Annie Jacobs v. Krm Wagering, LLC ( 2023 )

RENDERED: MAY 12, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-0543-MR
ANNIE JACOBS; AMANDA
MARTIN; ANGELA SMITH; ANN
HARRIS; ANTHONY BLACKBURN;
BARBARA JEFFRIES; BEATRICE
CALDWELL; BENJAMIN
TOMPKINS; BERNICE MCLAURINE;
BERNITHA KENDRICK; BUD
SLONE; CAMERON ROSZKOWSKI;
CAROLYN TOMPKINS; CATHY
RAWLINGS; CAYE OWENS;
CHRISTINA LYNN; CRYSTAL
TEVIS; DEBRA BANKS; DONNA
RUSSELL; HUBERT HAMM;
JACCQUELYNE BURROUGH; JACK
STICKLER; JAMES CARR; JAMES
FENDER; JAMES W. ADKINS;
JESSICA HENDERSON; JOHN
HUTSEL; JONATHAN GOODWIN;
JOYCE CLARK; KENNETH
ATKINSON; KENNETH SMOOT;
LARRY MURPHY; LEO BEGLEY;
LISA PERSLEY; LOLITTA
WILLIAMS; MALINDA YOUNG;
MARCELLA WRIGHT; MARGARET
EDWARDS; MARK KING; MARTHA
THOMAS; MI KYINE; MICHELLE
GREY; MONICA DAVIDSON;
PAMELA HUMMEL; PHILLIP
LYKINS; PHYLLIS MORGAN;
PRICILLA WALKER; ROLAUNDA
JACKSON; SAMUEL STALLWORTH;
SHIRLEY GARNER; SHIRLEY
WALKER-JONES; STEVEN J.
MCCUBBINS; SYLVIA BOND;
TAMMIE OVERSTREET; TAYNA
CARTER; TONY DIVENS; TONY
DIVENS; TREVOR CAMPBELL;
VERONICA AVERY; VICKIE
CRETH; VICKIE SMITH; WANDA
BURGESS; WANDA ROBINSON;
WILLIAM MARSHALL; AND
YVONNE CARSON APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JULIE M. GOODMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 21-CI-00498
KRM WAGERING, LLC;
KEENELAND ASSOCIATION, INC.;
LEXINGTON TROTS BREEDERS
ASSOCIATION, LLC; AND RED
MILE, INC. APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CETRULO AND ECKERLE,
JUDGES.
THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Annie Jacobs, et al. (hereinafter referred to as
Appellants), appeal from an order of the Fayette Circuit Court which dismissed
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their complaint. Appellants request that we reverse the trial court’s order and
remand for discovery and a trial on the merits. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Before we begin discussing the case at hand, some background
information is required regarding the changes in betting on horse races that have
occurred over the last decade.
Faced with serious financial challenges and
seeking a means to develop new revenue sources,
Kentucky’s horse racing industry expressed interest in
developing the use of devices for wagering on historical
horse races. Historical horse races are horse races that
have been run sometime in the past at an approved racing
facility and are then currently presented in the form of a
video display on an electronic device, or terminal, at
which individual wagerers may place bets. One such
device, similar in appearance to a slot-machine, is a
patented product marketed under the name “Instant
Racing.” The bettor inserts money or its equivalent into
the Instant Racing terminal and then chooses a horse
identified by a number. The terminal then displays a
video recording of the race for the better to watch, or, as
the name “Instant Racing” implies, the bettor may forego
the excitement of the actual race by opting to see
immediately the results of the race and the outcome of
his wager. Bettors are not given information from which
they might identify the specific time and place of the
actual running of the race, or the identity of the horse, but
some statistical data regarding the horses is provided for
bettors who wish to place their bets with some degree of
deliberation.
Proponents of historical horse racing promoted
legislation introduced in the 2010 General Assembly that
would have explicitly authorized the licensed operation
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of such non-traditional forms of horse racing and horse
race wagering. However, the proposed legislation was
not enacted into law. Following the 2010 legislative
session, in July 2010, the [Kentucky Horse Racing]
Commission promulgated a series of regulatory changes
designed to accommodate the industry’s request for
expanded wagering by way of “terminals” displaying
video recordings of prior races.
These regulatory changes prescribe the rules by
which the wagering on historical races shall be
conducted, but the most critical element of the
regulations is the requirement that all such wagering
must be “pari-mutuel.” That is so because, pursuant
to [Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)] 230.215 and KRS
230.361, any wagering on horse racing in Kentucky must
be based upon a pari-mutuel system. In other words, the
Commission has no authority to license an operation for
wagering on horse racing that is not utilizing a form of
pari-mutuel wagering.
