Paula M. Haney, as Personal Representative of Estate of Donald Prater, Jr. v. Shane Cantrell ( 2023 )

RENDERED: MAY 19, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-0402-MR
PAULA M. HANEY, AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF ESTATE OF
DONALD PRATER, JR. APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JOHN DAVID PRESTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 21-CI-00019
CITY OF PAINTSVILLE; JEFF
TABOR; JOHNSON COUNTY
SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT;
PAINTSVILLE FIRE DEPARTMENT;
PAINTSVILLE POLICE
DEPARTMENT; RICK RATLIFF;
SHANE CANTRELL; AND
ZACHARY STAPLETON APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART,
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CALDWELL AND GOODWINE,
JUDGES.
CALDWELL, JUDGE: Paula Haney (Haney), as the representative of the Estate
of Donald Prater, Jr. (the Estate), brought suit against the Paintsville Police and
Fire Departments, the Johnson County Sheriff’s Department, and individuals
employed by those entities. The suit alleged wrongful death, battery, excessive
force, and negligence, as well as negligent hiring, retention, training, and
supervision against the City of Paintsville.
The Johnson Circuit Court dismissed the suit against the Paintsville
Fire Department and Chief Rick Ratliff, finding that the Department was entitled to
governmental immunity and the Chief to qualified official immunity. The court
dismissed the suit against the City of Paintsville, finding the city enjoyed immunity
from suit pursuant to the Local Governments Act, KRS1 65.2003.
Summary judgment was entered in favor of the Johnson County
Sheriff’s Department and Deputy Jeff Tabor, finding the Department was entitled
to sovereign immunity and Tabor to qualified official immunity. The court
likewise entered summary judgment in favor of the Paintsville Police Department
and Officers Zachary Stapleton and Shane Cantrell, based on qualified official
immunity.
1
Kentucky Revised Statute.
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The Estate appeals the rulings of the Johnson Circuit Court dismissing
the actions or granting summary judgment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand.
FACTS
On April 17, 2020, the Paintsville Fire Department received a call that
an injured man was sitting on the porch of an abandoned home on Main Street in
Thelma, Kentucky, a community in Johnson County. When emergency medical
services responded, they found Donald Prater, Jr. (Prater) sitting on the porch, clad
only in a t-shirt. He was covered in mud and blood and was clearly under the
influence of a controlled substance. He was transported to the hospital by
emergency medical services.
Deputy Jeff Tabor of the Johnson County Sheriff’s Department
responded to the hospital. There, he interviewed Prater who told him he believed
he had ingested some “bad meth” and had been hallucinating that he had been run
over by a train which had “pushed his soul out of his body.” Before leaving the
hospital, Tabor spoke with doctors who said they would perform toxicology testing
upon Prater.
Shortly after Tabor left the hospital, an emergency call was received
into dispatch from the hospital, reporting that a man had torn a telephone off the
wall of the emergency department and then had run naked out a back door of the
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hospital. Paintsville Police Department officers were dispatched to the hospital,
where they learned that the man had been seen running in the direction of a nearby
hotel. Deputy Tabor also responded back to the scene. Along with the hospital
security guard, the three officers went to the hotel, where they were told that the
naked man had been there, but he had already run out the front door. The officers
split up to search the area for the man, believed to be Prater.
A call came in from a nearby apartment complex reporting a naked
man walking down Main Street. The law enforcement officers all converged on
Main Street, with Paintsville Police Department (PPD) Officer Shane Cantrell
arriving first. He made contact with Prater, who refused to heed his commands
and started yelling and cursing at him. PPD Officer Zachary Stapleton then arrived
on the scene and Prater began yelling and cursing at him and began advancing
toward him. Officer Stapleton unholstered his taser and ordered Prater to stand
still. Instead, Prater rushed towards Stapleton, who deployed his taser. Unfazed
by the shock, Prater pulled the taser probes from his body and ran away up Main
Street.
The officers followed Prater until he rushed towards Officer Cantrell,
who deployed pepper spray at him. Prater continued to resist, undaunted. Officer
Stapleton struck Prater with his baton on Prater’s right thigh, but Prater still
continued to resist arrest. Deputy Tabor arrived on the scene and managed to get
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Prater prone on the ground, but Prater kept his arms beneath him making it
impossible to handcuff him. Tabor deployed his taser without probes in a “dry
stun” hoping to subdue Prater, but it had no effect. Instead, all three officers, along
with Fire Department Chief Ratliff who had arrived on the scene to respond as a
medical responder, worked together to handcuff Prater.
