alienage, ancestry, or
race. Id. Individuals convicted of robbery in the first degree have no inherently
4
Adams requested the circuit court enjoin the Attorney General but did not state any grounds
upon with relief could be granted. On this basis, the circuit court granted the Attorney General’s
motion to dismiss. Adams has abandoned this argument on appeal.
-3-
suspect characteristics. Furthermore, inmates have no fundamental right to parole.
Stewart v. Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Ky. 2005).
Because KRS 439.3401 does not infringe on a fundamental right or
disadvantage a suspect class, a rational basis review is appropriate. “Under the
rational basis test, a classification must be upheld against an equal protection
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification.” Howard, 969 S.W.2d at 703 (citing Heller v.
Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 125 L. Ed. 2d 257 (1993)). Under rational
basis analysis, a legislature is not required to have actually articulated the rationale
for creating classifications. Zuckerman v. Bevin, 565 S.W.3d 580, 596 (Ky. 2018)
(citation omitted).
Adams’ equal protection rights are not violated by KRS 439.3401.
First, the General Assembly’s differentiation between robbery in the first degree
and burglary in the first degree is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
Any person who has been convicted of or pled guilty to robbery in the first degree
is classified as a violent offender. KRS 439.3401(1)(n). Only persons convicted
of or who have pled guilty to burglary in the first degree, which is accompanied by
either “the commission or attempted commission of an assault described in KRS
508.010, 508.020, or 508.060[,]” or the “commission or attempted commission of
-4-
kidnapping as prohibited by KRS 509.040” are classified as violent offenders.
KRS 439.3401(1)(l) and (m).
Robbery in the first degree requires the person to use or threaten “the
immediate use of physical force upon another person with the intent to
accomplish the theft[.]” KRS 515.020(1) (emphasis added). A nonparticipant is
always present and placed at risk during a robbery in the first degree. Conversely,
burglary in the first degree does not require the presence of a nonparticipant in the
crime. See KRS 511.020(1). Because robbery in the first degree always places a
nonparticipant at risk, it was rational for the General Assembly to classify the
offense under the violent offender statute. On the same basis, some burglary
offenses involving nonparticipants are also classified under the violent offender
statute. These classifications rationally further the legitimate state interest of
requiring offenders who risk the safety of others to serve greater portions of their
sentences before qualifying for parole.
Furthermore, under KRS 439.3401, sex offenders are not treated more
favorably than individuals convicted of robbery in the first degree. Individuals
who have committed sexual offenses are classified as violent offenders. See KRS
439.3401(1)(f)-(h). Adams argues that the sex offender treatment program
(“SOTP”) allows offenders to circumvent the violent offender statute and receive
parole after serving only twenty percent of their sentences. This is incorrect. Sex
-5-
offenders are classified as violent offenders and must meet the requirements of
KRS 439.3401 before becoming eligible for parole. Sex offenders must also
complete SOTP before being eligible for parole. KRS 197.045(4).
Based on the foregoing, Adams’ equal protection challenge must fail.
The order of the Franklin Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
ATTORNEY GENERAL DANIEL
Antonio D. Adams, pro se CAMERON:
Beattyville, Kentucky
Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney E. Albini
Assistant Solicitor General
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, MARY NOBLE
AND COOKIE CREWS:
Allison R. Brown
Frankfort, Kentucky
-6-