Appalachian Racing, LLC v. Family Tr. Foundation of Kentucky, Inc., 423 S.W.3d
726, 730-31 (Ky. 2014) (footnotes omitted). Pari-mutuel wagering is “any system
whereby wagers with respect to the outcome of a horserace are placed with, or in, a
wagering pool conducted by a person licensed or otherwise permitted to do so
under State law, and in which the participants are wagering with each other and not
against the operator.” Id. at 737 (citation omitted). In other words, an
establishment that permits and facilitates betting on horse racing does not collect
any winnings. The establishment only collects the wagers from the bettors, places
the wagers into a pool, and then distributes the winnings to the winners.
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The Kentucky Supreme Court in Appalachian Racing concluded that
the regulations created by the Commission for historical race betting were valid
and within their statutory remit. Id. at 738. The Court, however, remanded to the
trial court for additional discovery to determine if the machine wagering on
historical racing as contemplated by the appellants was actually pari-mutuel
wagering.
Upon remand, the trial court allowed the parties to conduct discovery.
After four years of discovery, a hearing was held in 2018 to determine if the
wagers made on the instant racing machines constituted pari-mutuel wagering.
The trial court ultimately held that the instant racing machines constituted a system
for pari-mutuel wagering. The case then returned to the Kentucky Supreme Court
in Family Trust Foundation of Kentucky, Inc. v. Kentucky Horse Racing
Commission, 620 S.W.3d 595 (Ky. 2020).
The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the instant racing machines
did not facilitate pari-mutuel wagering.
Without providing simultaneous access to one historical
horse race to the same group of patrons, no pari-mutuel
pool can be created among the patrons in which they are
wagering among themselves, setting the odds and the
payout. The testimony presented to the trial court
disclosed that odds are established by the “off odds” as
set at the time the horses left the starting gate. In other
words, patrons wagering on randomly-generated
historical horse races within the Exacta System [of
instant racing] are not establishing odds with other
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patrons wagering on the same race(s). Emphatically,
such patrons are not wagering among themselves as
required by pari-mutuel wagering.
Id. at 601 (emphasis in original) (footnote and citation omitted). “To be clear, pari-
mutuel wagering requires that patrons generate the pools based on wagering on the
same discrete, finite events. Only in that way are patrons ‘wagering among
themselves’ and setting the odds and the payouts[.]” Id. (footnote omitted). The
Court also held that the way the machines work, the betting pool is initially funded
by the association running the machines and not solely by the bettors as required to
be pari-mutuel wagering. Id.
The Court further held that
[t]he Commission is charged with regulating pari-mutuel
wagering. But without positive legislative action and
sanction, it has no authority to create from whole cloth
and to approve a wagering pool in which each patron is
wagering on a different event or set of events. Such a
wagering pool by no means can be considered a pari-
mutuel wagering pool in which patrons, as among
themselves, are setting the betting odds and payout.
Id. at 602-03. The Court ultimately held that any change in the definition of pari-
mutuel racing to include the type of wagering done on instant racing machines had
to be done by the legislature and not an administrative body or the judiciary. Id. at
603.
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In response to the Family Trust Foundation holding, KRS
230.210(15)1 was amended to the following:
“Pari-mutuel wagering,” “pari-mutuel system of
wagering,” or “mutuel wagering” each means any
method of wagering previously or hereafter approved by
the racing commission in which one (1) or more patrons
wager on a horse race or races, whether live, simulcast,
or previously run. Wagers shall be placed in one (1) or
more wagering pools, and wagers on different races or
sets of races may be pooled together. Patrons may
establish odds or payouts, and winning patrons share in
amounts wagered including any carryover amounts, plus
any amounts provided by an association less any
deductions required, as approved by the racing
commission and permitted by law. Pools may be paid
out incrementally over time as approved by the racing
commission[.]
On February 12, 2021, the initial complaint was filed in this case.
Appellants, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, sought to recover
gambling losses for wagers placed on the instant racing machines over the past five
years. They argued that the wagers made on the instant racing machines were
illegal because the machines were not systems for making pari-mutuel wagers as
held by Family Trust Foundation. Appellants raised three claims for damages:
first, that they were entitled to recovery based on Kentucky’s Loss Recovery Act
(LRA) found in KRS 372.020 and KRS 372.040; second, that the Kentucky
Consumer Protection Act (KCPA) found in KRS 367.220(1) entitled them to
1
This amended statute became effective on February 22, 2021.
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damages; and third, that they were entitled to damages based on the theory of
unjust enrichment.