Once they were able to secure him, Ratliff noticed that Prater’s
breathing had become shallow. Ratliff grabbed a pocket mask from his vehicle
and started rescue breathing and monitoring Prater’s pulse. While waiting for an
ambulance to arrive, Prater went into full arrest, with Ratliff attempting CPR. The
EMS crew took over lifesaving efforts and Prater was transported to the hospital.
He was pronounced deceased a short time later.
The emergency room physician believed that Prater had died from
cardiac arrest brought about by excited delirium due to drug use. The medical
examiner found no evidence of lethal trauma. Haney, as the personal
representative for Prater’s estate, alleged in a complaint filed in Johnson Circuit
Court that it was the actions of the officers and Ratliff which had caused Prater’s
death. She sought damages for battery, wrongful death, and negligence, against
the officers and Ratliff, as well as suing the City of Paintsville, its fire and police
departments and the Johnson County Sheriff’s Office for negligent hiring, training,
and retention.
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The Johnson Circuit Court dismissed the suit against the City of
Paintsville and the Fire Department, finding they enjoyed governmental immunity.
The suit against Ratliff was dismissed after the court found he was entitled to
official qualified immunity. Summary judgment was entered in favor of the
Johnson County Sheriff’s Department after finding it was entitled to sovereign
immunity and in favor of Deputy Tabor, finding he was entitled to qualified
official immunity. Finally, summary judgment was entered in favor of the
Paintsville Police Department and Officers Stapleton and Cantrell after finding all
were entitled to qualified official immunity. The Estate appealed and we affirm in
part, reverse in part, and remand the matter to the Johnson Circuit Court for
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Appellate courts review the granting of motions to dismiss by trial
courts de novo. “Since a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted is a pure question of law, a reviewing court owes no
deference to a trial court’s determination; instead, an appellate court reviews the
issue de novo.” Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010).
Motions for summary judgment are similarly reviewed by appellate
courts with no deference granted to the trial court’s legal determinations.
The proper standard of review on appeal when a
trial judge has granted a motion for summary judgment is
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whether the record, when examined in its entirety, shows
there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” CR 56.03. The trial judge must view the evidence
in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
resolving all doubts in its favor. Spencer v. Estate of
Spencer, 313 S.W.3d 534, 537 (Ky. 2010) (quoting
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807
S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991)).
Hammons v. Hammons, 327 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Ky. 2010).
ANALYSIS
1. Dismissal of Suits
The trial court granted motions to dismiss in favor of the City of
Paintsville and the Paintsville Fire Department, as well as the suit against Fire
Chief Rick Ratliff personally. The trial court held that the Paintsville Fire
Department was entitled to governmental immunity, pursuant to Caneyville
Volunteer Fire Department v. Green’s Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790(Ky. 2009). Finding Ratliff’s actions on that day were discretionary, the trial court
found the Chief was entitled to the protections of qualified official immunity. The
trial court held that the City of Paintsville was immune from suit pursuant to KRS
65.2003.
The trial court cited the Caneyville Volunteer Fire case to support its
finding both that the department was entitled to governmental immunity, as well as
the Chief being entitled to qualified official immunity. In that opinion, the
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Kentucky Supreme Court cited the case of Autry v. Western Kentucky University to
explain the difference between governmental immunity of agencies of the
government and qualified official immunity for the employees of those agencies
when sued individually:
Governmental immunity extends to state agencies
that perform governmental functions (i.e., act as an arm
of the central state government) and are supported by
money from the state treasury. Yanero v. Davis, 65
S.W.3d 510 (Ky. 2001). However, unless created to
perform a governmental function, a state agency is not
entitled to governmental immunity. Kentucky Center for
the Arts Corp. v. Berns, 801 S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1990). An
analysis of what an agency actually does is required to
determine its immunity status.
If a state agency is deemed to have governmental
immunity, its officers or employees have official
immunity when they are sued in their official or
representative capacity. The immunity that an agency
enjoys is extended to the official acts of its officers and
employees. However, when such officers or employees
are sued for negligent acts in their individual capacities,
they have qualified official immunity.
Qualified official immunity applies to public
officers or employees if their actions are discretionary
(i.e., involving personal deliberation, decisions and
judgment) and are made in good faith and within the
scope of their authority or employment. This is intended
to protect governmental officers or employees from
liability for good faith judgment calls in a legally
uncertain environment. An act is not “discretionary”
merely because some judgment is used in deciding on the
means or method used. However, even if an act is
discretionary, there is no immunity if it violates
constitutional, statutory, or other clearly established
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rights, or if it is done willfully or maliciously with intent
to harm, or if it is committed with a corrupt motive or in
bad faith. The burden is on the plaintiff to show that the
public official or employee was not acting in good faith.
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522-23.
If the negligent acts of public officers or
employees are ministerial, there is no immunity. An act
is ministerial if the duty is absolute, certain, and
imperative, involving mere execution of a specific act
based on fixed and designated facts. If ministerial acts
are proper, then the public officer or employee has
official immunity without qualification. Id. at 522. Any
act done by a public officer or employee who knows or
should have known that his actions, even though official
in nature, would violate constitutional rights or who
maliciously intends to cause injury, has no immunity.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73
L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982).
219 S.W.3d 713, 717 (Ky. 2007)
In the Caneyville Volunteer Fire matter, the Kentucky Supreme Court
determined that municipal fire departments, such as the Paintsville Fire
Department, are perhaps the archetypal example of governmental function.
It is incontrovertible that fire departments perform
a paradigmatic function of the government in keeping the
populous and its property safe from fire. Indeed, one
would be hard-pressed to think of a more representative
government function. Notably, Kentucky has a
longstanding tradition of treating firefighting as a
governmental function and thereby cloaking it in
immunity.
286 S.W.3d 790, 799 (Ky. 2009).
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The trial court’s determination as to whether the Paintsville Fire
Department is entitled to governmental immunity was correct. Turning to the
determination as to Chief Ratliff personally, the trial court determined that his
actions on that day were discretionary. We agree. As Chief Ratliff is a firefighter
and emergency medical responder, he is not ordinarily engaged in participating in
the arrest of citizens. He made a judgment that his assistance was needed to place
Prater in handcuffs. The exercise of judgment is the gravamen of the exercise of
discretion.
The Estate argues that Chief Ratliff was not acting as Fire Chief at the
time of the incident and so he was not entitled to immunity as he was not engaged
in discretionary functions of being a firefighter, but rather was acting as a police
officer by helping with the detention of Prater. Such argument ignores the facts
that Prater had originally been transported to the hospital by emergency medical
services and that as the Fire Chief, Ratliff also had oversight of the emergency
medical services provided in the area. He responded to the later scene in his
capacity as a provider of emergency medical services and provided those services
in determining Prater had a weak pulse and in providing emergency medical
measures on the scene. He was clearly providing emergency services pursuant to
KRS 75.070 and is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.
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The City of Paintsville was sued by the Estate on a theory of negligent
hiring, training, and retention. The trial court cited KRS 65.2001 and 65.2003 as
providing municipalities immunity from lawsuits. We find the trial court painted
this immunity with too broad a brush.
KRS 65.2003 clearly limits the immunity granted by the statute to
those occasions when the municipality is engaged in judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative, or quasi-legislative functions.2 We cannot agree that the theory under
which the Estate was suing the City of Paintsville falls under these categories.
Rather, the theory of liability forwarded here is as non-governmental a task as
there can be. The theory of negligent hiring, oversight, and retention is a theory of
2
KRS 65.2003(3):
Any claim arising from the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
quasi-legislative authority or others, exercise of judgment or discretion vested in
the local government, which shall include by example, but not be limited to:
(a) The adoption or failure to adopt any ordinance, resolution, order,
regulation, or rule;
(b) The failure to enforce any law;
(c) The issuance, denial, suspension, revocation of, or failure or refusal to
issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order
or similar authorization;
(d) The exercise of discretion when in the face of competing demands, the
local government determines whether and how to utilize or apply existing
resources; or
(e) Failure to make an inspection.
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liability regularly forwarded against private entities.3 It is in hiring and overseeing
an employee that a municipality acts most as a private entity and least as a
governmental one.
Therefore, we affirm the orders of dismissal as to Chief Ratliff and the
Paintsville Fire Department, but reverse and remand on the question of whether the
suit against the City of Paintsville for negligent hiring, training, and supervision
can go forward, finding that the trial court erred in holding that the city was
immune from suit pursuant to KRS 65.2003.