In January of 2022, Appellees filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.02(f), failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, and a hearing was held on February 7, 2022. On April
27, 2022, the trial court entered an order dismissing Appellants’ complaint. This
appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
As this appeal stems from a motion to dismiss pursuant to CR
12.02(f), we will first set forth our standard of review.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted “admits as true the
material facts of the complaint.” So a court should not
grant such a motion “unless it appears the pleading party
would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts
which could be proved[.]” Accordingly, “the pleadings
should be liberally construed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, all allegations being taken as true.” This
exacting standard of review eliminates any need by the
trial court to make findings of fact; “rather, the question
is purely a matter of law. Stated another way, the court
must ask if the facts alleged in the complaint can be
proved, would the plaintiff be entitled to relief?” Since a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted is a pure question of law, a
reviewing court owes no deference to a trial court’s
determination; instead, an appellate court reviews the
issue de novo.
Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010) (footnotes and citations omitted).
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LOSS RECOVERY ACT (LRA) CLAIMS
As previously mentioned, Appellants raised three claims in their
complaint. We will analyze each in turn. The first is the LRA claim. The LRA,
found in Chapter 372 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, states that gambling
contracts and transactions are void. KRS 372.010. KRS 372.020 states:
If any person loses to another at one (1) time, or within
twenty-four (24) hours, five dollars ($5) or more, or
anything of that value, and pays, transfers or delivers it,
the loser or any of his creditors may recover it, or its
value, from the winner, or any transferee of the winner,
having notice of the consideration, by action brought
within five (5) years after the payment, transfer or
delivery. Recovery may be had against the winner,
although the payment, transfer or delivery was made to
the endorsee, assignee, or transferee of the winner. If the
conveyance or transfer was of real estate, or the right
thereto, in violation of KRS 372.010, the heirs of the
loser may recover it back by action brought within two
(2) years after his death, unless it has passed to a
purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration
without notice.
KRS 372.040 states:
If the loser or his creditor does not, within six (6) months
after its payment or delivery to the winner, sue for the
money or thing lost, and prosecute the suit to recovery
with due diligence, any other person may sue the winner,
and recover treble the value of the money or thing lost, if
suit is brought within five (5) years from the delivery or
payment.
These two statutes are the methods of recovery Appellants are using
to try and recoup gambling losses from the instant racing machines during the time
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they were not pari-mutuel wagering systems. While wagers made on pari-mutuel
racing are legal in Kentucky pursuant to Chapter 230 of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes, Appellants claim that because the instant racing machines were held to
not be pari-mutuel wagering systems, all bets made on those machines were illegal
and void.
The trial court held that KRS 372.005 and KRS 230.210(15) preclude
recovery in this instance. KRS 372.0052 states that “[t]he terms and provisions of
this chapter do not apply to betting, gaming, or wagering that has been authorized,
permitted, or legalized, including, but not limited to, all activities and transactions
permitted under KRS Chapters 154A, 230, and 238.” As previously mentioned,
KRS Chapter 230 concerns pari-mutuel wagering and that chapter allows the
Commission to promulgate rules to regulate pari-mutuel wagering. The trial court
held that the Commission authorized and permitted Appellees to operate instant
racing machines for the purposes of pari-mutuel wagering. The court also held that
even though those machines were later found to be illegal, they were nonetheless
authorized by the Commission. The court held that this authorization was
sufficient for KRS 372.005 to apply.
We agree with the trial court. The legislature permitted the
Commission to regulate pari-mutuel wagering and Appalachian Racing, supra,
2
This was referred to as the safe harbor provision during the trial court proceedings.
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permitted the Commission to regulate pari-mutuel wagering on historical racing
via instant racing machines. KRS 372.005 does not require that the wagering on
pari-mutuel racing be legal. It requires that it be “authorized, permitted, or
legalized[.]” Id. (emphasis added). The Commission was permitted to authorize
the instant racing machines; therefore, KRS 372.005 applies and Appellants cannot
recover under the LRA.
Furthermore, KRS 230.210(15), the current definition of pari-mutuel
wagering, also precludes Appellants’ recovery under the LRA. The current
definition of pari-mutuel wagering includes the type of wagers made on the instant
racing machines. The definition also states that it is “any method of wagering
previously or hereafter approved by the racing commission[.]” Id. (emphasis
added). The trial court held that the word “previously” made the definition
retroactive. The court believed that the retroactive definition, in conjunction with
KRS 372.005, made all previous wagers on the instant racing machines authorized,
permitted, and legal.
Appellants argue that the new definition of pari-mutuel wagering is
not retroactive because it was not expressly deemed so. We agree with the trial
court and disagree with Appellants. KRS 446.080(3) states that “[n]o statute shall
be construed to be retroactive, unless expressly so declared.” “Though it is clear
that the General Assembly must expressly manifest its desire that a statute apply
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retroactively, magic words are not required. What is required is that the enactment
make it apparent that retroactivity was the intended result.” Baker v. Fletcher, 204
S.W.3d 589, 597 (Ky. 2006) (footnote and citation omitted). We believe that the
“previously . . . approved by the racing commission” language is sufficient to make
this statute retroactive. The statute is clearly intending to make the previous
authorizations for pari-mutuel wagering on the instant racing machines legal under
the new pari-mutuel wagering definition. While the Family Trust Foundation case
may have held that wagers made on the instant racing machines were not pari-
mutuel wagers, the new definition of pari-mutuel wagering made those wagers
authorized, permitted, and legal. The retroactive definition of pari-mutuel wagers,
read together with KRS 372.005, precludes Appellants from recovering.
KENTUCKY COMMERCE PROTECTION ACT (KCPA)
We will now address Appellants’ claim regarding the KCPA. The
KCPA can be found in Chapter 367 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes.
Specifically, Appellants relied on KRS 367.220(1). KRS 367.220(1) states:
Any person who purchases or leases goods or services
primarily for personal, family or household purposes and
thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or
property, real or personal, as a result of the use or
employment by another person of a method, act or
practice declared unlawful by KRS 367.170, may bring
an action under the Rules of Civil Procedure in the
Circuit Court in which the seller or lessor resides or has
his principal place of business or is doing business, or in
the Circuit Court in which the purchaser or lessee of
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goods or services resides, or where the transaction in
question occurred, to recover actual damages. The court
may, in its discretion, award actual damages and may
provide such equitable relief as it deems necessary or
proper. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to
limit a person’s right to seek punitive damages where
appropriate.
KRS 367.170 states: “(1) Unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices
in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful. (2) For the
purposes of this section, unfair shall be construed to mean unconscionable.”
The trial court held that there was no evidence that Appellees were
engaged in any unfair or deceptive practices. In fact, Appellees, along with others,
initiated the Appalachian Racing case in order to determine if the Commission’s
historical racing regulations were lawful. Furthermore, the court held that because
Appellees were operating under the safe harbor provision in KRS 372.005, there
can be no deceptive or unconscionable acts.
We agree with the trial court. Appellants were not deceived into
making these wagers and the provisions of the safe harbor statute make the wagers
legal. As there was no deception or unconscionable acts, there can be no recovery
under the KCPA.
Furthermore, we do not believe gambling falls under the KCPA. The
KCPA covers the purchase or leasing of goods and services. Appellants argue that
providing the opportunity for gambling is a service. The case of Collins v.
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Kentucky Lottery Corporation, 399 S.W.3d 449 (Ky. App. 2012), suggests
otherwise. In Collins, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the purchase of a
lottery ticket was not a service because it “does not create any ongoing contractual
relationship between [the Kentucky Lottery Corporation (KLC)] and the player. It
is merely a game of chance resulting in a temporary and ephemeral association
between the KLC and the purchaser of the ticket.” Id. at 453. While the trial court
in this case did not discuss this issue, we believe it also supports our conclusion
that the KCPA does not apply. Like the lottery, wagering on horse races is a game
of chance and there is no ongoing relationship between the bettor and the entity
taking the wagers.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Appellants’ final claim is unjust enrichment. “For a party to prevail
under the theory of unjust enrichment, they must prove three elements: (1) benefit
conferred upon defendant at plaintiff’s expense; (2) a resulting appreciation of
benefit by defendant; and (3) inequitable retention of benefit without payment for
its value.” Jones v. Sparks, 297 S.W.3d 73, 78 (Ky. App. 2009) (citation omitted).
The trial court held there was no unjust enrichment because there was no
inequitable retention. We agree. Appellants knew they were gambling and could
lose their money. Furthermore, the instant racing machines were authorized and
later made legal by the retroactive application of the current pari-mutuel wagering
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definition. Appellants gambled and lost; this is not unjust enrichment. See
Collins, 399 S.W.3d at 455.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Appellants’ claims are precluded by law and there is no set of facts which would
entitle them to relief.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS BRIEF FOR APPELLEES KRM
FOR APPELLANTS: WAGERING, LLC AND
KEENELAND ASSOCIATION,
Andre F. Regard INC.:
Lexington, Kentucky
Steven B. Loy
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF FOR Anthony J. Phelps
CHURCHILL DOWNS Lexington, Kentucky
INCORPORATED:
Kathryn S. Beck
Bethany A. Breetz Louisville, Kentucky
Phillip W. Collier
Chadwick A. McTighe BRIEF FOR APPELLEES KRM
Jeffrey S. Moad WAGERING, LLC; LEXINGTON
Louisville, Kentucky TROTS BREEDERS
ASSOCIATION, LLC; AND RED
MILE, INC.:
Robert E. Maclin, III
Preston W. Worley
Brittany Deskins
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENTS FOR
APPELLEES KRM WAGERING,
LLC AND RED MILE, INC.:
Steven B. Loy
Lexington, Kentucky
Robert E. Maclin, III
Lexington, Kentucky
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