2. Entry of Summary Judgment
The trial court granted motions for summary judgment in favor of the
Johnson County Sheriff’s Department and Deputy Tabor and the Paintsville Police
Department and Officers Cantrell and Stapleton.
We find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for
the Paintsville Police Department. The Police Department, as a subdivision of the
City of Paintsville itself, was sued under the theory of negligent hiring, training,
3
Kentucky’s recognition of torts based upon negligent hiring, negligent training,
negligent supervision, and negligent retention is well established. See, e.g.,
Turner v. Pendennis Club, 19 S.W.3d 117, 121 (Ky. App. 2000) (“Kentucky has
indeed recognized and acknowledged the existence of claims of negligent training
and supervision.”); McDonald’s Corp. v. Ogborn, 309 S.W.3d 274, 291 (Ky. App.
2009) (recognizing negligent supervision); Oakley v. Flor-Shin, Inc., 964 S.W.2d
438, 441-42 (Ky. App. 1998) (recognizing negligent hiring and retention).
MV Transp., Inc. v. Allgeier, 433 S.W.3d 324, 336 n.10 (Ky. 2014).
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and retention. As we held above, the trial court too broadly relied upon KRS
65.2003 in finding immunity protected the police department, so we reverse as to
that entity and remand.
The Sheriff’s Department, however, is a subdivision of the county
government and is therefore entitled to sovereign immunity.
Whereas a county enjoys sovereign immunity and cannot
be held vicariously liable for the torts of its employees, a
municipality is immune only for torts committed in the
performance of legislative or judicial or quasi-legislative
or quasi-judicial functions, . . . and can otherwise be held
vicariously liable for the torts of its employees.
Schwindel v. Meade Cnty., 113 S.W.3d 159, 164 (Ky. 2003) (citations omitted).
As to the employees of the entities, all three were found to be entitled
to qualified immunity. We find that the granting of qualified immunity was
premature as there was no finding of whether there was a particular “special
relationship” which existed between the parties.
The caselaw is clear. Public officials owe the general public no duty
of care unless the public official has some particular “special relationship” with the
injured party.
In order for the special relationship to exist, two
conditions are required: 1) the victim must have been in
state custody or otherwise restrained by the state at the
time the injury producing act occurred, and 2) the
violence or other offensive conduct must have been
committed by a state actor.
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City of Florence v. Chipman, 38 S.W.3d 387, 392 (Ky. 2001), as amended (Feb.
26, 2001).
There was no finding concerning whether the officers owed Prater a
duty of care due to this “special relationship.” As the trial court failed to review
the claims against Cantrell, Stapleton, and Tabor using the correct standard, we
reverse the granting of qualified immunity for each of them and remand for a
determination whether Prater was in state custody and, if so, whether any of the
officers committed “violence or offensive conduct” upon him during that custody.
Such is a very different question than what the trial court found, i.e., that the
officers were entitled to qualified governmental immunity. See Fryman v.
Harrison, 896 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Ky. 1995) (“In order to establish an affirmative
legal duty on public officials in the performance of their official duties, there must
exist a special relationship between the victim and the public officials.”). We
remand to the trial court for a determination as to whether this special relationship
existed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly granted dismissal to the City of Paintsville
Fire Department and Chief Rick Ratliff. However, we find that the trial court erred
in dismissing the claims against the City of Paintsville alleging negligent hiring,
training, and supervision as such are not judicial or legislative functions. The trial
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court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Johnson County Sheriff’s
Department as a subdivision of the county government. However, we find that the
trial court improperly entered summary judgment in favor of the individual officers
and deputy without a finding that there was no “special relationship” between each
of them and Prater, and in favor of the Paintsville Police Department on the claim
of negligent hiring, training, and supervision as those are not judicial or legislative
functions.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE JOHNSON
COUNTY SHERIFF’S
Andre F. Regard DEPARTMENT AND JEFF TABOR:
Charles W. Rowland
Lexington, Kentucky Jonathan C. Shaw
Paintsville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
PAINTSVILLE POLICE
DEPARTMENT, ZACH
STAPLETON, SHANE CANTRELL,
RICK RATLIFF, PAINTSVILLE
FIRE DEPARTMENT, AND CITY
OF PAINTSVILLE:
Melissa Thompson Richardson
Colin Buckner
Lexington, Kentucky
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